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“Refugees Not Welcome” – The 2015 Migration Crisis and the Hungarian Government’s Rhetoric

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Summary

Recently Europe has faced a massive influx of refugees coming from the Middle East via Greece, Italy, and Hungary as their main routes to Europe. While some members of the European Union, such as Germany, were welcoming to the refugees, others had somewhat more hostile attitudes towards them. Hungary was one of the most vocal countries regarding their concerns associated with the dramatically increased number of refugees in Europe. The issue and debate about refugees and migration quickly became the most pressing one nation-wide as well as in the European Union. The fact that this issue became such a major and troubling debate between Hungary and the European Union is in large part due to the rhetoric of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his administration. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that underlying concepts of outsiders to the Hungarian society have been established centuries ago. These so-called ‘frames’ allow for oversimplification of nuanced situations as well as for gross generalization regarding a group of individuals, who might share less than what seems obvious at first sight.

Therefore, for the purpose of this study, a theoretical framework is necessary. This framework explains how frames are constructed and how they account for a collective understanding of people, groups, events and how they are based on some widely shared experiences or beliefs of an in-group (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Problem definition allows for certain powerful actors – for instance, political leaders – to define issues as a key concern (Ingram et al, 2007), therefore the importance of text-producers’ efforts in problem definition is undoubtedly a determining factor in which frames might become activated at a given point in time (Hart, 2010). Furthermore, in-group members often have reservations towards out-group members, which can be based on a number of differences, such as race, religion, and so on (Esses et al, 2001). Moreover, perceived threats commonly associated with immigration were presented, as the debate in Hungary moved from a humanitarian crisis to immigration. These threats are characterized by three main themes: security threats, economic threat, and cultural/identity threats (Mayda, 2006). Some historical context is also needed regarding the history of Hungary during the Ottoman occupation in 16th and 17th century, which has shaped common understanding of the Muslim world amongst Hungarians.

The study presents the National Consultation questionnaire of 2015, which explicitly addressed the immigration debate, which is essentially the Orbán administration's official stance regarding migration. However, the representativeness of the questionnaire is questionable due to the highly suggestive nature of the questions, and the limited answer options, the Consultation was seen by the administration as a great success, as well over 80-90 per cent of respondents expressed their agreement with the government's position on all questions. Moreover, numerous examples of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's rhetoric supported by quotations from recent public speeches and interviews regarding immigration are presented and analyzed, which shows how all of the concerns defined by the theoretical framework have been addressed at one point or another by Orbán. Dangers and threats of mass migration have been heavily emphasized by Orbán. Arguments regarding the economy include that migrants would take away job opportunities from native Hungarians or otherwise become dependent on the welfare state, which would inevitably result in less resources being available for Hungarians in need. Security threats are also addressed, as Orbán claims that no other nation in Europe is capable of correctly identifying the issue concerning migration. Furthermore, Orbán has depicted Hungary as the last bastion of Europe multiple times, while simultaneously speaking of his administration as the sole protector of the nation and Europe. Orbán's rhetoric became increasingly negative when speaking of the cultural and existential threats posed onto Hungarians by migration. He often called attention to the cultural and religious differences between the Hungarians and the migrants by pointing to the majority of migrants holding Muslim beliefs arriving to a traditionally Christian Europe. Orbán also frequently warned Hungarians that 'our way of life' is in danger and argued that preemptive measures are the best way of defending the Hungarian way of life and cultural as well as ethnic homogeneity. Such measures include the rejection of the resettlement quotas proposed by the European Union, in which Hungary refuses to cooperate through burden sharing by resettling a proportionate amount of refugees in each member state.

1. Introduction & Methodology

1.1. Introduction

Recently Europe has faced a massive influx of refugees coming from the Middle East via Greece, Italy, and Hungary as their main routes to Europe. The masses fleeing the terrors of war travelled in some of the most dangerous circumstances to reach Europe through land as well as water. While some members of the European Union, such as Germany, were welcoming to the refugees, others had somewhat more hostile attitudes towards them. Hungary was one of the most vocal countries regarding their concerns associated with the dramatically increased number of refugees in Europe. The issue and debate about refugees and migration quickly became the most pressing one nation-wide as well as in the European Union. The fact that this issue became such a major and troubling debate between Hungary and the European Union is in large part due to the rhetoric of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his administration.

Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to delve into the rhetoric of Viktor Orbán and inspect how the administration's views regarding refugees, resettlement quotas, and immigration could gain ground to the extent that refugee and immigrant became synonymous and the European Union's institutions are regarded as a threat to Europe's future. It is essential to investigate where such narratives stem from to understand how they could become such a powerful political tool in directing public discourses regarding migration in Hungary. The tendencies of the Hungarian government and the public to isolate out-groups, such as refugees, are not only relevant to the country, but also to the European Union, as the proposition of resettlement quotas has been challenged and rejected by Hungary. This makes for a more global issue than simply that of the unwelcoming nature of Hungary, which is likely to affect the rest of the member states as well. Moreover, it further severs such effects concerning member states that several other Eastern European countries (such as Poland and the Czech Republic) have expressed disagreement over the resettlement quotas following Hungary.

Thus, while this paper focuses largely on the rhetoric of Viktor Orbán, it cannot be overlooked that underlying concepts of outsiders to the Hungarian society have been established centuries

ago. This deeply rooted divide that Hungarians sustain between their nationals and others provided the current government with a favorable foundation to their agenda of portraying refugees as a danger and threat to our Western societies. These so-called ‘frames’ allow for oversimplification of nuanced situations as well as for gross generalization regarding a group of individuals, who might share less than what seems obvious at first sight. In the case of Hungary, one of these frames concern the Muslim community and is mostly based on and fueled by the collective understanding and memory of the history of the Hungarian-Turkish wars and the Ottoman occupation in the 16th and 17th century. A second crucial frame in this debate is one concerning immigration, which places an exclusively negative light on the possible consequences of welcoming immigrants due to differences in values, and especially in Hungary.

1.2. Research question

This thesis’s research questions are:

- What rhetoric dominates the refugee/immigration debate in Hungary in 2015?
- What are the key frames that the Hungarian government utilizes in an effort to control the debate in favor of its agenda?

Therefore, in answering the research questions this study uses relevant theories (such a framing, group theory, and others) that allow for identifying and categorizing tactics of rhetoric and help the understanding of the overall context in which such events could take place. Chapter 2 presents the methodology of this study and explains data collection and elaborates on the case of Hungary. Chapter 3 establishes a theoretical framework thorough which the case will be interpreted later on. Chapter 4 includes analysis of the National Consultation of 2015, its questions and results as well as analysis on public speeches given by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán with special focus on the immigration debate. In Chapter 5 the findings of the analysis are discusses as well as they are related to previous studies focused on the topic of the migration crisis. Finally, in Chapter 6 follows a conclusion of the study.

2. Methodology

This paper presents a case study on Hungary in 2015 as the country faced an extremely rapid and high increase in the number of refugees arriving to Europe through Hungary and an unusually harsh rhetoric of the government emerged. A case study was found best suitable for the investigation of the topic, as according to Robson, a case study deals with a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context as well as it uses evidence from multiple sources (Robson, 1993, p.146). Hungary was chosen as the subject of this single case study, as the events of 2015 were widely publicized and gained enormous attention across Europe. Therefore, one can speak of a well-documented phenomenon, which allows for a fair research as well as its recency provides a contemporary nature and makes for a relevant case. Furthermore, another important aspect to the case of Hungary is the precedent it set amongst some other Eastern-European countries, who following the Hungarian example also acquired a harsher rhetoric regarding the same issue. This has severed the situation even further, as an ever lower number of countries decided to voluntarily participate in the resettlement of refugees. Thus Hungary is a key actor in the events of 2015 and investigating this case can make one better understand why Hungary has shown unexpected hostility as well as how Hungarian leaders can successfully frame the public discourse.

To answer the research question of this study, a supportive and relevant theoretical framework needs to be established in order to allow for understanding of tendencies shown by the Hungarian government as well as the historical implications and background of the country. Data and documentation will be used, such as public speeches given by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, questions and results of a National Consultation questionnaire as well as data on asylum applications in Hungary and Europe. Public speeches as well as all documentation regarding the National Consultation were accessed through the Hungarian governmental webpage in English in order to ensure authenticity. Data on asylum applications were acquired through the webpage of the European Parliament and the European Commission.

The language of the information that reach the majority of a population is of key importance, as it can often be highly influential in framing general public discourses (for example, speeches

performed by national leaders). Therefore, this study focuses on such materials. In analyzing the collected data, this paper presents the 2015 National Consultation questionnaire, its results, and turn-out rate. Following, public speeches given by Viktor Orbán are analyzed through speech analysis and by decoding underlying meaning to his words (this method is also applied to the National Consultation), in which the author's Hungarian background and understanding of Hungarian societal norms can be useful.

When conducting analysis of Orbán's speeches, arguments against immigration and resettlement are found to relate to three key themes. The analysis also groups quotes and arguments made at different occasions throughout the course of an approximately 3-year period (2015-2018) in order to present the frequency of repetition of said arguments. While the majority of Orbán's speeches presented in this paper are from 2015, since that is when the crisis peaked as well as when the National Consultation took place, later examples of the government's rhetoric are also relevant in showcasing the persisting effect of the narratives associated with the migration debate that were put into motion in 2015. Data from the speeches chosen for this study were coded by identifying reoccurring themes and expressions and then aggregated accordingly (such as mentions of "migration", "our way of life", "Brussels", and so on). Thus, the frequency of specific arguments used in the debate, as well as their categorization regarding the main themes put forward by the administration, can be detected.

In addition, the Discussion chapter relates findings to the previously presented theoretical framework to confirm if the theories apply to the case. Part of the Discussion chapter also reflects upon the methodological choices.

3. Literature review

In understanding the current Hungarian government's approach, this paper utilizes a number of theories to identify and explain possible motives of certain detectable strategies recently applied during the so-called 'migration crisis'.

3.1. Frames, Conflict and Group Theory

According to Newton, the process of policy-making is much more complex than finding available solutions to problems at hand. She argues that lawmakers link issues and solutions in a way that resonates with preexisting notions that people have about who is responsible for a social crisis. (Newton, 2005) The same line of thought can be applied to a broader context of politics, as political parties and governments are also likely to rely on such preexisting notions when negotiating policies with the public, or when a more or less new issue arises and political actors wish to sell a certain agenda. The abovementioned preexisting notions that shape the individual's evaluation of certain situations become their "frame in thought" (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.105).

As Chong and Druckman note, frames are essential in communication, since they allow for organization of everyday life, provide meaning to current events, as well as specific understanding of political issues (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.106). This is possible for the reason that most frames are widely shared within a society and people are capable of understanding frames different from their default across societies. The reason for frames being widely shared is that, according to Chong and Druckman, a given consideration is stored in a group's shared memory and is available for retrieval and thus use. However, they also argue that not every belief that is stored in memory will be found strong enough or relevant in a frame applied to a current issue. Several factors will determine how effective framing effects will be "the strength and repetition of the frame, the competitive environment and individual motivations." (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.111)

Communicators are also often assumed to be elite actors, for example, politicians and the media, while the audience is usually seen as the general public (Chong & Druckman, 2007). This is a highly relevant point for this paper, as the focus is on the communication tools and framing strategies of the Hungarian government. Indeed, according to Hart, through communication text-producers (in this case the government) are able to greatly influence the attitudes of text-consumers (the public) regarding people, objects, events, and so on. However, in order to gain control to any extent over the text-consumers' understanding of and responses to certain events, the text-producers must be accepted as reliable sources of frames. (Hart, 2010) It is at this point then, that a shared memory can be triggered by text-producers who are then able to use certain frames that might be already strong among members of society and thus take advantage of an existing frame of a situation and steer public reaction to a desired direction. Moreover, for certain frames that focus on a specific issue, the frame has to present a phenomenon as an existing political, economic, or social problem for it to become legitimate. The work of Ingram and colleagues further supports the notion that problem definition is a political exercise as it labels a phenomenon as a problem. For example, in this case the topic of immigration would be framed as a burning societal issue in Europe, which bears economic and social threats to the receiving country, instead of it being seen as a natural response to war in the immigrants' home country or a humanitarian crisis via the process of problem definition. Therefore, problems are not examined from a neutral or objective viewpoint; rather they are "interpretations of conditions that have been subjectively defined as problematic and, as such, demand some type of ameliorative action" (Ingram et al. 2007, p.94). Over time and in contemporary policy design this practice of problem definition led to the identification of target populations as well as rewards and sanctions designated to given groups (Ingram et al, 2007).

Another point of relevance for this paper is the two institutional cultures identified by Ingram and colleagues, which categorization helps in understanding and identifying modes of communication and the role of language used by powerful institutions, such as the government. These categories are degenerative politics and professionalized/expert politics. Degenerative politics is indicated by "hyper-competitive policymaking setting containing negative, divisive, and demeaning modes of communication, deception, and long-term factions with [...] negative views of one another" (Ingram et al, 2007, p.118); whereas professionalized politics can be identified by being

dominated by scientific rationale, means-ends reasoning, and expert language. (Ingram et al, 2007)

At this point, it is established that members of a society share a collective memory that creates frames, within which they interpret events, other people, and so on. Moreover, these frames are likely to be utilized in problem definition, which can be subject to manipulation by powerful actors, such as text-producers (mostly in politics and mass media) in order to shape the understanding and interpretation of a given phenomenon by text-consumers (the public at large) in a way that would benefit the text-producers' agenda. Since for any given problem there might be a number of different frames simultaneously available for interpreting reality, the individual is able to choose the one they identify with the most.

Due to the presence of several frames regarding one single issue that individuals are free to choose from, different groups are formed within society based on their stance on said issue and these groups are often opponents of one another. The Realistic Group Conflict Theory is used in identifying how and why these groups interact. As Esses and colleagues note, the Realistic Group Conflict Theory argues that "perceived group competition for resources produces efforts to reduce the access of other groups to the resources" (Esses et al, 2001, p.390). This competition takes place between the in-group (including self, or "us") and the out-group (excluding self, or "them"), and the in-group is assumed to achieve positive distinctiveness (from the out-group) if it is successful at restricting the out-group's opportunities.

Esses and colleagues focus on immigrants as an out-group, and note that if immigrant out-groups do not excel economically, they are likely to be considered a burden on the welfare state (social services, unemployment insurance, etc.). Simultaneously, they might also be seen as a threat to collective identity, if they are not well integrated into the mainstream culture. However, it is also noted that if the same group does well economically their success might be seen as gained at the expense of the in-group (of nonimmigrants). In the same vein, their assimilation to the society might be seen as challenging the dominant positions of the in-group, which results in antipathy and discrimination (Esses et al, 2001).

An out-group is more likely to be seen as a competitor if it has highly distinct characteristics from those of the in-group. However, the out-group has to be simultaneously similar to the in-group on certain dimensions that would suggest competing for the same resources (Esses et al, 2001).

This perception of competition between the in-group and the out-group can be linked to the notion of resource stress, which suggests that access to resources (be it economic or political power, jobs, etc.) is limited, therefore these resources should not be available to every group to the same extent. Esses and colleagues further argue that such perceptions are likely to result in zero-sum beliefs, namely that the more the out-group gains, the less will be available for the in-group (Esses et al, 2001).

Furthermore, Meuleman and colleagues point out that apart from economic conditions, the size of a minority out-group is greatly influencing the in-group's threat perception. The reason for that is that the larger the out-group, the more ethnic competitors it suggests, and thus more struggle for resources in terms of available jobs, for example. Additionally, higher levels of political mobilization potentially become available for the out-group, which could manifest in approaches in policy-making that the in-group does not support. However, they also note that attitudes towards out-groups evolve strongly only in the case of a sudden change in either the size of the out-group or economic conditions, since accelerated shifts in such conditions can have a significant effect on labor and housing, amongst others, and because there is not enough time to absorb the changes, unlike in the case of a slow evolution (Meuleman et al, 2008).

In addition, Meuleman and colleagues also identify Hungary as the country with the most widespread negative attitudes towards immigration among the 17 countries of their study based on the European Social Survey data between 2002 and 2007. Hungary, already as one of the least immigration friendly countries, is the one where an increase in anti-immigration attitudes is most pronounced from 2002 to 2007. Even though, foreign immigration into Hungary is found to be limited (Meuleman et al, 2008).

This contradiction of an increasing trend of anti-immigration sentiments in the Hungarian population and the limited number of immigrants arriving to Hungary raises the question of what skews public opinion towards such attitudes. A possible explanation is securitization. Securitization is

described as “an extreme form of politicization created by speech acts” (Beck, 2017, p.2). According to Beck, the distinct characterization of such speech acts is that the problem is exaggerated as an existential threat or a ‘supreme priority’ issue in order to justify extraordinary measures preferred by (mostly) political elites via political communication (Beck, 2017).

In other words, securitization is a form of exploiting already existing frames, in which text-producers magnify previously identified social problems further and then direct public opinion to preferred solutions, which then become legitimized in the eyes of the text-consumers through this process.

However, it is also important to note, that parties are found to be more successful at reinforcing anti-immigrant sentiments when they express cultural ideas instead of classical racist ones (Bohman, 2011). Bohman argues that political elites focus on articulating such differences between the in-group (nonimmigrants) and the out-group (immigrants), and promote an exaggerated image of the size of the out-group, which increases the visibility of immigrants (Bohman, 2011). That will in turn increase anti-immigrant sentiments further, which is another example of a combined use and exploitation of frames, perceived threat, and securitization efforts.

An excellent example of how ‘othering’ has been utilized in uniting a group by government provided frames is presented by Pajnik and colleagues, who focus on the populist right’s efforts in finding an enemy in order to unite post-socialist Slovenia after 1989. In this case, the fall of the Soviet Union brought about many social and economic problems. However, those were not categorized as primary. Instead, a number of out-groups were identified as the root cause of social issues and tackled by so called “re-traditionalisation”. Re-traditionalisation, as Pajnik and colleagues define it, consists of constructing “the Slovenian nation as ‘our people’, while simultaneously excluding ‘the others’ using criteria of ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, gender, political affiliation and so on” (Pajnik et al, 2016, p.139). In the case of Slovenia, the in-group is the ‘true Slovenians’ and the out-group is everyone who does not align with the traditional Slovenian values (for example, proper gender roles), such as migrants, Roma, Muslims, LGBT people and so on (Pajnik et al, 2016).

3.2. Hungary's Historical Experiences with Turks and Islam

The first part of the literature review/theory presented how in-groups and out-groups relate to each other, and pointed to some stress points (such as economic conditions, cultural differences) in explaining why in some instances more than others, these groups tend to encounter conflicts. In order to contextualize the particular case of Hungary, which in 2015 faced the arrival of overwhelmingly Muslim refugees in a relatively short period of time, it is especially important to be aware of the relation between the Hungarian society and Islam.

The Turkish wars and the Ottoman occupation of Hungary in the 16th and 17th century are of great importance, not only for the reason for which the wars had taken place, but also and more importantly for how these wars and the occupation are depicted in modern day. Pirický's study of the representation of Ottoman Turks in contemporary school books in the Visegrád 4 countries (Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland) finds that folk songs, sayings, stories and so on present a tremendous amount of anti-Turkish images. The relevance of such notions is supported by the fact that "Reform Age Poetry (1825-1849) determined the place of the tragic Battle of Mohács against the Ottomans (1526) in Hungarian collective historical awareness, outdoing historical science" (Pirický, 2013, p.110). This negative presentation of "the Turk" promotes the image of an oppressor (Pirický, 2013). Pirický finds that historical accounts of the Ottoman focus nearly entirely on battles and military activity rather than on everyday life, cultural aspects, or even economy. He also notes that Turks are usually depicted as a "dangerous enemy" and framed as a continuous threat to medieval Europe. Simultaneously, they are shown as an integral part of the European power system, but not as an integral part of the European space, which reinforces the idea of a politically powerful actor, however, still as an outsider to European values (Pirický, 2013). In addition, this view of the Muslims is not exclusively found in Hungary. For example, Benveniste and Pingaud note that in today's France "the Muslim man is not only a misogynist, he is a warrior and an invader" (Benveniste & Pingaud, 2016, p.73).

Moreover, an important distinction is made by Pirický when he points out that the Ottomans who once settled in Hungary, originally arrived from the Balkans, so that the characteristics that are referred to in identifying the Turks are more suggestive of Bosnian and Serbian influences;

whereas the currently used words, Turk and Turkish, refer to a relatively newly constructed modern state (Pirický, 2013).

Given that the Ottoman age is generally thought of as a period of tragic losses, cultural existential threat and military occupation, the influence of such narratives shall not be underestimated in contemporary environment. According to Pirický, the aforementioned textbook representations of foreign cultures and religions have a great influence in the formative period of the individual, who is typically expected to adhere to national norms and values (Pirický, 2013).

Furthermore, Berend, in her study of historical Hungarian texts, finds that “Christian identity in all these texts is parasitic on anti-Islamic sentiment, and its express conceptualization is intimately tied to actual or desired violence against Muslims” (Berend, 2013, p.3). She notes the spread rhetoric inciting violence against Muslims, the disruption of Muslim communities in the name of uniting the European community under Christianity.

