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The Importance of Using History and Narratives in Islamism

An Empirical Study of Hizb ut-Tahrir from 2001 to 2016

By Dan Ejlersen

Master's Thesis

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Supervisor:

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Summary

This thesis examines the phenomenon of narratives within Islamism, i.e. political Islam, through an empirical study of the Islamist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir's (HT) 'history use' in their construction of narratives in the period from 2001 to 2016. As HT positions themselves as an Islamic 'party', so is the terminology adopted through the thesis. The focus of the thesis is the 'history use' in the main party and their national branch in Great Britain representing a European Islamism. In Chapter 1, HT is firstly contextualised in the political situation in Europe throughout the period of interest here, to be a party capable of balancing the political challenges they face. Secondly the research question followed by a hypothesis is presented, stating that the 'history use' in HT's narrative construction has played a significant role for the party. Also, in this chapter HT's history, ideology and structure presents that HT's ideology of establishing a caliphate and uniting all Muslims in a single community, *Ummah*, has been the backbone for the party while evolving with the political situation in Europe. In Chapter 2, the stance of social constructivism, historical methodology, document analysis and coding of sources are established as the epistemological and methodological frame for the thesis. This is followed by a presentation of the theoretical frame applied in the analysis - the historical research tradition of 'history use' combined with the contested term 'narratives'. These combined is argued to constitute the optimal theoretical frame in analysing how HT uses history to construct narratives. In the following Chapter 3 the most essential research on political Islam is expounded to establish different prisms explaining the developments and mechanisms HT has been able to balance in the period of existence. These prisms are argued to constitute a broad frame of understanding entailing several elements from which HT's history use in their narrative construction can be explained. The five researchers, Suha Taji-Farouki, Dale F. Eickelman & James Piscatori, Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy and Peter Mandaville has been chosen for this purpose. Following this, a presentation and characterisation of the 143 HT publications included as sources is found. The following Chapter 4 entails the analysis which is comprised of two sections. In the first section, based on the coding methodology, 'history use' and 'narrative' frame, a characterisation of HT's use of history in their narrative-construction is given. Here four established master narratives, two upcoming master narratives and one indirect master narrative is identified in HT's history use. Likewise, the party's history use is characterised within the three levels; existential, identity and positioning. These shapes how HT uses history in different contexts as analysed in the second section. In section two, the two upcoming master narratives, 'The Iraq Wars' and 'The Wars in Afghanistan' and the indirect 'Clash of civilisation' master narrative are thoroughly analysed.

Beyond being shaped by the three levels, it is found that HT uses a constructed history to construct narratives rather than commonly researched history. Explaining this, is the centrality of HT's ideology, which is found to be both the stable and flexible element in HT's history use in narrative-construction. This means that HT's history use is found to be constructed and fitted to the present context in which HT finds themselves. This is especially clear in the different ways the main party and the national branches uses history. As the 'Clash of civilisations' was found to be the master narrative which HT uses the most and most differently, it is further discussed Chapter 5. In that chapter it is argued that the indirect master narrative 'Clash of civilisations' is a significant element in HT's continuing existence. Departing from this argument corresponding to the established hypothesis, the master narrative and HT's use of it is discussed in the first section of the chapter. In the second section it is discussed and argued that HT are successful in using this master narrative in a wide number of contexts. In relation to this, it is found that it is the 'Clash of civilisations' master narrative which makes HT capable of adapting to the contemporary context. Through the discussion, it is found that this master narrative especially has been important for recruitment and retaining of members. Based this, it is in the conclusion, Chapter 6, concluded that HT's use of history in their construction of the 'Clash of civilisations' master narrative is a significant and explanatory factor for the party's continuing existence. Furthermore, it is concluded that HT uses constructed history in their construction of narratives and that the construction of narratives is fitted to the contemporary context. This is concluded to be an explanatory factor of HT's continuing existence.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.0 Introduction

This thesis examines the phenomenon of narratives within Islamism, i.e. political Islam, through an empirical study of Hizb ut-Tahrir's (HT) 'history use' in their construction of narratives in the period from 2001 to 2016. Despite being a global Islamist organisation, I have chosen to primarily focus on the main party¹ and national branch in Great Britain representing a European Islamism (Roy, 2011: 244). The mentioning of HT as a party is based on HT's founder Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani's² understanding of the word *Hizb* (party)³. According to Suha Taji-Farouni, al-Nabhani "*employed the term with the signification of political party [...] following growing familiarity with European politics, issuing in the emergence of this usage alongside the traditional sense of a general group [where its task] is a political one*" (1996: 85). It is however not HT's politics *per se* which is in focus of this thesis. Rather it is HT's narratives constructed to support their ideology, i.e. Islam. This leads to the definition of Islamism which is here understood as "*the political dynamics generated by the activities of those people who believe that Islam as a body of faith has something crucial to say about how society should be organized, and who seek to implement this idea as a matter of priority*" (Hirschkind, 2011: 1).

As an Islamist organisation, HT could at first sight, be considered an extremist or violent Islamic organisation in line with the Muslim Brotherhood, the British-based Al-Muhajiroun or Al-Qaeda (Aslan, 2010: 4f.). This is, however, not the case, but HT are commonly referred to as radical or fundamentalist Islamists (Taji-Farouki, 1996: xi; Abbas, 2007: 5f.; Pantucci, 2015: 93). In fact, HT is a non-violent Islamist organisation as reflected in their ideology of establishing a caliphate, i.e. Islamic state, through a non-violent model referred to by HT as the "Method of the Prophethood" (Hanif, 2012: 205). The goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate is however also found within the more extremist and violent Islamic organisations mentioned but for these organisations, violence is a key element (Aslan, 2010: 4-6). As counter-extremism legislation has grown explosively in Europe following the terrorist attack on September 11th 2001 against the World Trade Centre in the United States of America (henceforth, 'the US') and the bombings

¹ What I call the 'main party' refers to the entire party managed by the international committee, allegedly positioned in Jordan.

² Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani has been spelled in many ways in the vast body of literature, but I adopt the spelling found in Taji-Farouki S. (1996) *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate*, London: Grey Seal.

³ It is also indicated in the party's name meaning "*The Liberation Party*". It is, however, relevant to point out that this party-terminology differs from the common understanding within politics in Western countries.

in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, the *modus operandi* for Islamist groups, and especially the manoeuvrability of the most extreme and violent Islamic organisations has shrunk (Ejlertsen, 2018: Unpublished assignment). Likewise, the general tendency in European countries has since the 1970s been a change in politics from multiculturalism to assimilation of rising numbers of Muslims in Europe (Roy, 2011: 244). This has since the 1990s been escalated by a rising Islamophobia in Europe (Mondon and Winter, 2017: 2171). HT has successfully balanced this rising body of legislation and change in European politics by mainstreaming and adapting to the political context while still enforcing their ideology. In HT's successful balancing they even succeeded in positioning themselves as an accepted Islamic alternative to modern politics in Britain (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 157). In line with this, in the public sphere, HT might be considered a religious more than political organisation, but several researchers have shown that groups like HT must be considered modern political organisations rather than religious organisations (Roy, 1994: 3; Sedgwick, 2006: 199; Mandaville, 2014: 107). Olivier Roy and Mark Sedgwick even argue that a dichotomy between these two phenomena exist (Sedgwick, 2006: 199; Roy, 1994: 3), but based on the findings by Kirstine Sinclair about the relation between Islam as religion and political ideology in HT, such a dichotomy does not exist and are by HT considered inseparable (Sinclair, 2010: 17). Thus, HT's ideology must be considered a holistic system of both religion and politics (Sinclair, 2010: 17).

When focusing on the ideology of HT, several researchers have argued that Islamist organisations ideological goals are ahistorical or mythical, including HT's (Roy, 2004: 23; Kepel, 2002: 73; Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996: 30f.). This is despite they themselves claiming to use historically correct facts and narratives to reach their goal, for example a narrative about the Caliphate. According to HT, their ideology is Islam and their goal is to establish the caliphate in a Muslim-majority country as it were established in the first caliphate existing from year 632 CE (Kamrava, 2013: 20f.). This is yet nothing but a dream according to Roy because the historical setting and context can never be re-established as a result of development of the societies (Roy, 2004: 288). Interestingly, this understanding is also found in the party's ideology which reflects that HT does not want to establish an exact historical replica, but one which is established by the same model and preferably in the same geographically location as the first caliphate (Pankhurst, 2013: 98). Hence, to term HT's goal and ideology as 'ahistorical' seems valid, but viewing the party *quod talis*, HT is in no way separated from history.

In this thesis I argue that HT's flexibility is explained through HT's use of history to construct narratives fitted to the different contexts within HT are present, whether locally,

nationally or globally. Through the lens of the historical research tradition ‘history use’ combined with the lens of ‘narratives’ in reading of empirical material from HT, the party appear to be very historically conscious. Based on this, I will through the thesis argue that HT have been able to unleash the full potential of using historically constructed narratives supporting their ideology as an explanatory factor for successfully balancing the above-mentioned challenges. This is argued to be a part in securing their existence.

By pursuing the party’s history use and narrative-construction at an organisational level it is important to emphasise that it at some level is individuals who maintain, construct and spread the history and narratives in HT. As discussed in Chapter 5, these have a vital role for HT. The gap between the organisational and individual level will not be extensively addressed in this thesis, but the individual members of HT must not be forgotten. According to Tsafirir Goldberg, a tendency especially amongst minorities (which is often HT’s target group), is that individuals engage more with local or community histories than national history and actively engages with past-related activities where the construction of history and narratives are meaningful to them (Goldberg, 2017: 194). Furthermore, Goldberg argues, these individuals needs histories and narratives of the past to make sense of the present, and adds that “[t]hese narratives stem from social representations of the past, transmitting collective memory in ways that are oriented to present interests and collective needs in increasingly diverse and dialogic ways” (2017: 194f.).

Henceforth, this thesis will show that HT’s history use and narratives must be considered a tool for reaching the ideologic goal for the party. It must be emphasised that this thesis will not engage in the topic of how the party’s history and narrative-construction is used internally in the party and how it is received by their members since it is beyond the scope of this study.

1.1 Research Question

As already indicated, HT is representative of an Islamist organisation functioning at several levels and within many contexts at once. As it will become clear later, it is the ideology which is the centre of HT’s history use and narrative-construction. Taking up this perspective, I will be conducting an examination of the phenomenon of narratives in Islamism through an empirical study of HT’s history use in narrative-construction. By doing so, I hopefully will be able to identify the use of history and narratives as important elements in HT’s continuing existence. Despite focusing on narratives within Islamic extremism rather than Islamism, Jeffrey R. Halverson, H.L. Goodall, Jr, and Steven R. Corman have identified twelve so-called ‘master narratives’, commonly used by Islamist groups (Halverson et al., 2011: 7-9). As four of them

have been identified in the empirical material from HT, I argue that HT uses some of the most common narratives but has also constructed more narratives through the period from 2001 to 2016. Based on this, I have found it relevant to establish a research question combined with a hypothesis from which this thesis is guided and structured:

1) How has Hizb ut-Tahrir used history to construct narratives in the period from 2001 to 2016?

2) Based on the readings of empirical material from HT I expect to find that history is used with the same purpose and intentions throughout the period, that the use of history is contextualised to specific settings and that the narratives used by HT are based on constructed history. Furthermore, I expect to find that history use and narratives are used for recruitment, communication, and support for their ideology. In line with this, I expect that the narratives are used in different fora such as local communities, in the (inter)national media, webpages and extensively on social media. Based on these expectations, I assume that history use and narrative-construction play a significant role for HT in different contexts.

By combining these two I am convinced that the analysis of the empirical material will reveal how, why and with which significance history has been used in narrative-construction by HT in the period.

1.3 Introduction to Hizb ut-Tahrir

“Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam, so politics is its work and Islam is its ideology”^{4&5}. So writes HT on their international webpage at least, but to be able to examine HT’s history use, it is relevant to shortly explore who and what HT is. This is done with a brief introduction to the *History, Ideology and Structure of the party*.

1.3.1 History

Born out of a time of Islamic religious decline after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 and the establishment of the Jewish state Israel in 1948, the Islamic scholar and judge Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani⁶ founded Hizb ut-Tahrir in 1952 in Jerusalem (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 6f.). The

⁴ Hizb ut-Tahrir – *Definition*, <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/def>, consulted 19.03.2019

⁵ When citing text published by HT, I have included the exact wordings without correcting spelling or grammar.

⁶ Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani has been spelled in many ways in the vast body of literature, but I adopt the spelling found in Taji-Farouki S. (1996) *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate*, London: Grey Seal.

Islamic decline must be considered in the context of the rising Arab nationalism and the entry of imperialist and colonial West (i.e. Europe and the US) to the Middle East bringing secular ideas, of for example capitalism, colonialism and socialism (Pankhurst, 2013: 129). As a reaction, al-Nabhani, came up with a revolutionary ideology of reviving the *Khilafah* (the caliphate, i.e. Islamic state)⁷ uniting all Muslims in one state. It was revolutionary due to a thorough and strong foundation of ideas and methods based on al-Nabhani's reading of not only Islamic sources, but also analyses of the secular systems, capitalism and socialism (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 38f.). Al-Nabhani not only rejected the methodologies of the secular nation states in the "Muslim world"⁸ which he considered a product of Western colonialism, but also other Islamic movements (Hanif, 2012: 205; Pankhurst, 2013: 102). According to Noman Hanif, al-Nabhani was "*drawing upon the Prophet Mohammed's example in Arabia in matters concerning the establishment of a political movement, interaction with society, gaining power and founding an Islamic state*" (Hanif, 2012: 205). Zeyno Baran argues that the goal of uniting all Muslims in the caliphate changed the Islamic world's discourses of the caliphate as an utopian goal to a reachable goal (Baran, 2005: 69). Thus, the resonance by the Muslim world of the possibility of a caliphate and Islam as ideology, according to Baran, became the beginning of a "war of ideas" between the secular West and the Islamic world (Baran, 2005: 71). In this way, al-Nabhani laid the groundwork for what Edward Said and Samuel Huntington termed the "clash of civilisations", meaning that the West and the Muslim world would clash (Huntington, 1996: 13).

The basic ideas were the rejection of the nationalism rising in the Middle East due to its blocking of the possibility to unite all Muslims in a unitary *Ummah* (association of people united by an Islamic doctrine) (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 39). This *Ummah* can be understood as what Benedict Anderson has termed an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 2006: 7) here constructed by Muslims around the world, but also functioning "*as the basis for claiming legitimacy for the will of Muslim communities and states*" (Halliday, 2002: 23). Initially HT was thought to primarily exist in the Arab countries, because the Arab language is central in Islam, making it natural to establish the core here. However, due to the rejection of nation states, HT began to expand to other states, making it a transnational party (Hanif, 2012: 206). According to Hanif,

⁷ Translations and explanations of Arabic words are taken from Taji-Farouki, S. (1996), *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the search for the Islamic Caliphate*, London: Grey Seal

⁸ The 'Muslim world' is allegedly in al-Nabhani's understanding the Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East. The term 'Muslim world' is used by many scholars, in many contexts and with many purposes. However, I define the term, based on Mandaville, as a socially constructed term relating to the approximately 1.25 billion Muslims across the world having a relationship to the religion Islam, constituting a diverse composition of distinct ethnic, national and linguistic groups each having different thoughts and practices of Islam (Mandaville P. (2007) *Global Political Islam*, London: Routledge., 16).

the expansion of the party already kicked off when it was established in 1952, “*moving through the Middle East and the Arab world in the 1960s and 1970s and then extending to Central and South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s*” (Hanif, 2012: 206). Furthermore, HT since the 1990s have also established branches in the West, and now reaches over 40 countries worldwide (Hanif, 2012: 206; Sinclair, 2012: 37; Pankhurst, 2013: 108). What is most paradoxically is that HT’s brand in Great Britain (Britain/UK) today has a very central role in the working of the party in the West (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 151). We return to this matter in the “Structure of the party” section. Returning to an interesting aspect of the history of HT is that their doctrine, according to Emmanuel Karagiannis & Clark McCauley, has not changed in the last fifty years (2006: 317). Despite the fact that HT has had two leaders, who have tried to provide alternative Islamic answers to contemporary questions, since al-Nabhani’s death in 1977, the doctrine and ideology laid by al-Nabhani has remained unchanged (Karagiannis and McCauley, 2006: 317). As we shall see later this is still the case.

In 1986 the British branch of HT was established by Omar Bakri, and a large work of establishing a core base of loyal members began (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 172f.). It was, yet slowly progressing since the central committee of HT had not established a strategy for the UK branch and remained unknown to most Muslim communities (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 150). This, changed after the signing of the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organisation Accord in 1993, where HT in Britain began reaching for young second generation Muslims on UK campuses and at mosques (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 172). This almost led to a ban of HT in Britain for their anti-Semitism and homophobia, which led to a downgrading of their rhetoric and public profile. The main party asked Omar Bakri to step down due to his overly controversial line which he did in 1996 (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 150). It was first in 1998 that the central committee crafted a strategy for national executives in the West, where HT in Britain were to “*incorporate localized international incidents—specifically the Middle East peace process, the Balkans conflict and continued US presence in the Gulf—into a narrative of a “War on Islam” and the West’s “oppression” of Muslims*” (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 147). This was especially strengthened after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on 9/11, 2001 (9/11), where HT in Britain were to emphasise that the military and security actions of Western governments towards Muslim countries were an expression of attempting to weaken the global *Ummah* by severing the relations between Western Muslims and the Muslims in the Muslim world (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 150).

Likewise, from 2005 the British branch began mainstreaming their rhetoric for the non-Muslim population and changing their name to Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain (HTB) (Sinclair, 2012: 46). This was a part of “*adopting measures to disguise the party’s intolerant ideology, and by engaging with politicians, local government councils and the media*” (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 155). An effort that intensified when HTB the same year was to adopt a communique entailing a two-tracked strategy targeting both Muslims and non-Muslims under the theme “keep your ideology in your heart” (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 147 & 155). This was in line with the main party’s strategy of “*use[ing] the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath to expose the alleged weaknesses of Western capitalist societies; they also sought to present Islamism as a viable alternative to liberal capitalist democracy*” (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 150). Despite this demand to use 9/11 as historical reference, it has not been met neither from the main party or national branches as the analysis in this thesis will show. The adoption of this strategy began what Houriya Ahmed & Hannah Stuart calls the “*War on Terror/’War on Islam’ paradigm*” (2010: 151), where HTB intensified their self-perception the “*vanguard of Islam*” (Hanif, 2012: 202). This may have happened as a reaction to the 2005 7/7 terror bombing in London, where radical and extremist Islamism became a large subject in the public and political sphere (Karagiannis and McCauley, 2006: 328). From 2005 to 2006, HTB downplayed their combative elements in their narratives and instead they “*emphasizes “political” struggle and uses euphemistic language to hide its support for jihad, anti-Semitic beliefs and a totalitarian system of governance*” due to fear of proscription (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 155f.). Also, engaging with other Muslim groups and engaging different media, local authorities and policy-makers as the “Islamic” voice have been a part in their effort of avoiding being labelled representatives of extremism (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 156). Thus, HTB’s outward expression has been mainstreamed, which is potentially why they have not been banned in the UK. Instead, according to Ahmed and Stuart, the image to the population has become a legitimate Islamic political party (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 157). As this thesis argues, HTB has been successful in doing this through construction of narratives fitted to the British audience.

1.3.2 Ideology

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology is Islam, interpreted as a holistic socio-political system with the vision of establishing a transnational *Khilafah* lead by the *Khalifah* (leader) and uniting the Islamic *Ummah* (al-Nabhani, 1998; Taji-Farouki, 1996: 54; Hanif, 2012: 201; Pankhurst, 2013: 95). The ideology is based on initially eight (later expanded to thirteen) books written by al-Nabhani, concerning every aspect necessary to establish and run the caliphate. This is according to al-

Nabhani a “single state which would resume the Islamic way of life based upon the Islamic ‘*Aqeedah* [rational doctrine of faith], implement Islam within society after this was deeply rooted in the peoples’ hearts and minds, and which would carry the Message of Islam to the whole world” (al-Nabhani, 1998: 2). Reza Pankhurst argues that, the future caliphate is not a historical replica of the caliphate which has existed before, but an Islamic state build on *Sha’ria* (Islamic juridical system) for the political system in the state (Pankhurst, 2013: 98). This is also confirmed by a member of HT, calling it a “historical relic whose end has had to come in favour of democratic forms of government” (Mahmoud, HT Australia in Orofino, 2015: 404). The caliphate should, according to al-Nabhani, be inhabited by all Muslims regardless of ethnicity, language and traditions, as long as they become liberated from the Western imperialism and colonialism (al-Nabhani, 2002: 75f.). It is thought to be established in the Muslim-majority countries at first, before beginning colonising non-Muslim-majority countries (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 145). Regarding the establishment of the caliphate, al-Nabhani writes in the book *The Islamic State* that:

“The only way to establish the Islamic State is to carry the Islamic Message and to work towards the resumption of the Islamic way of life, which necessitates taking the Islamic countries altogether as one unit because the Muslims are but one *Ummah*, which represents a human group bound by one ‘*Aqeedah* from which emanates her system” (al-Nabhani, 1998: 236).

In the *The Islamic State* book, al-Nabhani also laid out how the future caliphate would be organised in the so-called *Draft Constitution of the Islamic State* with 186 Articles (al-Nabhani, 1998: 240ff.). In this draft constitution the caliphate is presented as a state based on Islam, with fair elections of leaders, state provision of wealth, goods, jobs and education to their citizens, and a sound basis for domestic and foreign policy, economics and *sharia* as judiciary system (al-Nabhani, 1998: 240-276). All is based on the thought of “bringing the Muslims back to living an Islamic way of life in *Dar al-Islam* [Land of Islam]”⁹ and protecting Muslims in the *Ummah* from influence from the colonialist West or *Dar al-Kufr* (Land of Unbelief) (al-Nabhani, 1998: 238). This is according to Elisa Orofino based on a dualistic view of the world, where it is in a clash of civilisations, i.e. a battle between the *Dar al-Islam* and the *Dar al-Kufr* (Orofino, 2015: 403). *Kufr* (unbelief) is consequently used by HT as ‘not Muslim’, but according to Rob James this carries much more weight in HT rhetoric, when talking of the Western world, having a connotation that these are actively against Muslims (James, 2011: 215). The thought of making

⁹ Hizb ut-Tahrir – *Definition*, consulted 19.03.2019

Muslims live in the *Dar al-Islam* rather than *Dar al-Kufr* is most certainly in line with the party's name, where Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami means '*The Party of Islamic Liberation*', meaning a liberation from the Western ideas, thoughts and systems (Pankhurst, 2013: 95).