Astor and colleagues note that discourses of religious heritage are especially influential in countries where religion is closely tied to national identity, in so far as they provide myths, metaphors and symbols that are essential to the discursive representation of the nation (Astor et al, 2017). They argue that official religious heritage discourses can be activated or deactivated. They further suggest that these discourses would most likely be activated in times of “crises of pluralism”, which occur due to processes of sudden sociodemographic or political changes (such as mass migration) and result in “cultural defense” (Astor et al, 2017).

The migration and ethnoreligious diversification processes have been politicized on a religious basis, which reactivated and enabled the religious heritage discourses to shape political, institutional course of action and public opinion. (Astor et al, 2017)

3.3. Hungary's Recent Approach to Asylum and the European Union

Besides understanding group relations and a relevant historical background to the case, it is also essential to examine some more general issues regarding immigration in the area.

Korkut notes that in Hungary even immediately after accession to the European Union, acceptance of ethnic or migrants groups was low, and even lower for the indigenous Roma groups (which indicates the Hungarian public's attitude towards groups different than their own). When faced with alarming trends of a shrinking nation, due to lower birth-rates and mass emigration of young professionals from Hungary to other parts of the European Union, which foresee the rapid aging of the Hungarian population, two-thirds of Hungarians still oppose that the government should allow large immigration from the Third World, as found in 2009 (Korkut, 2014).

Furthermore, Almond argues that the emigration of the youth paired with the arrival of thousands of temporary asylum-seekers would result in a negative net cost for Hungary. That is because, as he argues, the young men arriving to Hungary are likely to seek low-skilled jobs due to lack of language skills, thus increasing competition for already scarce opportunities and resources (Almond, 2015).

Moreover, he points to the further difficulties Hungary faces in being responsible for asylum-seekers arriving to the European Union through Hungary as their first entry point, which obligates Hungary in looking after them, even though, many will proceed going to Germany or Austria for better opportunities (Almond, 2015). The notion that these refugees would prefer going to other European countries and not stay in the first safe country they have reached is likely to support the image of an economic migrant, rather than a refugee, in the public's eyes.

Similarly in Britain, after a bureaucratic meltdown due to the administration's inability to keep up with processing asylum applications, political elites had begun promoting the idea that claiming asylum became a form of economic migration. This resulted in the stigmatization of refugees as 'unwanted economic migrants' (Statham, 2003). This way of framing refugees is of particular importance, as it spreads across media and quickly works its way into the public opinion at large, by feeding into prejudices already in place.

Due to the kind of stigmatization that Statham (2003) argues increasingly surrounds refugees and might create the perception that it is a form of economic immigration, it becomes necessary to look at how immigration can be framed. For this study, frames that recognize immigration as a negative phenomenon are particularly relevant. Some of the most common negative attitudes towards immigration are based on the threat perception of the in-group. Following Mayda's analysis, three kinds of threats can be associated with unwanted mass immigration. The first is the perceived fiscal impact on the welfare state in the host country, as immigrants tend to become part of the bottom of the income distribution. This then makes them more likely to become dependent on the welfare state as beneficiaries, while not contributing to it beforehand (Mayda, 2006). Especially in countries, such as Greece and Spain, that were hit hard by the economic crisis and since then implemented a number of austerity measures and still face an increasing number of working poor, people tend to be less accepting of immigrants receiving benefits, as they believe that 'their own people' should be taken care of first. (Giglioli, 2016)

The second and third perceived threats are non-economic factors, worries concerning security and cultural and national identity. Security worries rise with higher levels of immigration due to the perception that immigrants are more likely to become participants in criminal activity. Worries of cultural and national identity are concerns over the beliefs and national values of the host country being threatened by a foreign group with significantly different values, religion and so on (Mayda, 2006).

As Almond argues, membership in a nation requires one to "accept and adapt to the norms of the existing society" (Almond, 2015, p.16). This would require the individual arriving to a new host country to completely accommodate to the cultural norms of the majority of said country. However, that might prove to be challenging, as no one country is entirely homogenous, especially in Europe where globalization processes have been prevalent in recent decades. Therefore, it can appear controversial of a host country to demand immigrants to live up to such expectations and the basis of a perception that the host country's cultural or national identity is exposed to an existential threat is questionable when weighed against widely held and supported European notions of acceptance and diversity.

4. Analysis

As it has been established in the previous chapter, the importance of text-producers efforts in enforcing narratives is significant, as they are able to create new frames or to intensify already existing ones. Therefore, it is essential to look at how the language of texts is used in establishing dominant frames. For the purpose of the discourse analysis of the Hungarian government's rhetoric during the 2015 migration crisis and the immigration debate, this paper analyzes the language and modes of expression coming from the Hungarian government, as well as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, specifically, as key representative of the administration as well as text-producer. This chapter exhibits the questions and results of the National Consultation on immigration and terrorism in 2015, which is relevant for its key position in the immigration debate, as the government repeatedly relies on its results and what they claim the results represent. Following is a speech analysis based on speeches and interviews given by Viktor Orbán. The analysis lines up three key themes of arguments raised against the case of immigration. Those are 1) migrants are coming to Europe for better living standards, therefore they are not fleeing persecution and are not to be considered refugees, 2) migrants pose a cultural and existential threat to the nations of Europe (particularly Hungary), and 3) Brussels/the European Union is responsible for the crisis because of their negligence and lenient policies and they cannot offer Hungary appropriate solutions.

4.1. National Consultation on immigration and terrorism

National Consultations have been institutionalized by the government in Hungary starting in 2010 and since then became a vital element in Hungarian agenda setting and policy making. There have been eight National Consultations held with themes varying between economic policies, immigration, and most recently on family protection in 2018 (Nova, 2017; kormany.hu) The purpose of such consultations, as stated by the government, is to help in showcasing the will of the people and the government often refers to them as great success in representing as well as engaging people in what are considered the most burning issues at hand by the government. This part of the chapter presents the questions posed to Hungarian citizens that have been mailed to

them by the government and then expected to be sent back filled out or completed online between May and July 2015.

The consultation begins with a letter in which Orbán addresses the Hungarian citizens and reminds them of the terrorist attacks in Paris in the beginning of 2015. He then points out that “Brussels and the European Union are unable to adequately deal with the issue of immigration” (National Consultation, 2015). Orbán also fails to admit that there are legitimate refugees amongst the people arriving to the country, as he describes them as illegal economic immigrants, who “present themselves as asylum-seekers” and it is explicitly stated that they pose a threat to Hungary’s welfare system as well as its job market (National Consultation, 2015). Additionally, the letter also features a picture of Viktor Orbán with the Hungarian flag in the background as well as his signature.

The first three questions concern the individual’s perception about the threat of terrorism. The first question directly relates terrorist threats to the individual and gives examples of recent terrorist acts, which likely sets a frightening tone to begin the questionnaire with. The following question is concerned with Hungary potentially becoming a target of such acts, while the third question relates the rise of the threat of terrorism directly to Brussels (the European Union) and its inability to implement appropriate immigration policies.

1] We hear different views on increasing levels of terrorism. How relevant do you think the spread of terrorism (the bloodshed in France, the shocking acts of ISIS) is to your own life?

Very relevant Relevant Not relevant

2] Do you think that Hungary could be the target of an act of terror in the next few years?

There is a very real chance It could occur Out of the question

3] There are some who think that mismanagement of the immigration question by Brussels may have something to do with increased terrorism. Do you agree with this view?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree

The fourth and fifth questions speak of exclusively economic migrants who are illegally crossing borders, which criminalizes them immediately, and who pose threats to Hungarians' livelihoods and job opportunities. Furthermore, it is also suggested that the number of such threatening illegal immigrants has sharply increased very recently, which can amplify threat perceptions.

4] Did you know that economic migrants cross the Hungarian border illegally, and that recently the number of immigrants in Hungary has increased twentyfold?

Yes I have heard about it I did not know

5] We hear different views on the issue of immigration. There are some who think that economic migrants jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. Do you agree?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree

The sixth and seventh questions outright target Brussels and its policies. Essentially, both questions hold the same meaning: Brussels has failed due to their 'lenient policies' and therefore the Hungarian government shall step in to solve the issues burning Europe.

6] There are some who believe that Brussels' policy on immigration and terrorism has failed, and that we therefore need a new approach to these questions. Do you agree?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree

7] Would you support the Hungarian Government in the introduction of more stringent immigration regulations, in contrast to Brussels' lenient policy?

Yes, I would fully support the Government
I would partially support the Government
I would not support the Government

Finally, questions eight through twelve focus on policy making. The government seeks out support for much stricter migration policies, which would include the ability to take border crossing individuals into custody and returning said individuals to their home country as soon as possible, without considering providing asylum. The questionnaire also suggests the concept that instead of the Hungarian government, the migrants themselves should be responsible for covering costs during their stay in Hungary and that the government should rather focus on supporting families and children exclusively of Hungarian nationality.

8] Would you support the Hungarian government in the introduction of more stringent regulations, according to which migrants illegally crossing the Hungarian border could be taken into custody?

Yes, I would fully support the Government

I would partially support the Government

I would not support the Government

9] Do you agree with the view that migrants illegally crossing the Hungarian border should be returned to their own countries within the shortest possible time?

I fully agree

I tend to agree

I do not agree

10] Do you agree with the concept that economic migrants themselves should cover the costs associated with their time in Hungary?

I fully agree

I tend to agree

I do not agree

11] Do you agree that the best means of combating immigration is for Member States of the European Union to assist in the development of the countries from which migrants arrive?

I fully agree

I tend to agree

I do not agree

12] Do you agree with the Hungarian government that support should be focused more on Hungarian families and the children they can have, rather than on immigration?

I fully agree

I tend to agree

I do not agree

As one can see, the questions posed by the National Consultation speak of illegal economic immigrants, exclusively. At no point is there any mention of genuine asylum seekers, which is likely to create a skewed perception of reality, since not even the possibility of a mixed group of economic immigrants and asylum seekers is entertained. Furthermore, looking at the answer options, one can recognize that the options are limited and binary, as in one can either answer in support of the suggested concepts or against them while there is no neutral choice. It is noteworthy, moreover, that there are two answer options available in favor of such concepts and only one against them. In addition, answers in support of the government's position are counted and generally referred to as simply in favor of the proposed policies, regardless which option was used in answering the question.

It can be said with confidence that the questionnaire is less of a survey and more of an interactive public statement from the administration, in which respondents can express their opinions to a limited degree. The questionnaire first implies positions by wording such as "we hear different

views” or “there are some who think...” then asks the respondents if they would support hypothetical policies implemented in the near future, and finally explicitly states the Hungarian government’s position and directly asks for agreement. Due to the highly suggestive nature of the questions posed to the citizens, the respondents are more likely to give biased opinions. Therefore, the validity of the results becomes questionable because not only are the question highly suggestive in their language, but answer options are very limited, as well.

The results of the National Consultation show that between 84,65 per cent and 98,25 per cent of the participants agreed with the concepts suggested within the frames of the consultation, with an average of 94,18 per cent (National Consultation Results, 2015). The question that received the lowest approval with 84,65 per cent was the eleventh question regarding whether the European Union would be able to best combat the immigration issue by financially supporting the origin country of the migrants. This number is low only in relative terms and when speaking of the national consultation in particular, as less than 16 per cent of participant opposing such a proposal indicates that the vast majority of the respondents are in accordance with the position of the government. The question that was answered with the highest approval – 98.25 per cent – of respondents is the last one, which proposes that above all, Hungarian families and children should be supported by the government. This does not come as a surprise, to the contrary, since the pool of respondents consists of exclusively Hungarian citizens, therefore amplified in-group attitudes shall be expected as they are being surveyed on the out-group’s behavior, potential threat posed by them, and whether the administration that is supposed to serve the in-group should focus foremost on the out-group’s needs.

Q1: How relevant do you think the spread of terrorism (the bloodshed in France, the shocking acts of ISIS) is to your own life?	Very relevant	Relevant	Not relevant
	70,49%	25,92%	3,59%
Q2: Do you think that Hungary could be the target of an act of terror in the next few years?	There is a very real chance	It could occur	Out of the question
	39,32%	56,97%	3,71%
Q3: There are some who think that mismanagement of the immigration question by Brussels may have something to do with increased terrorism. Do you agree with this view?	I fully agree	I tend to agree	I do not agree
	61,07%	27,79%	11,14%
Q4: Did you know that economic migrants cross the Hungarian border illegally, and that recently	Yes	I have heard about it	I did not know

the number of immigrants in Hungary has increased twentyfold?	72,63%	23,45%	3,91%
Q5: We hear different views on the issue of immigration. There are some who think that economic migrants jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. Do you agree?	I fully agree	I tend to agree	I do not agree
	72,74%	18,76%	8,50%
Q6: There are some who believe that Brussels' policy on immigration and terrorism has failed, and that we therefore need a new approach to these questions. Do you agree?	I fully agree	I tend to agree	I do not agree
	72,74%	18,76%	8,50%
Q7: Would you support the Hungarian Government in the introduction of more stringent immigration regulations, in contrast to Brussels' lenient policy?	Yes, I would fully support the Government	I would partially support the Government	I would not support the Government
	89,65%	7,55%	2,80%
Q8: Would you support the Hungarian Government in the introduction of more stringent regulations, according to which migrants illegally crossing the Hungarian border could be taken into custody?	Yes, I would fully support the Government	I would partially support the Government	I would not support the Government
	87,92%	9,31%	2,76%
Q9: Do you agree with the view that migrants illegally crossing the Hungarian border should be returned to their own countries within the shortest possible time?	I fully agree	I tend to agree	I do not agree
	86,15%	10,25%	3,61%
Q10: Do you agree with the concept that economic migrants themselves should cover the costs associated with their time in Hungary?	I fully agree	I tend to agree	I do not agree
	82,73%	13,48%	3,78%
Q11: Do you agree that the best means of combating immigration is for Member States of the European Union to assist in the development of the countries from which migrants arrive?	I fully agree	I tend to agree	I do not agree
	60,62%	24,03%	15,35%
Q12: Do you agree with the Hungarian government that support should be focused more on Hungarian families and the children they can have, rather than on immigration?	I fully agree	I tend to agree	I do not agree
	92,88%	5,37%	1,74%

(National Consultation Results, 2015)

The positions presented by the questionnaire are argued for and further supported by the government later on, as the next part will show. Even though, there have been approximately 8 000 000 questionnaires sent out, only 1 000 254 were filled out and processed by the administration (Herczeg, 2015). Nevertheless, the consultation was considered and often referred to by the government as a great success and representing the will of the Hungarian people.

4.2. Analysis of Viktor Orbán's Speeches

In the immigration debate, and especially during the migration crisis in 2015, an incredibly important distinction between refugees and economic migrants must be made. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “refugees are persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection” (UNHCR, 2019). Whereas regarding migrants, although, there is no formal legal definition, there is wide agreement that “an international migrant is someone who changes his or her country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status” (UNHCR, 2019). In other words, a migrant does not need protection, as is they are not in fear for one’s life, unlike refugees, who do not choose to leave their residence but are forced to. Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime Minister, admits to the importance of such a distinction:

“[...] we should clearly distinguish between genuine refugees and immigrants who come here simply because they are seeking a better life than that which their native lands can offer. [...] Immigrants, however, are not the same as refugees: they want a better life, and this is why they come here. We understand this, but cannot accept it.” (Viktor Orbán, 19.05.2015)

In this statement, Orbán admits to the differences in the terminology used for refugees and migrants. However, instead of addressing the issues that refugees face (fleeing from war in their home countries), he then immediately goes on to focus on the immigrants in describing them as people who arrive purely with the intention to take advantage of Europe and its standards. Shortly after the following statement was made by Orbán:

“My conclusion is that most of the people coming here are not refugees.”
(Viktor Orbán, 14.09.2015)

This is crucial, as portraying the vast majority of people arriving to Europe in the period of summer 2015 as immigrants enables Orbán and his government to reinforce the preexisting concepts about immigrants taking away opportunities from natives’ (for example on the labor market) and justifies the lack of empathy for those in need. Moreover, he emphasizes that the immigrants arriving to Hungary would be a burden for the country, as they would become dependent on the welfare state:

“[...] there is the problem of freeloaders, because not all of the migrants coming

here today will be hard workers, and there is pressure on social welfare systems.

[...] our way of life has been challenged.” (Viktor Orbán, 14.09.2015)

To say that one’s way of life has been challenged, is a serious statement regarding the out-group’s intentions. Due to such characterizations the out-group would be perceived with suspicion at best, or the in-group would resort to a complete rejection of the out-group at worst. It is also noteworthy, that both points about the threat of an out-group with large numbers arriving to Hungary poses an economic threat and that those arriving not being asylum seekers have been raised within the National Consultation. Although, there are many more extreme and more specific examples of Orbán addressing differences between the in-group of natives and the out-group of immigrants/refugees – as seen later – such a vague statement that implicates threat to the in-group is likely to hold great influence.

Some of the differences most frequently highlighted by Orbán are those concerning the cultural backgrounds of Christians of Europe and Muslims of the Middle East. Some of these include the treatment and emancipation of women in society as well as the opposite attitudes of Christians’ empathy towards non-believers and the firm position of Muslims regarding non-believers (which is also partially the reason they are seen to pose a great threat to Europe). After exclaiming that the European way of life has been attacked by the mass of refugees and migrants arriving to Europe, Orbán goes on to say that:

“Hungary [...] must protect its ethnic and cultural composition.”

(Viktor Orbán, 05.09.2015)

The significance of addressing the ethnic and cultural composition of Hungary lies, in part, in that Meuleman and colleagues (2018) have identified Hungary as the country with the most negative attitudes towards immigrants. This is indication that frames, which depict outsiders in a negative light, have been in place long before the arrival of refugees in 2015. Therefore the government is able to increase the alertness of the public by bringing such frames to the front, thus triggering an emotional reaction in citizens by suggesting that the in-group and the out-group are in opposition to each other and future clashes on ethnic and cultural bases are inevitable. This problem definition regarding potential clashes between different cultures becomes even more specific when Orbán talks about the:

“[...] challenge posed by the problem of “the Islamization of Europe.”

(Viktor Orbán, 05.09.2015)

By relating the issue not only to Hungary, but now to the entirety of Europe, the issue immediately takes on a significantly larger scale, and thus signals a much higher level of perceived threat for the text-consumers. In this interpretation the conflict is not only between the Hungarian in-group and the immigrant out-group but also between the European in-group and the immigrant out-group. The word “islamization” signals an intentional process of immigrants and Orbán directly opposes Europe and Islam. This dichotomy is further supported by the following words of Orbán:

“Hungarians would like to keep Europe for the Europeans, and we also wish to keep Hungary as a Hungarian country.” (Viktor Orbán, 19.05.2015.)

Hungarians are implied as the people who have Europe’s best interest at heart (since it is for Europeans and not for outsiders), and therefore find it unacceptable and impossible to allow Islam within the borders of Hungary. Another implication is that Hungary would no longer be a Hungarian country, which might raise the question: what makes a Hungarian country? The following might provide an answer:

“We are a Christian and national government, we have mercy in our hearts, and we have always sheltered refugees – genuine refugees.” (Viktor Orbán, 19.05.2015.)

In the first part of the statement above Orbán says that Hungary is firstly a Christian and secondly a national government. That would suggest that anyone who is not a self-declared Christian and/or national Hungarian is not considered as a part of the in-group in Hungary. Although, this may seem restrictive from the government, it gives a good indication of what values are supported and expected from the in-group members, as Christian and Hungarian national customs and traditions are well-known to the public. Therefore, the public is more than capable of relating to such rhetoric, as even if one does not share Christian beliefs, one’s national identity will allow for in-group membership, so long as they are Hungarian. Additionally, the most highly shared position posited by the National Consultation also ties into this argument, namely that Hungarian families shall be supported foremost, before any other out-group. Moreover, because the government closely links Christianity and Hungarian national identity, for a non-Christian individual is more likely to relate to such values, rather than to understand Muslim values and beliefs.

Portrayals of the future, such as the following, may also be aimed at intimidating the public:

“[...] immigration would lead to a majority Muslim population in Europe within the foreseeable future. (Viktor Orbán, 13.09.2015.)

“[...] when these communities arrive in Europe, they create their own societies according to their own religion, culture and way of life, and these societies exist side by side. [...] these communities have far more children than our communities living according to the conventional European, Christian way of life. [...] our way of life will be in the minority. [...] we are defending our way of life. [...] we are concerned for its survival.” (Viktor Orbán, 14.09.2015)

Orbán suggests that if Europe allows Muslim immigrants to settle down in the European Union that would lead to a Muslim majority, which accounts for a great cultural threat in the area. He raises concern about Muslim families having more children than traditional European ones, so that over time Muslims would inevitably outnumber today's in-group, the Europeans and/or Christians. It is also suggested that these immigrants are not willing to integrate to “our way of life”; instead they would create communities of their own, separated from the rest of the society that is the in-group. Although, it is not clearly stated in what way the European way of life would be in need of defense, the idea of “life as we know it” being demolished is perpetuated countless times. Furthermore, to say that something needs to be defended is simultaneously implying that said thing is under attack. Therefore, the in-group, at least to some extent, is at war with the out-group.