Regarding the community of Islamic believers, i.e. *Ummah*, al-Nabhani has provided a description of how it is rightly established and organised in the chapter '*Molding [sic.] People into one Ummah*' (al-Nabhani, 1998). In this chapter he presents the way that the *Ummah* became united when the first caliphate was established in Medina. Here both Muslims and non-Muslims became followers of the Messenger of Allah, i.e. the Prophet Muhammed, who set up the Islamic State. Al-Nabhani writes;

“They naturally differed from each other in mentality and attitude. Therefore, the process of molding [sic.] these countries together and of uniting them into one single *Ummah*, adopting the same *Deen [Islamic belief]*, language, culture and laws was a colossal task. [...] Once those people were identified by the banner of Islam and ruled by the Islamic State. They became a single *Ummah* (al-Nabhani, 1998: 157f.).

This is what HT in the empirical material terms the 'Method of the Prophethood'. The underlying meaning in this description is that all differences between Muslims and non-Muslims can be overcome by establishing the Islamic State and becoming part of the *Ummah*. This will according to al-Nabhani be possible through four factors paraphrased here; 1) the teachings of Islam, 2) living together with the liberated people, 3) quick embracing of Islam by the people in the concurred land, and 4) a radical change in life to a better one for the people influenced by colonialism, capitalism and other ideas than Islam in general (al-Nabhani, 1998: 158).

1.3.3 Structure of the Party

Hizb ut-Tahrir is organised in a hierarchical pyramid-like structure where the authority to formulate the party's ideology and strategies are centralised at the international leadership headed by the international *Amir* (supreme leader) (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 114-117). The structure is in proximity to the *Khilafah* structure presented in Article 86 of the Draft Constitution: "*The territories governed by the State are divided into units called Wilayat (provinces). Each Wilayah is divided into subunits called 'Imalat (districts)*" (al-Nabhani, 1998: 257). It has however adapted to the global and transnational setting in which HT works, and the *Wilayah* often coincides with a present nation state where the national branches are encouraged to contextualise the strategies and communiqués from the main party in their own setting (Karagiannis and McCauley, 2006: 317). Due to this strict hierarchical structure it is assumed that the publications from the main party are read and implemented in the entire structure. Hence the empirical

material used in this thesis is assumed to have been read in the entire structure, whether it is a main party- or national branch- publication. The nation-specific strategies reflect the composition of ethnic origins and interests of the Muslim communities living as minorities in Western countries as well as the political contexts in the nation states (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 147; Sinclair, 2012: 37). Based on Taji-Farouki (1996), Sinclair has presented the current structure of the party, in a very concise way, why I paraphrase there the section from the Danish article. Also, a model of the structure is found in Appendix 1. The current structure of the party is hierarchically divided into three levels below the *Amir* (international leader). The first level is the national level with a national leadership consisting of five to ten members under a *mu'tamad* (leader), who is appointed by the international leadership and which appoints the members and a *naqib* (leader) in the neighbourhood committees which constitutes the second level. These are covering cities or city areas and consists of four members. The third level consists of a vast number of *halaqah* (study circles) of five to ten members and a *mushrif* (leader) (Sinclair, 2012: 40). As indicated by Sinclair, the fact that the international leadership determines party activities, the prioritisation of these and controls the actions of their members in the over 40 branches worldwide, underlines the high level of discipline within the party (Sinclair, 2012: 42). This is expressed in the uniform character of both internal and external party activities. The internal party activities are study circles, publishing of material, conducting events, while the external are participation in public debates, public meetings, demonstrations and distribution of leaflets (Sinclair, 2012: 43).

Despite the strict centralisation and control by the international leadership, the national leadership has the autonomy to act on behalf of the international leadership if necessary in the national context (Sinclair, 2012: 41). Several examples of this are found in the British branch, but since it is the biggest branch in Europe with approximately 1500 members¹⁰ and has the central role of translating and publishing HT material to the English-speaking Muslims, it might have greater autonomy than other branches (Sinclair, 2012: 38). The British branch has, according to Sinclair, rejected the idea of translating and publishing leaflets to the British Muslims due to the belief that they would be misunderstood in the British context, for example a leaflet encouraging to kill Jews in 2003 (Sinclair, 2012: 41). Also, the branding of HT in Britain as Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain (HTB) from 2005 show that the national branches of HT have intensified their focus on the Muslims in their countries, making them a Hizb ut-Tahrir *of* the

¹⁰ The number of members is very hard to determine, and the mentioned number was estimated by Sinclair in 2012. Much has happened since, so the numbers may have changed.

West and not just Hizb ut-Tahrir *in* the West (Sinclair, 2010: 88). According to Farhaan Wali, the HT have been the spearhead of Islamism in Britain and “[s]ince the group’s arrival in the UK, its ideological agenda has centered on recruiting young people. The demographic makeup of UK membership illustrates this youth bulge, as 85 per cent of members are below the age of 30 and 96.3 per cent were recruited before the age of 25” (Wali, 2016: 102). This is according to Volf because the European HT branches in general are more successful in recruiting young second-generation Muslims and offering them a new identity (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 171f.). This is caused by two factors. The first being the simple fact that HT is still legal in several Western countries such as Britain, Denmark, the United States, Canada, Australia, but also the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and Yemen, while HT have been banned as extremist or terrorist organisation in Turkey, Russia, Central Asia and many countries in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (Volf, 2015: 2-3). The second reason is, according to Irina Volf, that “*The European HT branch is better structured; it mobilizes resources faster and more efficiently and enjoys more political opportunities than clandestine branches of HT in Central Asia*” (Volf, 2015: 5-6). Contributing with a third factor, it is in the present thesis argued to be caused by HT’s success in using history to construct narratives which appeals to these young Muslims.

1.4 Structure of Thesis

This thesis consists of six chapters guided by the research frame established in this present Chapter 1. In this present chapter the topic, aim and context for this thesis has been presented followed by a brief introduction to Hizb ut-Tahrir’s history, ideology and organisational structure. In Chapter 2 the approach and methodological framework is presented. Departing from, a social constructivist epistemology, the framework of ‘history use’ and ‘narratives’ is combined. This is followed by a presentation of the coding system applied to the empirical material. This empirical material is presented in Chapter 3 after a presentation of five essential works on HT and political Islam which are considered prisms for analysing HT’s history use and narrative construction. In Chapter 4 the history use and narrative-construction by HT is analysed. This is done in two sections. The first entails a characterisation of HT’s history use, finding that HT uses history at three levels, as well as finding four established transhistorical narratives, two upcoming transhistorical narratives and one indirect transhistorical narrative. These findings are discussed in Chapter 5 where especially the indirect transhistorical narrative, ‘Clash of civilisations’, is argued to have a considerable influence on HT’s continuing existence. It is then concluded in Chapter 6 that HT uses history to construct narratives which fit a specific context

and especially the ‘Clash of civilisations’- narrative is the key to explain HT’s continuing existence.

Chapter 2: Approach and Methodological Framework

2.0 Introduction

Based on a qualitative hypothetic-deductive approach (Brinkmann and Tanggaard, 2015: 242), the methodological framework is in the present chapter presented in three parts. Part one entails a presentation of my epistemological stance, while part two entail the methodological and theoretical frame. In part one, social constructivism as epistemological stance is presented to, in the words of historian and social constructivist Hayden White, “*remind [my] readers of the purely provisional nature of [my] characterizations of events, agents and agencies found in the always incomplete historical record*” (White, 2001b: 222). In part two, first, the methodological frame of historical method and qualitative document analysis is presented, followed by the ‘history use’ terminology introducing the ‘history use’ theory and the contested term ‘narratives’ due to its centrality in this study. Since this study will analyse the history use by HT in order to determine how HT’s narratives are constructed and how these are used by the party, the narrative-concept should be considered the frame wherein HT’s history use must be placed. Hence the structure of this chapter. This theory-construct is summarised in part three.

2.1 Social Constructivism as an Epistemology

I take a stance within *social constructivism* due to the intention of analysing how history is used in *social constructions* of narratives. What, in my view, makes them social constructions are, as stated by Kenneth J. Gergen, that “*the process of understanding is not automatically driven by the forces of nature, but is the result of an active, cooperative enterprise of persons in a relationship*” (Gergen, 2003: 15). My understanding of how narratives are constructed and how history is used, is likewise inspired by Michel Foucault’s understanding of discourses as a knowledge-producing act in a social relation (Foucault, 2010: 334f.). The discourses in the knowledge-producing act in a narrative are here understood as interpretations of the past with a specific purpose. This means that the interpretation of the past is constructed as a (real) history for individuals in a social setting. However, I find historian and social constructivist Hayden White’s criticism of the existence of a “real” history valid (White, 2001a: 376). He states:

“for traditional historical discourse there is presumed to be a crucial difference between an ‘interpretation’ of ‘the facts’ and a ‘story’ told about them. This

difference is indicated by the currency of the notions of a ‘real’ (as against an ‘imaginary’) story and a ‘true’ (as against a ‘false’) story. Whereas interpretations are typically thought of as commentaries on ‘the facts,’ the stories told in narrative history are presumed to inhere either in the event themselves (whence the notion of a ‘real story’) or in the facts derived from the critical study of evidence bearing upon those events (which yields the notion of the ‘true’ story)” (White, 2001a: 376f.).

Hence, the ‘true’ narrative is only true when the discourses in the narrative have gained hegemony (Foucault, 1994: 108) and is interpreted and perceived as true in the social setting. To construct a solid narrative, the use of history in the discourses has to be based on what Finn Collin and Søren B. Wenneberg terms *social facts*, i.e. knowledge of the social reality (Collin, 1998: 52; Wenneberg, 2000: 102-104). When analysing how history is used in the construction of narratives, it is vital to make a distinction between what Wenneberg terms *knowledge* and *pseudo-knowledge* (Wenneberg, 2000: 98-101). Here I consider the pseudo-knowledge the socially constructed ‘true story’, which is what I expect to identify in HT’s construction of narratives. In grasping these I rely on Edward Said’s argument that “*The things to look at are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, not the correctness of the representation*” (Said in Brimnes, 2004: 58). Combining these social constructivist elements it seems clear that it is necessary to fully understand the context the narratives are constructed within and why (Brimnes, 2004: 57).

Departing from this I consider the narratives I find in the analysis to be discursive hegemonic entities, but it is not the discourses used by HT I will use to determine which narratives are constructed. Instead it is the history use and narrative theoretical frame. This is presented hereafter, but it is first necessary to present how I methodologically approach the empirical material.

2.2 Methodology

2.2.1 Historical Methodology and Document Analysis

Since the aim is to analyse how HT have used history from 2001 to 2016, the most suitable methodology is ‘document analysis’ of written material published by HT in the period (Duedahl et al., 2010: 53). A thorough characterisation of this body of sources and reflections about strengths and weaknesses is found in Chapter 3. The analysis will follow the method by Henrik Åström Elmersjö, by only focusing on references to historical events that are used to construct or strengthen narratives supporting HT’s ideology (Elmersjö, 2017: 199). These references I consider what Carlo Ginzburg called “leads” (Ginzburg, 1999: 147). This means that I intend to

work abductively by firstly determining how historical events are used in a respective year from 2001 to 2016 to construct an exposition of how history has been used in HT's narrative-construction and how it has changed in the period. Hence, the analysis will consist of a characterisation of HT's history use and a concise analysis of how HT uses history. Based on my social constructivist epistemology I consider the sources "*written representations of oral utterances [translated by author]*" (Ginzburg, 1999: 142), which through the historical methodology, entailing source criticism, interpretation, and contextualisation, will be analysed as expressions of the context within they are written (Jensen, 2003; Egaa Kristensen, 2007; White, 2001a; Ginzburg, 1999; Tosh, 1995; Brimnes, 2004). An essential part in this thesis is the analysis of both the originator's and the sources' tendency (or bias) in order to determine whether the historical references are used or depicted in a certain way that does not correspond to other author's portrayals (Kjeldstadli, 2001: 187). The entire work is structured around the problem-oriented research strategy (Jensen, 2003: 166-169).

2.2.2 Coding of Sources

In analysing the body of sources in this thesis I have coded these based on Rob James' (2011) coding methodology for analysing postings on HT online communication fora. According to James "*[i]t is possible to discern a number of different streams of opinion running through the posts. These have each been given a letter code and a short description*" (2011: 218). Yet, it is not different streams of 'opinion' which is my focus, but references to historical events. For James to establish a representative categorisation scheme he initially read through 100 postings of a total of 1498 postings to get a grasp of the streams of opinions and came up with 10 coding categorisations (James, 2011: 217-219). This procedure I have followed but I have initially read through the entire body of sources (143) and not just a representative number. This was however, only done to identify which historical events HT refers to, where I found five historical events which could be used as categories. However, this methodology only covered one level of analysis, i.e. identification of *which* historical events are used, why the methodology has expanded with a further two levels – identification of *how* these historical events are referred to or used, and *why* these historical events are referred to or used. The latter two levels are corresponding to each element in the typologies found in the history use frame presented below¹¹. This has meant a quite large number of coding categories (18) for analysing HT's history use, but since these reflect the elements in the typologies, I argue that the analysis has become more systematic and precise, heightening the validity and generalisability of my findings (Bøgh

¹¹ See also Appendix 2: Coding Index

Andersen et al., 2012: 100f.). Simultaneously with the history use coding, the initial history subject categorisations were withheld, but due to the denser reading of the sources these have also evolved, both by adding categories and subcategories. The total number of coding categories at this level has reached nine and an overview of historical events primarily identified can be found in Table 1. Here the number of references, i.e. how many times a certain event has been mentioned and/or used, have been included to indicate which topics are most referenced or used. Certainly, these categories require further explanation and analysis why these will be subjects to analysis in Chapter 4. It must also be stated that some references have been coded with more than one category because the specific reference or piece of text have corresponded to more than one category and is useful in different analytical contexts.

Table 1: Historical event as coding category including the number of references found

Topic	Historical event or development	Number of references found
9	History of the Clash of Civilisations	69
1	Colonisation and imperialism	64
5	The Israel-Palestine issue	46
8	America in the Middle East	44
7	Other events – incidents – unrests – protests	31
6	The War in Afghanistan	22
4	The Iraq Wars	20
2	End of the <i>Khilafah</i> (1924)	17
3	The Cold War	2
Total:		315

Furthermore, the sources have been coded with the *country or place* from where the publication has been originally published. This has been done to create an overview of the composition of the body of sources which I consider important to analysing the origin and context wherein a source has been published. The geographical distribution of HT's publications is presented in Table 2. In Chapter 3 a presentation of the sources is found.

Table 2: Geographical distribution of Hizb ut-Tahrir publications

Country or place published	Number of sources
Main party	58
Great Britain	41
The Ameer's Facebook page (Q&A)	10
Pakistan	7
Syria	5
Scandinavia, The US, Palestine*	3
Tunisia, Australia, Afghanistan, East Africa*	2
Canada, Bangladesh, Kuwait, Russia, Libya*	1
Total:	143

* These countries each have the given number of sources included in the body of sources used in this study.

2.3 History Use

As earlier mentioned, HT is a highly history conscious party, where history plays a vital role in their narratives why it is relevant to use the 'history use' theoretical frame to analyse *how* and *why*. Likewise, due the perception of HT as a political party, another reason for applying this theoretical frame is, as stated by Elmersjö, that “[h]istory is frequently used as a political instrument and when political movements present themselves to the public, history can be considered one of the more convincing implements” (Elmersjö, 2017: 193). This makes me perceive the use of history by HT an activity where they construct and communicates their narratives to their members, the public and the political sphere. In continuation of this argument, I rely on Hannah Arendt (1958), who argues that “a communicative action is not only a means to achieve something [...] it is also an aim in itself. It is through communication that we express identities and desires” (Arendt in Nordgren, 2016: 487). Thus, the history use by HT becomes a way to express their identity and narratives as well as a tool to reach their ideological goal. To fully grasp the 'history use' theoretical frame used in this study¹², I first present the underlying mechanisms, secondly try to come up with a definition and thirdly present different concepts of *how* and *why* history is used.

Even though 'history use' is a relatively new research field within the history research tradition in the Nordic countries, its foundation goes back to the historical philosopher Friedrich

¹² Only the most essential elements within the historical tradition of 'history use' are included in this framework and the closely related (and often intertwined) tradition of 'memory' research has been left out of consideration even though these fields almost are inseparable. A thorough presentation of the field is hence beyond the scope of this study, yet Anette Warring's historiographical overview of the field has been very useful, see; Warring A. (2011) Erindring og historiebrug - Introduktion til et forskningsfelt. *Temp - tidsskrift for historie*.

Nietzsche's (1844-1900) response to the stream of historicism in the 19th Century, questioning the effect history has and for who (Nietzsche, 1994: 6f.). In this process, he finds that three themes or types of history exist (Nietzsche, 1994: 7f.); *the monumental*, where people use history as an example, teacher and inspiration in life. *The antiquarian*, where the past is admired (and glorified) in an appreciation and preservation of selected cultural heritage. Lastly, in *the critical* history use, people "*hold the past responsible, put it through intense questioning and finally conviction [translated by author]*" (Nietzsche, 1994: 62). It is in an extension of these thoughts that the 'history use' research field in close connection to the field of 'memory' research has risen (Warring, 2011: 6). In line with Nietzsche, the field first began to develop in the 1990s by some of the prominent historians such as Bernard Eric Jensen, Claus Bryld, Klas-Göran Karlsson, Peter Aronsson, Jörn Rüsen and Niels Kayser Nielsen (Warring, 2011: 8-12 & 23-24). Developing the history use research field Kenneth Nordgren (2016), brings in a new perspective which is why I include him in this thesis. These scholars have made history use a contested term with many definitions. A short presentation of the essential definitions is hence necessary to fully grasp the analytical tool.

According to Karlsson, history use is when history is activated in communicative processes to meet certain needs and interests (Karlsson, 2004: 52f.), while it according to Aronsson is "*when parts of the historical culture is chosen or activated with the purpose of creating meaning, give legitimacy and/or grasp change by references to a notion of coherence between past, present and the future [translated by author]*" (Aronsson in Warring, 2011: 26). Inspired by Aronsson and Karlsson, Nordgren argues that use of history is;

"the communicative process in which aspects of the historical culture are applied to communicate meaning and action-oriented messages. By using historical references, people reproduce and reformulate dominant narratives in a given historical culture within societal, political, or cultural contexts" (2016: 481).

In line with these researchers, Jensen argues that "*we deal with history when a person or group of persons is interested in something belonging to the past and uses their knowledge about it for a purpose [translated by author]*" (Jensen, 2010: 8). The last definition is from Nielsen, who deals with so-called 'mundane history use'; "*history use [is] not only about the active creators and continuous users of history, but also those communication processes in relation to history that we hardly registering has something to do with history [translated by author]*" (Kayser Nielsen, 2010: 15). Thus, in my interpretation, history use is when a persons' or groups'

historical consciousness is consciously activated and used in a contemporary setting through purposeful communication, i.e. an act.

In the previous paragraph the two most essential concepts within history use have already been mentioned – *historical consciousness* and *historical culture*. These are now to be elaborated, but as these are contested as well, I only present the most proper for the context of this study. These constitute the only two concepts that relatively concur about between the above-mentioned scholars (Warring, 2011: 7)¹³.

The first concept, *historical consciousness*, is defined by Jensen to be “*any kind of consciousness concerning the processing conditions between past, present and future, as these processes are understood as conditional to and/or created by acts of humans*” [translated by author] (Jensen, 2003: 59f.). Thus, it is the processes by which individuals understand the relation between the past, present and future. Hence, the historical consciousness is determinant for how history is used but is, according to Nordgren, also influenced by historical culture (Nordgren, 2016: 481).

The second concept, *historical culture*, is defined by Rösen to be “*the life coherences and the societal context which the historical consciousness emanate from and work in*” [translated by author] (Jörn Rösen in Warring, 2011: 10). Building on this, Nordgren argues that historical consciousness “*comprises all references to the past that are available in a given context, such as artifacts, rituals, customs, and narratives. A historical culture also includes the networks through which these references are distributed, such as schools, cultural institutions, and the media*” (Nordgren, 2016: 481). Adding to the concept, Bryld defines it as “*the individual and collective process by which the history is communicated and used on the basis of certain types (genres) and norms* [translated by author]” (Bryld in Warring, 2011: 10). The combination of these makes it relevant in studies of how societies, institutions or communities deal with the past within the interests of politics, ideology and power (Warring, 2011: 11).

Departing from this definition and understanding of concepts, it is now necessary to operationalise these in the context of understanding *how* HT uses history. Here, I rely on Karlsson, and Jensen to establish a systematic typology. Likewise, I adopt elements from Nordgren’s ‘*framework for the use of history*’ to operationalise *why* HT uses history (Nordgren, 2016: 491-496).

¹³ For an overview of the large body of concepts argued to be most essential by different scholars, see; Warring A. (2011) Erindring og historiebrug - Introduktion til et forskningsfelt. *Temp - tidsskrift for historie*, 6-7

Karlsson, argues that seven types of history use exist. These can be both overlapping, coexisting and mutually excluding (Karlsson, 2004: 55) which one can get an indication of in the following paraphrasing of the seven types: 1) *Scientific use*, done by history researchers for discovering and re-constructing history with the intent of verification and interpretation, 2) *existential use*, done by all people for remembering and forgetting functioning as orientation and anchorage, 3) *morally use*, done by well-educated and intellectuals meeting needs to rehabilitate, restoring and reconciliation, 4) *ideological use*, which is practised by intellectual and political elites to invent and construct, to legitimise and rationalise, 5) *political-pedagogical use*, practiced by intellectuals, political elites and pedagogues to meet illustrating, publicising and debating needs with the intent of politicising and instrumentalising, 6) *non-use of history use*, also practised by intellectuals and political elites with the intent to forget and erase, to legitimise and rationalise, and 7) *commercial use*, used by professionals within commercials and economy to increase profit and increase the value of history, used for commercialisation (Karlsson, 2004: 55-66). By analysing these types of history use, one can understand the historical culture which rests upon the historical consciousness (Warring, 2011: 25).