According to Hart (2010), two of the most commonly used metaphors for immigration are the ‘war’ and the ‘water’ metaphors, which are also frequently used by the Hungarian government. The ‘war’ metaphor constructs the immigrant as a possibly violent force and creates cognitive associations between immigrant and threat, which according to Hart, is likely to trigger emotive effects. Immigrants are often defined as intruders and therefore, immigration is more likely to be perceived as invasion (Hart, 2010). Furthermore, because one interprets reality via metaphors, they are the basis for one's action (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). For that reason, in immigration discourse, the use of ‘war’ metaphors enables the individual to perceive a ‘defenseless human being as dangerous enemies and seems to justify a war-like reaction to them’ (El Refaie, 2001, p.368).

To battle immigration is to battle the intruder and to defend one's culture from destruction that the immigrant poses. (See also, Hart, 2010)

“Now we are inundated with countless immigrants: there is an invasion, they break down fences, and it is clear to us all that they are not seeking refuge, and are not running for their lives.” (Viktor Orbán, 05.09.2015.)

“And so these people are not seeking safety, but just the opposite: they are risking their existing safety, taking on huge risks in dinghies, refrigerated trucks and the Channel Tunnel. In the process their children are dying, and even this does not stop them.” (Viktor Orbán, 05.09.2015.)

The above presented quotes describe immigrants as an aggressive force using expressions such as “invasion” and “breaking down fences”, which are far from being associated with people fleeing for their lives. In the first quote, Orbán outright denies that any of these people crossing the border would be refugees, as he puts everyone in the group of people seeking a better life and voluntarily taking on dangerous quests to the West. In the second quote, he still does not refer to these people as refugees and by directly blaming parents for their children's death during such trips, he paints the image of a particularly cruel and negligent group. By putting emphasis on the aspect of safety, a double responsibility is placed on the refugees/immigrants, as now not only they are depicted to threaten the safety of Hungary and Europe, but also their own families.

Another point often made by Orbán is that the level of terrorism threat is increasing, which he argues is inevitable once such masses of people with fundamentally different cultural and spiritual backgrounds are welcomed in Europe:

“today we are not witnessing the arrival of refugees, but a Europe being threatened by mass migration. It is forbidden to say that tens of millions are ready to set out in our direction. It is forbidden to say that immigration brings crime and terrorism to our countries. It is forbidden to say that the masses of people coming from different civilisations pose a threat to our way of life, our culture, our customs, and our Christian traditions.” (Viktor Orbán, 15.03.2016)

Once again, the refugee status of the people arriving is disputed and denied. Moreover, Orbán goes on to victimize the Hungarian government and the public by saying that they are restricted in what they are allowed to say and discuss. This creates the perception that the truth of the

situation is not allowed to be discussed, namely that tens of millions of immigrants are bringing crime and terrorism to Europe with the intention to destroy “our way of life.” This may indeed help in solidifying the perception that Hungary is the only country in the European Union that identified the problem correctly and is not afraid to take action. The increased threat of terrorism is later argued to be supported by the case of Greece:

“Of course there is crime...and there is an increased threat of terrorism [...]”
(Viktor Orbán, 14.09.2015)

“Greece said that it was not possible to rule out the presence of jihadists among the masses of migrants arriving. [...]we do not know, and no one can say, how many terrorists have already arrived among the masses of migrants.”
(Viktor Orbán, 16.11.2015)

“We shall not import to Hungary crime, terrorism, homophobia and synagogue-burning anti-Semitism.” (Viktor Orbán, 15.03.2016)

This example of Greece is used as a deterrent example: they were not able to control the immigrant groups arriving and now they are unable to tell the real level of terrorism threat. It is thus a justification for certain measures in order to keep refugees/immigrants out of the country, since no one is able to tell who might be a terrorist. Therefore, one shall be suspicious of every member of the out-group and once again, the mission of the in-group is to keep the peace and safety of their territory as alarming buzzwords are repeated over again associated with out-group members and criminal acts.

Moreover, Orbán does not only wish to warn Hungarians of such threats, he addresses every country that might come into contact with the issue:

“in this Hungary has historical experience: everyone should be wary of the idea of Islam being part of any European country.” (Viktor Orbán, 16.06.2018.)

This is a clear parallel drawn between the history of Hungary during the Ottoman invasion, which is now being directly related to today’s issue at hand. Orbán suggests that the refugees/immigrants arrive with the same intentions as the invader Ottomans centuries ago and that this poses the same threat to each European country as it once did to Hungary.

While the ‘war’ metaphor puts the in-group and the out-group at direct opposition to each other, the ‘water’ metaphor creates the imagery of a mass of people flowing into a territory as a seemingly unstoppable natural force. Because ‘water’ is a mass noun instead of a count noun, immigrants are conceptualized as one mass entity, ripping them of their individuality. In result the implication is that immigrants can be treated the same across cases because immigration is one single phenomenon (Hart, 2010). Furthermore, El Refaie argues that “the fact that the refugees actually came across the sea seems to have created a particularly strong sense of a ‘natural’ thematic link between the people and water” (El Refaie, 2001, p.359). Although EL Refaie made the previous argument about a decade and a half before the 2015 crisis, it appears to be just as relevant today. A number of examples of the ‘water’ metaphor have also been utilized by Orbán in the immigration debate:

“[...] the flow of immigrants [...]” (Viktor Orbán, 13.09.2015)

“We Hungarians have been advocating the closure of our borders to stop the flood of people coming from the Middle East and Africa.” (Viktor Orbán, 16.11.2015)

“Mass migration is like a slow and steady current of water which washes away the shore. It appears in the guise of humanitarian action, but its true nature is the occupation of territory; and their gain in territory is our loss of territory.”

(Viktor Orbán, 15.03.2016)

“[...] we are under siege. The migrant flow has not come to an end, but only slowed down [...]” (Viktor Orbán, 07.03.2017)

As one can see the metaphor starts out as a ‘flow’, which is a gentler sounding form, then turns into a ‘flood’, then becomes a ‘steady current’, which has intentions of ‘occupation’ and finally a ‘siege’. This escalation of the ‘water’ metaphor for immigration can be seen as an indicator of the government’s rhetoric becoming harsher over a relatively short period of two years.

As mentioned previously, an important part of the immigration debate is how relations between Hungary and the European Union are depicted. This point had been addressed in the National Consultation, as well. As it has been presented, the results of the National Consultation showed a strong resonance from the Hungarian people with the government regarding the European Union and especially the ‘migrant resettlement quotas’.

“[...] the proposal of the European Commission is – to be absolutely frank –

nothing short of absurd, bordering on the insane. [...] I am convinced that the proposal that we should let asylum-seekers into Europe and should apportion them out among the Member States on the basis of some artificially defined quota is a crazy idea.” (Viktor Orbán, 19.05.2015)

Orbán has vocalized his administration’s stance on the resettlement quotas, which would assign a proportionate number of refugees to each European Union member state in order to relieve some pressure off of the forerunner countries who take in a large number of refugees and migrants each year, such as the UK and Germany amongst others. By discrediting other solutions than those of his administration, Orbán is able to further strengthen the perception that Hungary cannot rely on anyone’s help, as the European Union is unable to identify appropriate solutions that would favor national interest. However, the European Union/Brussels is not the only scapegoat that Orbán explicitly addresses. He often refers to Greece and their lack of preventive actions as one of the main reasons for the crisis:

“Brussels should be putting more pressure on Greece, because for years now the European Union’s external borders haven’t been protected there. If Greece had been fulfilling its obligations, this whole immigration crisis wouldn’t exist” (Viktor Orbán, 13.09.2015)

“In the first place we should mention Greece here, as Greece is the first EU country encountered on the route from that direction; if Greece had observed what we agreed on, and if they had fulfilled the obligations they were supposed to, we would not have any problems on the Serbian-Hungarian border [...]” (Viktor Orbán, 14.09.2015)

While Greece is pointed out as a sole actor at fault, Orbán does not release pressure off the European Union, as he expects Brussels to focus on Greece’s responsibility in the events that could take place. Greece’s neglect of the obligation to protect the European Union’s external borders is in strong contrast with the often repeated argument of Orbán referring to Hungary as the ‘bastion of Europe’. This is likely to create a greater sense of righteousness as Hungary is now perceived to make up for the lacking of the rest of Europe and to ensure that the European Union and its people are protected by the Hungarians. Nevertheless, Orbán often points out the incapacity of the European Union to deal with the migration crisis as the most fundamental systemic issue:

“A Europe which requires its half a billion citizens to respect its laws is unable to persuade migrants to undergo a simple registration process. Brussels’ policies and the great powers made the situation even worse when they proved to be unable to grasp the root of the problem, and saw people who are clearly illegal economic migrants as being refugees.” (Viktor Orbán, 21.09.2015)

In this context, not only does he target Brussels but he also repeatedly refuses to acknowledge the presence of refugees amongst the masses, and decides to solely focus on economic migrants. To imply that the majority of said migrants are indeed economic migrants takes away from the credibility of the refugees and suggests that they are not in need of or deserving of help from Europe. Therefore, along with border protection as one of the main priorities, Hungary is now also at ‘war’ with the European Union:

“We must protect the borders of Hungary and Europe, and at the same time we must also fight against Europe’s short-sighted policy, which has turned against the will of the European people [...] Europe is unable to protect its external borders, an increasing number of internal borders are being closed within Europe, one of the most important achievements of which has been the free movement of goods and people, commonly referred to as “Schengen” [...] More than eighty per cent of Hungarians think that Brussels’ ill-chosen immigration policy has failed, and therefore the rules must be tightened.” (Viktor Orbán, 21.09.2015)

The explicit statement that the European Union is no longer serving the will of its people is a frightening concept, as that is supposed to be its sole purpose. If that is no longer true, Hungary then must take it upon itself to protect its own and the rest of Europe’s state from the existential threat that is mass migration. He further supports this argument by referring to other European countries that have closed down their borders due to the risk of unregulated migration as well as the results of the National Consultation, which once again proves to be in strong accordance with the administration’s stance. Because this is presented to be held by the vast majority of participants in the National Consultation and by the administration, Orbán must represent the nation; therefore, he must be right. Then, if the nation is perceived as being represented by its government, an external power has no say in what would be best for said nation:

“[...] from somewhere outside Hungary, people want to tell us Hungarians who we should live alongside. This is what the quotas are about. [...] In the light of the

terrorist attacks, Brussels can no longer question Member States' right to defend themselves, given that mandatory resettlement quotas are dangerous, because they would spread terrorism across Europe.” (Viktor Orbán, 16.11.2015)

This presents a new frame, in which the out-group is now identified as the institution of the European Union and the in-group is the Hungarian nation. In this context, if the in-group is not cautious with the out-group, potential threat is likely to be imported by the out-group and its ideas/policies if implemented. Moreover, the argument against resettlement quotas evolved from being ‘a crazy idea’ to being outright dangerous and importing terrorism into every country affected. Orbán later on explicitly states that the European Union is an unreliable source of help:

“We cannot rely on Brussels and the European Union: on the contrary, they just make our work harder.” (Viktor Orbán, 07.03.2017)

“Brussels has opened up a conflict between the eastern and western halves of the EU.” (Viktor Orbán, 16.06.2018)

Not only is Brussels said to be unhelpful, they are argued to have caused division between member states that welcome refugees and migrants and member states that refuse to do so. However, this division shall not be taken lightly in a union where all member states are expected to share burdens and uphold the same European value set across its entirety. In this division Hungary is also portrayed as superior in understanding their reality and the issues they are facing, as Orbán describes Hungarians as:

“[...] the Hungarians are a people with self-respect and pride, but also sound self-knowledge and a realistic assessment of their situation.”

(Viktor Orbán, 16.06.2018)

The above presented talking points and arguments have been repeated countless times during the crisis. Results of the National Consultations have further fuelled the narratives already in place and were used as justification in the immigration debate, albeit not an overwhelming number of Hungarians participated in the consultation.

5. Discussion

5.1. Discussion on my findings

This chapter will aim at explaining how the relevant theories can be applied to the examples of framing efforts and rhetoric of the Hungarian government regarding the immigration debate and why such efforts have high potential to be successful in the case of contemporary Hungary. While aware of the fact that the migration crisis was due to a large number of refugees arriving to Europe, this chapter refers to the issue discussed as the ‘immigration’ debate. This is for the reason that the Hungarian government with Orbán as its main representative have disregarded the fact that the crisis was one of refugees fleeing war and reframed the discourse and the public perception as solely the issue of immigration policies both in Hungary and Europe. Therefore, despite the issue being highly specific to the refugees arriving to Hungary during 2015, the discourse was much more general in addressing the issue of immigration as a constant challenge to the country.

As stated earlier, the process of problem definition is of key importance in the case of the Hungarian immigration debate. That is because problem definition allows for the text-producers to frame any phenomenon in any way that would fit the agenda of said text-producers most (Ingram et al, 2007). In the case of Hungary, the text-producer is the government, the text-consumer is the public and the problem defined is immigration. By building on a previously existing frame, in which the Hungarian society is not welcoming towards migrants and especially towards Muslims (for reasons discussed later in this chapter), the government was able to present the challenges that the refugees’ arrival brought as one, if not the most pressing issue. Within this frame refugees and immigrants are seen as the same out-group with the same intentions, and therefore they are seen to pose the same threat to Hungary. This is why the refugee crisis could transform into an immigration debate so quickly, essentially abandoning the initial issue. In a simplistic manner, the frame presents a *threefold threat*. First, immigrants pose a *security threat* to Hungary, since they are arriving from war stroked areas and it is nearly impossible to sift potential terrorists out of the crowds. Second, immigrants pose an *economic threat* to Hungary, where resources are already scarce. Third, immigrants pose a *cultural threat* because of their fundamentally different religious background and culture that is seen to be incompatible with so-called Western values. Additionally, another frame was put into motion, in which the Hungarian

government identifies the European Union and its institutions as the enemy of the nation. This frame focuses on how the European Union is unable to contain the immigrants, secure the borders, and grant an orderly process of accepting refugees. Meanwhile, it also warns against the authoritarian nature of a resettlement quota, which Hungary completely rejects because it finds unacceptable that it is forced upon states.

As seen in the previous chapter, the government was also able to bring this issue to the forefront so much so that a National Consultation took place, the results of which were extremely lined up with the government's own stance (albeit the representativeness is questionable, since only about one million respondents participated compared to the eight million questionnaires sent out). Not only were these results presented as proof of great public support for the government, but also they likely provided for even stronger conviction to those who believed in the severity of the situation, as it created the perception that over 80 per cent of the rest of the Hungarians (or more accurately, respondents) agreed that stricter measures should be implemented given the dangers posed by immigration and the lack of the European Union's ability to deal with it.

Furthermore, following Ingram and colleagues' categorization, Hungary's institutional culture can be identified as 'degenerative politics'. This includes "negative, divisive, and demeaning modes of communication" and "negative views of one another" (Ingram et al, 2007, p.118). The previous chapter has provided many examples in which Orbán focused on the negative effects of differences between the in-group of Hungarians and the out-group of immigrants. Orbán presents the vision of a near future in which a clash between the in-group and the out-group is inevitable due to the fundamental differences in their views regarding nearly every aspect of life. Amongst others, these include language, women's rights, religious/spiritual convictions; all of which define an individual's life to a massive extent. According to Orbán, if such values are not homogenous within a society, this may lead to chaos and decay of a nation. This is where the divisive nature of such rhetoric stems from, since it does not present differences between groups as a positive, constructive source for a society to improve itself in terms of solidarity and acceptance, but rather as a negative, destructive force that will put the very nation that tries to embrace it on the verge of extinction.

As the previous chapter showed, the criticism of the Hungarian government that targets Islam specifically is based on some historical experiences. However, stories about the 16th and 17th century Hungary that was occupied by the Turks are found to be focusing on the clashes and wars nearly explicitly while not granting much space for discussion about the cultural aspects of the era (Pirický, 2013). This depiction of about 500 years of a nation's history is then likely to create a skewed view on how the then majority Christian Hungarian and the Muslim community were able to co-exist in the Carpathians. Due to generation after generation of Hungarians being taught about the Turks (and Islam in connotation to them), there is a wide collective understanding of past events that jeopardized the nation state's very existence as it is known today. While this outlook on Islam is not exclusive to Hungary, as other European nations, such as France, also view Muslims as "warriors and invaders" (Benveniste & Pingaud, 2016, p.73), it is undoubtedly stronger and more alive in Hungary than it is in the rest of the European countries. That is for the reason that, as mentioned before, Hungary has been indeed under occupation for half a century and the collective memory of the nation has not been forgiving. It also works for a widely accepted narrative, which many generations have found legitimate, that the government can and does use the narrative of dangerous intruders who intend to undermine the nation's best interest. Moreover, while the government is able to stress a narrative or frame, which builds on fear of the intruders to a great extent, not only does it bring a nation together on the basis of fear of and contempt for an out-group, it also has a high potential at successfully selling the government's program, which accentuates dealing with the issues in a way that appeals for the fear-driven majority and thus gain support for the party. The results of the National Consultation, for example, in part represent that the government has been successful in activating such frames, while in part also give positive feedback to Orbán that such rhetoric is supported or at least tolerated, which he is able to then use in legitimizing his views on a global scale, such as in the European Union.

The foundation of such critical rhetoric is the fundamental differences between Christianity and Islam. By depicting followers of Islam as aggressive and malicious in their intention of coming to Europe to turn it into a Muslim majority continent, as Orbán has done on multiple occasions, in contrast to the open-minded and tolerant Christian Europe is a strategic move that triggers an emotional response. The incompatible nature of Islam with the values of the traditionally

Christian Europe has been often emphasized by Orbán and he questions the ability of Muslims to catch up to a progressive thinking globalist Europe with regards to their ‘out-dated’ traditions and value system. Orbán predicts that Muslim communities, once established in Hungary, would inevitably keep growing to the point where ethnic Hungarians will become a minority in the foreseeable future. If the Muslim out-group community is unable to integrate to Hungarian and European values, then by becoming a majority group, they pose a great existential threat to Hungarians. In the case of Hungary these tactics work exceptionally well, given its history and the four major emotions of voters identified by Bosetti. These emotions are hope, hatred, anxiety, and fear (Bosetti, 2011). This is a major point, since the anti-immigrant narrative used by Orbán’s government is able to target all of the abovementioned feelings. The Hungarian citizen may be convinced that a highly significant number of migrants are arriving to Hungary with malevolent intentions (fear) of staying there and taking employment opportunities in an otherwise already scarce environment (anxiety) as well as disrespecting Western cultural and religious values (hatred) so the only way of protecting the country (and the entirety of Europe) is to trust Orbán and his extraordinary ways to keep migrants out (hope).¹

However, it is noteworthy, that many of the Western European countries, such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, since the end of World War II have been open to immigration without jeopardizing their nation’s existence. Of course, it could be argued that minority groups may have a tendency to organize themselves in slightly communities segregated to different degrees, but that is not different in the case of Hungary either, where Roma communities have been a part of the Hungarian society for centuries that also live under such circumstances according to their own traditions. Nevertheless, since the Roma community holds a long shared history with ethnic Hungarians, it is understandable that a Muslim community would be regarded as more of an out-group. For instance, while the Roma community speaks Hungarian, the arriving Muslim refugees or immigrants do not. This is a very obvious point of difference that is easily detectable for anyone without having to search further arguments for why members of this out-group do not belong to Hungary. Although it is true that immigrants as well as refugees often arrive to countries of which language they do not master at the time of arrival, that does not mean

¹ This idea has been previously used by the author in a work titled: The European Migration Crisis and the Hungarian Government’s Rhetoric

they would never integrate by learning it. In fact, the European Union has set out an action plan to best integrate third-world nationals, in which they aim at creating a network between the European host-countries of mutual learning about integration programs, as well as promoting education, training, and full participation of migrants in societal life (European Commission, 2016). However, because this action plan and these integration programs have not been incorporated in the Hungarian immigration debate, the public remained unaware of the potential benefits of such programs for both the in-group and the out-group. Therefore, the initial fear and contempt towards the refugees and immigrants also remain.

The result of such frames is the aforementioned three-fold threat perception (Mayda, 2006). The perception that immigration poses significant threats to Hungary is rooted in fear. Concerns about national security are likely to be exaggerated as Orbán's government regularly warns Hungarian citizens of the dangers that the out-group automatically brings along, thus securitizing the topic. This is usually a heightened fear of terrorism; even though, Hungary has not been a target of any attacks of that sort. Threats of an existential cultural crisis are frequently associated with the aforementioned differences in religious and traditional backgrounds of the in-group and the out-group. Orbán consistently mentions how the European way of life is at stake and that the out-group's way of life is completely incompatible with that of Hungary or Europe. The out-group's suggested lack of ability to conform along with the Christian Hungary and Europe not being strong enough to outweigh the out-group is what Orbán identifies as the key concerns. This becomes an existential crisis because of the perception that if the Muslim out-group is so much stronger and more dedicated to their traditional religion and culture, the European Christian way of life would soon be gone. For a country with a relatively small population but long-standing traditions and a history rich with occupations and fights for independence, the thought of its heritage being "wiped out" in the foreseeable future is understandably frightening – even if unlikely.