In Jensen's typological work, he relates the different types of history use to six dimensions of historical consciousness. Departing from historical consciousness, the typology is "*the/those lived history(/ies) that constitutes the starting- and pivotal point [translated by author]*" (Jensen, 2003: 67). The six dimensions are paraphrased as: 1) *Identity formation*, due to its part of personal and collective identity, 2) *history use that put something/someone into perspective*, especially as part of meeting the, in Edward Said's term, 'other' and the different (Said, 1978: xii), 3) *history use as competence in a certain scenario*, i.e. a possibility of a person to grasp the connections between peoples' conditions for actions, possibilities, choices and consequences in a sociocultural setting, 4) *legitimising and de-legitimising*, in relation to clarifying interests, principles and values, 5) *enlightening and clarifying*, when used in an intellectual and scholarly fashion, and 6) *playing and amusing* when used in an amusing setting (Jensen, 2003: 68-70). Warring argues that Jensen's typology shows how history as a form of understanding and as a form of practice are connected, which I find relevant (Warring, 2011: 25).

Elaborating *why* history is used, Nordgren, departing from Nietzsche and Rösen, argues that three basic reasons for using history exist: "*to explain the surrounding world, to form identities, and to exert influence. In effect, uses of history are expressions of historical consciousness*" (Nordgren, 2016: 488). All three types of history use can exist simultaneously (Nordgren, 2016: 489). Under the headline '*Using history to explain the world*' he argues that

the world is explained by means of historical references, analogies and metaphors (Nordgren, 2016: 488). Furthermore, the differences between the past and present are in that process, narrated relating to the present context, and thus the “*narratives that are produced become material for constituting identities and influencing the world*” (Nordgren, 2016: 488). In ‘*Using history to constitute identities*’ Nordgren uses Arendt’s point that it “*is through communication that people emerge as individuals for one another and as part of the world*”, Nietzsche’s point that “*past events are highlighted as a cultural heritage worth preserving, creating emotional ties to a place and a community*” and lastly Rösen’s point that people need recognition and continuity (Nordgren, 2016: 488). The last reason for using history, *to influence the world*, is to use history as an argument for criticising, challenging and mobilising against an establishment or in broader terms used as arguments, examples or symbols to achieve change (Nordgren, 2016: 489). To use history in this way also implies use of power, which must be understood in Foucauldian terms; “*those who can control the sphere of discourse and interpretation can also articulate hegemonic or dominant narratives*” (Nordgren, 2016: 489).

The operationalisation of history use here consisting of a definition of history use, its central concepts, historical consciousness and historical culture, combined with the operationalisation of how and why history is used, will be used to answer five central questions when analysing history use: “*who uses the history, which parts, with which purposes, in which contexts and in which ways? [translated by author]*” (Warring, 2011: 29). Yet, some of these are already hypothetically answered, since it is earlier argued that history is used by HT to construct certain narratives. Therefore, it is now relevant to exert the now operationalised history use theory into the frame of narratives.

2.4 Narratives

Like history use, *narratives* is a contested term widely discussed in the field of humanities studies. This discussion is however beyond the scope of this study¹⁴, but it is important to establish an applicable definition. Likewise, it is essential to clarify how the concept ‘narrative’ is different from the concept ‘story’, which is at the core of the before-mentioned discussion (Halverson et al., 2011: 1). In the following, I rely on the scholars I find most relevant in the context of this thesis to define what a narrative is. These are Halverson, Goodall & Corman

¹⁴ To get a grasp of the current discussion, see for example Rösen J. (2005) *History: Narration, Interpretation, Orientation*, New York: Berghahn Books.; Roberts G. (2001) *The History and Narrative Reader*, London: Routledge.; Straub J. (2006) *Narration, Identity, and Historical Consciousness*, New York: Berghahn Books.; and Thomas B. (2016) *Narrative: The Basics*, Abingdon & New York: Routledge.

(2011), Margaret Somers (2001), Peter Burke (Burke, 2001) and David Carr (2001). Departing from these scholars Hayden White (2001b) and Kenneth J. Gergen (2006) has tried to operationalise how to analyse narratives, why I rely on these in this matter.

In defining what a narrative is, Halverson *et al.* argues that a “*narrative is not a single story, but a collection of stories, and a collection is systematic because the stories are components that relate to one another with coherent themes, forming a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts*” (Halverson et al., 2011: 1). Due to the focus on the HT as a group, I will add Somers’ individualist understanding of narratives as constituting a social identity to the definition used in this thesis. She argues that “*it is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities*” (Somers, 2001: 360). Bringing in Somers’ individualist understanding of narratives, the problem of individualism versus structures must be addressed. According to Burke, the problem exists with “*making a narrative thick enough to deal not only with the sequence of events and the conscious actions of the actors in these events, but also with structures...whether these structures act as a brake on events or as an accelerator*” (Burke, 2001: 311). In this thesis I incorporate this individual understanding into the structuralist understanding because, it is at some level are individuals who construct and maintain the HT narratives, where the latter is considered constituting the structures. Likewise, based on Carr, I argue that it is not only historians who are story-tellers and individuals participate in what Carr terms *practical* narrativity, i.e. they constantly tell themselves and others stories about their lives in a narrative consciousness (Carr, 2001: 155).

To operationalise how to identify and analyse narratives, I rely on White’s theory of narratives as *verbal fiction* and *emplotment*¹⁵ (White, 2001b: 270-282; Egea Kristensen, 2007: 251; Jensen, 2003: 270-273). Central for White’s argument is that no connection between the narrated and the lived history exist (Jensen, 2003: 270), why he perceives the narratives verbal fiction. Hence, White argues that the contents “*are as much invented as found and the forms of which have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the sciences*” (White, 2001b: 222). This argument has its roots in Northrop Frye’s argument that four kinds of archetypal historical myths exist; *romantic, comic, tragic* and *ironic*, where the interpreter or historian of a myth/story is guided by so-called “*pre-generic plot-structures*”

¹⁵ Originally presented in White H. (1973) *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

(mythoi) (White, 2001b: 222). This means that one can understand why a story turns out as it does, because of preceding knowledge of the different kinds of archetypical plot structures (White, 2001b: 223). Thus, the *point* of a story is visual when the plot structure and theme of the story is identified, which is what I will discover in the analysis (White, 2001b: 223). According to Gergen, the “point” is understood as the *valued endpoint*, meaning that “*An acceptable story must first establish a goal, [have] an event to be explained, a state to be reached or avoided, [and must have] an outcome of significance*” (Gergen, 2006: 100). Furthermore, White builds upon Frye, in arguing that a story not only entails a fictional and thematic aspect (making them pure fictions), but that,

“histories gain part of their explanatory effect by their success in making stories out of mere chronicles; and stories in turn are made out of chronicles by an operation which I have elsewhere called ‘emplotment’. And by emplotment I mean simply the encodation of the facts contained in the chronicle as components of specific kinds of plot structures, in precisely the way that Frye has suggested is the case with ‘fictions’ in general” (White, 2001b: 223).

This means that a person must use the facts or events in a chronicle in the attempt to construct a true historical record based on a “this must have been the case”- line of argumentation (White, 2001b: 223). This is however backward in HT’s history use as will become visible in the analysis. Instead, HT take an existing historical record or rather a narrative and construct a history suitable of proving it. According to White, these elements of the chronicle are *made* into a story by prioritising and/or highlighting some elements above others (White, 2001b: 223).

In this study, this means that based on the established definition of narratives, the analysis of emplotment structures and valued endpoints will identify the narratives constructed and used by HT as well as identify their practical narrativity.

2.5 Summary

Based on my social constructivist epistemology and historical methodology the analysis of the empirical material will follow the theoretical merging of history use and narratives. I will here argue that the history use framework is analysing the elements which in the narrative-operationalisation is called emplotment structures and practical narrativity, making the merging of the two theoretical frames optimal in analysing how HT uses history to construct narratives. It is especially notable when analysing the history use that the valued endpoint of different stories will become visible and the aim is to analyse how these fit into different collections of stories

constituting different narratives. Hence, by analysing the history use by HT, the narratives the party constructs will be identified.

Chapter 3: Existing Research and Presentation of Sources

3.0 Introduction

As I am analysing HT's history use and narratives, I find it relevant to get an understanding of the diverse levels and spheres HT must contextualise themselves within. Hence, in the present chapter I will put forth some of the existing research on Islamism that provide an insight to the different levels and spheres wherein HT jostle for position: Suha Taji-Farouki (Taji-Farouki, 1996), Olivier Roy (1994; 2004; 2011), Gilles Kepel (2002; 2004), Dale F. Eickelman & James Piscatori (1996), and Peter Mandaville (2014). The selection of these scholars has been inspired by Kirstine Sinclair's Ph.D. dissertation *The Caliphate as Homeland: Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Britain* (2010), but I have categorised them differently. The main assumption is that the history use and construction of narratives by HT must be considered both products of and contributors to a specific context which can be explained from different prisms provided by these scholars.

Even though I solely rely on these Western-educated scholars, I consider these to be most suitable to position HT within the Western context in focus. This assessment is based on the readings of Sinclair's Ph.D. dissertation (2010) and Noman Hanif's article *Hizb ut Tahrir: Islam's Ideological Vanguard* (2012) in which he provides an account of the different perspectives used for research on HT and political Islam in general. Also, these scholars must be considered products of different research paradigms that gives a broader understanding of the development of political Islam and the way it has been researched. According to Hanif these scholars must be positioned within the distinct periods of 'post-1990' and 'post 9/11' which according to him, have been a product of the prevailing political conditions such as post-communism in the former and terrorism or security in the latter (Hanif, 2012: 209). Being aware that most of these scholars have been active throughout both periods, I argue that they are coloured by these in their arguments.

Due to my focus on HT's history use and narratives I have left out another large branch of political Islam research which is based on Social Movement Theory (SMT) with Quentin

Wiktorowicz and Marc Sageman¹⁶ as the most prominent. This has been left out because I examine HT from a global and transnational perspective rather than a national and local perspective. According to Sinclair both perspectives are possible when examining HT (Sinclair, 2012: 37f.), but due to my focus the former is more suitable.

On that note, it is time to present the different scholars which I perceive as providers of different explanations of the underlying mechanisms and trends which affects HT and hence can function as prisms to explain their history use and narrative construction. The presentation of these scholars is followed by a presentation of the body of sources which the analysis in Chapter 4 is based on.

3.1 Existing Research: Prisms for Explaining HT's History Use and Narrative-construction

3.1.1 Taji-Farouki: Combining Tradition and Modernity

In her book *A Fundamental Quest – Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (1996) Taji-Farouki's main argument is that HT, or rather their founder al-Nabhani, successfully has managed to combine a historical perspective of Islamic historical traditions with contemporary modern politics at the time HT was founded (1996: xi). This revolutionary combination laid their ideology and made it possible for the party to position themselves as an Islamic alternative to not only other Islamic groups of the time, for example the Muslim Brotherhood, but more significantly to the regimes influenced by Western-imposed nationalism (1996: 15). What is most relevant to recall from her analysis of HT's history, ideology and structure is that she argues that HT's revolutionary ideology is a product of what al-Nabhani wanted to distance the party from. Despite al-Nabhani's discourses about the party having a historically correct basis and bases their ideology on the exact history of for example the Prophet Muhammed, Taji-Farouki argues that it is not the case. In reality, she argues, al-Nabhani found it necessary to construct an alternative to the political situation and hence constructed a narrative that could provide this (1996: 38ff. & 74f.). This means that HT instead of being historically correct, al-Nabhani found a way to use history to construct a basis that could fit the political need.

¹⁶ Wiktorowicz Q. (2005) *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers., and Sageman M. (2008) *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Considering that al-Nabhani wanted to distance the ideology from the political situation and the historical development in the Middle East, emphasising the end of the Ottoman Empire, the imperialism from European countries, the establishment of Israel and latest the rise of nationalism and secularism, Taji-Farouki emphasises that al-Nabhanis' 'distancing thoughts' actually are reflected in the ideology (1996: 71). HT is thus considered a representative of these ideas having a constructed reality and history to gain most influence in this cluster of ideas (1996: 66). This HT refuses, but it according to Taji-Farouki is this mix of constructing the past to fit the modern politics that has made the party successful and in her conclusion she insinuates that this paradox of combining a call for re-enforcing the Islamic traditions found in history and the adaption to the modern politics of the time has made their survival extraordinary and universal through HT's time of existence (1996: 188-192).

The prism to take further from Taji-Farouki is the way HT's construction of the past is constantly adapted to the modern context, which I argue will be identified in the analysis.

3.1.2 Eickelman & Piscatori: Transnationalism and Adaption to Local Contexts

Departing from the main argument that political Islam must be considered in a local and shifting context, Eickelman & Piscatori's book *Muslim Politics* (1996) emphasises that it is more suitable to talk about Muslim politics rather than Islamic politics (1996: 4). In this argument lies an understanding of the importance of local Muslim cultures where politics are constructed to shifting contexts (1996: 16f.). Taking a broader stance towards the construction of history and traditions in Muslim politics than Taji-Farouki, Eickelman & Piscatori argue that the cultural Islamic traditions present in all Muslim politics, are in reality invented in relation to a constructed past (1996: 29). This is a result of modernisation in the local setting in which Muslims are living, entailing an objectification of Islam and the religiosity of the Muslims (1996: 38). Related to this, they argue, is a rising deterritorialisation of Islam leading to their second main argument that Islamism has turned transnational, which HT is an example of (1996: 137f.). In fact, they considers the result of the transnational Islam to be horisontal, meaning that the politics of Muslims worldwide and not just in a Muslim-majority country reflects an adaption to the modern world (1996: 138). This is evident in the rising number of Muslim non-state actors and Muslim minority communities in Western countries. Here they are concerned with "Muslim issues", meaning that they adapt their politics to the local context in which they live. This is reflected in a drastically changing geopolitical sphere due to globalisation (1996: 146).

However, it is important to emphasise that a distinction between mainstream and radical Muslims must be made where the latter to a larger extent are performing political actions in their local setting depending on the context (1996: 52). Eickelman & Piscatori argues that these actors are inventing traditions of the past to fit their contemporary political work. Furthermore, they argue that the tradition of an Islamic state and the “Golden Age” of Islam has been invented and is indeed a modern construct as a blueprint for action (1996: 34f.). They even argue that the merging of Islam as religion and politics is a modern slogan and that the two spheres have been separated since the Prophet Muhammed, but many radical Muslims have tried to combine them (1996: 46f.). However, according to Eickelman & Piscatori the mainstream Muslims have adapted to the secularisation of Islam and politics and do not want them to merge (1996: 53). In this relation, they emphasise that HT is the only party that has embraced the transnationalism where they construct their traditions of the Islamic state and the Golden Age to their shifting local political contexts (1996: 139).

In line with the concluding argument, I consider Eickelman & Pistacori’s ‘transnationalism’ wherein HT constructs their past to the local context the next prism to take further.

3.1.3 Kepel: Globalisation, Westernisation and the “War of ideas”

In Kepel’s two books *Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam* (2002) and *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (2004) Kepel argues that a globalisation of Islamism has taken place from the 1970s and a Westernisation from the 1980s with rising popularity of Islamic groups. In the latter book, Kepel argues that the globalisation already in the 1990s, has made Islamism present in the West and even made London a hotbed for Islamists (2004: 88). However, one main argument is that Islamism both peaked and ceased to exist at the beginning of the 2000s with the 9/11 terror attack. In fact Kepel argues that after the terrorist attacks in the US during the 1990s, Islamism was on a fallback and the turn to terrorism by Islamists meant a beginning de-radicalisation of Islamism (2002: 300 & 313; 2004: 149). The general approach for Kepel to reach this argument is as he argues, that to understand the globalisation of Islamism, one must analyse local historical events (2004: 73). This approach is seen in both books, and a common denominator is the idea of Islamism as one side of the “war of ideas” against the “West” which shapes the need for Islamists to examine their history to construct a political action that can match or even defeat the Western ideas (2002: 139). In his first book he argues that *Jihad* (religiously legitimised violence) is the preferred method in winning that war, while in the second book he points to two overarching strategies in winning the war of ideas – *Jihad* and *Fitna* (undermining Muslim societies from within). In this context, Kepel considers HT within the realm of *Fitna* due

to their non-violent although radical Islamism (2004: 289). This battle of ideas is central for his argumentation which is used to explain why Islamism has occurred as a reaction to the decades with Western colonialism, nationalism and secularist regimes in Muslim-majority countries (2002: 41, 185, 193f.).

In Kepel's view, the Westernisation of Islam occurred by the ending of the Cold War, where the *Dar al-Islam* was made universal or global by Ayatolla Kohmeini, which meant a turn towards Europe as the new battlefield for Islam (2002: 185 & 190). In relation to the modern age of globalisation, Kepel considers Westernisation of Islam a consequence of migration that has made Muslims settle as minorities in Western countries. He argues that it especially is the second and third generation Muslims in these minority countries that turns to radical Islamism (2002: 193 & 197). Here HT is a relevant actor since they can provide a substantial and seemingly robust ideology and give meaning to these young Muslims. However, due to transnationalism the ideology seems to adapt to a local war of ideas, i.e. between a local community and the host country, while also playing into the global war of ideas. This is based on his argument that the ideology must adapt to the needs in the society (2002: 30).

Another significant effect of this globalisation of Islamism is the localisation of it, where he points to terror attacks in Western countries with so-called "home-grown" perpetrators – this indicates that the global Islamism has reached the local level (2004: 147). In his conclusions Kepel argues that Islamism has entered a new stage by utilising the modern technologies such as the internet (2004: 253).

Several prisms are to be taken further from Kepel. The first is the movement of Islam to the West as a result of the globalisation of Islam. The second is Kepel's approach - explaining the contemporary global condition through local historical events. The third is the "war of ideas" which can be contextualised both within a global and local perspective.

3.1.4 Roy: Secularism, (neo-) Fundamentalism and Religiosity

Globalisation, Westernisation, individualisation and objectification of Islam are elements in political Islam that until now has been central for the present chapter and most certainly are for Olivier Roy too. This is reflected in his works included in this research overview, i.e. *The Failure of Political Islam* (1994), *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (2004), and *Islam in the West or Western Islam? The Disconnect of Religion and Culture* (2011). In understanding HT's position within political Islam, Roy provides some quite controversial – but very relevant – perspectives, which is why he is included in this thesis. Turning the premise of political Islam

around, the central argument for Roy is that political Islam has failed (1994: ix). While most of the scholars presented here have argued that a political Islam constitutes a merging between Islam as religion and politics, Roy argues that such a merging is not possible (2011: 246). This must, in Roy's view, be considered within the aspect of secularism, meaning that when any given Islamic group conducts an action argued to be Islamic with a political purpose it becomes solely politics rather than religion (1994: 39). Thus, these groups (HT included) in Roy's view, promote and are a result of secularism even though they maintain the merging of the two realms. This brings forth Roy's second major argument that political Islam no longer is a question of Islam as a religion spread globally but rather a question of Islam as religiosity expressed in a local setting (2004: 128f.).

The explanation for this lies in different effects of globalisation and especially the Westernisation of Islamism, where the two central elements are individualisation and objectification of Islam (2004: 201f.). In Roy's view, this means that with a lack of Islamic authority in the Muslim world and the Western world, it has become an individual task for a Muslim to determine what it means to be a Muslim (2004: 33f.). In this process, Islam as religiosity becomes objectified where the individual must choose or re-invent the "right" Islamic religiosity, i.e. a re-discovering Islam (2004: 38f.). In this perspective, HT have been successful in being a kind of Islamic authority for young Muslims in minority communities in the West. This is also a product of the movement of Islam to Western countries, where Roy argues that in recent years a Western Islam has emerged where these Islamists have deculturalised away from the culture of the host country but also the country of origin in preference to a religiosity that reflects an understanding of Islam as a holistic socio-cultural and global entity (2011: 245). HT is an example of this, with the ideology of establishment of a caliphate and a global *Ummah* while providing a specific culture, but this culture is by HT more considered a set of values rather than a culture in anthropological terms (2004: 39).

A third major argument is based on his conceptualisation of radical Islamists as fundamentalists and more recently neo-fundamentalists, because these individuals have replaced a pristine culture with a universal global religiosity based solely on a 'pure' Islam (2004: 25). It is according to Roy, these fundamentalists that aim at establishing the caliphate and *Ummah*, but to Roy the model on which they want to (re-)establish is based on a myth of the Islamic state and an imaginary construction more than a model based on correct Islamic history (2004: 30f.). Furthermore, according to Roy, the reestablishment of the caliphate cannot be considered more than a dream due to the attempt to contextualise the ahistorical model as a truly historical model

in a context with a lack of the exact same conditions as found in the model (2004: 288). Furthering this argument Roy, states that it is neither culture or history that provides a basis for HT's reconstruction of the caliphate but a pseudo-Koranic terminology taken out of context (2004: 238). Hence Roy argues that the history used within Islamism as historical correct models are in fact constructed.

Selecting the most essential prisms to take further from Roy is not easy. Yet I argue that Roy's perception of secularism, his argument of a change of Islam from religion to Islam as religiosity, and lastly his understanding of HT as (neo-) fundamentalist group seeking to contextualise an ahistorical model of the caliphate are essential.

3.1.5 Mandaville: Post-Islamism and the Interplay Between Global and Local Spheres

In Peter Mandaville's book *Islam and Politics* (2014), which is an extension of his first book *Global Political Islam* (2007), the connection between the global sphere and local setting is addressed within political Islam. Mandaville argues that these levels are related and the interplay between them is important for understanding political Islam today (2014: 2). Before exploring Mandaville's main arguments in relation to HT, it must be emphasised that this book has been published almost 20 years after the first book included in this research overview, meaning that his writing must be influenced by the other scholars. It must also be assumed that political Islam has changed a lot in that period. Mandaville argues that departing from their front runners, Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi and later Sayyid Qutb as modern anti-nationalism and anti-Western movements, Islamism has moved to a new stage – post-Islamism (2014: 376). This stage is, according to Mandaville, a result of globalisation, translocality and individualisation of Islam, where Muslim politics is what constitutes the interplay between the global and local spheres (2014: 374ff.). In this lies an understanding of the development of Islamism from Islam as global religion to Islam as local religiosity, where individual Muslims' social contexts and the cultures in which they play into constitutes a local and global identity (2014: 24ff.). This aspect is especially evident in HT which offers Muslim individuals a local cultural identity but also a sense of being a part of the global community of Muslims, *Ummah*.