The economic threats are often focused on employment and an increased pressure on the welfare state. As Orbán often mentions, because the out-group is unlikely to integrate, it will also be greatly dependent on the welfare state, which is unfair to the working Hungarians who should be first and foremost taken care of. This point is also explicitly included amongst the questions of

the National Consultation, which shows just how important and useful of an argument the government finds it in making a point about the utmost importance of Hungarian nationals. In addition, because the out-group is seen negatively due to pre-existing frames, the success or lack thereof is secondary in the case of the out-group (Esses et al, 2001). If the immigrants in Hungary were dependent on the welfare state, they are considered a burden and the country should not be obliged to finance them. If the immigrants in Hungary hold preferable positions in the labor market, they are depriving the ethnic Hungarians of opportunities that should be available for them before any member of any out-group. This is the type of resource stress that Esses and colleagues argue results in zero-sum beliefs (Esses et al, 2001). Namely that the more opportunities are granted for the out-group, the less opportunities will be available for the in-group. This supports the idea that the out-group is seen either as a burden on the welfare state or as taking job opportunities away from the Hungarian nationals. Thus, it appears that there are virtually no scenarios in which the out-group can have a positive effect on the overall structure of society, not in economic, nor in cultural terms. In reality this is not entirely accurate, since the presence of a mosque does not take away from the Christian churches of Europe. However, speaking of this subject in such a manner can certainly create the perception that this is exactly what Hungary is facing. And if there is consensus that this zero-sum game is indeed what Hungary is in the midst of, then the best option for protection available for the Hungarian government would be to not even allow this out-group to set foot within the borders.

The fear of the out-group gaining cultural hegemony in Hungary is encouraged by Orbán speaking of millions of refugees/immigrants crossing the borders of Hungary in a short period of time. As Meuleman and colleagues argue, the size of an out-group is of great importance, as the larger the group, the higher the perception of threat amongst the in-group (Meuleman et al, 2008). Therefore, Orbán amplifies the negative sentiments towards a Muslim community and its growth in Europe by exaggerating actual numbers of out-group members. Obviously, millions of out-group members crossing the borders daily or even weekly can sound threatening to citizens of a country with a population of less than 10 million people. In reality, although, there was a spike in the numbers of asylum applications in 2015, this number barely exceeded 177 thousand and has been decreasing drastically in 2016 and 2017 (29 430 and 3 390 applications, respectively) (European Parliament, 2017). Furthermore, the total number of asylum applications in the

European Union was 1 321 600 and 1 259 955 in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Although, the European Parliament stated that 2,2 million people were illegally present in the European Union in 2015, this is a cumulative number and applies to the entirety of the European Union (European Parliament, 2017). Therefore, the statement that millions of refugees and immigrants have crossed the Hungarian borders is inaccurate, as Hungary was not the sole ‘transit’ country (a significant amount of refugees arrived from Italy and Greece, as well) and the vast majority of both legal and illegal migrants were not in Hungary.

The inaccurate use of terms such as refugees and immigrants (which refer to vastly different groups) in combination with an increased visibility of the out-group can account to the misinformation of the in-group, even though, the actual numbers are not nearly as high (Bohman, 2011). Under the circumstances created by the consistent push of divisive and critical frames regarding immigration in Hungary, the cultural differences often pointed out by Orbán can also appear more dramatic than what they are. Due to the exaggerated numbers of out-group members and the over-dramatized concerns about deep cultural differences, in which Orbán describes a nearly barbaric people unable to conform to Western civilization, religious heritage discourses can be activated (Astor et al, 2017). As Astor and colleagues suggest, this sort of discourse is usually observable in cases where a country faces a sudden sociodemographic change and there is no possibility to slowly adjust to them. Such religious heritage discourses are especially prevalent in Hungary, due to national identity being closely bound to religion. Moreover, it helps such discourses to gain ground that text-producers, such as the government, explicitly advocate for them. As seen in the Analysis chapter, Orbán often speaks of protecting “our way of life” and being the protector of not only Hungary, but Europe as a whole, which signals a cultural defense mode (Astor et al, 2017).

Additionally, another interesting aspect of the government’s rhetoric can be observed incorporated in the recently drawn up constitution of Hungary (Fundamental Law) in 2011. As Majtényi and colleagues note “not only does the Fundamental Law outline abstract moral principles, but these moral principles are actually manifest in the political system, in the actions of politicians, bureaucrats and citizens, which the regime comprehensively refers to as the System of National Cooperation (NER)” (Majtényi et al, 2018, p.2). Majtényi and colleagues’ study

showcases that the ‘othering’ tactics of the government are not newly discovered and notions of the in-group vs. out-group dynamics have long been a part of the Hungarian public discourse, to the point where the national constitution’s language explicitly rejects individuals as well as groups who do not comply with national ideals. Moreover, Majtényi and colleagues (2018) also make an incredibly valid point by noting that the Fundamental Law tends to use the concept of the people’s will (or nation’s will) as an equivalent to the government’s will, which inherently implies that minorities, by definition, cannot be right and are inferior to the will of the majority. Thus, because the majority’s and the people’s will is one, the government is immediately justified in their policy agendas.² This process is what Pajnik and colleagues refer to as “re-traditionalisation” (Pajnik et al, 2016). Characteristics of “re-traditionalisation” include dividing individuals into groups of “our people” and the “others” (which groups oppose each other), and then refocusing the in-group of “our people” on traditional values such as those of nationality, proper gender roles, etc. – all of which one can observe in the case of Hungary. For instance, after the 2015 National Consultation on immigration and terrorism, in which the immigrants were distinctly divorced from the Hungarian nationals and their values, the briefly mentioned 2018 National Consultation on protection of the family reinforced traditional family values. In this National Consultation the government posed questions formulated in a highly suggestive manner similarly to the 2015 Consultation. For instance, Hungarians were asked if they agreed that “children have a right to a mother and a father” (National Consultation, 2018).

As Chong and Druckman note, the effectiveness of framing efforts for the most part depends on the strength and repetition of frames and the competitive environment (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.111). In the case of Hungary the frames in which immigrants are depicted in negative ways are extremely strong due to some historical events, which are still vivid in the collective memory of the society as well as struggles in the economic sector. The repetition of these frames is well indicated by the scheme of the National Consultation programs and the documentation of Orbán’s public statements and speeches, in which he took advantage of every possibility to further push the government’s preferred narrative. As for the competitive environment, as of today there is no opposition party present in the political arena in Hungary, who would

² This idea has been previously used by the author in a work titled: The European Migration Crisis and the Hungarian Government’s Rhetoric

effectively challenge the governing Fidesz and Orbán regarding immigration policies. Thus, citizens are left with a rather unanimous view, as the situation is depicted in a black and white manner. These frames also lack empathy because although, they largely rely on the emotional response triggered in text-consumers, such as the public, the predominant emotions they target are fear and contempt for the out-group. Such framing efforts in Hungary have been undoubtedly successful due to the combination of various societal aspects discussed in this chapter.

Finally, Orbán has also been vocal about rejecting the resettlement quota proposed by the European Union, which would require member states to take in a proportional number of refugees under burden-sharing across the Union. The response of the Hungarian government could come as rather surprising in the light of the events of 1956, when roughly 200 thousand Hungarians found themselves fleeing from government persecution in the aftermath of the uprising against the Soviet powers. This was a somewhat similar emergency to the recent crisis in Hungary, which was also resolved by resettlement. Between October 1956 and June 1957, 200 thousand people have left Hungary, a majority of whom applied for asylum in Austria (a country with a population of about 7 million people at the time) (Zieck, 2013). Nevertheless, Austria welcomed the Hungarian refugees and resettlement started by the 7th of November 1956. Evidently, Austria was not able to deal with such a massive number of refugees in such a short period of time and requested financial and operational assistance from other countries. It is noteworthy that, as Zieck (2013) notes, a significantly higher number of countries made more generous offers than what can be seen today by proportions. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Hungarian refugees were resettled in 36 countries, with only 410 of them remaining in Austria, albeit selection criteria were applied by some states (Zieck, 2013).

As Zieck puts it: “resettlement [...] is essentially based on the goodwill of states”, since no state is obligated to resettle refugees in a third state (Zieck, 2013, p.47). The lesson Hungary was ought to learn after having its 200 thousand citizens relocated all over the world, was that in their time of need those host countries had generosity for and stood in solidarity with them. However, the story of the 200 thousand Hungarian refugees who had been given shelter and protection by 37 countries some 60 years ago and largely thanks to Austria, has not been a part of the debate over the recent migrant crisis in Hungary. Not even after António Guterres, UN High

Commissioner for Refugees issued statements as a reminder in September 2015 (Flemming, 2015). The Hungarian government still stands strong in their belief, that unlike Austria with a smaller national population over 60 years ago was able to take part in the resettlement of 200 thousand people, Hungary today with the support of other European Union member states, both in financial and operational terms, could not take part in resolving a similar issue by receiving 1.79 per cent of the refugees in Europe (European Union, 2015).

5.2. My findings in relation to other studies

This part of the discussion presents how the findings of this study relate to previous articles regarding the topic of the 2015 migration crisis in Hungary. Some of the relevant and below presented articles focus on aspects that this study did not or only briefly touched upon. Nevertheless, findings of such studies often come to the same or significantly similar conclusions as this thesis. Therefore, links of this study's to such material are found to be relevant and compelling.

This study focused mainly on how Orbán's administration used pre-existing frames in their effort to fuel an anti-immigration/anti-refugee public discourse. Majtényi and colleagues (2018) argue that frames regarding any out-group are inherent to the language of the newly drafted constitution (Fundamental Law) in 2011, which thus enables and justifies the in-group in their negative sentiments felt towards out-groups. They note that some articles of the Fundamental Law make explicit distinction between in-group and out-group members, while others leave much room for interpretation of conditions that could determine whether one is deserving of in-group membership. For instance, Article XXII allows for the possibility of criminalization of homelessness by local government decrees for the protection of public health, cultural values, and security (Hungarian National Assembly, 2011). In this case, the homeless is perceived as the out-group, who may pose a public health and security threat to the in-group of non-homeless Hungarians, therefore the in-group is morally justified and legally allowed to discriminate against the homeless. Another example, one that leaves room for interpretation in individual cases, is Article XIX, which states that one's 'usefulness' to the community would determine the extent of unemployment measures and benefits (Hungarian National Assembly, 2011). Such a vague

formulation of such significant determining factors can be problematic, as it does not give a clear guide in what terms one's 'usefulness' shall be interpreted. As Majtényi and colleagues argue, this particular article is not helpful in abandoning the prejudices that target the Roma minority, which has been often depicted as lazy and unworthy of gaining in-group privileges in Hungary (Majtényi et al, 2018; Glied & Pap, 2016). These findings of Majtényi and colleagues support the finding of this study that the Hungarian government relies heavily on language as part of their strategy in convincing citizens of their views regarding immigration or out-groups in general as well as that such frames have been put into place long before the 2015 crisis.

Moreover, this study stated that the confusing and irregular use of terms, such as migrant/immigrant/refugee/asylum seeker created a linguistic environment in Hungary, in which all the aforementioned terms gained negative connotations and more importantly, became associated with the immigration debate. Bocskor also finds that 'migrant' was used most often as an umbrella term by the Hungarian administration in referring to the entirety of the people arriving to Hungary (Bocskor, 2018). Even though, organizations such as the European Parliament and the UNHCR provide definitions that make clear distinctions between migrants and refugees, the Hungarian government argues that any person who travels further than the first safe country, shall not be regarded as a refugee, but as an economic migrant, therefore they stand justified in using the term loosely (Bocskor, 2018, p.558).

Furthermore, Thorleifsson argues that the result of a successful campaign of the Hungarian government, which depicts the migrants not only as an unwanted out-group, but as a group that personifies the enemy, is that the conflict would no longer take place between two equal groups that have simply different sets of values and traditions. Instead, the conflict then turns into a war between a civilized and a non-civilized world (Thorleifsson, 2017). Indeed, this study presented a number of examples of Orbán depicting members of the out-group as people essentially solely defined by their group membership, which inherently means that they would be unable to conform to Western ideas regarding several societal issues due to their strong beliefs, which are seen as out-dated. Differences between religious and world views have been exaggerated to a great extent and Orbán even went as far as accusing Muslim communities of conspiring against Western societies and aiming at destroying the 'traditional Christian Europe'. However, the out-

group was not only framed as an enemy on the basis of cultural and value system differences. Part of the fear tactics of the Hungarian administration included claiming that if such a large number of migrants were relocated to Hungary, national citizens' opportunities on the labor market would immediately become limited. As noted previously, the administration argued that migrants would either take job opportunities away from nationals or would become a burden on the welfare state, which then would result in less resources being available to nationals in need. All of the tactics of the Hungarian administration that aim at broadcasting the image of a dangerous and powerful enemy on multiple fronts (such as security, economy, culture) can indeed create a frame that does not allow for the out-group members to break such a narrative, as everything they might do is communicated as a negative to the public long in advance.

Finally, an important aspect of the immigration debate in Hungary as well as in Europe is also pointed out by Glied and Pap, who argue that the actions and the language of Orbán and his government bears significant symbolist values, such as the border fence (Glied & Pap, 2016). As Glied and Pap (2016) note, the border fence erected on the southern border of Hungary to Serbia was not for the single purpose of keeping refugees out of the country, but it also provided as a metaphor of protection and security. This study also demonstrated how Orbán has spoken of his administration as the sole protector of Hungary and its citizens' interest and then of Hungary as the sole protector of and only hope for the rest of Europe. This aspect is essential in the Hungarian immigration debate, as the government does not only frame the refugees and migrants as the enemy, but simultaneously frames itself as the solution to the problem on a global level.

5.3. Discussion on my research design

This section addresses the nature and weaknesses of the research design of this study as well as the validity and reliability of it.

This single case study of Hungary that focused on the events of the migration crisis in 2015 can be identified as a representative and as a typical case study. Representative for the reason that it exclusively focuses on the events in Hungary and more specifically, how and which frames Orbán and his administration utilized in activating and dominating the public discourse regarding

the immigration debate. However, the theoretical framework that allowed for the investigation of the in-group versus out-group relations as well as threat perception and government efforts to direct public discourse are more general and could be applied to other cases, which would account for a typical case. Moreover, this study is a synchronic and explanatory study, as it examines one particular event in time and it aims at helping to understand why the Hungarian government has been successful in framing the public discourse about immigration and the refugee crisis in a way that resulted in unwelcoming and negative attitudes towards out-group members in Hungary. For that reason the study also presented some preceding events that shaped the in-groups' collective understanding (for instance, historical events such as the Ottoman wars).

Nevertheless, some weaknesses of the study shall be addressed. Although this study aimed at focusing on the most relevant materials that would allow for a thorough understanding and an adequate representation of the current situation in Hungary (such as the National Consultation and speeches), it is nearly impossible to include some of the most recent publications and public statements by the government, as events are still unfolding today. Even though this makes for an incredibly relevant case, it also makes it challenging to capture the entirety of the situation. Moreover, because the migration crisis quickly became one of the most pressing issues in Hungary, countless statements have been made by a number of government officials, which were not included in this study. Therefore, data collection was limited to some extent, as there is an endless number of accounts of statements that could have been included and analyzed. Although this paper presented exclusively the positions represented by Orbán, it could be useful to have a broader look at the party composition of the Hungarian parliament and the views they hold in this debate respectively. Furthermore, while the author's Hungarian heritage allowed for accession of materials only provided in Hungarian as well as for the understanding of societal norms and issues concerning out-groups as a native, there is a possibility for bias, as the events were not entirely unknown to the author (partially due to the publicity the case has received in global media).

Regarding the validity of the study, it is the author's conviction that this study is a true reflection of reality, as it presents accurate data regarding statements as well as results of the National Consultation. Moreover, it provides an adequate analysis of speech and linguistics in light of the

established theoretical framework and historical knowledge relevant to the case. The relevance of the data (such as the National Consultation) used in this research is significant, as it is some of the materials that undoubtedly reached in some way or form the vast majority, if not all of the Hungarians residing in the country. Furthermore, the findings of this study are also consistent with previous studies that focused on some aspects of the migrant crisis and the Hungarian government's approach to the issue.

The reliability of the study and its findings is supported by its consistency regarding other studies and the fact that the events discussed are well documented and widely accessible for any researcher interested. Therefore, due to the precise documentation regarding public statements in Hungary and the European Union's institutions as well as the number of asylum applications amongst others and the synchronic nature of the study, results of further research should be in line with those of this study. That is for the reason that a specific event in a specific point in time is investigated and even though it is still unfolding, certain tendencies can be identified and confirmed. Furthermore, the theoretical framework that has been developed for the purpose of this study suggests that theories regarding the nature of in-group versus out-group relations are universally applicable, even across different levels. For instance, in a European context Hungary could be regarded as an out-group due to their negative attitudes towards immigration and their unwillingness to resettle refugees, while in a Hungarian context, as seen in this study, the out-group was identified as migrants.

6. Conclusion

This paper presented some of the issues Hungary faced during the 2015 migration crisis, in which an extremely rapid increase in refugees arriving to Europe challenged the capacities of the European Union. During this time the Hungarian government quickly turned the debate about how to best take care of these people and how to ensure a safe transition for relocation of refugees into a debate concerning immigration, disregarding the concerns of mishandling the situation coming from other European countries. This study aimed at investigating what pre-existing conditions and other strategies enabled the Hungarian government to successfully communicate a narrative to the public that depicts out-group members, such as the refugees, in a way that results in the majority of Hungarian citizens rejecting cooperation with the European Union regarding resettlement of refugees.

To answer this question a theoretical framework was set up. This framework explained how frames are constructed and how they account for a collective understanding of people, groups, events and how they are based on some widely shared experiences or beliefs of an in-group (Chong & Druckman, 2007). It was also argued that problem definition allows for certain powerful actors – for instance, political leaders – to define issues as a key concern, which can trigger emotional responses or previously established frames within the society (Ingram et al, 2007). The importance of text-producers' efforts in problem definition is undoubtedly a determining factor in which frames might become activated at a given point in time and how text-consumers may perceived certain messages (Hart, 2010). Furthermore, it was established how in-group and out-group relations are normally structured. This included, for instance, how in-group members have reservations towards out-group members, which can be based on a number of differences, such as those regarding race, religion, and so on (Esses et al, 2001). Such reservations and doubts about out-group members, if framed in a particular manner, can lead to an increased threat perception on the in-group's side. Therefore, perceived threats commonly associated with immigration were presented, as the debate in Hungary moved from a humanitarian crisis to unwanted mass immigration. These threats are characterized by three main themes: security threats, economic threat, and cultural/identity threats (Mayda, 2006). Moreover, such threat, regardless whether it being perceived or real, can be further securitized by text-

producers, which can further increase levels of threat perception (Beck, 2017). Finally, some historical context was given regarding the history of Hungary in relation to the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman occupation of the country during the 16th and 17th century, which has shaped the shared memory and common understanding of the Muslim world amongst Hungarians. It has been also found that representations of Turks have mostly focused on the wars between the two groups, and only rarely was everyday life mentioned, which likely creates the perception that there was no peaceful co-existing in the 150 year period under the Ottoman occupation (Pirický, 2013). The particular case of Hungary and the administration's rhetoric was then examined through this framework.

The analysis first presented the National Consultation questionnaire of 2015, which explicitly addressed the immigration debate. The questionnaire was essentially the Viktor Orbán administration's official stance regarding migration, in which refugees were not addressed a single time, and respondents were asked whether they agreed with the proposed positions. Out of the approximately eight million questionnaires only approximately one million participants responded. The representativeness of the questionnaire was further questionable due to the highly suggestive nature of the questions, nearly all of which was a preposition that immediately presented a frame followed by a question as well as the decidedly limited answer options that left little to no room for individual opinion statement. Nevertheless, the Consultation was seen by the administration as a great success, as well over 80-90 per cent of respondents expressed their agreement with the government's position on all questions.

The second part of the analysis presented numerous examples of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's rhetoric supported by quotations from recent public speeches and interviews regarding immigration. In this, one can see how all of the concerns defined by the theoretical framework have been addressed at one point or another by Orbán (such as security, economic and cultural concerns). Orbán quickly abandoned referring to the people arriving to Europe from war struck areas as refugees and thus the debate became strictly about immigration. Therefore, dangers and threats of mass migration have been heavily emphasized by Orbán. Arguments regarding the economy include that migrants would take away job opportunities from native Hungarians or otherwise become dependent on the welfare state, which would inevitably result in less resources being available for Hungarians in need. Thus, from the government's perspective, migrants

would only bring more uncertainty to the already fragile Hungarian labor market and welfare state and the possibility of innovation that could boost the Hungarian economy in any area is inherently rejected. Moreover, security threats are also addressed, as Orbán claims that no other nation in Europe is capable of correctly identifying the issue concerning migration and the security threat that Europe became suddenly exposed to. Orbán has depicted Hungary as the last bastion of Europe multiple times, while simultaneously depicting his administration as the sole protector of the nation and Europe. Furthermore, in an ever-harshening fashion Orbán's rhetoric became increasingly negative and frightening when speaking of the cultural and existential threats posed onto Hungarians by migration. He often called attention to the cultural and religious differences between the in-group of Hungarians and out-group of migrants by pointing to the majority of migrants holding Muslim beliefs arriving to a traditionally Christian Europe. Orbán also frequently warns Hungarians that 'our way of life' is in danger and once Muslim communities are welcomed in the country, the natives would have no chance of maintaining a majority rate within the population. Therefore, he argues that preemptive measures are the best way of defending the Hungarian way of life and cultural as well as ethnic homogeneity. Such measures include the rejection of the resettlement quotas proposed by the European Union, in which the rest of the Western European member states admit that the best way to tackle the issue of the masses predominantly arriving to Hungary, Italy, and Greece, is burden sharing by resettling a proportionate amount of refugees in each member state. However, Orbán finds the proposition unacceptable and he argues that this is further proof that the best interest of Hungarians is not a priority issue for the European Union and that the Union thus jeopardizes the future of not only Hungary, but the rest of Europe as well.

In conclusion, the findings of the analysis support the theory of in-group versus out-group relations and the rest of the theories lined up in the framework for this study (such as framing, threat perception, securitization, et cetera) are found to be applicable to the case of Hungary, as well. Furthermore, other studies that focused on the 2015 migration and its implications particularly in Hungary (Thorleiffson, 2017; Glied & Pap, 2016; Majtényi et al, 2018) were found to be consistent with the findings of this study, namely that the Hungarian government utilizes fear tactics in activating certain frames that concern out-groups and particularly those associated with Islam. That is due to the history of the country during the Ottoman occupation, which is

mostly depicted and taught in rather negative terms. Therefore, frames that view Muslim communities as a threat are inherent to the Hungarian society, which largely affected the reaction to the migration crisis and provided a solid foundation for the government to build their anti-immigration campaign. Moreover, challenges of the Hungarian economy and a heightened fear of terrorism in the light of recent attack in Europe during the period of the crisis also contributed to the Orbán administration's success in directing public discourse in a favorable way to the government's agenda, while also gaining support from the public due to the protective role Orbán took upon himself and upon his administration.

Lastly, it would be beneficial for future studies to examine the issue from the perspective of opposition parties in Hungary, as well as from the perspective of the public. Of particular interest could be the public's reaction and opinion regarding key elements in the debate, such as certain rhetorical tools (for instance, incorrectly referring to refugees as migrants and the depiction of existential threat posed by refugees) and the National Consultation. Furthermore, a similar framework could be applied to other Eastern European countries (such as Poland and the Czech Republic), who albeit European Union member states, following the example of Hungary, also rejected the resettlement quotas, as it would be interesting to see whether the same or similar frames are at work in those cases.

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8. Annexes

1. Letter from Viktor Orbán, National Consultation 2015



Tisztelt Magyar Polgár!

Mi, magyarok 2010-ben úgy határoztunk, hogy minden fontos kérdést megbeszélünk egymással, mielőtt döntéseket hozunk. Ezért indítottunk nemzeti konzultációt többek között az ország új alaptörvényéről, mindannyiunk szociális biztonságáról, a nyugdíjasok helyzetének javításáról. És ezért indítunk most is nemzeti konzultációt a megélhetési bevándorlás kérdéséről.

Mint bizonyára emlékszik, Európát az év elején példátlan terrorcselekmény rázta meg. Párizsban ártatlan emberek életét oltották ki kegyetlen hidegvérrel és ijesztő brutalitással. Mindannyiunkat megdöbbentette mindaz, ami történt. Ez az emberi ésszel felfoghatatlan szörnyűség ugyanakkor azt is megmutatta, hogy Brüsszel és az Európai Unió nem képes megfelelő módon kezelni a bevándorlás kérdését.

A megélhetési bevándorlók törvénytelenül lépik át a határt, és miközben menekültnek állítják be magukat, valójában a szociális juttatásokért és a munkalehetőségért jönnek. Csak az elmúlt néhány hónapban mintegy húszszorosára nőtt a megélhetési bevándorlók száma Magyarországon. Ez egy új típusú fenyegetést jelent, amit meg kell állítanunk.

Mivel Brüsszel kudarcot vallott a bevándorlás kezelésében, Magyarországnak a saját útját kell járnia. Nem fogjuk hagyni, hogy a megélhetési bevándorlók veszélyeztessék a magyar emberek munkahelyeit és megélhetését.

Döntést kell hoznunk arról, hogyan kell védekeznie Magyarországnak a törvénytelen határátlépésekkel szemben. Döntenünk kell, hogyan korlátozzuk a robbanásszerűen növekvő megélhetési bevándorlást.

Tisztelettel arra kérem, lépjen velünk kapcsolatba, mondja el nekünk is, hogy mit gondol a foltett kérdésekről, töltsé ki, és küldje vissza a kérdőívet. Számítok a véleményére.

Üdvözzel:

Orbán Viktor

2. National Consultation Questionnaire 2015



NEMZETI KONZULTÁCIÓ a bevándorlásról és a terrorizmusról

FELELŐS KIADÓ: MINISZTERELNÖKSÉG

Töltse ki a kérdőívet!

1] Sokféle véleményt lehet hallani az erősödő terrorcselekményekkel kapcsolatban. Ön mennyire tartja fontosnak a terrorizmus térnyerését (a franciaországi vérengzés, az ISIS riasztó cselekményei) a saját élete szempontjából?

Nagyon fontos Fontos Nem fontos

2] Ön szerint az elkövetkező években lehet-e terrorcselekmény célpontja Magyarország?

Komoly esély van rá Előfordulhat Teljesen kizárt

3] Vannak, akik szerint a Brüsszel által rosszul kezelt bevándorlás összefüggésben van a terrorizmus térnyerésével. Ön egyetért ezekkel a véleményekkel?

Teljesen egyetértek Inkább egyetértek Nem értek egyet

4] Tudta-e Ön, hogy a megélhetési bevándorlók törvénytelenül lépik át a magyar határt és az elmúlt időszakban húszszorosára nőtt a bevándorlók száma Magyarországon?

Igen Hallottam róla Nem tudtam

5] Sokféle véleményt hallani a bevándorlás kérdésével kapcsolatban. Vannak, akik szerint a megélhetési bevándorlók veszélyeztetik a magyar emberek munkahelyeit és megélhetését! Ön egyetért ezekkel a véleményekkel?

Teljesen egyetértek Inkább egyetértek Nem értek egyet

6] Vannak, akik szerint Brüsszel politikája a bevándorlás és a terrorizmus kérdésében megbukott és ezért új megközelítésre van szükség ezekben a kérdésekben. Ön egyetért ezekkel a véleményekkel?

Teljesen egyetértek Inkább egyetértek Nem értek egyet

7] Támogatná-e Ön a magyar kormányt, hogy Brüsszel megengedő politikájával szemben szigorúbb bevándorlási szabályozást vezessen be?

Igen, teljes mértékben támogatnám
 Részben támogatnám Nem támogatnám

8] Támogatná-e Ön a magyar kormányt, hogy szigorúbb szabályokat vezessen be, ami alapján őrizetbe vehetők a magyar határt törvénytelenül átlépő bevándorlók?

Igen, teljes mértékben támogatnám
 Részben támogatnám Nem támogatnám

9] Egyetért-e Ön azzal a véleménnyel, hogy a magyar határt törvénytelenül átlépő bevándorlókat a lehető legrövidebb időn belül vissza kell fordítani a saját hazájukba?

Teljesen egyetértek Inkább egyetértek Nem értek egyet

10] Egyetért-e Ön azzal, hogy a megélhetési bevándorlók, amíg Magyarországon tartózkodnak, saját maguk biztosítsák az ellátási költségeiket?

Teljesen egyetértek Inkább egyetértek Nem értek egyet

11] Egyetért-e Ön azzal, hogy a bevándorlás elleni küzdelem legjobb eszköze, ha az Európai Unió tagországai segítik azon országok fejlesztését, ahonnan a bevándorlók érkeznek?

Teljesen egyetértek Inkább egyetértek Nem értek egyet

12] Egyetért-e Ön a magyar kormánnyal abban, hogy a bevándorlás helyett inkább a magyar családok és a születendő gyermekek támogatására van szükség?

Teljesen egyetértek Inkább egyetértek Nem értek egyet

3. National Consultation Results 2015

<http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/d3/c0000/Bev%20konzult%C3%A1ci%C3%B3%20eredm%C3%A9nyi.pdf>

Nemzeti konzultáció a bevándorlásról és a terrorizmusról (2015)

1. Sokféle véleményt lehet hallani az erősödő terrorcselekményekkel kapcsolatban. Ön mennyire tartja fontos kérdésnek a terrorizmus térnyerését (franciaországi vérengzés, az ISIS riasztó cselekményei) a saját élete szempontjából?

- Nagyon fontos (A) ▪ Fontos (B) ▪ Nem fontos (C)

A	B	C
70,49%	25,92%	3,59%

2. Ön szerint az elkövetkező években lehet-e terrorcselekmény célpontja Magyarország?

- Komoly esély van rá (A) ▪ Előfordulhat (B) ▪ Teljesen kizárt (C)

A	B	C
39,32%	56,97%	3,71%

3. Vannak, akik szerint a Brüsszel által rosszul kezelt bevándorlás összefüggésben van a terrorizmus térnyerésével. Ön egyetért ezekkel a véleményekkel?

- Teljesen egyetértek (A) ▪ Inkább egyetértek (B) ▪ Nem értek egyet (C)

A	B	C
61,07%	27,79%	11,14%

4. Tudta-e Ön, hogy a megélhetési bevándorlók törvénytelenül lépik át a magyar határt, és az elmúlt időszakban hűszorosára nőtt a bevándorlók száma Magyarországon?

- Igen (A) ▪ Hallottam róla (B) ▪ Nem tudtam (C)

A	B	C
72,63%	23,45%	3,91%

5. Sokféle véleményt hallani a bevándorlás kérdésével kapcsolatban. Vannak, akik szerint a megélhetési bevándorlók veszélyeztetik a magyar emberek munkahelyeit és megélhetését. Ön egyetért ezekkel a véleményekkel?

- Teljesen egyetértek (A) ▪ Inkább egyetértek (B) ▪ Nem értek egyet (C)

A	B	C
72,74%	18,76%	8,50%

6. Vannak, akik szerint Brüsszel politikája a bevándorlás és a terrorizmus kérdésben megbukott, és ezért új megközelítésre van szükség ezekben a kérdésekben. Ön egyetért ezekkel a véleményekkel?

- Teljesen egyetértek (A)
- Inkább egyetértek (B)
- Nem értek egyet (C)
- Nem tudom megítélni a kérdést (D)

A	B	C	D
72,74%	18,76%	8,50%	~0,1%

7. Támogatná-e Ön a magyar kormányt, hogy Brüsszel megengedő politikájával szemben szigorúbb bevándorlási szabályozást vezessen be?

- Igen, teljes mértékben támogatnám (A)
- Részben támogatnám (B)
- Nem támogatnám (C)

A	B	C
89,65%	7,55%	2,80%

8. Támogatná-e Ön a magyar kormányt, hogy szigorúbb szabályokat vezessen be, ami alapján őrizetbe vehetők a magyar határt törvénytelenül átlépő bevándorlók?

- Igen, teljes mértékben támogatnám (A)
- Részben támogatnám (B)
- Nem támogatnám (C)

A	B	C
87,92%	9,31%	2,76%

9. Egyetért-e Ön azzal a véleménnyel, hogy a magyar határt törvénytelenül átlépő bevándorlókat a lehető legrövidebb időn belül vissza kell fordítani a saját hazájukba?

- Teljesen egyetértek (A)
- Inkább egyetértek (B)
- Nem értek egyet (C)

A	B	C
86,15%	10,25%	3,61%

10. Egyetért-e Ön azzal, hogy a megélhetési bevándorlók, amíg Magyarországon tartózkodnak, saját maguk biztosítsák az ellátási költségeket?

- Teljesen egyetérték (A)
- Inkább egyetérték (B)
- Nem értek egyet (C)

A	B	C
82,73%	13,48%	3,78%

11. Egyetért-e Ön azzal, hogy a bevándorlás elleni küzdelem legjobb eszköze, ha az Európai Unió tagországai segítik azon országok fejlődését, ahonnan a bevándorlók érkeznek?

- Teljesen egyetérték (A)
- Inkább egyetérték (B)
- Nem értek egyet (C)

A	B	C
60,62%	24,03%	15,35%


12. Egyetért-e Ön a magyar kormánnyal abban, hogy a bevándorlás helyett inkább a magyar családok és a születendő gyermekek támogatására van szükség?

- Teljesen egyetérték (A)
- Inkább egyetérték (B)
- Nem értek egyet (C)

A	B	C
92,88%	5,37%	1,74%

4.Number of asylum applications in Hungary, 2015, 2016, 2017 (European Parliament, 2017)

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/eu-migrant-crisis-facts-and-figures>




A WELCOMING EUROPE?

2017 **2016** 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011

ASYLUM APPLICATIONS

Austria	745,155
Belgium	38,785
Bulgaria	122,960
Croatia	15,755
Cyprus	84,270
Czech Republic	18,280
Denmark	20,945
Estonia	42,255
Finland	28,790
France	12,305
Germany	2,245
Greece	6,180
Hungary	51,110
Ireland	1,475
Italy	5,605
Latvia	29,430
Lithuania	2,160
Luxembourg	1,880
Malta	19,420
Netherlands	1,310
Poland	2,940
Portugal	1,930
Romania	1,460
Slovakia	2,225
Slovenia	350
Spain	430
Sweden	145
United Kingdom	175



■ < 1,000 ■ 1,000 - 10,000 ■ 10,000 - 100,000 ■ > 100,000

HUNGARY

9,830,485

Population in 2016


4,748

Refugees

29,430

Asylum seekers

EVOLUTION OF ASYLUM APPLICATIONS




■ Total number of asylum applications in the EU
■ Asylum applications in Hungary

A WELCOMING EUROPE?

2017 **2016** 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011

ASYLUM APPLICATIONS

Austria	222,560
Belgium	33,780
Bulgaria	128,850
Croatia	31,120
Cyprus	99,330
Czech Republic	18,340
Denmark	18,210
Estonia	24,715
Finland	26,325
France	5,045
Germany	2,930
Greece	3,220
Hungary	58,650
Ireland	1,445
Italy	4,990
Latvia	3,390
Lithuania	2,430
Luxembourg	4,815
Malta	3,695
Netherlands	160
Poland	4,600
Portugal	1,840
Romania	1,750
Slovakia	975
Slovenia	355
Spain	495
Sweden	1,475
United Kingdom	190



■ < 1,000 ■ 1,000 - 10,000 ■ 10,000 - 100,000 ■ > 100,000

HUNGARY

9,797,561

Population in 2017


5,691

Refugees

3,390

Asylum seekers

EVOLUTION OF ASYLUM APPLICATIONS



■ Total number of asylum applications in the EU
■ Asylum applications in Hungary

5. National Consultation on the protection of families (2018) results

<https://nemzetikonzultacio.kormany.hu/eredmenyek.pdf>



6. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech in the European Parliament

19 May 2015, Strasbourg (Straßburg)

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have come to join you here today in Strasbourg because you are going to talk about my country, Hungary. I always see it is as an honour when Members of the European Parliament hold a debate on the situation in Hungary. And I see it as my bounden duty to speak on behalf of my country, Hungary, and the Hungarian people. I would remind you that the Hungarian people decided in a referendum to join the European Union, and we have been proud of this decision ever since.

Mr. President,

It would be logical to assume that we are here today because Europe is curious about the achievements of the Hungarians: curious about what Hungary has achieved over the past five years, and how. There would indeed be plenty to talk about. In terms of growth in gross domestic product among the twenty-eight Member States, in 2010 Hungary ranked twenty-first, and last year it ranked second. While elsewhere levels of sovereign debt are rising, in Hungary we have succeeded in reducing the rate from 85% to below 77%; and while unemployment was well over 11% in 2010, it is now below 7% – and I sincerely hope that we shall reach full employment within three years.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

You have, however, convened this debate (if my information is correct) to talk about political issues – in particular, the question of immigration. This debate has been labelled “the situation in Hungary”. As far as political issues are concerned, I might inform you that Hungary can be regarded as the European Union Member State which has been screened more than any other by the X-ray machine of constitutionality. At the same time, I sincerely welcome the fact that you are placing on the agenda important issues which the European people are genuinely concerned about: law and order, security and immigration. These topics are some of the key issues of our

common future. The answers we give to these questions may decide what kind of European Union we will leave to our children; these problems, however, are not Hungarian problems, but European ones. And the only reason these issues should come up in the context of my country is that the Hungarian people like to talk about difficult issues in a straightforward manner. This is our nature; we do not like empty talk, and we do not like waffle. We like to talk straight, or not at all. So we talk straight about the death penalty and immigration, and we also see that the discourse we have been engaged in so far – which is seen by many as PC, or politically correct – has not taken us Europeans any closer to a solution.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We are a frank and open people, and we are speaking our mind when we say loud and clear that we Hungarians would like to keep Europe for the Europeans, and we also wish to keep Hungary as a Hungarian country. Both of these goals of ours are legitimate, and I am convinced that both of them are fully in harmony with the core values of Europe and the intentions of the founders of the European Union.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I suggest that we should clearly distinguish between the free movement of workers within Europe and migration coming from outside Europe. And within the latter, we should clearly distinguish between genuine refugees and immigrants who come here simply because they are seeking a better life than that which their native lands can offer. It pains us, Commissioner Timmermans, but the situation in Hungary at present is that we are unable to offer jobs to immigrants. It is best if we talk about this honestly, and in a straightforward manner.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First and foremost, we wish to address the issue of economic migration in our own way. Hungary and the European Union have good reason to address the issue of economic migration.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am convinced that the proposal which we are now familiar with, the proposal of the European Commission, is – to be absolutely frank – nothing short of absurd, bordering on the insane. I am convinced that it is a dangerous approach to say “there is no problem here: let us open the doors wide and allow everyone in”. The facts are clear: the migration pressure on Europe today is enormous. Compared with 2010, illegal immigration in Europe has tripled, and within a short time in Hungary the number of those illegally crossing the border has increased twenty- to thirtyfold. We openly raise the issue that the current treaties should be revised, and the right of Member States to defend their own borders should be restored to national jurisdictions. We take the view that this would be a reasonable, humane and realistic position. I say this with due respect, but I am convinced that the proposal that we should let asylum-seekers into Europe and should apportion them out among the Member States on the basis of some artificially defined quota is a crazy idea.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am convinced that quotas will only encourage human traffickers, will attract even more people to Europe, and will encourage them to attempt perilous sea crossings in order to enter EU territory. I am therefore convinced that it would be more appropriate if the regulation of immigration were delegated to national competencies. My view is – and I am glad that finally a debate has started on this issue – that, instead of quotas, we must allow individual Member States themselves to decide on this issue. We Hungarians want to decide ourselves on whether we want immigrants in Hungary or not. We are a Christian and national government, we have mercy in our hearts, and we have always sheltered refugees – genuine refugees – and shall continue to do so in the future. Immigrants, however, are not the same as refugees: they want a better life, and this is why they come here. We understand this, but cannot accept it. Illegal border-crossing is a crime against which we must take action. Hungary must defend its rule of law, and also its borders; we do not want Hungary to be a target country for illegal immigrants. There are countries which have decided that they wish to live with this problem; they have decided that they want to have a policy of immigration. And we respect this decision on their part. This is why

we have launched a consultation on immigration. We believe that it is fair and correct to ask our citizens how they see this question. (I would like to tell one of the previous speakers here that they must have been labouring under some terrible misunderstanding: in Hungary at present there is no public consultation of any kind on the issue of the death penalty.)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to remind you that Hungary has not signed any agreement or treaty with anyone on what we are allowed to talk about in Hungary, or what we are not allowed to talk about. Neither have we signed any agreement on what we may conduct a consultation about, and what we may not; about what issues we may raise, and what issues we may not. Likewise, our treaty of accession to the EU makes no stipulation of any kind to the effect that in the Member States of the European Union we must not talk about certain things, or must not raise certain issues. Therefore, we see it as a violation of the core treaty of the European Union for anyone to try to tell us what we Hungarians may or may not voice our views about.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

If we look at the number of asylum-seekers relative to per capita gross national product, Hungary is the second most affected Member State, after Germany. If we look at the number of asylum-seekers per thousand inhabitants, Hungary is once again second – this time, after Sweden. Here I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the Western Balkans region is not adequately addressed in the European Commission's migration agenda. Of the 43,000 asylum applications received in Hungary in the first quarter of 2015, 24,000 were submitted by Kosovars. Consequently, cooperation with the countries on the Balkans migration route is essential, while it is also crucial to develop the migration, asylum and border administration capacities of these countries. And please do not ignore the crisis in Ukraine, as that is a trial which we have yet to face.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As regards the death penalty, I take the view that Europe must not bury its head in the sand. I do not want to return to the Middle Ages, with taboo subjects which we must not talk about. In fact this debate is not about the death penalty, but about the issue of freedom of thought, opinion and speech. I maintain that we must talk about the death penalty. We operate on a constitutional basis and, in Hungary also, the relevant rules can only be amended in harmony with the European Union.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The principles, treaties and rules of the European Union are not carved in stone, they were not conceived by gods, or even inspired by them; they were created by human beings, and people may therefore change them at any time. This is freedom, and this is democracy.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Each person's opinion on these issues is just that of one individual and nothing more, whoever that individual may be: whether a philosopher, an EU Commissioner, a prime minister, or a party chair – his or her view is the view of a European citizen. It is not something sacred, it is not dogma, it is not some higher truth. Therefore Hungary continues to stand up for the ideal of freedom, and the free expression of opinion as a European value.