In relation to this, Mandaville argue that the Islamism today has been influenced by Salafi and Wahabi Islam that has spread to the world, bringing an understanding of Islam in two universal idioms of *Ummah* as an integral part of a global community and *Ummah* as the righteous community under assault – where HT is positioned within the latter (2014: 351). These idioms are integrated parts of HT's ideology, and according to Mandaville these discourses can provide

meaning, purpose and a sound worldview for young Muslim individuals in the local social community searching for exactly that (2014: 350f.). Hence the interplay between the global and local spheres are found in that perspective as well. This and HT's ideology, has also made Mandaville perceive HT as the only so-called "*khilafist group*" which works at the local cultural and global level to establish the caliphate (2014: 354). This is also due to the successful adaptation to the developing Islamism by HT, where they fulfil another central characteristic of post-Islamism – moving political work beyond state-policy as the traditional political arena (2014: 376). Following this argumentation, Mandaville in his closing chapter positions HT within a broader category of an anti-systemic social movement which has been able to challenge the normative premises of the world systems until today (2014: 360). However, in a closing remark Mandaville argues that HT and other Islamic groups suffer under an effect of the post-Islamism, which is the so-called "*third generation jihadi activists*" also known as "lone wolfs" (2014: 363).

The important prism to take further from Mandaville is the interplay between the global and local spheres creating both local and global identity in the contemporary post-Islamist world.

3.1.6 Summary

To sum up, several underlying mechanisms and trends have been identified above. The different scholars' explanations and definitions of these I henceforth consider prisms wherein HT's history use and narrative construction can be explained. This is due to my perception of these as influencers on HT and hence how and why HT construct narratives through the use of history. Taken singlehandedly, they constitute separate prisms but taken together I argue that they constitute a broad frame of understanding of the many levels and contexts HT must construct narratives in to maintain the status as 'vanguard of Islam'.

3.2 Empirical Material: Presentation of Sources

This thesis is based on a total of 143 sources stretching periodically from 2001 to 2016, but several more have been read through in the selection process¹⁷. The criteria for selection have been texts containing a use of history by HT published in the period of interest. Hence, I searched for references to concrete events in history, presentation of historical chains of events and indirect historical references to a period, for example colonialism, used in a contemporary context. These criteria were based on the theoretical framework. Most sources are what HT calls

¹⁷ To get an overview of the 143 sources, see Appendix 3: List of sources

“*Leaflets*” (91) but given that they are very similar to the second and third types of sources, “*Press release*” (24) and “*Political analysis*” (17) respectively, it is tempting to consider them as the same type. The fourth type is called “*Weilah Publication*” (9) which is much like the other types, but these are published in a specific country. Common for these sources is that they are published by HT’s main party or by a specific country, but all are gathered on a main webpage for electronic publication <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/>. Initially, it was thought to get printed material from HT, but all my sources have been collected online due to easy availability, sufficient content and an impression that the online material would be the same as printed versions. These types of sources is the most common types of publications from HT, as they have been the most efficient way to spread HT ideology since the party’s establishment (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 219f.). It must also be mentioned that HT have followed the technological development and have begun to use online media as their primary form of communication making it more relevant to look for online material. Additionally, an article (1) and a webpage (1) completes my dataset.

Initially, it was thought to use other media sources to find usable pieces of statements or other interview parts, but since the present material is presented to HT’s members and recipients of their publications it seemed unnecessary to add an intermediary media to go through. The reason is also that the aim is not to portray how HT uses different media and whom they are communicating to, but how they use history. Here the assessment is that the leaflets, press releases, political analyses, and *Weilah* publications fulfil that aim. It must also be mentioned that most sources have been translated into English from either Arabic or the language of which country it is originally published in. This might have affected the meaning of sentences, which I must be aware of. Taking my focus on the main party and HTB into consideration, it must be stated as a source criticism, that the dataset does not contain sources published by HTB before 2006 and no sources from the main party in 2003 and 2004.

Chapter 4: Analysing History Use by Hizb ut-Tahrir

4.0 Introduction

Despite the characterisation of HT as an ahistorical party (Roy, 2004: 288), a closer look reveals an extremely historically conscious party. I even argue that the historical consciousness and historical culture that exist in HT has been of vital importance for HT’s survival up until this day – and is likely to continue being so. This historical consciousness is expressed in several contexts and with different purposes, which I have comprised in three levels. The first level is the

existential level, where history is used to explain and legitimise HT's existence. It is within this level that history is used to legitimise and defend their ideology. The second level is the *identity level*, where history is used to construct a correct Muslim identity. The third level is the *positioning level*, where history is used to position the party within the Muslim and non-Muslim world. This level is the most extensive, where HT uses history to explain, legitimise and delegitimise actions both locally and globally yet primarily in the Muslim world. In this analytical categorisation they are separately dealt with but often both intersect transversely of levels and between the characterisations of how and why history is used. However, before exploring these levels thoroughly, I find it important to state some general tendencies in HT's history use that goes for all levels.

4.1 Characterisation of History Use by Hizb ut-Tahrir

The overarching tendency for HT's history use is that it is used to uphold their ideology. In this perspective I consider the ideology as a cluster of so-called 'master narratives' which are defined by Halverson *et al.* to be

“a transhistorical narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture [which] "grow up" to attain that stature over time through repetition and reverence within a particular culture. In addition, by "culture" we are referring to an interrelated set of shared characteristics or qualities claimed by an ethnic, social, or religious group to which human beings collectively identify” (2011: 14).

Hence, the history use by HT has the re-establishment of the caliphate and *Ummah* at their centre in all three levels as we shall see later.

This perspective and the coding categorisation of historical events used in the HT published material from 2001 to 2016, has made me able to identify four transhistorical narratives, two upcoming transhistorical narratives, one indirect master narrative. Beyond that a relatively large number of narratives constructed to specific contexts or national events have been found. Here, it must be stated that despite examining a fifteen year period where Islamism arguably has changed a lot, the history use and master narratives used by HT have barely changed. Yet, it is reflected in the material, especially from Britain, that from 2005 HT have accepted the presence of HT in Western countries and let them use national events and contexts in their narratives and thus history use (Sinclair, 2012: 47). These national events and contexts reflect the above-mentioned narratives constructed to specific contexts and national events (Topic 7) which have been found thirty-one times (31 coding references). This also points to the tendency that a

difference exists between how history is used by the main party and the national branches. This is obvious when comparing publications from the main party to branch-publications from Britain, Scandinavia, Australia, Canada and Russia. By the main party, history is used more subjectively and consequently to legitimise the ideology and de-legitimise for example (in their view) injustices towards Muslims. In the national branches it is used more as relatively objective explanations or background information legitimising a certain reaction or the like. This is of course an impression of mine, but since the national branches have begun to contextualise their work and publications to their local setting it might express a necessity to communicate as they do. With this in mind, it is now time to return to the established, upcoming and indirect transhistorical narratives.

4.1.1 Established Transhistorical Narratives

1) Colonisation or imperialism

These are references to Western countries that have, or are perceived as having, colonised Muslim countries in the Middle East in the 19th and 20th centuries, such as France, Britain and the US. Despite referring to a specific period in the history of the Middle East, the reference is used in a contemporary setting when de-legitimising the presence of Western countries in the Middle East today. The reference is especially used about the US's presence in the region in relation to the Israel-Palestine issue, the Iraq Wars, the war in Afghanistan and lately in Syria. Yet, Britain and France are often narrated as US-associates or colonisers themselves in the just mentioned wars.

2) The Israel-Palestine issue

Due to the centrality in HT's ideology of the establishment of the caliphate in the land of Palestine, this transhistorical narrative entails both de-legitimising references to the establishment of Israel and references that legitimises HT establishing the caliphate where Israel is geographically located. This narrative also consists of the battles for the right for Palestine to possess the land of Israel, with references to the battles or wars that have taken place in the 20th and 21st centuries. Especially the 1967 war is often used, but also the U.N. Resolution establishing Israel in 1948, the 1968 battle of Al-Karamah, the 1973 war, the Camp David Accords (1978), and the mentioning of the more recent 2006 Israeli attacks are found (Kamrava, 2013: 299-346). In relation to this, references to this narrative are not only aimed at Western countries that intervened in this matter but are also used to criticise state-leaders in Middle Eastern countries for not recognising Israel's replacement by the caliphate. Likewise, these leaders are also often considered "puppets" of the colonisers since they are not working to

demolish Israel and because these are considered followers of the Western ideas and self-interests. This makes HT perceive these leaders as actors enforcing Western politics in the Middle East instead of Islamic politics.

3) America in the Middle East or Muslim World

Even before HT was established in 1952, the US has been present in the Middle East which in the view of HT has had a negative influence on the region. This is why 'America' is narrated as a coloniser and often the lead 'crusader' of the Muslim lands, which Halverson et al. argues is common master narrative (2011: 109). Within this narration is also the perception of the US as the country which has brought corrupt systems to the Middle East, which is a reference to the states which have accepted the ideas of Western ruling/state structures, such as democracy or capitalism. Especially the US's role in the establishment and support for Israel, the Iraq wars through the 1990s and 2000s and the war in Afghanistan beginning in 2001 are used as historical references. These aspects are supported by HT's analyses of the US wanting more influence in the region through the "New Middle East" project as a part of a bigger game of splitting the Shi'a and Sunni Muslims. This according to HT makes sure that the US agenda is reached, and no Islamic political system will occur in the region weakening the US's agenda. Thus, this entails both a de-legitimisation of the presence of the US in the region but also a strong criticism and de-legitimisation of the regimes in the Muslim world. Furthermore, also followers of the US's presence in the Middle East or South Asia are included in this master narrative as a way for HT to show that it is not only the US's, but also countries/actors who follow the US's ideas that have a negative influence on the Middle East.

4) The end of the Khilafah in 1924

This transhistorical narrative has several types of references. The most used narrative or reference is that 1924 meant the destruction of the caliphate and the beginning of a period of miserable conditions for Muslims forced to live without a uniting *Imam* (religious leader), which legitimises the caliphate's re-establishment. The next type is a ruling out of any other possibilities than that it was destroyed in 1924 by the Turk Mustafa Kemal Atatürk acting as an agent for colonialist Britain. The next type is the use of historical events around 1924, such as the first First World War (1914-1918) and the Psykes-Picot Agreement (1917) (Kamrava, 2013: 2-4), which are used to explain how the caliphate could be destroyed. When used in contemporary historical references it is narrated as the end of the caliphate, but when looking for a closer definition of the time period of the caliphate, HT is very vague. This aspect I will analyse and discuss further below.

These four transhistorical narratives are listed hierarchically and interestingly the Israel-Palestine and 1924 transhistorical narratives are not the most used, despite their extensive and important roles in al-Nabhani's ideological works. According to Halverson *et al.* the latter three transhistorical narratives are well established within Islamic extremist narratives (2011: 7f.), why it is interesting that HT's primary transhistorical narrative is 'colonisation or imperialism' throughout the 15 year period. I argue that using colonisation or imperialism is used as a contemporary and contextualising legitimising element in the narrative of re-establishing the caliphate in the Muslim majority countries, with the underlying connotation that the caliphate has been taken from the Muslims and destroyed by the colonisers. Thus, a re-establishment means the restoration of the correct way of life in the correct geographical setting. This is, as we shall see below, a part of the positioning level.

4.1.2 Upcoming Transhistorical Narratives

Now, turning to what I conceptualise as the 'upcoming transhistorical narratives'. The notion 'upcoming' must be understood as narratives not yet transhistorical but are potential candidates to be in the future. This is due to the proximity of the historical events these narratives are based on and have thus not been deeply embedded in the HT culture and historical consciousness. This is yet only a question of time. Within this category two upcoming transhistorical narratives exist but considering that they most often are referred to in the same contexts, it is mostly of analytical reasons that they are presented separately. The first is the 1) *The Iraq Wars*, and second 2) *The Wars in Afghanistan*. I assume that the reason why they are used almost inseparably is that they provide some of the same legitimising or de-legitimising elements, while also entailing important, different perspectives and explanations of the world giving more weight to arguments. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that considering them one upcoming transhistorical narrative could be more useful.

1) The Iraq Wars

Not only is this narrative about the Iraq Wars in the 1980s, 1990s and in the 2000s, but it is also a symbol of the destruction of Muslim co-existence in a country or even region. Especially the "occupation" of Iraq in 2003 by the US and her followers in the name of "War on terror" - meaning war on Islam in HT rhetoric (James, 2011: 217) - is used to explain how Iraq became the breeding ground for sectarianism and the divide between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims as well as Kurds. Likewise, these wars seem to be considered beginning of the US's, Britain's and France's occupation of the Middle East and destruction of Muslim countries, killing innocent

Muslims and destroying the stability on behalf of the colonisers economic and strategic self-interests. Even though especially two wars (1991 and 2003) are included in this narrative, they are narrated as one continuing war against Muslims where the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 added fuel to the fire under the war on terror agenda. Based on the way these wars are narrated as the starting point of Western intervention with the purpose of foiling the coherence of Muslims in the region and destruction of the possibility of having Islamic political systems that can unite all Muslims, this narrative is used to strongly de-legitimise Western presence in the Middle East and legitimising the establishment of the caliphate.

2) The Wars in Afghanistan

Much like the ‘Iraq wars’ narrative, the narration about the War in Afghanistan beginning in 2001 follows the same logic about the Western occupation of, and presence in the Middle East. This is also used by HT as part of the narrative of Western forces trying to foil coherence among Muslims while enforcing economic and strategic self-interests. Within this lies not only the direct intervention by occupation and war that has brought death and destruction to the country, but also the ruler’s adoption of Western democracy thought, making the narrative a symbol of the failure of - in HT’s view - misplacement of a democratic thought in a Muslim country, which has only brought instability, repression, death and destruction. In relation to this, together with the ‘Iraq wars’ narrative, the war in Afghanistan is narrated as the result of a missing defence against the West, because the regimes for too long has been accepting agreements with the colonisers. Thus, this narrative not only constitutes a criticism of Western intervention either referring to the occupation itself or to the “puppets” in the governments. It is also often framed as the cause for the chaos in the world today, assumingly meaning injustices and harsh treatment of Muslims all over the world according to HT.

4.1.3 Indirect Transhistorical Narrative

The Clash of Civilisations

The last master narrative identified is based on several sources using it as a historical reference, but it does not only have a historical connotation but also a futuristic – “*The Clash of Civilisations*”. I consider it ‘indirect’ because the history use is not, like the transhistorical narratives characterised above, emanating from a specific historical event, but rather history used to show a development in the relation between the West and Islam – often negatively. With the most coding references this constitutes the master narrative most used by HT. Not only is it the most used, but during the coding of the sources it became clear that this is also the narrative used most differently. This means that this master narrative is used in many varied contexts than the

narratives presented above, with many different purposes and using many different historical events or developments to make the valued endpoint. This makes it both a solid but also flexible master narrative, and HT have figured out the many possibilities of use. This, I argue, is the key factor for HT's continuing existence, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. However, the common denominator is the clash of civilisation narrative as known from Said and Huntington, but the narration is reversed so it is Islam and the Muslim world representing the dominating world from which the West have learned. This indirect transhistorical narrative thus constitutes what I conceptualise as the 'Clash of civilisations in reverse' inspired by Al-Azam's *Orientalism in Reverse* (2000: 234-237). The point is that history is used by HT to construct de-legitimising narratives about the West or Western-involved situations, to legitimise the existence of Islam as the true way of life and HT's ideology. Likewise, it can be argued that HT often rely on normative narratives. However, as a critical spectator, this way of setting up arguments and constructing narratives can make the HT appear rather desperate for establishing the caliphate and overly defending of their 'right' to exist. This can however be explained by Mandaville's argument that HT uses populist rhetoric as link between these perceived clashes and religiosity (Mandaville, 2014: 357).

This brings me to further aspects of HT's history use worth being sceptical about but, might be a strength for HT's construction of narratives. The main tendency is that HT only uses history that can strengthen or support the ideological master narratives, which have several effects. The first is that historical facts often are framed, twisted to fit the narrative or even left out. The latter mentioned is conceptualised as 'historical silences' in the field of history, and these often express more than the inclusion of historical facts (Kjeldstadli, 2001: 194). This is the case with HT's history use, where several essential historical events are left out. The most controversial is a missing historical delimitation or definition of the caliphate, although several scholars having dealt with it in different history and religion accounts (Lewis, 1998; Schulze, 2000; Kamrava, 2013; Raudvere, 2014). In line with this controversy I argue that since the historical consciousness within HT is quite extensive, the leading ideologists responsible for text production in HT must have been in contact with this kind of research. However, I argue that the reason is HT's ideology lack a clear definition, why the contemporary enforcers of the ideology abstains from delimiting and defining it. I claim that this vague definition of the caliphate is an element that new members of HT find approachable and thus take the bait, i.e. adopts the HT ideology. This is further discussed in Chapter 5. In relation to the establishment of the caliphate, it is often narrated as if the caliphate is to be established very soon and that the current conditions

for the re-establishment are good – but it seems to have been the same argumentation since HT’s establishment. This I consider an ideological narrative emanating from the perception of the party being in the second step of the so-called Method of the Prophethood. Another example of non-use of history is regarding the 9/11 or in the British setting, the London attacks on the July 7th, 2005 (7/7) (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 152). I contend that the reason for these silences are mostly strategic, due to political sensitivity, where the party have had to evaluate the public reaction to these incidents and its effects before acting themselves. Also, by keeping silence the risk of publicly saying something potentially hurting for the party’s ability to exist and spread their ideology is avoided. Likewise, these incidents can be considered too historically close to HT’s young members, meaning that the HT members can remember the historical events. The point is that HT does not use events that are too contemporary, due to the difficulty in framing these according to the ideology, which is easier with past events that no members can remember.

However, contradicting this line of argument is the case of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, where it might be the geographical and not the historical distance that has made them useful as upcoming transhistorical narratives. The sources reflect that these have been actively used both in the years within these wars took place but also in later years after their ending. Again, it seems to be the ideology that is the determining element in the history use and construction of narratives. This aspect also contains the element of selection and framing of certain historical facts that are altered to fit the ideological master narratives, hence becoming a narrative rather than a fact (White, 2001a: 376). All these aspects taken into consideration, I argue that despite not being a historically accurate party, it is HT’s incorrectness and contextualisation that has ensured the survival of the party for so long. It might even be the reason why HT have been more popular among Muslim youths than other Islamic groups. It is however beyond the scope of this study to examine in depth, but the most essential elements are discussed in Chapter 5. Instead, it is now relevant to return to the characterisation of HT’s history use within the three levels.

4.1.4 Three Levels of History Use

The Existential Level

Pervading HT’s history use is their ideology which, at this level, is used to legitimise the existence of the party but also to emphasise the continuing relevance of the party’s existence. This is especially evident when the party draws attention to the development of Islamism which it considers themselves a part and defender of as HTB writes in a publication, “*For over fifty years, Hizb ut-Tahrir has been at the forefront of the political work in the Muslim world to end*

tyranny and dictatorship”^{18&19}. The existence of HT is expressed as the defender of Islamism as a counterbalance to Western colonialism and Middle Eastern dictators influenced by the thoughts of the West. However, beneath this historical narrative lies the ideological argumentation of HT as the fighter and defender of the re-establishment of the caliphate. By emphasising this historical development of Islamism, HT not only uses a specific historical context i.e. the period of colonisation of the Middle East, which HT argues still is pervading. HT also uses this historical context to show that the fight against these tendencies is still relevant and that the party through the last almost seventy years have been the protagonist for the establishment of the caliphate. This I argue is a strong example of HT’s use of history to show and explain how and in which context the establishment of the party have been of immense importance for the Muslim world – and in their view, still is. The essence of this level is to emphasise the context in which the party came into being and how their existence has had an effect (often narrated positively) on certain developments or events as arguments in a narrative. Thus, the existence and their fight for establishment of the caliphate is legitimised while the West and its influence on the Muslim world is de-legitimised. It is within this level that HT’s historical consciousness is most explicit because they not only use the history in which HT was established, but they are capable of adapting and contextualising their own history to contemporary contexts in a way that strengthens their means for existence in a contemporary situation. This point is related to the positioning level when considering the events taking place during the period of which this thesis is concerned. However, this kind of use of history, I believe, has been vital for HT’s continuing existence because it has been an essential element in framing the party towards new potential members.

The Identity Level

Continuing the latter argument, I argue that HT’s history use reflects that the party is aware that by constructing historical events in a specific context to a specific audience, it will strengthen their master narratives supporting their ideology. This naturally counts for both party-internal and external impact. Internally I claim that, HT uses history to both strengthen the party’s identity and to shape their member’s identity coherently. Given that the majority of sources allegedly are published for HT’s members wherein the present context is explained with historical references, which highlight a normative reality for Muslims and how they should live their lives, I argue that

¹⁸ Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Struggle for Khilafah (2007: Britain)

¹⁹ Henceforth I reference the sources used with the following structure: ‘Name of publication (Year: Publication country/place)’ to get an understanding of the context of the source used. As the sources are retrieved electronically, I have not been able to use page number to specify the place of citations.

these historical references - often to the deeds and history of the Prophet or a much better life in the caliphate – are used to constitute how Muslims should act. This use of historical references are a part of constructing a normative image of a “right” Muslim identity and how a Muslim should live. In this also lies the ideological goal of Muslims living in the caliphate expressing the right Muslim identity, by narrating what the caliphate has been in the past. This is an example of how HT uses history to position themselves in the contemporary context.