Thank you for your attention.

(Prime Minister's Office) Retrieved: 04.04. 2019. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-primeminister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-in-the-europeanparliament>

7. Viktor Orbán's speech at the 14th Kötcsé civil picnic

5 September 2015 Kötcsé - Edited version

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Forgive me if my speech today is somewhat rough at the edges. The reason for this is that I'm going to speak about something which I have not spoken about before in this way; so here and there a few thoughts will turn up which do not quite follow on from each other with perfect logic. Of course I want to say a couple of things about the issue of asylum and immigration, but in a different context and with different vocabulary than I would do in a more public forum. I will try to speak in a way that politicians do not usually speak in public – or in a way that they are not advised to speak.

If I may make a personal comment, I'm obviously not the only person who from time to time faces the question, or asks himself the question: “What is the meaning of the things that are happening to me?” I suppose this is especially common among people who are the object of attacks, suffering and troubles, and who do not simply want to accept that this is bad luck, but think that the whole thing has a higher meaning – which just happens to be concealed for the moment. My profession prompts people to entertain such thoughts, and from time to time I ask myself what the meaning is of what I'm going through, or for what purpose people receive the knowledge which life gives them.

I often think I have found the answer to this question, but then it turns out I am wrong; for example in 1998. Back then I thought that the purgatory of the years from 1994 to 1998 had to be endured in order to make maximum use of the opportunities available in Europe at that time to complete a mission which then seemed impossible: something we used to call the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality. Now no one sees this as a big deal, but if you think back to all that went on in 1998, in '99 and in 2000 – the first attempts at unification of the nation on a non-territorial basis, if I can put it like that – one can feel that the great international battle one is engaged in gives meaning to all the knowledge that one has accumulated. One had to go through all of that because there is now a great battle to be fought. The Certificate of Hungarian Nationality, if you remember, was successfully introduced after battles with the Romanian prime minister of the day.

Then in 2010, I thought that finally I had found the meaning of everything that had happened to us (now let me speak personally, and say everything that had happened to me), because here was a country teetering on the edge of a hopeless economic crisis, which had also been plundered and somehow needed to be put back on its feet, and at the same time had to regain its sovereignty: the IMF had to be sent home and the European Union had to be fought in order to gain some room for manoeuvre. That was such a great task that clearly it gave meaning to what I had gone through earlier. Then in 2012 I realized that it was not about that – we had done that, and that was solved; the great opportunity now seemed to be our creation of the new constitution, which for forty or fifty years will provide the conceptual and legal framework for everything which we call the Hungarian nation. Probably this was the purpose of it all – together with the dual citizenship policy (which has somewhat eclipsed the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality in importance).

Then just a few months ago I realized that no, this was not the case. Probably all that had happened to us in recent years is because there is something which fundamentalists might call a crusade, but which moderates like me would rather describe as a challenge posed by the problem of “the Islamization of Europe”. Someone somewhere must reveal this for what it is, must halt it, and must replace it with another, counteractive policy. We can assume that not only in Hungary but also in Europe they are demanding from Hungarians – and in person from the elected leaders of this country – that if the good Lord has helped us through so much, we should tell them what we know. Here you are! I do not know if three years from now I will still think this, but in any case right now I am sure that if there is a higher meaning to all that we have been through (because everything that one survives makes one stronger), it is the task and the challenge which Hungary and Europe are facing now and in the months and years ahead. We must rise to this challenge.

At the beginning of my speech I would like to express my position.

My position is that what we are experiencing now is the end of an era: a conceptual-ideological era. Putting pretension aside, we can simply call this the era of liberal babble. This era is now at an end, and this situation both carries a huge risk and offers a new opportunity. It offers the chance for the national-Christian ideology, way of thinking and approach to regain dominance –

not only in Hungary, but throughout the whole of Europe. This is the opportunity. This will be the essence of my speech. Those who want more detail should not leave now, because I will now travel a long way before returning to the sentence which I have just said.

What was the situation in the past?

In the past, people running for their lives and people in distress sought refuge beyond the nearest available state border; there they hunkered down in safety, expecting to return, because they wanted to go home at some time. Only the truly persecuted did not want to go back: those in danger mostly for political reasons and for the ideas they represented. They were the ones who had no future in that region in the foreseeable future, and who indeed wanted to leave the countries they had fled as political émigrés – perhaps for life. The majority of '56-ers were like this. They, by the way, did not march through Austria – there was no question of that. They had to gather in a camp: there they had to wait, there they had to be registered, and there they had to make their requests for where they wanted to go. They had to wait until the countries in question assessed their cases, and when they were granted permission they could move on.

The current situation, Ladies and Gentlemen, is different. Now we are inundated with countless immigrants: there is an invasion, they break down fences, and it is clear to us all that they are not seeking refuge, and are not running for their lives. In Turkey, in Turkish refugee camps, nothing threatens their lives; and neither is there any danger in Greece, Macedonia, or the area around Belgrade. There is no danger in Budapest, and yet they are not rushing to come here. They do not want refugee status: they want to be refugees in Germany. This is quite a different story. In fact it is not refuge in a life or death situation that they are seeking, but a better quality of life. In truth, they are not seeking safety. What is happening is just the opposite. In fact, they are endangering their lives.

What I am about to say might seem harsh, and I apologize if anyone is offended. We all saw the picture of that little boy on the beach. No heart could remain unmoved, but still we must ask: who killed that little boy? His parents! No one forced anyone out of a Turkish refugee camp – where life is not like that in Germany, but where there is no threat to one's safety. No one was forced to

gather up their children, and take to the sea in a flimsy dinghy in the hope of a better life somewhere, risking their own and their children's lives. This is the truth! One cannot talk like this in Europe today, but this is still the truth. And so these people are not seeking safety, but just the opposite: they are risking their existing safety, taking on huge risks in dinghies, refrigerated trucks and the Channel Tunnel. In the process their children are dying, and even this does not stop them. This is the truth!

It seems that they want our lives, they want the life that we have. They want lives like the ones which we live. The only question is why we should be surprised. Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, for years we have taught them and told them that in fact this world is a global village: a global village in which it is no big deal to move from Alszeg to Fölszeg (one neighbourhood to another). We told them that there are universal human rights which apply equally to everyone, whatever corner of the Earth they may be in. We forced on them our ideology: freedom is the most important thing. Then, whoever would not accept this ideology, we bombed: Libya, Syria – when and whatever was in our interest. We created the World Wide Web, announcing freedom of information to the world, and we said that every human being must have access. Immediately! Everything must be immediately available everywhere. We sent them our TV series, and they are watching what we are watching. We bought their most talented athletes and performers. We sold them our football clubs, whose Arab and Asian owners now wear the shirts of a variety of English and French football clubs. Then from the money we made from selling our clubs, we send them back the product, the matches themselves via satellite, for which they pay us. We have involved them in the business. After having proclaimed global, universal human rights, having forced our ideology on them and having elevated freedom of information above all else, having sent our celebrities into their homes, now we are surprised that they are knocking on our door.

When Europe guaranteed freedom of movement, it did so in a period when few people wanted to make use of it. The situation has changed, because poor multitudes now want to move. They see our way of life, we advertise it on their TVs, they know our celebrities; they feel as though they are sitting with us in our living rooms, because the gap between the real world and the reality on the screen seems so small. They are in the same virtual space as we are. They think that the virtual space is theirs as well as ours, and that in this virtual space everyone can meet everyone

else. If this is something natural, then why can't everyone meet everyone else physically? The question is very easily put. In such a global village, in such a shared world, why should one person live in better conditions than another? If we are so close to each other, if we can so easily share their things, why shouldn't we do that? In part because of the culture lent to them or forced upon them, these people are no longer bound to their land and their past as strongly as they once were. A new common, global bond or shared reference point has been established to which we are all connected: a common "mind-set", as they say in English. And if their living conditions suddenly change, because a war breaks out, or if their lives collapse for any other reason, it is logical for them to think of immediately setting off, to seek imaginative escape routes; then they are no longer seeking safety, but seeking to acquire the life which we have in reality, and which they have hitherto only shared with us in virtual reality. In other words, those who are coming today want a future, and the future that they want now is one like that which we have. This is the question we are confronted with: militarily, politically and morally.

I think that the phenomenon I've just described is no more or less than identity crisis. This seems to be bad news, but it is the first good identity crisis I've ever seen. Earlier we have talked about identity crises among ourselves: the Christian identity crisis, or the national identity crisis. But now, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are witnessing the liberal identity crisis. Viewed from the right perspective, the whole issue of asylum and mass migration, the whole problem of economic migration is nothing more than the identity crisis of liberalism. I'll try to broadly summarize what it consists of. People in general – not only Europeans, but definitely Europeans – want to see themselves as good; but people can define "good" in a wide variety of ways. Liberals also want to see themselves as good. They also have an idea of what it means to be a good person. And liberals can only live with themselves if they see themselves as good people. However, the liberal notion of what is "good", as I described earlier, only exists at the level of phenomena: freedom of movement, universal human rights, and so on. Now this is producing disastrous consequences. But the particular quality of liberals is that while they want to be good people, they do not want to see their levels of welfare spending and standards of living falling; and so a crisis develops. This is the truly great challenge facing liberalism today: how to see themselves as good people according to their own principles, and at the same time how to protect the standard of living which they have achieved so far.

I am convinced that it is no longer possible in Europe to both see ourselves as good in the liberal sense and to live in prosperity. I might say that the most dangerous combination known in history is to be both rich and weak. There is no combination more dangerous than this. It is only a matter of time before someone comes along, notices your weakness, and takes what you have. This will definitely happen if you are unable to defend yourself. The liberal philosophy is a result of a Europe which is weak and which also wants to protect its wealth; but if Europe is weak, it cannot protect this wealth.

There is of course also a Christian misunderstanding. Like a sixteenth-century heretic, I must be careful in my comments on this, because I do not want to run the risk of offending our Catholic brothers and sisters; that would not be right, but all the same, if I consider the truly Christian voices – the really powerful Catholic voices – from the viewpoint of economic logic they confuse two different things. For if someone gives someone else something from their personal wealth, this is not only morally right, but it will not weaken the national economy. So to give someone something from my personal wealth will not cause economic problems. But if instead of giving from my personal wealth, I want the state to give something – for it to give care, welfare, jobs and benefits, and to guarantee a certain level of prosperity – I am ruining that which is ours, and I am likewise ruining our prosperity. Because the state has to either raise taxes or make cuts elsewhere in the usual social, welfare, cultural or other budgets; and the result of this is a shrinking economy. Helping others from one's own pocket can also benefit the economy, but if we look to the state for this, and if we want redistribution by the state – shifting funds away from the state's productive sphere and its economic resources – there can be no other result than weaker economic performance.

Therefore those Christian demands which are currently expressed as spiritual obligations are in my opinion correct when directed at citizens, but mistaken when directed at the state. And unfortunately I do not see a recognition of this difference in most of the statements from our spiritual leaders. Yet this is an important distinction, because the liberals are seeking to make sure that financial and moral expectations placed on individuals are instead placed on the state; this would, however, crush and destroy these states. It is therefore important to distinguish between

personal, individual responsibilities, and those which belong to a modern state. We need to draw this boundary, because morally we will not find our way – we will not be able to both fulfil the Christian duty to help others – while at the same time expecting our state to defend what we have.

The point is that today liberals dominate Europe; make no mistake, the conservatives in Europe today are also liberals: not willingly, but by yielding to coercion. Because today a very large proportion of the channels through which the thoughts and policies of conservatives are interpreted and mediated are in the hands of liberals. This is not new for us, as we have experienced this in Hungary after 1990; but the situation here has changed, and so they do not like us. Elsewhere the situation has not changed, and it remains as it was. Therefore, if a conservative chancellor or a conservative prime minister takes office, they can do nothing but to some extent (and this extent is not a small one) adapt to the system which is in the hands of people who are ideologically different from them. The European right suffers as a result.

Well, the fact is that liberals should ask themselves who they really are. Because if you cannot be good in the liberal sense while maintaining current existential needs, you need to solve this dilemma somehow. Poor liberals do not get any help from their politicians in this regard. This is what is missing in European politics. There is no vision, and indeed even expressing these questions in these terms is not allowed in European politics, and is almost life-threatening. This is a totally Hungarian luxury. It is possible to do so to a small extent in other Central European countries, but not very much. The fact that we are sitting here, and we can talk like this about these issues cannot happen anywhere else in Europe. Such a meeting could not be convened in Germany, where it would not be possible to say such things; nor could it in France – and it is even risky in Poland.

Overall, therefore, the question is one of who in the end will tell the liberals who they really are. I am not sure if we were completely right, but I don't think we were far wrong when we thought that modern liberalism is a form of hypocrisy. At all levels. Now I am not referring to the fact that at some level we are all hypocritical: that in every person there is the instinct to try to present themselves as being a little bit better than they really are – at least just a little bit. That is a fault which we all have, but it is at an individual level. Liberalism, however, is an intellectual area

which organizes hypocrisy as a system. It seems that at an individual level they are also hypocrites. How many liberals do we know who, for example, present themselves as good people by taking a few people into their home, and acting as if they had no thoughts of political gain by doing so, while in fact they obviously do? There is no one among us sitting here who would say that such actions are sincere, is there? The question does not arise. A liberal person who does something in order to present themselves in a good light knows full well that they are in fact a hypocrite. Please don't misunderstand me – I'm not talking now about the grand old liberals like Lajos Kossuth, Deák or Graf Lambsdorff; but we have always thought of the modern left-liberal school of thought – alongside which we live and which is dominant – as hypocrisy organized into a system at the individual level and at state level.

When we talk about Hungary, and about immigrants, and all of a sudden money needs to be distributed in Europe, we note that although most of the immigrants will come to Hungary, the Italians still get eight times as much money as we do, and the Greeks twice as much. Good-for-nothing liberal European immigration policy! Let us boldly state that liberal foreign policy at the world political level is nothing more or less than organized hypocrisy. And if you do not believe me, then read a couple of studies written by Mária Schmidt, who regularly proves that it is an oversimplification of world political conflicts to say that there is a “good” side – usually the United States and its allies – and a “bad” side, which is to be defeated. In the end it has always turned out to be about money, oil, raw materials and something completely different; and it was not really about doing good when they saw fit to bomb Iraq or indeed Syria, but the worst that was possible – all the while insisting that the world recognizes them as the good guys, the ones on the side of good. This is the essence of liberal foreign policy – it is organized around this.

Since we cannot assume the difficult job of answering for the liberals the question of who they are in this new situation, I think we should take the opportunity of saying who we are. Because we face a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Bad things have never emerged with such overwhelming force as now, and as they will emerge in relation to immigration over the weeks and months ahead. If we step back from the whole issue and its specific features and conceptually reflect on what is happening, then we see that we have a huge opportunity, if we fight well in this

debate, to restore the prestige and appeal of national identity and Christian identity, in opposition to the liberal identity. The question is whether we are capable of doing this.

Of course the good Lord will help the person who fights for good causes, because in such times it turns out, for example, that the Hungarian constitution – adopted at a time when an immigration crisis was still nowhere to be seen – is superbly suited to strengthening this Christian and national identity in the eyes of all and in opposition to the ruling liberal identities in Europe today. It is enough for me to refer to József Szájer’s wise choice of words for the title of one of the most important chapters: “Freedom and Responsibility”; this conveys all that is good in liberalism – freedom – and places it alongside all that without which freedom is meaningless. In this sense, it lays the foundations of a Christian and national identity, and there it is, in our Constitution.

Then came the need to incorporate another word, another term alongside Christian compassion: the expression of responsibility. It should be clarified that we did not do this from a liberal point of view – we know that the liberal feels responsible for the whole world because they are a good person, everything happening in the world causes them pain, and their soul feels heavy with the burden. In opposition to this approach, how does our identity stand up? I think that the Christian identity – although there are some here who can express this with greater theological accuracy than I can – reveals to us a completely clear order of importance or priority. First of all, we are responsible for our children, then for our parents. This comes before all else. Then come those with whom we live in our village or town. Then comes our country, and then everyone else may come. Christian thinking is not reflected in the kind of politics which invokes compassion and understanding, but which does not recognize this order of priorities; it is not reflected in the kind of politics which, in the name of responsibility for the world, destroys that which we can nurture in our children, the dignified old age we can give our parents, and, when possible, the protection we can give our country and culture.

Here, on our side, we live in a world which is constantly examining itself and the correctness of its actions. I also try to somehow review the things I do in order to be able to judge it not only according to its success, but also according to its justice and rightness. I have been involved in this for years; I am not a beginner, but see how difficult it is for me to sort these things out. The

liberal approach and way of thinking has permeated even us to such an extent that, when we are faced with a new situation, we are hard pressed to put our own thoughts, feelings and actions in order, so that they can at once be morally right, fair, generally acceptable and effective. And so it can be seen what an opportunity this whole immigration problem offers to finally clarify these questions and to reverse those general European conceptual trends which have led here. So what follows on from all this now, Ladies and Gentlemen? In my opinion there are four things.

The first thing which must be said is that a country with no borders is not a country at all. It is therefore in the community's fundamental interest, if there is country, and if they want it to remain, that it must be able to defend its borders. This is non-negotiable, and there is no situation which would permit us to set aside our right to say when and where our borders may be entered. Until we are able to restore this situation no proposed solution will work. What is the point of thinking about quotas and the distribution of people arriving, if we do not know how many will come in? And they are coming in as they please. It is like our throwing valuables into an empty sack. This is the first lesson in the current situation: the borders must be protected at all costs. At this moment we are unable to do this. If Parliament decides to adopt one or two laws, perhaps by mid- to late-September the Hungarian state will be in a position to protect its own borders, and say who may enter and leave, where and when.

The second lesson. Hungary – and now I do not want to speak for other countries, but I would like to think that most of Europe thinks as we do – must protect its ethnic and cultural composition. This needs to be explained, because in the eyes of liberals today this is the main sin. Allow me to mention a conversation I had with a talented, experienced, but not very hopeful European politician, who was no longer in frontline politics, and who asked me to explain what I meant when I said that we do not want a significant Muslim community in Hungary. I said that the meaning of this sentence was the normal, everyday one. The reply I received was that one cannot say such a thing. I asked why not. Why can we not talk about the right of every state and every nation to decide on whom they want living on their territory? In Europe, many countries have decided on this – for example the French or the British, or the Germans with regard to the Turks. I think they had the right to make this decision. We have a duty to look at where this has taken them. We cannot even say whether the results are good or bad. We only have the right to

say that this is something which we do not want – but we do have the right to say this. And we can say that we like Hungary just as it is. It is colourful and diverse enough.

I am convinced that Hungary has the right – and every nation has the right – to say that it does not want its country to change. One can argue whether or not this is the correct position; on whether or not this is fair; on whether or not this is humane. One can argue about many things. But we should not argue about whether a community has the right to decide if it wants to change its ethnic and cultural composition in an artificial way and at an accelerated pace. And if Hungarians say that they do not want this, no one can force them to do so. In the end – and keep this in your sights – in the very end this will be the battle which we must win. The question is whether there will be enough of us in Europe who say that every country has the right to change its ethnic and cultural composition as it likes, and no country or the Union has the right to force others to do this. We are now in a good position, and we must defend this position. In the end this is what will decide this entire battle. It is therefore very important who comes in. In the modern spirit of the age, if someone has come in and if you have let them in, from that point on what they represent is seen as a value. You will have to relate to the new situation, you will have to live with it and establish a form of coexistence, and you must also respect it and accept life alongside it.

So the borders must be protected, ethnic and cultural composition must also be protected, and enforced change must not be accepted.

The third thing is that you must stay economically successful, because in the modern spirit of the age, even if you are right, or closest to a morally perfect position, if you are not economically successful you will be trampled underfoot. So even if it is not top of the class, Hungary must maintain but its position as a well-performing European economy. This is not about money or the economy, but about our sovereignty. If we are unable to say “yes, we are attacked for a lot of things, but we are successful according to their economic criteria”, and if we cannot stick to our guns, then they will destroy us, and this will have all kinds of consequences. Therefore I think that in the modern world neither justice nor identity can work without economic success, and we must take note of this.

Finally, the fourth thing, which I think follows on from all this. Do not misunderstand me when I put it like this: everyday patriotism. This is not something of an intellectual nature, but a vital instinct, a daily routine: going into a shop and buying Hungarian products; when I want to employ someone, employing a Hungarian. It will not work if we cannot make this an everyday instinct, and if it simply remains a spiritual need for our national-minded intellectuals on the right. It will not work without you, of course, because for something to become everyday, it must be formulated to a high degree, something which can be expressed, and which will give us, its representatives, dignity, strength and self-confidence. But then it must be implemented on a daily basis, as I said: in workplaces, in shops, in conversations, and so on. I do not know in how many areas we have retreated; I do not know where, instead of healthy patriotism, some unrestrained, liberal, confused babble has taken over, and where we ourselves are unable to say why we make the decisions we do, rather than right, patriotic, national everyday ones.

The bad news is that when we do this, it must be characterized by the following words: modern, cool, trendy, sexy, upmarket. If we also try to cultivate everyday patriotism in language to the same level as that we use when talking to each other here, then the correct etiquette would be for us to all make the sign of the cross and simply look forward to the afterlife. But this is about the young generation. Our generation is fine the way we are, thank you very much, we have survived; but the situation is different for those coming along after us. If we cannot bridge the communication, cultural and other gaps, and if we cannot make everyday nationalism attractive to young people, rather than something chaotic, smelling of bad breath and the radical right, which sends shivers down people's spines and puts them in a bad mood, if we cannot make it different from this with fresh and youthful language, then this is a battle we will not win. This is the biggest task. I cannot say exactly who are able to do this, because if I could, we would have already done it over the past few years; but the truth is that in this regard we have achieved the least success. We do not speak this language, this culture as we should, and those coming after us are somehow not strong enough or – heaven knows why – not effective enough. In this world, patriotic, nation-based, everyday life instincts, life advice and thoughts – together with the public opinions based on them – are not present in the debate. But we cannot avoid this battlefield, and

if we do not rally to the call, it will be decided on the battlefield anyway. We must rally, go there and win, Ladies and Gentlemen!

This will be a programme for many years to come, and together with you I can only hope that the older among us will also be needed.

Thank you very much for your attention!

(Prime Minister's Office) Retrieved: 04.04.2019. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-primeminister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-14th-kotcse-civil-picnic>

8. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Interview with BILD Zeitung

September 13, 2015 10:23 PM

English translation of the article published on Saturday by BILD Zeitung Darum baut Ungarn einen Zaun gegen Flüchtlinge

BILD: Prime Minister, what did you feel when you saw the photo of the dead little boy on the beach in Kos? (sic)

It was a shocking experience; all loss of human life is a tragedy. But I also thought about the boy's parents: they set off from a safe refugee camp outside Syria and risked both their own lives and the lives of their children. We must make it clear to them that we cannot assume responsibility for the dangers that await them on the trip to Europe. For this reason, it would be better if they didn't come.

Do you have sympathy for the refugees?

Of course I do, all Christians feel sympathy for them. But this sympathy is not enough. We must act.

But you say that the refugee crisis is a “German problem” – What is Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mistake, do you think?

The German Chancellor always does everything right – this is the first paragraph of the Hungarian constitution. (Laughter) But we must have a serious talk about the consequences of the German decision allowing migrants to enter Germany. That statement caused a revolt in Hungary. Migrants broke out of their places of accommodation and attacked the police. They refused to be registered as laid down in EU law. Previously, our authorities had been keeping the situation under control – albeit with great difficulty. But then the German government announced that it would be “temporarily” suspending EU regulations, and chaos broke out in Hungary. This is what happens when rules are not followed.

Hungary didn’t bother about the rules so much in 1989. Thousands of East German citizens were allowed to cross the border into Austria and the Iron Curtain fell. Why isn’t that possible today?

There is an important difference: the refugees from East Germany were not in Hungary illegally; there was no question that they were being provided with official accommodation at the West German Embassy. They were being cared for there, and they waited. They did not totally disregard Hungarian law. After that the Hungarians opened their own border. Today, it is illegal immigrants who are breaking across our borders. The fence of communism was directed against us. The fence we are currently constructing is meant to serve us.

How do you feel as Europe’s leading villain? Do you still want to oppose the rest of the continent?

All I can say is that “Here I stand; I can do no other”. We Hungarians are Europeans, and we have signed a contract with Europe which means that we must guarantee that European citizens can move freely and that our borders are secure. This is what we have stuck to throughout. Those people now coming to Hungary are being doubly tricked: on the one hand by human traffickers, and on the other by certain European politicians. Both are promising them a better life, and that they will be able to stay here – even when there is once again peace in their country of origin. But

they will see that the honey that flows in Germany is a little less sweet than they had hoped. They will also realise that their standard of living depends on their performance, and not on the demands they make.

Have you seen the squalor at Budapest's Keleti Station personally?

I have been there, but I didn't go into the station itself.

A selfie with refugees like the one Chancellor Merkel recently took at a refugee centre in Berlin would perhaps be impossible there?

Yes, well, I'm probably not a favourite among the immigrants, but I don't judge my policies according to the exposure time of a photograph either.

Would you take in a family of refugees?

Yes, if it didn't encourage other refugees to come here to Europe. That wouldn't be a good idea today. My wife and children are taking action, and are committed to help, however.

Hungary's borders will be closed next Tuesday. Where should all the refugees go?

Back.

Back to where?

To where they came from. Because these migrants have not arrived in Hungary directly from war zones, but from refugee camps in countries bordering Syria: from Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. They were safe there. So these people are not fleeing danger – they have already fled successfully from that – and have no need to worry for their safety any more. These people are not coming to Europe because they seek safety, but because they want a better life than that in the refugee camps. They want to live a German life, or perhaps a Swedish life. The standard of living they

could have in Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary or Austria is not enough for them. On a personal level I can understand that, but the fact is that there is no fundamental right to a better life, only to safety and human dignity.

Nevertheless, many European heads of government want to accept immigrants...

Europe's leading politicians are currently living in a dream world. They have no idea of the actual dangers that immigrants mean to us. Nor about the magnitude of the problem, because we are talking about millions and millions of people. There is an endless supply – from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Mali, Ethiopia, Nigeria. If we let them all in, Europe will be in ruins.

So what should Europe do?

We have a plan, which we will present to Europe's other heads of government at our next meeting. Part of the plan includes providing massive funding to countries bordering Syria. These include Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Turkey itself is performing exceptionally well with regard to the refugee crisis. We in Europe should in fact hold a Mass for President Erdogan every week, regardless of whatever political viewpoints there are. We must not abandon states like Turkey, and we must not be miserly.

What does this mean, exactly?

I recommend that every Member State contributes an extra one per cent to the EU budget. Parallel with this, expenditure on other goals should be reduced by one per cent. This would generate a total of some 3 billion euros, with which we can provide financial support to the countries neighbouring Syria. And if we require more money, we can increase aid until the flow of immigrants subsides. Since a rapid solution is required, this is a process which would prevent us from arguing indefinitely about budget-related issues.

What about the refugees who are already here in Europe?

We mustn't fool ourselves. None of them want to go home. They will all remain here, I'm afraid.

What is your opinion about the idea that these people who are already here in Europe should be distributed among the countries of the European Union according to a quota system?

There are two arguments against this. Firstly, refugee quotas only make sense if borders are secure. Until then, no government can have any idea about how many people need to be distributed, because their numbers will be constantly increasing. And secondly: can we really prevent migrants from travelling to where they want to go? Should we chain them up in Europe's capitals, so they don't go back to Germany? Who can really keep them in Estonia, Slovenia or Portugal, if they want to go to Germany? It's an illusion to think they won't.

Will you continue to stand by your "no" vote on quotas, even if the European Union threatens a fine or the introduction of sanctions?

My confident opinion is that nobody has ever been punished for upholding EU law. Instead of trying to find a solution in quotas, Brussels should be putting more pressure on Greece, because for years now the European Union's external borders haven't been protected there. If Greece had been fulfilling its obligations, this whole immigration crisis wouldn't exist – not in Berlin, or in Budapest. But ultimately this is what makes us European: we would like to be decent people, both towards the poor Greeks, and towards the multitude of refugees. Except we do not want to face the consequences.

Does one of the dangers you are warning about include "Islamisation"?

I personally have great respect for Islam. Without Islamic philosophy, part of the world would have fallen prey to barbarism centuries ago. But once again, we mustn't fool ourselves: immigration would lead to a majority Muslim population in Europe within the foreseeable future. If Europe allows cultures to compete, then the Christians will find themselves on the losing side. These are facts. The only way out for those who want to preserve Europe as a Christian culture is

not to allow more and more Muslims into Europe. But this is something that Europe's leading politicians are unwilling to talk about.

Do you believe there is a chance of putting an end to the cause of the refugee crisis: the civil war in Syria?

The West is just as much party to the outbreak of the war as is the Arab world and other states. We will only succeed in finding a solution to the conflict if all parties involved are determined to put a stop to this war's barbarism. This alliance primarily requires the "big boys" (i.e. the United States and Russia) to come to a compromise. But Europe, the Arab states and China will have their own opinions too.

(Prime Minister's Office) Retrieved: 04.04.2019. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-primeminister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-interview-with-bild-zeitung>

9. Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on commercial station tv2's "Facts – Evening" television programme

Transcript of the interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, which was broadcast on 14 September 2015. in the 'Facts – Evening' programme of TV2.

Csaba Azurák: Prime Minister, thank you very much for accepting our invitation. Let us begin with the latest news, perhaps: will you declare a state of emergency due to mass migration on Tuesday?

The new legal situation will enter into force in the morning – or to be more precise, at zero hundred hours on Tuesday; this will entail new passages in the Penal Code. Based on these, the Government will have the right to declare a state of emergency. We shall discuss this at the Cabinet meeting scheduled for Tuesday, and we shall make a decision. If you want to bet on it, bet on "yes" rather than "no".

Soon – as worded in your government communication, and as you yourself put it – a new era will begin in the migrant crisis. Before we embark on the details, please tell me, do you expect scenes of crowd violence at the Hungarian border?

We do not know what is going to happen. We are prepared for all eventualities, simple situations and complicated scenarios alike. There is a fence on the border which lets everyone know where the Hungarian border is; crossing it or even attempting to cross it at a point other than the designated crossings qualifies as a crime, and if someone commits this crime, the police will enforce compliance with the law. In other words, the police will arrest those persons concerned, and will then launch the relevant fair legal proceedings. This crime carries a maximum prison sentence of several years, or expulsion from the territory of Hungary.

I am intrigued by the latter. What exactly will a migrant or illegal migrant find when they arrive at the Hungarian border after midnight? Previously there was talk of U-shaped transit zones closed in the direction of Hungary, then the position of the Government changed, and you spoke about administration points. So if a migrant arrives at the fence from the direction of Serbia after midnight, what will they find?

First of all, they will find a sign. We have given everyone – including ourselves – quite a few days to prepare for the new legal situation. This will be new for everyone, including the police and the courts. There will be signs at the border which clearly indicate which way a person wishing to legally enter the territory of Hungary should go, and what they should do; this is because we are not closing the border completely, but are simply enforcing compliance with the laws which have always been in force. So – not to beat about the bush – even earlier it was not legal to enter Hungary other than at designated border checkpoints. Then also, crossing the border elsewhere was not law-abiding conduct, and qualified as a misdemeanour; but the punishment was so mild that not many people took it seriously. Additionally, it was as if we had drawn a line in the dust and said “This is the border, you cannot cross this”, because there was no physical border barrier. Now there is. So we display these signs. Those who arrive – migrants, say – can see the arrows and know which way to go; they must go to these border checkpoints,

where there will be administration points, where they can submit their documents, and where they can state what they would like.

Within what timeframe will asylum applications be assessed?

There is a procedure for this; it is already quite rapid. The Hungarian government regards Serbia as a safe country – or to be more precise, the Hungarian government has decided that, as a matter of course, every EU Member State and every country accepted by the EU as a candidate country (and Serbia is a candidate country) qualifies as safe. If a country were not safe, how could it be a member or potential member of the European Union? Based on this logic, this is what we laid down in the government decree. It is this decree that must be enforced at the border. In this case, if someone claims to be a refugee, we shall ask them if they have submitted an asylum application in Serbia; if the answer is no, their application will be refused, as Serbia is a safe country.

While I am aware that there is no good answer to this question, let me ask you: what percentage of deportations or refusals do you expect?

A high percentage.

Over ninety per cent?

Look, it depends; it is not for us to decide, but for those who come here.

I am only asking because you must have some experience by now.

Our experience is that most of those who arrive here have not submitted asylum applications in Serbia, even though they should have. The reason that we were unable to enforce the Hungarian rules was just because they came in such large numbers and there was no scope to secure the border, because we did not have a fence. But just between ourselves: it is quite absurd, and does not cast us in a particularly positive light, that a one thousand-year-old state is unable to enforce

its own laws. The simple physical fact is that too many people are coming. In a situation like this, we must find a solution, as the Germans and Austrians are trying to find a solution now. We may have woken up a little earlier, and therefore we may be somewhat further ahead. They can only control their border crossing points; we are also able to control the green border, so Hungary is perhaps that much further forward.

We shall come back to the Austrian and German reactions later. Before that, however, let us talk about the fact that there are almost five thousand soldiers at the border to help the police in their work. What powers do they have? In particular, after the 21st, when you need a two-thirds majority for their “deployment”, in inverted commas. So what powers do they have? We have read about a great many scenarios, but you have made it clear that firearms will not be used, for instance.

The situation is that right now we are unable to directly use the army for border surveillance responsibilities, because the opposition did not support our proposal on that. Therefore, in order to curb this modern-day mass migration and to be able to draw on the assistance of the military, we are required to change a two-thirds law. The opposition did not agree to this, but manoeuvred in a way which has cost us two weeks. Sometime at the end of September Parliament will be able to carry out the required legislative amendment, and then this will no longer be an issue, but at present it is. So what the army is allowed to do according to the laws in force at present is a reasonable question. They call this a nice little legal debate, and now it even has its own literature. I believe that lawyers have looked into it from every angle. In this situation, the army can facilitate the work of the police. This is what the army can do.

Talking about the military, the departure of Csaba Hende is one of the events of the last few days. Is it true, as we have learnt from the press, that he tendered his resignation because you were not satisfied with the speed of the construction of the fence, the border fence?

Look, there is a bad Hungarian habit here, which I believe (the writer) Mikszáth also mentions; there are short stories and sketches about it. If a Hungarian is told that the deadline is thirty days, he will complete the job on the thirtieth day. But the thirtieth day is the latest date. You can carry

out a particular task in an office in three or four days; no one says you are not allowed to. And when we are running for our lives, when the enforcement of our laws in Hungary is at stake, you cannot just complete something by the deadline if you could have somehow completed it before. In this sense, the responsibility is not the minister's, because he would have completed the job by the deadline; but I would like to have seen much faster progress, so I was compelled to accept his resignation.

You have mentioned the anticipated eventuality that from midnight an enormous number of migrants – tens of thousands are expected – may become stuck on the Serbian side of the border.

We should not discount this possibility, but I did not say this, as an opposite scenario may well occur. Today no one can say precisely. This is a business, and while everyone is talking about immigrants and asylum and war zones, we hear very little about the fact that this is a business. And quite a lucrative business at that. What is more, I believe that we cannot rule out the possibility that in several countries there is some kind of relationship between the authorities and human traffickers. This is an organised business now. Those who organise this business do not like to lose. The situation now is that those who want to dump people at the Hungarian border will never get paid for their role as human traffickers, because they will not be able to carry their “consignment” all the way to the agreed destination, which is Germany. Therefore the traffickers themselves will have to find another route if they are to complete their “orders”. This will cause problems in Croatia and Slovenia, but I sincerely hope that there, too, there are governments which are capable of making decisions.

I only wanted to point out that by securing the Hungarian-Serbian border from midnight tonight – and this border will be secured much better than before – we will not have solved the problem. They merely have to find a new route, or we divert the flood of migrants to a new route.

We have nonetheless solved three problems. We have complied with European regulations, we have enforced the laws of Hungary, and we have protected Hungarian interests. This is not a minor achievement.

I was not talking about those problems, but about the flood of migrants. As you yourself mentioned, these people heading for Germany will reach their destination by avoiding Hungary.

Each country must solve its own problems. Every one of the countries which signed the agreement referred to as “Schengen” agreed to use their own resources in protecting their external Schengen borders; this is what it says in the agreement. Consequently, if they criticised Hungary earlier for not being able to enforce the Schengen Agreement, they had every right to do so. But when they criticised us for seeking to enforce the terms of an agreement which we all signed up to, it is unfair and unjust. In the first place we should mention Greece here, as Greece is the first EU country encountered on the route from that direction; if Greece had observed what we agreed on, and if they had fulfilled the obligations they were supposed to, we would not have any problems on the Serbian-Hungarian border, and neither would the Austrians or the Germans.

How much has the Hungarian state spent so far on the transportation, food and registration of temporary migrants? And how much money has the EU given Hungary for this? Just so that we can compare.

The total we have spent so far is around thirty billion forints, and by our reckoning we will spend more or less the same amount during the remaining period. This means that we are talking about some EUR 200 million. And the EU has given us a few million euros to date. So these two figures are not even comparable.

Prime Minister, less than 24 hours ago the Austrian government had a crisis meeting and later the Germans announced the reinstatement of border controls. Slovakia and the Czech Republic are considering the same. This is despite Austria having strongly criticised the Hungarian government when it attempted to focus its measures in that direction. What consequences will the German and Austrian decisions have for Hungary?

We could joke about the fact that the Austrians are now doing something which Hungary was continuously criticised for earlier, but this is not the time. This is not the time to feel satisfaction, and this is likewise not the time to talk about our own role, which I believe is positive. This is not

what we are talking about now; we may yet come back to this issue in later evaluations. We now have a problem, a challenge, an extraordinary situation which we must resolve. We are better equipped to solve this problem together, rather than individually, and I am therefore pleased if the critical, anti-Hungarian tone is absent from the statements of the Austrian chancellor and the Austrian government, and we are finally able to cooperate in a sensible manner.

Did you read my questions before the interview?

No, I didn't.

The next one would have been whether you feel some sort of satisfaction due to the change in the Austrian and German positions. But let us skip that.

I didn't say I do not feel satisfaction; I only said that this is not the time.

This is not the time to talk about it. Fine. In an interview you gave the German newspaper Bild at the weekend you said that European leaders are living in a dream world, and they have no idea about the dangers. Does the Austrian-German reaction to the current shock – because I believe we have every reason to call it that – which we were talking about mean that European leaders, Western European leaders are finally beginning to wake up from that dream world?

We hope so. The next few days will tell. It is certain that the people forced this change. Judging by the swift changes in the positions of governments which we are observing in Western Europe today, above all I would conclude that Europe is, after all, a land of democracy; Europe is a democratic political world. You cannot go against the will of the people here for long, and without genuine arguments. You can for a short time, and with the right arguments, but it is very difficult to do so for a long time and without genuine arguments. And the everyday experience of the people both in Western Europe and in Central Europe, and in our own world, too, is that they are uncertain; there is fear, they do not understand what is going on, and they seem to sense – and I am going to talk about this later, because this is something I mention whenever I can – that their very way of life is in danger. Of course there is crime, we should have no illusions on that score,

and there is an increased threat of terrorism, this is another thing we should have no illusions about; there is the problem of freeloaders, because not all of the migrants coming here today will be hard workers, and there is pressure on social welfare systems. But the real fear – at least, this is the primary consideration for me – is that our way of life has been challenged. Because we see that wherever in Europe larger Islamic communities have emerged – as the German Chancellor said – parallel societies come into being. So experience shows – real life, rather than theory, philosophy, or liberal fairy tales – that when these communities arrive in Europe, they create their own societies according to their own religion, culture and way of life, and these societies exist side by side. The future supply of arrivals is almost unlimited – as we can see from the numbers coming now; and if we look at the demographic figures, we can see that these communities have far more children than our communities living according to the conventional European, Christian way of life. Simple mathematics leads us to the prospect of a Europe where our way of life will be in the minority, or will at least be faced with a major challenge. So in fact we are defending our way of life. Europe is a region in which we pay attention to one another, respect one another, and work hard for peace and security. This is a peaceful and safe world; but it is not like this of its own accord. We have worked hard for this, and we are concerned for its survival.