The Positioning Level

Since their establishment, HT have worked to position themselves within different spheres depending on the context they play into. In this positioning level, HT’s ability to contextualise themselves to a given larger context is vital. Here HT must be considered experts in constructing the past into narratives that support their effort to position themselves, for example ideologically as the only party capable of re-establishing the caliphate. This self-perception is here understood in the frame of al-‘Azm’s Reversed Orientalism, where the main argument is that it “*makes no sense to talk about classical, medieval or modern Islam; because Islam is always Islam. Islam can withdraw, return, be in low ebb or high tide, but not much more than that*” (2000: 236). This entails an emphasis that Islam is very different from Western ideas, where historical processes in the West are driven by economic interests, class struggles and socio-political forces, while the driver of history in the East is Islam (al-'Azm, 2000: 234). From this perspective HT uses history to position themselves against the Western powers, their systems and their ideas. Also, they position themselves against other Islamic groups claiming to be more Islamic correct than HT but also mainstream Islam. Since HT as a political party must act in the changing political sphere, “*the importance of the politics of the imamate [leadership] and even its legitimacy lie in the extension to which it is capable of ijtihad [a process of deducting legal rules in absence of sharia]*” (al-'Azm, 2000: 236). This means that HT must be able to contextualise their politics and understanding of Islam in the present context, which I argue HT is doing. When doing this HT strongly positions themselves as anti-Western and as proponents of the ideological line of establishment of the caliphate. This will according to Baran lead to a clash of civilisations in what he called the “war of ideas” (2005: 68). This level is the most used by HT, where they use history to explain, legitimise and de-legitimise actions accentuated to strengthen their position in a given context.

4.2 Analysis of History Use by Hizb ut-Tahrir

As the first four master narratives are already known and thoroughly analysed elsewhere²⁰, I find it relevant to analyse the two upcoming transhistorical narratives, *the Iraq Wars* and *the Wars in Afghanistan*, and the indirect transhistorical narrative, *Clash of Civilisations*. This is done in an approximately chronological order to analyse how HT's history use has developed in the period.

4.2.1 The Iraq Wars

As mentioned in the characterisation, the Iraq Wars are by HT narrated as one continuing war with devastating effects for the Muslim lands. Furthering this argument, the sources show that these wars are used to; 1) criticise the 'colonialists' presence in the Middle East and the effects of that, 2) criticise the 'puppet rulers in the Muslim world' and 3) are used as element in the positioning level. The sources also show a differentiation between how these wars are used by the main party and the national branches. A common denominator is HT's use of these wars to explain the world as they see it which is in close proximity to their ideology. When examining the first source mentioning Iraq from 2008 and the last from 2016 the narrative about the wars have not changed. In 2008 the HTB writes "*it is Bush and Blair's continued brutal occupation and murder in Iraq and Afghanistan that is responsible for the chaos in the world today*"²¹ while HTB in 2016 writes "*The decline of Islam in our lives, Western interference, the division of Muslim lands and the installation of client regimes – all of that has only brought instability, repression, death and destruction to the region and the world. Afghanistan and Iraq are testimony to this*"²². Likewise, in 2013 – the middle of the period – HTB wrote:

"This is yet another example of a military intervention in another Muslim country by a Western colonial state - like the bloody interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq which cost so many innocent lives - to try to maintain their political and military enslavement of the people in order to facilitate their economic exploitation, while using the tired rhetoric of the 'war on terror', 'Islamism', 'extremism' and 'terrorism'"²³.

These three citations show a very static use of the Iraq wars as a historical event where the narrative has not changed in the eight-year period. However, the way the narrative is used has been constructed to different contexts. In the first citation the former President of the United

²⁰ See Halverson JR, Goodall HL and Corman SR. (2011) *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism*, New York: Palgrave McMillan.

²¹ Labour attacks Muslim community to cover up leadership crisis and disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan (2006: Britain)

²² How Muslims Should view the Brussels Bombings (2016: Britain)

²³ Mali Invasion - Yet Another Colonial War in the Muslim World! (2013: Britain)

States, George W. Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as historical individuals conducting ‘occupying’ policy towards the Middle East are used as reasons for worldwide chaos. This I claim is an element of creating a narrative that legitimises that a caliphate is needed to stop this chaos. Likewise, it is used to de-legitimise the presence in the Middle East by Western countries (the US and Britain) and even framing it as an occupation using a language that mobilises the readers against the Western presence in Muslim countries to strengthen the narrative of the necessity of establishing a caliphate. In the second citation, the mentioning of Iraq I argue must be understood as the Iraq wars since the late 1980s, this citation is used to explain which consequences the influence from the West have had on the Middle East. Because this citation is written after the ending of the war, it uses the known consequences of the war to emphasise the de-legitimacy of Western presence. What is interesting about this citation is the narration of the Iraq wars reason for the ‘decline of Islam in their lives’, which I claim is an ideological use of a historical event mixing the existential and identity levels.

Examining this line of argument, there has indeed been a division of Muslim countries, if considering this use of words as a reference to the demolition of the caliphate in 1924. This according to HT led to separation of nation states with Western interference in the regimes of the Muslim countries, making room for secular rather than Islamic ideas. Recalling Kepel and Mandaville’s historical accounts of Islamism, Islam has become a large part in many Muslims lives especially since the 1970s and in the light of globalisation the Muslims today most certainly have Islam in their lives (Kepel, 2002: 193; Mandaville, 2014: 360-362). Also, from this perspective the citation proves an ideological use of history to mobilise against the West. In the last citation HT constructs a narrative about the West as only interested in economic profit hiding behind their orientalist “the West versus Islam” rhetoric and not caring about the devastations they create in the Muslim countries. By using the Iraq War as a historical reference along the history of colonialism, HT strengthens their ideological narrative of de-legitimising Western presence in the Muslim countries with an undertone of legitimising HT’s caliphate.

A central theme in using the Iraq War beginning in 2003 for the main party and HTB is that HT gives Western countries and especially the US a significant role in a correlation between ‘puppet rulers’ and sectarianism. Writing during the war, HTB in 2008 emphasised that;

“there is another factor we must add to the reality of the superpowers' inability to consolidate their foothold in Iraq and Afghanistan in the face of individual Muslim resistance. This important factor is that these states could not have stepped in Afghanistan and Iraq were it not for the puppet rulers in the Muslim world who

opened the doors to these countries, by land, sea and air, and surrendered their military bases for airstrikes against the Muslim lands”²⁴.

Not only does HT draw on their historical consciousness about the imperialism and colonisation of Muslim countries in the Middle East during the 20th century, they also use it to de-legitimise those regimes which adopted the ideas from the colonialists. They also use it as an explanation why the US cannot win the war and win the ‘war of ideas’ in Iraq. This is because of the ‘individual Muslim resistance’ which I argue can be understood as those Muslims fighting the Western presence at the grassroots level, i.e. different sects created by the invasion. The same line of argument and use of the war as well as its effects can be found several years after the war-ending. In 2016 HTB wrote that;

“[f]or centuries, colonial powers like Britain and France exploited, or even created, divisions to divide and rule Muslims. In more recent years the US has exploited Shia’-Sunni differences to fuel wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The politicisation of sectarian narratives has meant that Muslim communities around the world become more divided against each other, instead of uniting under ‘La ilaha illa Allah [Muslim statement of faith, meaning ‘there is no god except Allah’]”²⁵.

Here HT constructs a narrative that the sectarianism of today has existed ‘for centuries’ because colonial powers in the past have gotten influence on the regimes. This, I claim, is a clear example of HT constructing their history to fit their contemporary context and not using the prevalent history researched by scholars. As the leading ideologist responsible for text construction in HT is broadly considered intellectuals, I argue that they are aware of the prevailing history but chooses to construct it in a manner supporting their ideological narrative. This is also shown when it is emphasised that the US ‘exploited’ the Shia’-Sunni differences to ‘fuel wars in Iraq’ as if they were already existing when they invaded Iraq in 2003. Here most scholars argue that the sectarianism was a result of the invasion and was barely existing before, meaning that HT again constructs the history to their advantage (Kamrava, 2013: 206). Also, it seems to be written as if a global sectarianism has existed ‘for centuries’ but that the Iraq war was the consolidating event that made it clear. In relation to this, I argue that the last sentence indicates that the only way to end this sectarianism between the Muslims in the world is to unite under HT’s caliphate. In this way HT have constructed a history contextualised as a political tool to legitimise their ideology and construct a demand for it. Another way to prove that this is a constructed history

²⁴ A Message from the Amir of Hizb ut-Tahrir On the 87th Remembrance of the Destruction of the Khilafah (2008: Main party)

²⁵ Advice to the Muslim Community following the Murder of Imam Jalal Uddin (2016: Britain)

to contemporary contexts is that when HTB two years before, i.e. in 2014, published a leaflet, the history of sectarianism was constructed differently. Here HTB wrote that “*One should be reminded that it was only after the US invasion of Iraq that the most recent destructive trends were set on fire in the Middle East*”²⁶. These ‘destructive trends’ were constructed as a de-legitimising history of the US and British presence in the Middle East, which had brought

“everything from direct invasion of Muslims countries, drone attacks on innocents, the enflaming of ethnic and sectarian tensions, the installation and support of brutal tyrants who wreak misery over Muslims, arming despots in wars against other Muslims, to talk of the further ethnic and sectarian break-up of Iraq itself into three new states: one for each of the Kurds, Sunnis and Shiah [branches of Muslims]”²⁷.

This show that HT mixes the history of US and British presence in the Middle East *before* the invasion of Iraq with the history of these countries’ presence *after* the invasion of Iraq in their de-legitimising narrative.

Another example of HT’s use of the Iraq Wars as narrative is the way they construct the history of it and how is it considered but a piece in the Wests’ aim of ensuring that the Islamic caliphate does not materialise²⁸. In 2014 the main party published a leaflet explaining how to perceive their upcoming competitor, the so-called Islamic State (IS). In this leaflet, HT consider IS as a result of the sectarianism caused by US invasion of Iraq but constructs a history that goes back to the 1991 War. Despite being a rather long quotation, I consider it relevant to bring forth to show how the history is constructed to fit a contemporary political context:

“Whoever reflects on the current events sees them as an episode in a series of episodes that were not only initiated by America with its occupation of Iraq, but also before the occupation, since America imposed no-fly zones in North of Iraq in 1991, where Kurdistan became a quasi-state region! And when America occupied Iraq in 2003, the American governor of Iraq, Bremer set a constitution carrying the seed of dismantling Iraq that made him utter with confessional and sectarian-based quota system. The seed continued to grow until the month of 12/2011, when America exited Iraq with its military appearance but remained in it with its security and political reality, wherein the tree of sedition blossomed. Then America fueled it placing an intolerant sectarian tyrant at the head of the government in Iraq. [...] And the

²⁶ Muslims Will Not Compromise on the Khilafah! (2014: Britain)

²⁷ Muslims Will Not Compromise on the Khilafah! (2014: Britain)

²⁸ Increased Attacks on Muslim Women in the UK is being Fuelled by Islamophobic Media and Western Foreign Policy (2013: Britain)

sectarian incitement escalated with the creation of the Shiite armed militias, and in return focusing on ISIS”²⁹.

This narrative, I claim, is far from the historical reality, why it must be considered a narrative constructed to mobilising against the Western countries, instead of fighting each other and establishing the caliphate as the only solution to a united and peaceful *Ummah*. Also, from this narrative, HT argues that the sectarianism emanating from this chain of events is happening in line with the US’s policy to keep Iraq a fragmented entity to prevent the establishment of the caliphate³⁰. The same is said about the British and other governments’ foreign policy where HT argues that these countries’ interest in economic profit and prevention of the establishment of an Islamic state is what keeps the Muslim countries colonised³¹. The narrative can also play into the larger master narrative about the Iraq Wars from the perspective of differences between Western and Islamic politics. Hence, the history of the Iraq Wars just presented is constructed to emphasise the failures and injustices of the Western countries’ politics towards Muslims by de-legitimising them while legitimising HT’s caliphate as the only just entity with just politics.

This is also evident in the positioning of the Iraq Wars within the US’s, Britain’s, and the colonial states’ many incidents where they according to HT turns a blind eye to humanitarian and ethical values, for example in Bagram, Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, but also monstrous massacres “scattered in all corners of the world, from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the terrible massacres in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Caucasus, Mali and Chechnya...among others”³². Hence, by pointing to these events HT shows that they are aware of historical events that, in their view, have negative consequences for Muslims. These are then used to promote their de-legitimising narrative about the West.

4.2.2 The Wars in Afghanistan

Even though the most common historical reference to the war in Afghanistan in HT rhetoric is the war from 2001-2011 initiated by the U.S. led “Operation Enduring Freedom” and beginning the so-called “war on terror” (Kamrava, 2013: 195f.), also references to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979-1989 (Fawcett, 2013: 207) are found in the sources. Therefore both wars must be included in this upcoming transhistorical narrative. Due to the proximity

²⁹ America is Dismantling Iraq, and Marching Behind it Spectra of the Kaffir Colonists. (2014: Main party)

³⁰ America is Dismantling Iraq, and Marching Behind it Spectra of the Kaffir Colonists. (2014: Main party)

³¹ Increased Attacks on Muslim Women in the UK is being Fuelled by Islamophobic Media and Western Foreign Policy (2013: Britain)

³² Threatening with Military Intervention in Syria, Which is Increasingly Talked About, is the Epitome of Evil (2013: Main party)

between this narrative and the ‘Iraq Wars’ narrative, I choose not to analyse the same citations or elements that I have indicated above to be prevailing for both Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead elements differentiating from Iraq and solely counts for the ‘War in Afghanistan’ narrative is here analysed. The historical references in this narrative are in general used to 1) construct the US’s war in Afghanistan as a failure, 2) legitimise the establishment of the caliphate, and 3) is most significantly used as an element within the identity level. When examining the publication dates of the sources referring to the 2001-war most of them are published after the termination of the war – eight of fourteen are published in or after 2013, i.e. two years after. This counts for publications from both the main party and national branches in Britain and Pakistan. In the leaflets published post-2013 the majority of historical references to the war in Afghanistan relates to the 1979-1989 war but includes the 2001-2011 war to put the US’s failure into a deeper perspective. This tendency is found in a differentiation between how HT uses history *during* the latest war and *after* its termination. Writing during the latter war, history is used to legitimise the establishment of the caliphate and strengthen the “true” Islamic identity while it after the war is used to explain the failure of US’s war in Afghanistan.

Beyond the publications analysed in the ‘Iraq Wars’ narrative from 2006 and 2008, HT began to publish leaflets about the US’s war in Afghanistan in 2009. Considering that the war had been going on for eight years before HT began directly using the US invasion in their narratives, I argue is an indication of that the party until then had been strategically assessing which direction the war would take – in favour of the US or the Muslims. Following his indication, I argue that HT analysed the line of events in favour for the US, why they presumably found it necessary to begin constructing narratives intended to turn the fortunes for the Muslims. This is evident in several citations from different leaflets, which show how HT uses history to both legitimise the establishment of the caliphate and to strengthen the Islamic identity among Muslims. This I claim is done to create a need for balancing the colonial powers, in a realist balance-of-power perspective (Viotti and Kauppi, 2012: 67). In 2009 HTB wrote:

“Since 1924, we have ended up divided into more than fifty weak and insignificant states whose rulers have systematically colluded with colonial powers against their own people, as our brothers and sisters have been massacred in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere. Without the Khilafah "Caliphate", we are without a shield, exposed to the most vicious colonialist attacks”³³.

³³ 85 years without Khilafah lead to division, chaos, and stagnation. Now, change is in the air (2009: Britain)

Here the history of the fall of the caliphate is used as a legitimising argument in establishing a new caliphate, while the references to the ‘brothers and sisters [that] have been massacred’ in several countries and historical events are used in a moral way. These elements are constructed in a way that is supposed to create an emotional connection to both the caliphate and the Muslims exposed to horrendous treatment during this war, making all Muslims aware that HT can save all Muslims from this fate under their caliphate. The reasons for constructing these elements in this way, I argue, is an expression of a mix between the existential, identity and positioning level. Especially the existential and identity level reflect that the Muslims worldwide must meet HT’s normative construction of a true Muslim protecting their existence. I consider it a part of the positioning level due to the appeal to Muslims to balance the US and the West due to the altered view of the clash between the West and Islam post-9/11 (Morey and Yaqin, 2011: 79). This is made clear by the following citation: *“Moreover, the Khilafah "Caliphate" is the only chance to bring stability and security to Afghanistan and Pakistan, a region plunged into chaos and bloodshed by Western intervention”*³⁴. This citation shows that the war is used as an appeal to the moral of Muslims all over the world to fight against the bloodshed by Western powers. The next citation show HT’s awareness of Muslims all around the world being exposed to ‘attacks’ and states that *“today for those who attack Islam in the West the issue is if one practices Islam and calls to account Western governments for their colonial wars in Iraq [and] Afghanistan”*³⁵. I contend that this way of referencing the war in Afghanistan by HT is a way to make it clear that, in their view, practising Islam and standing up to Western injustices is central for a Muslims’ identity. That is even clearer when HT in another leaflet writes that *“[we] believe that Islam does NOT allow joining secular political parties, especially when they promote policies that directly contradict Islamic values - such as the war of occupation in Afghanistan”*³⁶. Here it is interesting that HT uses ‘Islamic values’ as a political argument in resistance against the occupation of Afghanistan. Considering the citations and findings in this paragraph it is interesting that the post-2001 War in Afghanistan is narrated in a moral way compared to the Iraq Wars narrative. I contend that this can be explained by considering it a reaction to the 9/11 and a way to play into the power game in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq for an Islamic authority (Kamrava, 2013: 406). This is evident when HT in the following citation argues that the public opinion in Afghanistan has been misguided. In this argument an undertone of that the puppet rulers have

³⁴ Miliband says: Sharia is OK but no to Khilafah! We say: Stop redefining Islam and interfering in Muslim lands (2010: Britain)

³⁵ Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain gathers community leaders in Walthamstow, London (2009: Britain)

³⁶ The attack on Islamic Forum Europe is yet another example of hypocrisy in the campaign against Muslims in Britain (2010: Britain)

failed can be detected and that the caliphate is the only entity that can restore a right public opinion:

“after almost one and half decade, during which many elections passed, the western puppets during the first and second round of the elections tried to mislead the public opinion in Afghanistan, as if around 5 to 7 million people voted and believed in democracy in Afghanistan”³⁷.

After the end of the 2001-2011 war, the way HT uses history has changed - going from delegitimising the presence of Westerners, to using history to explain why The US has failed in their “*crusade against Muslims*”³⁸. Not only is the way HT uses history changed, now this latter war is included in a broader explanation of the US’s failure drawing references to the 1979-1989 war against the Soviets into the centre of explanation. Adding to this is HT’s extensive referencing of Pakistan almost as saviours of Afghanistan. This aspect I consider relevant to analyse to fully understand HT’s historical references in this context. As mentioned above the first war in Afghanistan from 1979-1989 was fought against the invading Soviet Union (Kamrava, 2013: 159). Explaining the reasons and history of the war is beyond the scope of this thesis³⁹, but in relation to HT’s perspective of the war, it is relevant to emphasise that this war took place during the Cold War meaning a power-game between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. Here many countries in the Middle East functioned as proxies for both parts (Fawcett, 2013: 63). When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the US quickly responded with support for Afghanistan to balance the Soviet Union. According to Marvin G. Weinbaum, this support came as economic support and arms for the Afghans, but it was channelled through Pakistan that also supported Afghanistan in hosting Afghani refugees, supporting the *mujahideen* (holy warriors), and transferring weapons across the border given by the US and other international powers (Weinbaum, 1991: 71f.). The reasons for helping Afghanistan must according to Weinbaum be found in Pakistan’s geostrategic and security reasons, which are beyond the scope of this thesis to explore⁴⁰, but the support for Afghanistan is what made the Afghans victorious (Weinbaum, 1991: 71f.). Consulting the publications from HT with this in mind, a paradox exists. On the one hand, HT gives Pakistan a significant role in

³⁷ Democratic Elections: A Humiliation for the Ones Trying to Reconcile Islam and Democracy through UN Mediation (2014: Afghanistan)

³⁸ Deal the Death Blow to America’s Presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2013: Pakistan)

³⁹ See; Kamrava M. (2013) *The Modern Middle East - A Political History Since the First World War* London: University of California Press., Fawcett L. (2013) *International Relations of the Middle East*, Oxford: Oxford University Press., and Schulze R. (2000) *A Modern History of the Islamic World*, London: I.B. Tauris.

⁴⁰ A thorough analysis of Pakistan’s role in the Soviet Union-Afghanistan War is found in Weinbaum MG. (1991) War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role. *Middle East Journal* 45: 71-85.

winning the war and saving an Islamic country from non-Islamic hegemony, but on the other hand criticise Pakistan and Afghanistan for letting the US support them and becoming puppet rulers. Considering that HT constructs this kind of historical events as narratives strengthening their ideology, I doubt that HT is willing to acknowledge the existence of this paradox.

Returning to the two wars' close relation in HT's narrative, the former war's status is in the following line of citations implicitly included. HT in Pakistan in 2013 wrote that, "*America is in a deep crisis within the tribal regions, on either side of the false border that divides the Muslims of Afghanistan and Pakistan*"⁴¹. In this positioning argument HT not only narrates the US as failing, but also constitutes a criticism of the colonial-fashioned Durand Line border originating from Pakistan's establishment in 1947 (Weinbaum, 1991: 72). This narrative of US in deep crisis is strengthened by HTB's statement that "*This particular American war has been the greatest quagmire into which it has sunk into, within its entire history of warfare*"⁴². With the emphasis on US's war against Afghanistan as the worst for them in the history of warfare, HT criticises their physical capabilities but also belittles the US's status of a superpower.

4.2.3 The Clash of Civilisations

This indirect master narrative entails many historical references used in different contexts and with different purposes reflecting the four transhistorical and two upcoming transhistorical narratives, but also uses of other historical events. Despite this diverse use of historical events, a common denominator is a Manichean perspective of the world that shapes the narratives (Weeks, 2016: 65). This dichotomy is found in HT's terminology of *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Kufr* and within Said/Huntington's theory of the Clash of civilisations, adopted by HT. This claim of HT having adopted this narrative is based my readings of the 143 publications but also from the former leader of the HTB, Omar Bakri Mohammed who in an interview with Douglas Weeks in 2012, stated that "*I believe in the clash of civilisations, it is inevitable. That is part of my belief [...] I am pro clash of civilisations because we believe the truth and falsehood must confront each other*" (Weeks, 2016: 65). Even though Omar Bakri was excluded from the party in 2004 and their attempt to mainstream themselves since, I argue that HT are still sustaining this world view.

This especially based on a direct mentioning of the clash of civilisations in the following three citations from two Syria-published leaflets from 2014: "*Muslims today constitutes most of the*

⁴¹ Deal the Death Blow to America's Presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2013: Pakistan)

⁴² Deal the Death Blow to America's Presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2013: Pakistan)

victims of its criminality, this became obvious immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, where its conflict was transferred against Islam as a civilization project”⁴³. Here HT uses the end of the Cold War and especially the fall of the Soviet Union as the beginning of the clash of civilisations. Later in the same publication, HT expands this understanding, writing that “[t]he conflict of civilization has progressed in the interest of Islam since the war waged by the America in the region so far”⁴⁴. Continuing this line of argument HT in Syria contextualises this clash of civilisations to fit the history of the prophet Muhammed to legitimise and strengthen the ideological narrative:

“this acclaimed conspiracy [i.e. use of agent rulers in Muslim countries against Islam] is nothing but a Western defeat in the arena of the clash of civilization against Islam, and the glad tiding of the imminent victory of Islam. It is the same clash that usually occurs between the haq (truth) and baatil (falsehood), between the followers of the Deen of Allah and the followers of Iblees [the Devil], since Allah created Adam until the Day of judgment, which was mentioned in the Qur’an, and mentioned in the Sunnah which makes it one battle; because its nature is one and its objective is one, it is hence the same battle that was mentioned in the Hadeeth of the Prophet (saw)”⁴⁵.

Not only is this clash between the West and Islam a historical phenomenon, but also a futuristic phenomenon in HT’s narrative. Hence, I claim that this clash of civilisation narrative is made a universal aspect for HT to include in narratives and legitimisation of the establishment of the caliphate. Considering that 2014 for Syria marked the height of the ongoing civil war and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) (Warrick, 2016: 414) combined with intense military intervention aimed at deposing the so-called Islamic State (Fawcett, 2013: 173), it is not surprising that HT in Syria uses this clash of civilisations narratives to strengthen the urgency of the caliphate and de-legitimisation of the Western realm of falsehood.

Despite this universalism of the master narrative, a difference exists between the main party’s and the national branches’ construction of clash of civilisations narratives. It is visible in the way historical events are constructed using more bombastic rhetoric by the main party compared to a more explanatory or almost subjective rhetoric by national branches. This difference, I argue, can be explained by the aspects of target groups and ideology-protection. Although an analysis

⁴³ The New Crusader Alliance led by America against the Ummah’s Revolution in Ash-Sham is weaker than the Cobweb (2014: Syria)

⁴⁴ The New Crusader Alliance led by America against the Ummah’s Revolution in Ash-Sham is weaker than the Cobweb (2014: Syria)

⁴⁵ Oh Muslims in Syria: Your Real War is with the West Who Wants to Prevent You from Establishing a Righteous Khilafah, While Bashar the Butcher is Only a Sheepdog in this Vicious War against Islam and the Muslims (Translated) (2014: Syria)

of HT's rhetoric is beyond the focus in this thesis, I will argue that rhetoric is a major instrument used by HT in their history use why I here present it as a pawn in the ideology-protection-game. With HT's transnational and strictly hierarchical organisation, I contend that the main party's target groups for publications are both individual Muslims worldwide, HT's national branches, other Islamic groups and regimes in Muslim-majority countries, etc. This means that the main party must construct narratives fitted to what Sinclair based on Kepel calls "Grand narratives", i.e. broad causal relations (Sinclair, 2010: 32). In this context these are the clashes between Muslims and the West throughout history. This HT must do in a way that combines the existential, identity and positioning levels to maintain and protect a strong ideological narrative which the main party often do through bombastic rhetoric. This is different from the way the national branches constructs narratives to reach their target groups, such as individual Muslims, the national media and national political sphere. The national branches must adapt their publications to the local context and often use history from the national host country while still fitting this history use into the grand narratives from the main party. Hence, the publications from the national branches often reflect a less bombastic and more explanatory, yet still ideological, rhetoric to fit the national discourses. The following pair of citations is but one example of this found in the sources. Writing about the presence of Western powers in Muslim countries in the Middle East in 2010, the first citation is derived from the main party and the second from HTB:

"Our second problem is the silence of the Ummah over the oppressive rulers and does not stand up to confront them or stop them. This is despite the humiliation that the rulers have brought to bear upon the Ummah...we have lost Palestine, Kashmir, Cyprus, East Timor and so on... then Sudan is on the brink of separation, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and now Yemen has been turned into an arena for the conflict of the West where the rulers are the tools and allies of the warring West"⁴⁶.

Here the references to events in history where the West is narrated as perpetrators of manipulating rulers in these countries bringing humiliation upon Islam must be considered expressions of the identity and positioning level. Drawing on some of the same historical events, HTB provides a more subtle narrative:

"America, Britain, France and other countries have a deep history of interference in Muslim lands - and elsewhere - for their own strategic and corporate interests: invasion, occupation, leaving behind conflict and division; the support for dictators

⁴⁶ America and Britain at the London Conference Fight each other over their own interests to gain stronghold on the land of Yemen! (2010: Main party)

and puppet regimes who oppress their people; the exploitation of the natural wealth and resources of the land by their multinational companies”⁴⁷.

This citation, I argue, is an equally strong criticism of the injustices done towards Muslims worldwide (in HT’s view) as the first citation and expresses a mix of the identity and positioning level as well. Hence the history use is almost similar, but the difference lies in the rhetoric.

The next narrative playing into the clash of civilisations master narrative is HT’s construction of the so-called “Crusaders”. This narrative is used to present the Medieval period of European Christian crusades to the Middle East fighting the Muslims. A clear periodically demarcation is lacking in HT’s narrative, but an approximation is found in only two leaflets from HT in the US (published 12.09.2013) and the main party (published 29.09.2013) which are in direct kinship by having the exact same wording in most of the leaflet:

“Also the Crusaders from the kingdoms of Europe united against us for about two hundred years since the late fifth century AH [Anno Hegirae, i.e. years after Muhammed’s escape from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE] corresponding to the eleventh century CE, then they were followed by the Tatars. Some of the kingdoms of the Crusades after the Fifth Crusade in 615 AH stood weak and shaky, however the Tatars did not bother with them, rather they attacked Islamic areas. Not only this, but the Crusaders after failing in that campaign tempted the Tatars and incited their attack on Muslim lands in 617 AH”⁴⁸.

As the citation shows, the period of the crusades seems to be referenced as the period, where the caliphate and the Muslims succeed in defeating the crusaders from the West. However, the two presented “facts” in this citation, i.e. the time period, and the Fifth Crusade as a failed campaign here stand up to scrutiny. According to the Medieval historians Wim Blockmans & Peter Hoppenbrouwers and Robert Bartlett the First Crusade towards the Muslim world was initiated by the Catholic Pope Urban II in 1095 and were followed by six crusades throughout the subsequent ca. 150 years ending in 1244 (Bartlett, 2000: 110; Blockmans and Hoppenbrouwers, 2014: 227-233). Following the periodisation of the six crusades by Blockmans & Hoppenbrouwers, what is referenced as the Fifth Crusade, is in fact the Sixth Crusade which took place from 1239 to 1240 (2014: 233). Converting the years 615 and 617 AH to the Gregorian calendar these years matches the Sixth Crusade. Also, I argue that the narration of the Western

⁴⁷ The abuse of Islam will not be stopped unless we re-establish the Islamic Khilafah State (2010: Britain)

⁴⁸ UN Security Council’s Resolution regarding Chemical Weapons Reveals the Reality of the Colonial Kuffar (2013: America) & UN Security Council’s Resolution regarding Chemical Weapons Reveals the Reality of the Colonial Kuffar They Stand United to Disarm All Sources of Power from the Muslim Lands (Translated) (2013: Main party)

Crusaders as ‘weak and shaky’, having ‘failed in that campaign’ and should have ‘tempted the Tartars and incited their attack’ is nothing but a construction of history fitted to the modern context.

Firstly, it was not the Tatars who followed the crusaders in attacking the Muslim world, it was the “*expelled Ayyubid ruler of Syria, as-Salih, and his allies from northern Iran [that] advanced through the Bekaa valley into Jerusalem, murdering even in the church of the Holy Sepulchre*” (Blockmans and Hoppenbrouwers, 2014: 233). Secondly, this Sixth Crusade disrupted a ten-year peace which indicates that the crusaders did not ‘stand weak and shaky’ – on the contrary showing a military strength since they came out successful in their crusade. However, the attack from as-Salih truly came as a chock for the crusaders and their defeat is probably what HT refers to (Blockmans and Hoppenbrouwers, 2014: 233). However, HT often refers to *Ummah*’s defeat of the Tartars in the same narrative, but it is rather unclear how these are connected.

A line of events has been constructed by HT in this ‘crusader’ narrative, such as references to the crusaders’ occupation of Palestine and Al-Quds (i.e. Jerusalem) and Sultan Salahuddin’s recapture of Al-Quds in the year 1205. It is shown in the following citations:

“[it] will be liberated by a strong leader who is pious and has the characteristics of Al- Farouq who had opened Al-Quds in the 15th year of Hijrah, he will be a leader who stands the trust of Al-Farouq who had decreed that No Jew will have his abode in Al-Quds. Such a leader will bear the character of Sultan Salahuddin who had recaptured Al-Quds from the filth of the Crusaders in the year 583A.H”⁴⁹.

This identity level construction of how a leader of the caliphate ought to be in the future caliphate by referencing Sultan Salahuddin’s fight against the crusaders is extended to the members of the caliphate in the next citation:

“The Crusaders destroyed the pulpit of al-Aqsa and converted the mosque as stable for their horses...but the Muslims did not engage themselves in vain protests [...] the Muslims were focused on re-organising troops under the command of Salahuddin, the Wali of Egypt and ash-Sham [the Levant] under the Khilafah which ruled with Allah has revealed and which fights in His path”⁵⁰.

Hence, the events are used to construct a history of an Islamic entity and leader capable of defeating the Westerners, but also to construct the roles of the caliph and members of the

⁴⁹ O People of Summits! (2010: Main party)

⁵⁰ Al-Quds cannot be liberated by resorting to protests and sit-in... it can only be restored by mobilizing armed forces to eliminate the Jewish entity! (2009: Main party)

caliphate. Likewise, this HT also use as a narrative to show the Muslims' past superiority against the West as well as Muslims today have the ability to be so again. Also, it is used to show the strength of the caliphate as the strongest country ever existed due to their capability of defeating the Western forces not only in military power but also in knowledge. Hence this narrative is allegedly constructed to strengthen the identity among modern Muslims, but also to present the historical background to Muslims worldwide. Likewise, these narratives are used to position and legitimise HT and the caliphate as a stronger force than Western powers. Hence when HT uses the 'crusaders' narrative to counter the modern Western ideas or intervention in Muslims countries, it is a way for HT to balance these.

Taking up the aspect of the caliphate, the references used by HT in this regard reflects an ideologically constructed history of how glorious it was. This 'gloriousness' is used in almost every publication to legitimise the need for its re-establishment. Departing from the existential, identity and positioning levels, the following citations show a historical construction of the 'best *Ummah*' and 'the most powerful of nations' in geographical terms, but also a construct of Muslims as saviours of the West from intellectual backwardness:

"For that reason, the Arabs and the other people became through this great Deen, the best Ummah to be raised up for mankind upon the face of the earth. It became the most powerful of nations and the most advanced in civilisation and knowledge until it became distinct and distinguished amongst the nations ... The borders of their state reached to the Pacific Ocean in the East, the Atlantic Ocean in the West, to the centre of Africa in the South and Siberia in the North. [...] On the knowledge and scientific advancement plain, then there is not enough space here to mention what the Ummah of Islaam reached to under the ruling of Islam in terms of scientific and knowledge based progress, flourishing and other aspects related to the affairs of civilisation. That was whilst the West remained in its cultural and economic backwardness throughout the period that it isolated itself from Islam and the West did not begin to flourish and revive until it began to come in contact with the Muslims, politically, in areas of knowledge and in trade. Then the European thought awoke from its slumber that lasted for centuries, as a result of the Islamic sciences, literacy, arts that came to them, to inherit all of this treasure, so that the industrial revolution would happen that the West boasts about now before the Islamic Ummah!"⁵¹.

The ideological construction of this narrative aside, the historical representation is in fact not entirely wrong. Despite conducting an orientalist account of the intellectual and geographical encounters with the past Muslim world, Ernest Renan confirms that the West "*from about the*

⁵¹ The Remembrance of the Birth of the Prophet (saw) on the 12th of Rabii' ul-Awwal. Is a Remembrance of Guidance, Honour and Consolidation (2016: Tunisia)

year 775, until towards the middle of the 13th century, that is to say for around 500 years, there had been scholars in Muslim countries, very distinguished thinkers. One can even say that, during this time, the Muslim world had been superior in terms of intellectual culture to Christendom” (Renan, 1883: 3). Although the citation above is from a 2016-publication, several references to the same elements in the history of the caliphate are found in almost every publication. An example of the construction of the caliphate in military and power perspective is found in a main-party publication from 2013:

“This Ummah had witnessed their adherents in the past: the Crusaders and Tatars who wreaked havoc, corruption, killing and destruction throughout the land, yet the Ummah had defeated them and expelled their evil. Becoming ruins as if they did not exist; and the Ummah returned to life once again, destroying its enemies, eliminating them from where they did not anticipate, thus the Ummah returned as the best nation sent to mankind”⁵².

In line with this, the past caliphate is constructed as an open and welcoming state embracing all seeking help or refuge in the next citation. This I claim is a construction of the caliphate representing the positioning level because it is published by HT in Scandinavia in 2015 in a context where Islam and the so-called ‘foreign fighters’ was strongly criticised in relation to the rise and demise of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (Lindekilde and Bertelsen, 2015: 30). The citation is as follows:

“You are well aware that you lived for centuries under the shade of a state that embraced and cared for those seeking sanctuary and the migrants, regardless of their beliefs and ethnic backgrounds. From hundreds of Qureishi [mercantile Arab tribe] who the Islamic State in Medina embraced to the 150,000 Jews who fled at the end of the fifteenth century from the Spanish Inquisition to the capitals of the Islamic State where they were embraced and allowed to live a natural life from the first day”⁵³.

Hence this construction of the caliphate, I argue, is an attempt to avoid too much clash between Islam and the Scandinavians while still glorifying the caliphate.

As mentioned in the characterisation of HT’s history use above, HT uses two other periods in their clash of civilisations narrative, i.e. imperialism and colonisation of the Middle East. In HT’s history use this is reflected in the Western intervention in the Middle East in the

⁵² Bashar the Tyrant shells the People of Syria in Response to the Jewish Aggression on Syria! (2013: Main party)

⁵³ The Waves of Refugees Influx is the Result of Western Foreign Policy Hostile to Humanity, The Islamic Nation is the Only One Able to Solve the Problem! (2015: Scandinavia)

20th century with a special emphasis on the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. A note should be made that in the common historical and political accounts concerning the Ottoman Empire, its termination is said to be when Mustafa Kemal proclaimed the Turkish republic on October 29, 1923 and not in 1924 as used by HT (Kamrava, 2013: 28; Schulze, 2000: 52f.; Lewis, 1998: 248f.; Grenville, 2005: 124). An explanation for this discrepancy between HT's reference to 1924 and the (more) historical correct 1923, has not been found. It especially the many, in HT's view, negative effects these 'colonialists' have brought to the Muslims countries which are used to de-legitimise the presence of the Western countries while also used to legitimise the establishment of the caliphate. This is exemplified in the following citation:

“Today marks 85 years since the colonialist agent Mustafa Kamal abolished the Islamic Khilafah "Caliphate" state. Since then, the Muslim Ummah has endured division, occupation, economic stagnation and foreign domination”⁵⁴.

Following the citation, the colonisers since the end of the Ottoman Empire have brought the division of Muslims and created puppet rulers to fulfil the colonisers' interests with damaging effects on Muslims. This ideological construction by HTB of the Muslims almost defenceless due to Western colonisation of Muslim countries is then expanded when the main party shortly after wrote that:

“[t]he Imperial Kuffar have never entered a land without corrupting it and demolishing its buildings and vandalizing its foundations, and the images of this still remain and have not been erased, indeed some of them still speak of their crime, and testify to their abusive treatment”⁵⁵.

Hence the construction of the Muslims' history as going down a slide since the end of the caliphate because of colonialism is both used to explain the Muslims' situation today, de-legitimise the presence of Western countries in the Middle East and as a strong ideological argument for establishing the caliphate as the only solution for ending this morass.

As the last focus of HT's history use within the clash of civilisations narrative, I now turn to HT's use of more contemporary events from around 2000 until 2016. Despite being quite diverse in content, I claim that they can be categorised within a “war of values” narrative. The reason for this narrative's existence is, according to Ahmed & Stuart, that HT's leadership in a strategy document from 1998 commanded “*the party's national executives in the West to*

⁵⁴ 85 years without Khilafah lead to division, chaos, and stagnation. Now, change is in the air (2009: Britain)

⁵⁵ Threatening with Military Intervention in Syria, Which is Increasingly Talked About, is the Epitome of Evil (2013: Main party)

incorporate localized international incidents [...] into a narrative of a “War on Islam” and the West’s “oppression” of Muslims” (2010: 147). As is shown below, HT uses history to legitimise why Islamic values are incompatible with contemporary Western values. This is done by using examples of Western campaigns and/or discourses that wants to force Muslims to adopt Western values. I argue that this constitutes a ‘war of values’ narrative used to uphold and defend the ‘right’ Muslim identity and to legitimise the caliphate’s approaching establishment to avoid corruption of Islamic values.

Writing in the contexts of the 9/11, Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the Madrid, London and Paris terror attacks in Europe, which in the West have been considered reasons to this war of values, I however argue that it for HT have been other events which have escalated this war. This I claim, emanates from the incidents where

“America desecrated the Noble Qur’an, then some journals in Denmark published cartoons mocking the Messenger of Allah, [...] this was blessed by other European publications and states, and today the Pope has initiated lies upon Islam and insulted its apex (Jihad)[sic]”⁵⁶.

Following this HTB in a 2007-leaflet drew up the contemporary battle lines between the West and Islam. Departing from existential and positioning wording, the following citation, I argue, is an attempt to de-legitimise the connotation of Islamism as evil and de-legitimise the basis of the modern Western construct of Islamism. The citation is as follows:

“Islam, in particular its political ideas such as Shariah, Khilafah and Jihad, are today attacked under the guise of attacking ‘Islamism’. ‘Islamism’ was a term created to label those Muslims who stand up to colonialism, speak out against dictators and desire the return of Islam to state and society in the Muslim world. Shariah is attacked as backward and oppressive, Khilafah as an ‘evil ideology’ and Jihad as ‘terrorism’. Even doing actions for Allah’s (swt) sake or seeking Jannah are now described as ‘extremist’ beliefs”⁵⁷.

What is relevant to emphasise in this citation is that HT accentuate the *sharia*, caliphate and *jihad* as solely political ideas and neglecting the religious understanding of these, while the ‘attack on Islamism’ seems to be an allusion to the religious/Islamic understanding of these. This, I argue, is an example of how HT’s leading ideologists/media representatives are masters of taking a modern context and construct a narrative based on historical references as a response, hence

⁵⁶ Would the Pope dare to attack Islam if the Islamic State – the Khilafah Rashidah – had been established? (2006: Main party)

⁵⁷ Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Struggle for Khilafah (2007: Britain)

defending their ideology. The same method is found in a leaflet eight years later, where also a development of the war of values can be deduced:

“What the press call their 'freedom to insult' has simply become a tool to bully and persecute a minority community - with a rise in far right and anti-Muslim sentiment across Europe. This collective act of incitement to hate is a reversion to type for an industry that has in the past smeared black people and Jews and Muslims across the world in the colonial past”⁵⁸.

The rhetoric in this citation is bombastic and defending compared to the previous, but HT legitimises this “counter-attack” by emphasising a rise in ‘anti-Muslim sentiment across Europe’. Likewise, using some of the Wests’ own “darker” periods in time, presumably the slave trading of indigenous peoples and the Holocaust together with the injustices done towards the Muslims in the colonial past, show that HT constructs a history strongly de-legitimising and attacking the Wests’ illegitimate actions. These illegitimate actions are mentioned at length in the majority of the sources, but in a leaflet from 2013 the fiercest are highlighted by the main party:

“America, Britain, France, Russia and all Kafir colonial states have for so long trampled all humanitarian and ethical values with their feet in the prisons of Bagram, Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib [...] They are infamous for competing in nuclear and biological crimes, weapons of mass destruction and monstrous massacres... Evidence of this is scattered in all corners of the world, from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the terrible massacres in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Caucasus, Mali and Chechnya...among others”⁵⁹.

Strongly ideologically this clutter of countries, also known as the international community in HT wording, are constructed in a moral way as wreckers of ‘all humanitarian and ethical values’ by again combining the Wests’ own historical darker events with events where Muslims are exposed to ‘massacres’. This, I contend, is done to position HT against the international community, but as written in a US leaflet:

“The basic idea of the international community remained the same: the war on Islam and Muslims with a change of means and methods but without the change of the general hostility against Islam and Muslims. This basic idea has not changed in the

⁵⁸ Hizb ut Tahrir Britain Denounces the Republication of Cartoons Insulting Prophet Muhammad (saw) (2015: Britain)

⁵⁹ Threatening with Military Intervention in Syria, Which is Increasingly Talked About, is the Epitome of Evil (2013: Main party)

current international position led by America and its allies, it still stems from hostility against Islam and Muslims”⁶⁰.

What is worth noticing is the phrase that ‘the basic ideas have not changed’ which I argue is supposed to be an explanatory historical reference to the entire past of clashes between the West and Islam. Deducing from this, I argue that HT from the 2000s have begun to construct the past through this lens of a war of values and constructing histories that fit the contemporary context. Combined with this and the historical consciousness revealed in the citations above, HT in Tunisia in 2016 wrote that the West “*have always attempted to draw the believers away from Islam or have them alter the message so that it fits with their own beliefs, traditions and values*”⁶¹, which I consider a great way to sum up the war of values because HT and Muslims have until now done the same and this hardly changes in the future.

Chapter 5: Discussion: The Importance of History and Narratives in Hizb ut-Tahrir

5.0 Introduction

Departing from the aim of examining Islamist narratives developed in the period from 2001-2016, it is found in the analysis that HT have established at least three new master narratives in the period – ‘the Iraq wars’, ‘the war(s) in Afghanistan’, and the indirect ‘Clash of Civilisations’. Furthermore, in the analysis it became clear that HT throughout the period, used history to construct narratives used to contextualise and position the party into a contemporary context. Especially the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ narrative is found to be the most significant and most influential in this respect. In line with my hypothesis I contend that the findings in the analysis indicate that HT’s capability of using history to construct narratives in a specific context is a significant explanatory factor in HT’s continuing existence. This is however discussed in the subsequent sections.

5.1 Why the ‘Clash of Civilisations’- narrative is the Key to HT’s Continuing Existence

The use of narratives by radical or extremist Islamist groups is not an unknown concept, but the extensive use of history to construct these is. Not only has the analysis shown that HT is a very

⁶⁰ UN Security Council’s Resolution regarding Chemical Weapons Reveals the Reality of the Colonial Kuffar (2013: America)

⁶¹ The Remembrance of the Birth of the Prophet (saw) on the 12th of Rabii’ ul-Awwal. Is a Remembrance of Guidance, Honour and Consolidation (2016: Tunisia)

history conscious party. It has also shown that both the main party and national branches are very capable in using this historical consciousness to construct ideology-supporting narratives. This I argue, reflects an extensive historical culture in HT which they exploit to the fullest when constructing vast number of references of the past into narratives tailored to a specific context. This for example is visual when considering each narrative used in the analysis as elements in HT's largest yet indirect master narrative 'Clash of civilisation'. From this perspective this master narrative must be considered an umbrella-narrative dependent on the many narratives used by HT in specific contexts and for specific purposes. For these narratives to fulfil their purpose, I argue, HT have until now been experts in constructing events of the past into a narrative which at first sight seems to be a correct historical account. However, examining these more thoroughly they reveal a combination of historical events constructed as the truth, but within the boundaries of the party's ideology. This has been exemplified in the analyses of all three narratives above. The significance of this Clash of civilisations narrative is that it is transversal in several ways. Therefore, I consider it the key to HT's continuing existence. As shown in the analysis, this umbrella-master narrative constitutes a strong and broad narrative. It is both dependent on and provider of narratives. This means that this narrative cross all the prisms established as analytical units in this thesis.

As found in the analysis, it is used by HT to explain almost every incident in which the West and Muslims have been in touch with each other. This means that HT successfully have constructed a master narrative which crosses the lines between history and narrative, truth and claimed truth, traditional and modern, time and space, local and global, cultural and non-cultural, structures and individuals, etc. As seen in the analysis, this master narrative is also suitable for crossing and mixing the existential, identity and positioning level in the construction of narratives. Especially by using the Clash of Civilisations master narrative HT shows a mix of stability, i.e. a solid ideology, and flexibility, i.e. construction of a transversal narrative.

The effects of this mix, I contend, is that this narrative is particularly relevant in recruiting new members to the party and since HT still gain new members, they are allegedly successful in exploiting this narrative to the fullest. Therefore, I argue that the Clash of civilisations narrative is the key to explaining HT's existence in the modern world. This 'modern world' or 'modernity' in general has not gotten much attention in this thesis but considering that HT constructs narratives intended to appeal to the 'Modern Muslim' it is of high importance for HT to make the past suitable for the modern world. To do this, I argue, HT uses the Clash of civilisations narrative because it is crossing the lines between the traditional Islamic history and the modern

historical reality (Taji-Farouki, 1996: xi). This makes Dietrich Jung & Kirstine Sinclair argue that HT's ideology is positioned within a Muslim modernity discourse that has occurred during the 20th century (Jung and Sinclair, 2016: 135). I do not intend to discuss modernity here as it is beyond the scope of this thesis⁶². Yet, as modernity has several aspects which can explain how the Clash of civilisations narrative is of significance for HT, I find it relevant to briefly touch upon. In this I depart from Jung & Sinclair's article from 2016 about modernity, subjectivity and religion in HT (Jung and Sinclair, 2016) stating that HT 1) as a non-state actor and social movement uses what Foucault termed dominance-technologies and propagates self-technologies to create a modern subject, and 2) notions about a modern social order and a modern subject can be connected with religious traditions and is not just a result of secularisation (Jung and Sinclair, 2016: 143f.).

Firstly, this understanding of a modern Muslim subject, i.e. an individual, is in line with the showdown of the causal relation between modernity and secularism found in both Roy, Kepel and Eickelman & Piscatory (Roy, 2004: 19; Kepel, 2002: 249; Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996: 23f.). According to Mandaville, this causal relation emanates from the common perception that secularism meant an individualisation of religions as seen in the European Renaissance and Reformation periods perceived as the modernisation of the West (2014: 9-12). Secondly, I argue that the first point by Jung & Sinclair can be explained by emphasising that HT through the Study Circles in national branches are shaping the individuals with the HT-ideology. Here it becomes a sort of culture or set of values that – in combination with the second point – are constructed by numerous narratives based on Islamic history and traditions. This is following Mandaville's argument, that social aspects and cultures are important (Mandaville, 2014: 18-21) and therefore I contend that HT almost constructs both a local and global HT culture. This combined with Taji-Farouki's argument of HT constructing the past to fit modern politics, I argue that the Clash of civilisations narrative is here used as an element of the existence and identity level. It is done to clarify what HT considers a good Muslim. An excellent example of this was found in the Wars in Afghanistan narrative.

⁶² Modernity is a widely discussed contested concept, why I have chosen only to read the most essential texts/works that relates to this thesis: Jung D. (2016) Understanding the Multiple Voices of Islamic Modernities: The Case of Jihad. *Temenos: Nordic Journal of Comparative Religion* 52: 61., Berger PL. (2014) *The Many Altars of Modernity: Toward a Paradigm for Religion in a Pluralist Age*, Boston: De Gruyter. and Jung D and Sinclair K. (2016) Modernitet, subjektivitet og religion - Hizb ut-Tahrir forestillinger om den moderne muslim. *Temp - tidsskrift for historie*.

As the imagined orientalist geographical boundaries between the West and Islam since the beginning of the 1970s has been fading due to Muslim migrant workers coming to Europe, the hard line between the Christian and the Muslim cultures have ceased to exist (Kepel, 2002: 191; Silvestri, 2007: 57). Considering that the British branch of the party was established in 1986 it is interesting that HT did first acknowledge the migrated Muslim's decision to become permanent residents in the West, in 2005 (Ahmed and Stuart, 2010: 147). Adding to this, when the main party in 1998 commanded the national branches to fit the "war on Islam" discourse which emerged in the 1990s into their work, they indirectly acknowledged that the party's transnationalism had reached Europe (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996: 142). Therefore, with the geographic distinctiveness between the Christian West and the Muslim East, I argue that the Clash of civilisations narrative must be considered a tool for HT to uphold the Manichean dichotomy between the West and Islam as civilisations in line with the anti-Western and anti-systemic ideology (Roy, 2004: 46f.). Hence this master narrative constitutes a combination of a historically based understanding of a traditionally divided world with a modern understanding of a globalised world wherein Muslim minority communities have begun to conduct their own local Muslim politics (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996: 20f.). This is according to Taji-Farouki, HT's strength and cause for continuing existence (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 190f.) but it also reflects Mandaville's argument about rising Muslim politics as part of post-Islamism (Mandaville, 2014: 369). Based on these elements, I claim that the Clash of civilisations narrative is the only narrative used by HT having the flexibility to cover or play into all levels – ideologically, traditionally and moder. On account of this, this master narrative is of specific significance for the party at both global and national level.

Furthermore, in line with Roy's analysis of the effects of globalisation I argue that this Clash of civilisations narrative has been used by HT to cross the boundary not only of time but also space. This is especially seen in the Iraq Wars and Wars in Afghanistan narratives, where these wars have taken place in a local setting, i.e. in Iraq and Afghanistan, but through the narrative are included as elements in the grand narrative of a clash between the West and Muslims (Sinclair, 2010: 32). This is explained by Mandaville's argument of the connection between local and global spheres as well as the importance of the interplay between these (Mandaville, 2014: 2). Here I claim that the Clash of civilisations narrative constitutes the interplay between these spheres. Hence this master narrative is global and local at the same time, which makes it capable of providing answers and a sense of belonging to something bigger for individual HT members while them being located far away from the events addressed in the narrative. This ability has

most certainly come as a result of globalisation and the development of the internet (Roy, 2004: 168; Kepel, 2004: 7). Thus, I argue that this narrative already works as an element in HT's argument found several times in the empirical material that the global *Ummah* already exists and that HT only needs to establish the caliphate to reach the third stage of the so-called "Method of the Prophethood". This is also based on HT's promotion of themselves as the only actors who can provide a proper life for Muslims no matter where they live – by contradicting only if they live under the caliphate.

Considering the characteristics of the narrative mentioned in this chapter, I claim that it is self-perpetuating. Contradictory to the historian Francis Fukuyama's argument that the history has ended (Fukuyama, 2006: xi), I argue that it is inevitable that the future will bring further clashes between the West and Muslims ideologies. Therefore, I have argued elsewhere that I consider this master narrative both a historical, modern and futuristic narrative which HT have mastered. It is self-perpetuating because the greater the number of clashes between the West and Muslims becomes, the stronger does the clash of civilisation master narrative get. This means that the historical consciousness of HT expands, and they can exploit this in constructing narratives fitting new modern contexts. It is a circular process which I argue is not declining in the future – on the contrary. The stronger the narrative gets, the easier it is for the party to legitimise their ideology and de-legitimise the Western ideas. This then makes it easier to recruit new members, spread their non-violent 'analyses' of the contemporary context, and propagate their ideology towards their target groups.

Unfolding this argument further, I argue that the Clash of civilisations narrative constitute an overarching flexible narrative with a strong ideological core which easily resonates in young Muslims. This primarily counts for young Muslims with a low interest in history or long, complicated Islamic teachings – they want a quick explanation for their current insecurity and often feeling of injustice towards them directly or towards Muslims around the world (Roy, 2004: 29). This narrative can provide exactly that – either by unfolding the entire Clash of civilisations narrative or by using one of the narratives included in the umbrella-narrative. When HT uses it in this way, it becomes an act of narrating a constructed history fitted to the context in which the recruitment happens. This must also be seen in the context of Baran's argument that the idea of the caliphate and uniting of *Ummah* has become tangible (Baran, 2005: 69). Hence, HT have made it a reachable goal rather than just a utopian ideal through this narrative. This is an example of HT succeeding in constructing a narrative gaining hegemony within the Muslim world.

The last aspect proving the Clash of civilisations narrative to be the key to HT continuing existence is topicality. As stated in the paragraph above the clash between the West and Muslims are hardly on decline. Therefore, I claim that this master narrative will henceforth be a relevant tool for HT to explain what Fernand Braudel called the *longue durée* (Middell, 2003: 115), i.e. the long-term historical structures of the history of encounters between the West and the Muslims. However, for the use of the *longue durée* to be an effective tool, HT must construct the Clash of civilisations narrative to the contemporary topicality, which they do. The first indication of this is that the national branches after 2005 have begun contextualising their publications as reactions to specific events making them a reactionary rather than proactive party. Also, a tendency is that the frequency of publishing follows national events, hence grasping the topicality. Examples of this are the veiling bans or the Danish cartoons, whereupon HT constructed the Clash of civilisations narrative as a response in that context. This is but two examples from a national branch. These examples show that HT are mixing this master narrative with minor and locally contextualised narratives indicating a flexibility of the party in combining the *longue durée* and topicality. This I claim makes them capable of continuing being a relevant and up-to-date party.

5.1 HT's Successful Contextualisation of Narratives

Even though it seems to be the narratives which are central for HT's ability to contextualise and position themselves, I based on the findings above argue that it is HT's history use in constructing narratives to the modern political situation which makes HT exist. The observation that three new master narratives have begun to be used since 2001 show that despite having a tight ideological frame, HT have succeeded in drawing both historical events and modern incidents symbiotically into their contemporary narratives meeting the topicality. This, I argue, is what makes the party appear as a relevant and truthful player in the 'narrative-fight' against the West and other Islamic groups on the market for 'true' interpretations of Islam (Iannaccone and Berman, 2006: 111). In this perspective HT's history use and narrative construction reach its highest purpose, i.e. an act of winning the 'war of ideas' in a changing contemporary context. The basic fact that HT still exist proves that HT's use of history in their narratives is essential for HT's ability to provide interpretations of the contemporary context and their relation to the 'true' Islam resonating in their target group.

A reason for this, I argue, is that contrary to other Islamist groups/organisations such as MB or al-Muhajiroun, HT does not confer to violence to reach their ideology – instead they exploit this

“war of ideas” by winning Muslim hearts and minds (Kepel, 2004: 139). And it is working. See for example Al-Qaeda, Taliban or Islamic State, who all conferred to some kind of violence and have been met with violence and hostility not only among Westerners but also Muslims arguing that these groups’ interpretation of Islam has been wrong (Bonino, 2018: 47). Instead HT’s non-violent interpretation of Islam has been far more appealing for both non-Muslims and Muslims – even though non-Muslims often consider HT a threat to the Western ideas (Morey and Yaqin, 2011: 2).

As especially indicated in the Wars in Afghanistan narrative, HT’s awareness and strategic analysis of an event made HT use history differently depending on whether publishing during or after the event. This I argue is a second reason for HT winning the wars of ideas. During the event HT constructed cautiously narratives in line with the identity level, while they after the event almost bombastically constructed existential and positioning narratives. Hence during the ongoing event HT seems to be assessing the situation while HT after its termination moves on to react on what has happened and use this event in relation to other events like this. This is done to extensively defend their ideology and Muslims in general.

A third reason lies in the act of communicating HT’s ideology and their narratives. This topic has not been the primary focus up until now in a classical communication perspective, but during my reading of the sources a significant tendency has been identified – repetition. HT are very repetitive. In almost every publication there is a paragraph outlining some element in history to legitimise or explain why the caliphate is relevant to establish. They also constantly repeat how the caliphate must follow the way it has been established in the past and how much ‘glory’ this caliphate has brought. I contend that several reasons for HT’s repetitiveness exist. The first is that when members gets the same narrative repeated over again, it becomes their belief or conviction. This can be explained in what Roy has identified as the change from traditional religion to an individual faith based on feelings (Roy, 2004: 29). For example, when HT constructs narratives within the existential and identity level they often use injustices (according to HT) done to Muslims, locally and globally. Hence, they play into the individual’s feelings and making them feel a collective injustice. The other reason is that due to a high influx of new members and loss of others, it makes sense to keep repeating the same narratives because they always are considered new and interesting by some (Sinclair, 2010: 17 & 33). Likewise, it also explains why HT use four “standard” transhistorical narratives since 1952, but it might very well be the Clash of civilisations narrative which has gotten new members to join, why this narrative is essential for HT’s continuing existence.

Also, internally in HT the construction of narratives has a vital role for contextualisation. When using historical references to construct narratives throughout the period, it is relevant to remember that the publications by HT have been authored by someone in the party who are following the tendency of the party's history use. I have called these 'leading ideologists responsible for text production' earlier. In this argument lies a connotation that strengthens the argument of HT constructing narratives based on their historical consciousness rather than referencing more common historical accounts. The point is that the historical events used are either too far back in time or geographically distanced for the person writing the publications. This means that the person has never experienced these himself. Instead it is the party's ideological frame and the customary tendency to portray historical events in a certain way that the person bases the writings upon. This means that if the author does not thoroughly understand the different narratives used by HT and the history these are constructed upon the right narratives are not communicated correctly. This weakens HT's appearance and position in the 'war of ideas'. Hence it is as vital for the leading ideologist responsible for text production to fully grasp the historical culture and consciousness as it is to construct these in line with the purpose of the communication fitting the topicality.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Setting out to examine the phenomenon of narratives in Islamism through the lens of 'history use' and narrative construction by Hizb ut-Tahrir in the period from 2001 to 2016 I can now conclude that use of history in narrative-constructions throughout the period has had a significant role for HT's continuing existence. In Hizb ut-Tahrir, the history use has barely changed throughout the period, which I have found to be caused by HT's ideology. This means that the history used in narrative-construction is in fact constructed history rather than commonly established historical accounts. However, due to an acceptance of the transnationality of the party, HT have become more flexible in their constructions of narratives which reflects the contemporary context. This counts for both the main party and the national branches which constructs their narratives on global and local historical events, respectively. In line with this, it has been found that the main party and the national branches use the same historical consciousness in narrative-construction but a difference in rhetoric exist.

In the analysis, four established transhistorical narratives, two upcoming historical narratives and an indirect transhistorical narratives have been identified. The four established transhistorical narratives are; 'colonialism or imperialism', 'the Israel-Palestine issue', 'America in the Middle

East or Muslim World’, and ‘the end of the *Khilafah* in 1924’. The two upcoming transhistorical are; ‘the Iraq Wars, and ‘the Wars in Afghanistan’. The indirect transhistorical narrative is the ‘Clash of civilisations’. It has been found that HT throughout the period have used history within three levels that has shaped how they have constructed these transhistorical narratives: The existential level, the identity level, and the positioning level as the most extensive. In relation to this it has been found that the most common ways of using history to construct narratives are to, de-legitimise Western interference with the Muslim world, legitimise the establishment of the caliphate, and most relevant to put an event into a larger perspective. As to why history has been used in narrative construction is almost equally distributed between the three categories of ‘using history to explain the world’, using history to constitute identities’, and ‘to influence the world’. This has depended on the context and purpose of the narrative constructed. Furthermore, it has been found that a difference exists between HT’s history use during and after an event. During the event HT have constructed narratives within the identity level while HT have constructed narratives within the existential and positioning level after the event. This leads me to conclude that HT is a reactionary party strategically assessing the contemporary context to determine how to balance the situation.

In the discussion it has been found that the flexibility of constructing narratives to certain contexts is caused by the ‘Clash of civilisations’ transnational narrative. This is due to its transversal essence which has made it able to cross all analytical prisms and levels established. Furthermore, it has been found that HT have successfully mastered the infinite number of possible applications of this transhistorical narrative. This has made it the most used and the narrative used most differently which is due to its functioning as an umbrella-narrative. It has been found that this transnational narrative has been primarily used in recruitment of new members and securing existing members due to its reliability and universality. Due to the universality of this transhistorical narrative it has been identified as a self-pertaining and expanding narrative which HT successfully has grasped.

Based on these findings I hereby conclude that history use in construction of narratives is a significant and explanatory factor for Hizb ut-Tahrir’s continued existence. Especially HT’s history use in constructing the transversal ‘Clash of civilisations’ narrative to contemporary contexts has been essential for HT’s existence in the period examined here and will be in the future.

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
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Appendices

Appendix 1: Figure of HT's Organisational Structure



Source: Taji-Farouki, Suha (1996), *A Fundamental Quest – Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate*, London: Grey Seal, p.116

Key concepts	How	Why	
<p>1) Historical consciousness</p> <p>is defined by Jensen to be “any kind of consciousness concerning the processing conditions between past, present and future, as these processes are understood as conditional to and/or created by acts of humans” [translated by author] (Jensen, 2003: 59f). Thus, it is the processes by which individuals understand the relation between the past, present and future.</p> <p>2) Historical culture</p> <p>is originally defined by Ruisen to be “the life coherences and the societal context which the historical consciousness emanate from and work in” (Jorn Ruisen in Warring, 2011: 10). Building on this, Nordgren argues that historical consciousness “comprises all references to the past that are available in a given context, such as artifacts, rituals, customs, and narratives. A historical culture also includes the networks through which these references are distributed, such as schools, cultural institutions, and the media” (Nordgren, 2016: 481). Adding to the concept, Bryld defines it as “the individual and collective process by which the history is communicated and used on the basis of certain types (genres) and norms [translated by author]”</p>	<p>3) A scientific,</p> <p>done by history researchers for discovering and re-constructing history with the intent of verification and interpretation</p> <p>4) an existential,</p> <p>done by all people for remembering and forgetting functioning as orientation and anchorage</p> <p>5) a morally,</p> <p>done by well-educated and intellectuals meeting re-discovering needs to rehabilitate, restoring and reconciliation</p> <p>6) an ideological,</p> <p>which is practised by intellectual and political elites to invent and construct, to legitimise and rationalise</p> <p>7) a political-pedagogical,</p> <p>practiced by intellectuals, political elites and pedagogues to meet illustrating, publicizing and debating needs with the intent of politicising and instrumentalising</p> <p>8) a non-use of history,</p> <p>also practised by intellectuals and political elites with the intent to forget and erase, to legitimise and rationalise</p>	<p>9) a commercial use,</p> <p>used by professionals within commercials and economy to increase profit and increase the value of history, used to commercialization</p> <p>10) Identity formation,</p> <p>due to its part of personal and collective identity</p> <p>11) history use that put something/someone into perspective,</p> <p>especially as part of meeting the, in Edward Said’s term, ‘other’ and the different</p> <p>12) history use as competence in a certain scenario,</p> <p>i.e. a possibility of a person to grasp the connections between peoples’ conditions for actions, possibilities, choices and consequences in a sociocultural setting.</p> <p>13) legitimising and de-legitimising,</p> <p>in relation to clarifying interests, principles and values</p> <p>14) enlightening and clarifying,</p> <p>when used in an intellectual and scholarly fashion</p> <p>15) playing and amusing</p> <p>when used in an amusing setting</p>	<p>16) ‘Using history to explain the world!’</p> <p>the world is explained by means of historical references, analogies and metaphors (Nordgren, 2016: 488). Furthermore the differences between the past and present is in that process narrated relating to the present context, and thus the “narratives that are produced become material for constituting identities and influencing the world</p> <p>17) ‘Using history to constitute identities!’</p> <p>Nordgren uses Arendt’s point that it “is through communication that people emerge as individuals for one another and as part of the world”. Nietzsche’s point that “past events are highlighted as a cultural heritage worth preserving, creating emotional ties to a place and a community” and lastly Ruisen’s point that people need recognition and continuity</p> <p>18) ‘To influence the world!’</p> <p>is to use history as an argument for criticising, challenging and mobilizing against an establishment or in broader terms used as arguments, examples or symbols to achieve change</p>

Appendix 2: Coding Index

Appendix 3: List of Sources

Original publisher	Publication date	Titel	Publication type	Access date	Place of retrieval
HT Main party	24.07.2001	America and Europe agree upon a united stance, regarding what is occurring in occupied Palestine	Leaflet	19.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/151/
HT Main party	07.04.2002	To the Military Leaders, Staff Officers, All Ranks of the Armed Forces, and the People of Power and Support in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon	Leaflet	19.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2571/
HT Main party	19.10.2002	The correct bond is the bond of the Islamic 'Aqeedah, not the Francophone bond	Leaflet	19.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/150/
New Statesman	13.09.2004	For Allah and the caliphate	Article	14.03.2019	https://www.newstatesman.com/node/195114
HT Main party	08.02.2005	Bush current tour of Europe exposes the shaking of the throne of American unilateralism in international politics	Leaflet	20.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/153/
HT Main party	24.02.2005	Bush current tour of Europe exposes the shaking of the throne of American unilateralism in international politics	Leaflet	20.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/153/
HT Main Party	21.05.2005	This is how the butcher of Andijan executed his crime	Leaflet	20.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/155/
HT Main Party	09.06.2005	O Muslims! Shape the Middle East by your own hands, for you are its rightful owners	Leaflet	20.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/152/
HT Main Party	18.09.2005	Would the Pope dare to attack Islam if the Islamic State – the Khilafah Rashidah – had been established?	Leaflet	20.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/149/

HT Main Party	12.08.2006	THE LEBANESE BLOOD IS WASTED BY A FATAL RESOLUTION IN THE AMERICAN--FRENCH STRUGGLE MARKET, WITH THE BLESSING AND CONNIVANCE OF THE RULERS IN THE MUSLIM COUNTRIES!	Leaflet	20.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/136/
HT Main Party	17.09.2006	Would the Pope dare to attack Islam if the Islamic State – the Khilafah Rashidah – had been established?	Leaflet	20.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/121/
HT Britain	20.10.2006	Labour attacks Muslim community to cover up leadership crisis and disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan	Weilah Publication	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/130/
HT Main Party	04.11.2006	Oh! The Muslim Soldiers: Is there not a wise person amongst you, who is concerned about the condition of Islam & Muslims, their modesty and honour?	Leaflet	20.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/122/
HT Main Party	29.03.2007	America ‘organises’ the Arab Summit in Riyadh! To finalise the Muslim Issues, particularly Palestine	Leaflet	21.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/172/
HT Britain	06.07.2007	Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Struggle for Khilafah	Weilah Publication	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/297/
HT Main Party	25.08.2007	Kuwait on hunting campaign directed at the Shabab of Hizb ut-Tahrir Accuses them of working for establishing the Islamic Khilafah!	Leaflet	21.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/250807HT.pdf
HT Main Party	25.11.2007	Palestine will not be freed by the Ministers stooping at the doorsteps of Bush at Annapolis; It will be liberated by armies fighting Jews at the al-Quds Walls.	Leaflet	21.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/337/

HT Main Party	28.11.2007	The Palestinian Authority submissive to the Jews, Traitor to Allah, His Prophet and the believers	Leaflet	21.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/345/
HT Main Party	28.02.2008	Oh Muslims, the Khilafah alone will shut the evil tongues from offending the Prophet	Leaflet	21.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/371/
HT Main Party	02.03.2008	One Word!Palestine's Victory is by opening fronts and mobilizing troops. Otherwise it is nothing but treachery with Allah, His Prophet & the believers.	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/020308HT.pdf
HT Britain	29.03.2008	Only the return of the Khilafah will silence those who attack Islam	Weilah Publication	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/380/
HT Main Party	30.03.2008	Oh People: Your Rulers are Shameless!When the US Summons them to Annapolis; Both Riyadh & Damascus Comply ... America Lines them up in two camps so Riyadh & Damascus Hate Each other.	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/300308HT.pdf
HT Britain	16.08.2008	Islam demands the Political Unity of this Ummah	Weilah Publication	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/570/
HT Main Party (The Amir)	13.09.2008	A Message from the Amir of Hizb ut-Tahrir On the 87th Remembrance of the Destruction of the Khilafah	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/130908HT.pdf
HT Main Party	07.10.2008	THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY IS SUCIDAL JUST AS THE COMMUNIST SOCIALISM WAS, ONLY THE ISLAMIC MODEL IS THE SURE-CURE AND SAFE FROM ECONOMIC PITFALLS	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/071008HT.pdf

HT Main Party	17.11.2008	At last the Drama of 'Deceptions & Manipulations' led to Security Accord and the Iraqi regime accepts the US mandate in Iraq!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lfIts_pdf/171108HT.pdf
HT Main Party	09.01.2009	Resolution 1860 is a disgraceful slap in the face of the rulers in the Islamic Lands	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lfIts_pdf/090109HT.pdf
HT Main Party	19.01.2009	O Muslims! Is not the time for you to realise that the Khilafah is your only refuge which can salvage you?	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lfIts_pdf/190109HT.pdf
HT Britain	17.02.2009	Leaked - UK Government to compel Muslims to adopt secular liberal values	Press Release	29.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/164.html
HT Britain	25.02.2009	Blears Message to Muslims: Change your values, Ignore Foreign Policy and Obey the State	Press Release	29.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/177.html
HT Britain	03.03.2009	85 years without Khilafah lead to division, chaos, and stagnation. Now, change is in the air	Press Release	29.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/176.html
HT Main Party	08.04.2009	Obama Offers Sugar-Coated Poison for the Region!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lfIts_pdf/HTeng08XXXXXX-XXXX
HT Britain	17.05.2009	HT Britain's statement to Muslim Community on MPs expenses scandal	Weilah Publication	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/729/
HT Main Party	04.06.2009	Obama Invades Muslim Countries Beginning with	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en

		Turkey to Egypt past Saudia!			n lflts pdf/HTen04062009.pdf
HT Main Party	26.06.2009	Hamas Regime is imitating the Fatah Regime at every step!!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/709/
HT Main Party	01.07.2009	Rulers of Turkey are out of their minds, they remain unremorseful!!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/HTen010709.pdf
HT Main Party	10.07.2009	East Turkestan has no “Mu’atasim”	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_w_pdf/100709HT.pdf
HT Britain	05.10.2009	Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain gathers community leaders in Walthamstow, London	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/334.html
HT Main Party	06.10.2009	Al-Quds cannot be liberated by resorting to protests and sit-in... it can only be restored by mobilizing armed forces to eliminate the Jewish entity!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/HTen06102009.pdf
HT Britain	27.11.2009	Press Conference Statement from Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain	Press Release	28.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/381.html
HT Britain	14.12.2009	Tory lies about Hizb ut-Tahrir exposed	Press Release	28.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/399.html
HT Main Party	27.01.2010	America and Britain at the London Conference Fight each other over their own interests to gain stronghold on the land of Yemen!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1232/

HT Britain	27.01.2010	Miliband says: Sharia is OK but no to Khilafah! We say: Stop redefining Islam and interfering in Muslim lands	Press Release	28.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/433.html
HT Britain	20.01.2010	Cameron's obsession for a ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir shows the world what freedom and democracy really mean!	Press Release	28.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/425.html
HT Britain	01.03.2010	The attack on Islamic Forum Europe is yet another example of hypocrisy in the campaign against Muslims in Britain	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/478.html
HT Main Party	28.03.2010	O People of Summits!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1220/
HT Britain	09.09.2010	The abuse of Islam will not be stopped unless we re-establish the Islamic Khilafah State	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/662.html
HT Britain	07.10.2010	Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain launches campaign: Save Pakistan - Establish Khilafah	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/682.html
HT Main Party	29.11.2010	To Dr. Hakim Al-Mutairi, author of the book: The Ideological Controversy and the Political Crisis	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1659/
HT Main Party	18.01.2011	The rule of the tyrant, Ben Ali, left secretly from the door and then returned back from the window, after all of the bloodshed!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1230/

HT Britain	20.01.2011	It is the Westminster political system that Sayeeda Warsi is part of that has fuelled Islamophobia in Britain	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/760.html
HT Main Party	29.01.2011	“So take heed, O people of insight!”	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1229/
HT Main Party	12.02.2011	Thirty years ago, Sadat fell dead by the faithful men of Egypt, a penalty for his sin of signing the treacherous Camp David Accords with the Jewish entity occupying Palestine, the land of Isra and Mira, and the land of al-Aqsa Mosque.	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1228/
HT Main Party	16.05.2011	The leaders of the Jews command their army to kill us in the Golan, Maroun al-Ras and Beit Hanoun, and the rulers of the Muslim lands around Palestine command their armies to kill their own people!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1227/
HT Britain	07.06.2011	PREVENT - Cameron admits defeat by forcing Muslims to convert to liberal values	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/908.html
HT Main Party	31.07.2011	Q&A: Turkish army resignations and Oslo bombings	Political Analysis	24.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/1240/
HT Main Party	28.08.2011	And After Bin Ali and Mubarak, the Third Tyrant Gaddafi Falls	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1226/
HT Main Party	09.11.2011	Q&A: Euro Crisis	Political Analysis	24.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/1238/

HT Main Party	11.11.2011	This is how the United States through its organ, the Arab League grants extra time to the Syrian Reg	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1225/
HT Main Party	15.05.2012	O Muslims! Do not accept a substituent to the Islamic banner and flag;	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1287/
HT Main Party	20.06.2012	Question & Answer: The Meaning of “Ruling in Islam”	Political Analysis	25.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/1717/
HT Main Party	25.06.2012	Khilafah is the only ruling system obligated by Allah, the Lord of the Worlds Calling for the democratic civil state is great sin, especially if the call is from the mouths of Muslims!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1324/
HT Main Party	13.08.2012	In Kenanah “Egypt,” only seats... Are set aside at the cost of continuing tragedies!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1368/
HT Main Party	01.09.2012	Question & Answer: IS there a Specific Banner Regarding Color or Shape that the People of al-Sham Should Abide?	Political Analysis	25.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/1749/
HT Main Party	15.11.2012	Question & Answer: Departments & Sectors in Khilafah State	Political Analysis	25.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/1756/
HT Main Party	17.11.2012	Supporting Gaza is Neither through Calling for Peace Nor through Delegations for Condolence of the Martyrs, but Only through that Strikes the Jewish Entity Morning and Evening	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1447/
HT Britain	16.01.2013	Mali Invasion - Yet Another Colonial War in the Muslim World!	Press Release	30.03.2019	Missing
HT Main Party	24.01.2013	Speech of Ameer of Hizb ut Tahrir, the Aalim, Ata Ibn Khalil Abu Arashtah - may Allah protect him - to our People in Al-Sham and to the Sincere Revolutionaries	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1506/

HT Britain	01.02.2013	Britain and France in North Africa Repeated Invasion of Muslim Countries Cannot be Stopped without the Islamic Khilafah State	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/1767.html
HT Main Party	13.03.2013	O People of Al-Sham: America Prepares a Poisonous Transitional Government, Do not allow it to Enter Your Country. Escalating Massacres so you can accept their plots, Seek Victory from Allah, and He will Grant you Nusrah and Instill Steadfastness in you.	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1577/
HT Main Party	07.05.2013	Bashar the Tyrant shells the People of Syria in Response to the Jewish Aggression on Syria!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1646/
HT Main Party	20.05.2013	The Tyrant of ash-Sham and the Iranian Regime and its Hizb in Lebanon Repeat Hulagu's Destruction of Baghdad in Qusair!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1669/
HT Britain	20.05.2013	Increased Attacks on Muslim Women in the UK is being Fuelled by Islamophobic Media and Western Foreign Policy	Weilah Publication	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/1860/
HT Main Party	27.05.2013	'Nero' of Sham Escalates Burning, Destruction and Killing of Humans, Trees and Stone So where are the Muslim Armies to rescue the elderly, widows, orphans and the injured ones?! (Translated)	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1626/
HT Main Party	01.06.2013	Series of Questions Addressed to Scholar Sheikh Ata Bin Khalil Abu Al-Rashtah, Ameer of Hizb ut Tahrir through his Facebook Page. The answer to the question: 'The manner Hizb ut Tahrir uses to express itself'.	Political Analysis	25.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/1773/
HT Pakistan	06.06.2013	Open Letter to Nawaz Sharif from Hizb ut Tahrir Wilayah Pakistan	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1754/

HT Pakistan	20.06.2013	Policy for Agricultural Development, Food Security and Rural Prosperity June 2013 CE - Shaban 1434 AH	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1769/
HT Pakistan	21.06.2013	Deal the Death Blow to America's Presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1797/
The Ameer's Facebook page	23.06.2013	The Answer to the Question: The meaning of the Hadeeth	Political Analysis	25.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/1818/
The Ameer's Facebook page	24.06.2013	Answer to the question: Regarding the Time Limit for the Muslims to Establish the Khilafah	Political Analysis	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/2132/
HT East Africa	05.07.2013	Obama's Tour is a Peril to Africa and Humanity!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1814/
HT Afghanistan	03.08.2013	The Outcome of Participation in Democratic Elections: Assaulting the Values of the Muslims in Afghanistan	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1916/
HT Pakistan	19.08.2013	Policy for Securing the Health of the Citizens of the Khilafah	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1909/
HT Main Party	28.08.2013	Threatening with Military Intervention in Syria, Which is Increasingly Talked About, is the Epitome of Evil	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1912/
HT Britain	28.08.2013	US-UK Intervention in Syria is Not to Help the People but to Block the Progress of the Islamic Change	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/2566.html
HT Australia	30.08.2013	Voting and Political Participation Promise Illusions! The Way Forward for Muslims is in Fostering an Independent, Unique, Role Model Community	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1932/
HT America	12.09.2013	UN Security Council's Resolution regarding Chemical Weapons Reveals	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1957/

		the Reality of the Colonial Kuffar			
HT America	12.09.2013	Chemical or Conventional Weapons! Does it matter?	Leaflet	24.03.2019	Missing
The Ameer's Facebook page	24.09.2013	Answer to the various questions: Collection of the Holy Qur'an – The Seven Recitations – Tafsir of the Ayah	Political Analysis	25.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/1986/
The Ameer's Facebook page	28.09.2013	The Answer to the Question: Regarding the Difference between Al-Kutla (structure) or At-Takatul (structuring) and the Ideological Party	Political Analysis	25.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/1974/
HT Main Party	29.09.2013	UN Security Council's Resolution regarding Chemical Weapons Reveals the Reality of the Colonial Kuffar They Stand United to Disarm All Sources of Power from the Muslim Lands (Translated)	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1976/
HT Main Party	11.10.2013	U.S. Aids are All Poison and their Demise is a Thousand Times Easier than their Permanence... (Translated)	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/1994/
The Ameer's Facebook page	01.11.2013	Regarding Using the Terms 'Minister' and 'Ministry' in the Islamic State	Political Analysis	25.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/2043/
HT Libya	02.11.2013	Federalism is a Project that Destroys the Unity of the Ummah (Translated)	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2106/
HT Scandinavia	15.11.2013	Participation in Municipal Elections is Haram The Interest that Allegedly Lies in such Elections is not a Shari Consideration (Translated)	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2105/
The Ameer's Facebook page	28.11.2013	Is the Ummah Ready to Tolerate the Consequences of Establishing the Khilafah?	Political Analysis	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/2135/

The Ameer's Facebook page	03.12.2013	Is It Permissible to Carry Out a Punishment from Allah's Punitive Code on Earth by Jihadist Groups or Members?	Political Analysis	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/2144/
HT Britain	16.12.2013	'Gender Segregation' Debate 'Muscular Liberals' Target Muslim Women Yet Again in their Desire to Impose their Values on the Muslim Community	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/3321.html
HT Tunisia	27.12.2013	The Colonial Kaffir Plunders the Wealth of the Muslims in Tunisia While the Rulers and Lawmakers are Creating a Manmade Constitution that Legitimizes this Crime Be their Hindrance and Prohibit them from Plundering your Wealth and Thwarting your Revolution (Translated)	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2191/
HT Canada	28.12.2013	Only Islam can End the Exploitation of Women by the Capitalist System!	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2172/
The Ameer's Facebook page	07.01.2014	Answer to the Question: Regarding Conferences, Protests and Seminars, and Has Hizb ut Tahrir Changed Its Method?	Political Analysis	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/2173/
HT Russia	28.01.2014	Security Agencies in Tatarstan Severely Oppress Muslims (Translated)	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2223/
HT Pakistan	01.02.2014	End the US Presence in Pakistan, the Cause of Bombings and Insecurity	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2228/
HT Palestine	07.02.2014	Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, is Paving the Way for a New Crusader Invasion (Translated)	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2237/
HT Syria	06.03.2014	Oh Muslims in Syria: Your Real War is with the West Who Wants to Prevent You from Establishing a Righteous Khilafah, While Bashar the Butcher is Only a Sheepdog in this Vicious	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2285/

		War against Islam and the Muslims (Translated)			
HT Bangladesh	14.03.2014	Warm Call to the Sincere, Aware and Courageous Youth Rise Up to Remove the Corrupt Ruling Regime which Exploits You and the People, Fails to Fulfil Your Needs and the Needs of the People	Leaflet	22.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2310/
HT Palestine	04.05.2014	“Reconciliation Amongst the Muslims is Permissible, Except a Reconciliation that Permits the Haram or Prohibits the Halal” (Translated)	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2390/
HT Kuwait	20.05.2014	Khilafah is Allah’s Promise and the Prophecy of His Messenger (saw) (Translated)	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2413/
HT Syria	22.05.2014	The Revolutionary Honour’s Charter: Signatories must know that it is a Trap by the West to Divert the Revolution from its Islamic Character...	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2415/
HT Main Party	04.06.2014	The Aim of the Hizb	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2439/
HT Britain	17.06.2014	Muslims Must Not Accept Inferior Secular Liberal Values Cameron calls for a ‘muscular’ campaign to enforce secular liberalism on Muslims in the UK: Muslims in Britain must hold onto Islam and resist attempts to assimilate into the creed of secular liberalism	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2474/
HT Main Party	19.06.2014	America is Dismantling Iraq, and Marching Behind it Spectra of the Kaffir Colonists.	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2476/
HT Syria	24.06.2014	Second Political Paper of Hizb ut Tahrir to the Stationed Believing People of Syria	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2437/

The Ameer's Facebook page	02.07.2014	Regarding what has been Declared by ISIS about the Establishment of the Khilafah	Political Analysis	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/2491/
HT Britain	07.07.2014	Muslims Will Not Compromise on the Khilafah!	Weilah Publication	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/2506/
HT Afghanistan	19.07.2014	Democratic Elections: A Humiliation for the Ones Trying to Reconcile Islam and Democracy through UN Mediation	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2531/
HT Syria	24.09.2014	The New Crusader Alliance led by America against the Ummah's Revolution in Ash-Sham is weaker than the Cobweb	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2585/
HT Syria	02.10.2014	Kurds are Part of the Muslim Ummah and the Injustice Inflicted Upon them is Part of the Injustice Done to the Muslim Ummah	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2600/
The Ameer's Facebook page	14.10.2014	Answer to the Question: Is the work to establish the Islamic State limited to the Arab countries only?	Leaflet	26.03.2019	Missing
HT Pakistan	01.12.2014	The Khilafah will End Democracy and its Injustice	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2675/
HT Australia	12.01.2015	We will not Abandon our Prophet (saw)	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2723/
HT Britain	15.01.2015	Hizb ut Tahrir Britain Denounces the Republication of Cartoons Insulting Prophet Muhammad (saw)	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/6766.html
HT Britain	10.03.2015	Press Release 'Prevent' is not just a toxic brand, it is a toxic agenda that needs challenging	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/7300.html

HT Britain	03.04.2015	Elections 2015 Message to the Muslim Community	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2830/
HT Scandinavia	03.06.2015	O Muslims: Choose Islam and Do Not Board the Sinking Ship of Democracy	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2909/
HT Britain	30.06.2015	Cameron's Full Spectrum Response includes Silencing Political Voices	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/8786.html
HT Palestine	03.07.2015	Ramadan if the Month of Conquests and Victories	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/2931/
HT Pakistan	16.07.2015	Work With Hizb ut Tahrir to Abolish Democracy and Establish the Khilafah on the Methodology of the Prophethood	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/2015_07_16_Pakistan_EN.pdf
HT Britain	21.07.2015	Repeated Rhetoric from Cameron's Failed 'Extremism' Policy	Weilah Publicatio	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/2955/
HT Scandinavia	15.09.2015	The Waves of Refugees Influx is the Result of Western Foreign Policy Hostile to Humanity, The Islamic Nation is the Only One Able to Solve the Problem!	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/3006/
HT Britain	19.10.2015	Cameron announces another nail in the coffin of 'British freedoms' calling them 'counter-extremism' measures!	Press Release	30.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/press-releases/britain/8785.html
HT East Africa	20.11.2015	CATASTROPHES OF THE CAPITALIST IDEOLOGY	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/2015_11_20_East_Africa_EN.pdf
HT Britain	29.11.2015	Message to Mr Cameron: Bomb us or Ban us – We	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/

		won't 'reform' or give up our Islam!			tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/3066/
HT Britain	24.03.2016	How Muslims should view the Brussels Bombings	Weilah Publication	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/3102/
HT Britain	30.09.2016	Advice to the Muslim Community following the Murder of Imam Jalal Uddin	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/3169/
HT America	11.11.2016	US Presidential Election Reflection	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/3215/
HT Britain	17.11.2016	The False Promises of Trump: The World Needs a Real Alternative	Leaflet	23.09.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/3209/
HT (Origin unclear)	18.11.2016	Answer to Question: Trump's Victory in the US Elections!	Political Analysis	26.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/tshow/3213/
HT Tunisia	11.12.2016	The Remembrance of the Birth of the Prophet (saw) on the 12th of Rabii' ul-Awwal. Is a Remembrance of Guidance, Honour and Consolidation	Leaflet	23.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/3236/
HT Main Party	Unknown	Hizb ut-Tahrir [Definition]	Webpage	19.03.2019	http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/def
HT Britain	Unknown	Leaked - UK Government to compel Muslims to adopt secular liberal values	Press Release	30.03.2019	Missing