If we read international or domestic criticisms, the gist is that what you are experiencing or talking about as a concern is being voiced by the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, who 25 years ago tore down the iron curtain and is now building a fence on the country's southern border. And this is not even mentioning other comments, such as: a journalist from Bild – I am sorry, but I am going to quote him verbatim – who called you Europe's number one villain; the Austrian chancellor accusing the Hungarian government of methods reminiscent of the Nazi era; or the most recent covers of foreign and Hungarian newspapers, which portray you with a Hitler moustache. How did you personally take these attacks? What do you think about them?

First of all, regarding the fence, we have to point out that the purpose of the Iron Curtain built under Soviet occupation was to take our freedom away. The fence we are building now is in order to help protect our own way of life and freedom. These are two different things; I do not see any emotional or intellectual problem here. The other question is more difficult. Look, I am human, too, though this hardly matters – or it matters the least, perhaps. No one is happy being

referred to in derogatory terms; I think my mother is not happy that her son is referred to as some kind of a villain in newspapers which see themselves as reputable. And let me tell you, I myself am not indifferent to these attacks. But this counts for very little compared with the constitutional oath I have taken to protect the country. After all, if I allow myself to be influenced by photos, journalist's opinions and such unpleasant attacks like these, who will be here to make decisions at the right time with a cool head? So I must tell you that, while I am also human, I cannot afford the luxury of being affected by these opinions; because if I was, I would not be able to do my duty. My job is not an easy one; we do not normally talk about this – and it is, after all, nobody else's business. Those who are afraid should not go into the woods. But it is very important to always stay calm and cool and in a fit state to make decisions. The bigger the problem, the more important this is.

Let us take a look at another aspect of the criticisms. The majority of those levelled at the Government and you personally accuse you of a lack of solidarity and humanity, and I think this is perhaps the most difficult question to answer on this topic. In the context of refugees and migration, can political logic and the arguments that you cite overrule, say, human kindness? At the weekend you yourself said that the photo of the body of the little refugee boy was shocking. You yourself said that you would...

About which, of course, it turned out...

That the father was a human trafficker...

His father is a human trafficker, who went to pick up his next "consignment", as though nothing had happened. So much for the reliability of the media.

Yes, but the photo...

Not including your interview, naturally, that is always an exception.

Regardless of this, that photo is shocking.

Look, there is indeed a problem here: how should we manage this problem humanely, and at the same time rationally, based on our own interests? And the question is whether these two considerations contradict one another.

I am sorry, just one question, or the end of my sentence. So you yourself said that yes, you would welcome refugees into your own home. Yet the decisions taken are setting a different course for the management of the refugee question. Why?

Because my conclusion is that most of the people coming here are not refugees. Our emotionally difficult situation stems from the fact that we live in a better, more comfortable, more peaceful world than the world they come from. There is always a kind of tension inside a person who has a better life: there is something that needs to be settled, and the question which needs to be answered is “Why is it that I have a better life, and that other person has a worse life?” But the other important thing is that the people of Europe should have the self-confidence to say (in Hungary for example) that the source of what we have is hard work. We have worked harder than many European nations for our standard of living, and it was not easy. We have had everything here: world wars, communism, the defeat of communism, economic crisis. So what we have here today is not something we took from someone else, and it is not something that was gifted to us; it is something we have worked hard for. It is important for us to realise that not everyone works as hard as we Hungarians do for the standard of living they expect. There are some who work less, and in this case it is not unfair for those who work more to be able to create better circumstances – more peaceful and safer circumstances – for themselves. Here it is the war which upsets things, because there are so many people here who did not leave their homeland of their own free will; but I think that here, too, we must apply the rule that these people are entitled to have their human dignity respected and to live in a safe place, and they are also entitled to return at some point to the countries they were forced to leave because of the wars. They can best achieve this if they remain in that region, and this is why we must support Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. That is where the refugee camps are, from which they can return home at the end of the war. Life for people in the refugee camps cannot be described as good, but these are safe places and people are no longer in danger there. What is more, these people charging through Hungary

do not even stop in Austria. These people are not coming here for safety, and are not fleeing for their lives. Those who think that Serbian, Hungarian or Austrian living standards are not good enough definitely don't see safety as their top priority; they are more interested in standards of living. They want a German standard of life. I understand this, but as I said, a person who lives in better circumstances must understand that other people would also like to have what they have. But we have worked for this, and I would point out once more that no one can possibly ask us to share things which we have worked for with people who are no longer in trouble, and who are no longer in danger. They have every right to expect us to help them as much as our circumstances allow. They have every right to expect the European Union to send money to the countries from which they come, so that the people who live there can also have opportunities, because everyone has the right to a chance in life, including Syrians. But this is not the same thing as saying "I'll come here, and try to take from the Europeans something which they have worked for". At the same time, my view is that it would be good to hear the words "please" and "thank you" more often from the migrants, rather than phrases such as "I am entitled to this" and "I demand that".

I am going to say two more words: "momentous" and "historic". In your various interviews and statements over the last few weeks you have rather frequently used these words to describe what is happening now. Let us distance ourselves a little from the realm of daily news, and frame this refugee issue in a wider context. I believe that many people around us are asking what is going on in the world and, in particular, why.

You have to be a very clever person to attempt to answer a question like that. I do not venture to do so; I will merely add something to your question or the possible answers. I have seen many a difficult and complicated situation in international politics, and I have learnt that while one always believes that there is some ultimate explanation hidden in the background, which should be found in order to understand a complex situation, this is not usually the case. The usual course of events is that something happens, which then attracts or triggers another factor, another interest, a third factor, and yet another business interest – and in the end, a single event has turned into a problem springing from many roots. I am convinced that even if there is some political intention to drive these people away from their region (and I believe that such an intention exists), and even if there is some intention to give them money to come to Europe (and I believe

that such an intention exists), this is not an explanation in itself. Just as valid is the explanation that overnight tens of thousands of people – taxi drivers and human traffickers – saw a business opportunity in migration. I have been to the border, and I asked the police what is happening on the other side of the fence – who cuts the wire and how, and how much money they receive for this. So all of a sudden tens of thousands of people found an opportunity to make money, and as a result, politics, malicious intentions and the everyday logic of business all add up – each one reinforcing and intensifying the other – to unleash a mass of people with a formidable force and intensity which can only be resisted with firm policies. We shall obviously need more subtle evaluations in the future, but I would warn everyone against believing that there is a single factor that can be identified. Civil society organisations join in. Here, in Hungary, many of the civil society organisations supported by the Soros Foundation have launched themselves into action. They all demand that the Government leave the border open. So I believe that there are many different identifiable organisations, individuals, forces and policies behind this phenomenon.

Prime Minister, what do you think is at stake in Europe's response to the current crisis? Is it really true that history is unfolding before our eyes, or is this just a political slogan?

Let me say once more: the facts tell us that the people arriving in Europe now come from a different way of life and a different culture. They hold different views, and lead a different way of life. If you say Islam, and I say Christianity, I am not saying that they and we have a different relationship with God. I am talking about a culture and a way of life. For instance, equality between men and women, or the structure of the family, monogamy or polygamy, education, what we teach our children. Take customs related to sexual relations which have evolved in European culture over a very long time: they are what they are, but they have evolved on the foundations of a culture, and they are very different over there. And I could go on. These are different ways of life, and we can observe that those who came here in large numbers continue to pursue their own lifestyles, rather than the European one. It is a liberal dream – or I don't know what to call it, an illusion – to believe that European values are so attractive to others that they cannot wait to seize the opportunity to transform their own personal and family lives, and to live like we do. They do not want to live like we do, because they hold different views on the world, they think differently about the place they occupy in the world, about how they relate with God, other people, and the

economic system. Therefore parallel societies come into being, and from then on sheer mathematics comes in to play, and because they have higher birth rates, are more family-centred, and in some respects lead more spiritual lives than we do, they are more competitive. And Europe is what it is. If we allow a competition to evolve between two civilisations here, in Europe, we Christians will lose. It is sad, but this is the situation. This is something we must face up to. This is also a criticism of the courage of our own Christian societies, but that is how it is. If we allow this competition, we will lose. We can only keep the continent as it is by not letting everyone in, and not allowing a competition of this kind to start.

It is difficult to talk about the terrorist dimension of the refugee question without being accused of inciting panic, and this is naturally not my intention, but we cannot avoid this topic. You have access to intelligence reports. Based on these, can you tell us if there are people coming here who are sent by various terrorist organisations – the Islamic State is mentioned here most frequently – exploiting the current flood of people? And if so, in what numbers?

They are coming, and luckily, they are going, too. This is not good news for Europe, but it is temporary reassurance for us because they are only passing through Hungary. But we do know that they are coming, and we know that they are moving on. However, we cannot filter everyone out.

For what purpose?

Based on their contacts, there is nothing well-intentioned in their plans. Europe must therefore face the fact that, as a result of this failed policy – as Europe's immigration policy has failed and collapsed before our eyes – and as a result of forcing through management of the situation with a failed immigration policy, a very serious situation has developed. The western countries of Europe have been penetrated by large numbers of individuals who – based on their former contacts – can reasonably be presumed to harbour malice in their hearts and who are capable of harming us, when the time comes.

We have talked about the problems enough. Let us talk about something a little more difficult: the solution. You have already made mention of it, and here I would once again go back to the interview you gave to the German newspaper Bild. In this you spoke about a plan which you would table at the next EU summit. This includes financial assistance to be provided for the countries around Syria, and the protection of the borders of Turkey and Greece. What does this entail exactly – for instance on financial assistance?

Look, I am quite willing to talk about this, but now the debate is about something else. This is not the hot potato at present. There are two issues on which we must win on the international scene. One of them is to convince Europe that, as the Greeks are unable to protect their own borders, we should urgently set up a pan-European force, a border guard force, and should go south to protect the Greek borders; because if the Greeks do not protect their borders, what we see today will continue. And of course, Hungary is protecting itself with the fence. But migrants are moving towards Croatia and Slovenia, so Europe is not yet out of the woods. We should therefore send military or policing forces there.

Are you talking about a so-called EU defence force, an EU army?

The European Union has an organisation called Frontex, whose name we hear frequently these days, but which has no teeth. In practical terms, the total amount of help that Frontex was able to offer Hungary was a contingent of 58 people. There are more people than this working in the kitchens catering for our defence forces and police, so this is a negligible number. Using the contributions of several countries, we must turn Frontex into a strong force which would be able to lawfully take over the protection of the Greek borders from the Greeks. Of course, this would be subject to Greek consent, and we do not have that. At the same time, the others also lack determination. The second threat we must now address is that they want us to set up refugee camps in Hungary. We must make the leaders of Europe understand that this is out of the question. Because the problem must be addressed as near as possible to its origin. If a refugee camp is set up in EU territory, it must be in Greece, but not in Hungary under any circumstances, as this will bring the conflict one thousand to one thousand two hundred kilometres closer to the heart of Europe. It must be kept where it is. At today's talks between interior ministers Hungary

must make clear, and must not compromise on the position that, to use the European term, there will be no “hot spots” (in other words, refugee camps), distribution centres or collection points of any kind in Hungary. If we have agreement on these two things, then we can talk about money, we can talk about the amendment of the Schengen Agreement, and many other issues as well. We have a Hungarian position on the solution.

Can the shock which, say, the Germans and the Austrians have just received accelerate the creation of the unity which you yourself have mentioned now? Can it accelerate a kind of process where more and more leaders will stand behind you or join you? I am thinking of the V4, the Baltic countries and Denmark. But to mention the latest news, can the turnaround in Austrian and German politics accelerate this?

It can, and this is not such a complicated thing. What do you teach your children? You teach your children – this is what is taught everywhere in European civilisation – that a clever person learns from other people’s mistakes, a stupid person learns from their own, while a hopeless person does not even learn from their own. They have not learnt from the mistakes of the Hungarians, and are now learning from their own. This is what is happening. I think this will channel decisions in the right direction.

Prime minister, thank you very much for accepting our invitation.

Thank you!

(Prime Minister's Office) Retrieved: 04.04.2019. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-primeminister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-commercialstation-tv2-s-facts-evening-television-programme>

10. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's address to Parliament before the start of daily business

21 September 2015, Budapest

Honourable Speaker, Honourable Fellow Members of Parliament,

I sought leave to speak at the beginning of the autumn session in order to give an account of recent events. The issue of illegal migration has burst into our lives with such force that I am now compelled to present my statement on it to the Honourable House. Before presenting my account, however, I wish to take this opportunity, in the name of the entire country and every Hungarian, to thank the members of the police and military forces serving at our borders. They are discharging their duty in a disciplined, humane and firm manner; in other words, their performance is exemplary. We thank you for the service you are rendering to the country.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am going to tell you what the Hungarian government believes to be the nature of the problem in the context of illegal migration. I must speak of why we are quarrelling with the European Union. I am going to tell you what we have done so far to curb immigration and to protect the borders of Hungary and Europe; and finally I shall say a few words about what we may expect in the next few months.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In simple terms, to call a spade a spade, the problem is mass migration. Immigrants are now not just pounding on our doors, but are breaking them down on top of us. Not just a few hundred or thousand, but hundreds of thousands – indeed, millions – of migrants are besieging the borders of Hungary and Europe. We cannot see an end to this. There is plenty of supply: millions are setting out. The following is not an exhaustive account. Iraq is a country of 33 million, where 8 million people are in need of humanitarian aid; in other words, 8 million people rely solely on humanitarian aid, and according to our projections this number will increase from 8 million to 10 million by the end of this year. Of these 8 million, we can say that as many as 4 million are

internal refugees. Syria: four years of civil war; 12 million refugees receiving humanitarian aid; 7.6 million internal refugees, 4 million of whom have been forced to leave for neighbouring countries and are currently living in refugee camps. Afghanistan: 950,000 refugees in Iran, 1.5 million refugees in Pakistan. There is a civil war in Libya; continual internal insurrections in Eritrea; Mali is facing an internal war; and there is a semi-civil war situation in Somalia. If we add up the figures – the number of people and war situations – we can conclude that the number of internal refugees in the Sub-Saharan region is around 12.5 million. This is the summary report on the situation. The North African line of defence has collapsed: the “Arab Spring” resulted in chaos, as the institutions of representative democracy – regarded by us, or rather by the West, as the only true form of state – remain inoperational in places where there is no will to operate them. Additionally, the European Union is weak. Already at the beginning of the year, there were signs that this would not end well. Those with keen eyes could see that the migration pressure would escalate. More and more people have set out, human traffickers have created their routes effectively with the help of the authorities, and Europe has not only left its doors and windows wide open, but has even sent out invitations to immigrants.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We take the view that it is the most natural thing in the world to want to protect one’s own family. This is just what we are doing now. Hungary has been a valued member of the larger European family for a thousand years. It is its historic and moral duty to protect Europe, as Hungary thereby also protects itself. The reverse is also true: when we protect the borders of Hungary, we also protect Europe.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thanks to the mass media and the internet, it is now clear to everyone that Europe is rich, but weak. This is the most dangerous combination possible. From their own viewpoint, it appears to be a perfectly reasonable decision for those who live in difficult circumstances to set out for a rich but weak region of the world in order to take their share of the good life there: in this instance, here. We understand this. We understand that many of them are forced to leave

countries where some are committing atrocities against their own people, where the economy has collapsed, and where unemployment has broken all records. The migrants themselves are the victims of bad political decisions. In fact, the world has turned its back on these people: the world has turned its back on states in which human dignity is not respected, and where it is degraded on a daily basis. We understand all this. But based on simple mathematical calculations, it is easy to see that Europe is unable to take on all the troubles of the world.

We are unable to support all the economic migrants. A minimal understanding of economics and our experiences to date are enough to tell all of us that we are unable to give jobs to everyone. Furthermore, we cannot even be sure that they all want to work hard. I think it puts things into perspective when one sees that there are some who are not even satisfied with Austria, and who then move on to Germany; and it also puts things into perspective when one sees immigrants demonstrating in Germany because they want to go on to Sweden. The situation is made worse by a spate of serious crime. A Europe which requires its half a billion citizens to respect its laws is unable to persuade migrants to undergo a simple registration process. Brussels' policies and the great powers made the situation even worse when they proved to be unable to grasp the root of the problem, and saw people who are clearly illegal economic migrants as being refugees. As a result, we find that our borders are in danger, our way of life based on respect for the law is in danger, and Hungary and the whole of Europe are in danger. What is happening now is an invasion; we are being invaded. It is, however, a daily experience in Europe now that those who have been invaded are unable to offer shelter.

Honourable House, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Why are we quarrelling with Europe? You can see for yourselves: we need to fight a battle on two fronts. We must protect the borders of Hungary and Europe, and at the same time we must also fight against Europe's short-sighted policy, which has turned against the will of the European people. I get the impression that many people are not willing to see the full gravity of the threat. First of all, they do not see mass migration as a threat or as a problem, but as an opportunity which we should welcome. We can understand the European left. They indeed look

upon migration as an opportunity enabling them to destabilise the nation state and accomplish their historic goal: the elimination of nations. There is a reason why political forces are taking turns in criticising Hungarians for standing up for our thousand-year-old statehood, the country's sovereignty and our national independence. We have got used to this since 2010. But it is not only the left which takes this stance: we can find people from across the entire political spectrum who through their conduct have even encouraged migrants to leave their countries and risk their lives en route for Europe in the hope of a better life. The consequences for us and for Europe are disastrous: as Europe is unable to protect its external borders, an increasing number of internal borders are being closed within Europe, one of the most important achievements of which has been the free movement of goods and people, commonly referred to as "Schengen". So we are quarrelling with Brussels. We have diverging views on the problem, the means by which to resolve the problem, and the consequences of the problem. We have different ideas about what is going to happen if we take or do not take certain steps. One thing is certain, however: we must reconsider a number of European achievements, agreements and institutions. But in the meantime, we must not sit here doing nothing. As long as Europe is unable to take united action, the individual nation states will be forced to defend themselves against this brutal threat in a fierce struggle, beyond their means, and by making extraordinary sacrifices.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We have done everything we could within the limits of the law. And in the future we shall continue to do our utmost, and to punch above our weight. I believe that this is what our people expect us to do. More than one million citizens have voiced their views on immigration. The results of the National Consultation are there for anyone to consult: we published them on the internet. More than eighty per cent of Hungarians think that Brussels' ill-chosen immigration policy has failed, and therefore the rules must be tightened.

Honourable Fellow Members of Parliament,

The Hungarian people have decided: the country must be protected. Every action the Hungarian government has taken to date, and every measure it will take derives from this overriding duty. In

2015 there are two political trends in Hungary: one which seeks to protect Hungary and the Hungarian people, and seeks to preserve our national culture and European identity; and one which for some reason works to oppose all this.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is not for fun that we have built and are building hundreds of kilometres of border fences. It was not for fun that we earlier convened the Honourable House for an extraordinary session to pass legislative amendments allowing us to curb mass migration and protect Hungarian citizens and their families. And it is not eccentricity which leads us to employ our own solutions: we are simply seeking to observe treaty obligations.

Honourable Fellow Members of Parliament,

What can we expect? No one should think that the problem will disappear overnight. No one should fall for the illusion that the government measures we have adopted will in themselves curb the flood of people which is putting pressure on the whole of Europe. We should instead prepare for a long struggle. On behalf of the Government, I can assure you that we shall make every effort to protect Hungary, the borders of the country and the Hungarian people. We shall persevere, and shall not compromise on this. But until there is a united European action plan, we cannot end the problem; we can manage it within our national remit, but we cannot solve it.

We have proposals on a solution to the problem which could lead our countries to a functioning pan-European action plan. We are talking about simple, logical solutions, dictated by common sense. If, for instance, our Greek friends are unable to protect the borders of Europe and the borders of the Schengen zone, we must take over their protection from them; all twenty-eight Member States should take a share in the protection of the southern borders of Europe. It is therefore obvious that, instead of diverting the problem towards the heart of Europe, we must take action at the source of the problem; we should not set up refugee camps – or whatever they may be called – within the European Union, but outside it. We should help the countries which have so far sheltered millions of war refugees, in order to enable them to provide more decent

conditions for the people who do not want to come to Europe, but who want to return to their homes once the war is over.

Proposals such as the quota system merely address the consequences, rather than the causes. This is not a European action plan. The underlying philosophy of the quota system is not aimed at ensuring that no more economic migrants come to Europe, or protecting Europe and the European way of life. It would instead spread the problem – based, I believe, on the silent recognition that migrants who have already entered Europe illegally will be reluctant to go back home. In response to this, we Hungarians say: leaders in Brussels have put the cart before the horse. We suggest that we should first put an end to the mass migration, and once we have succeeded in protecting our borders, we should discuss what should happen to those who are already here or who want to come here. At all events, we must persuade them to respect our laws. We must make it clear to everyone that Europe is Europe because explicit rules govern our co-existence. In Europe the rule of law does not mean oppression, but the provision of protection and security. We must also point out that everyone here has worked hard to live in peace and security: both individuals and the national communities together have worked hard for this. In Europe, welfare is not something you are entitled to as a matter of course: it is something that you have to work for.

Honourable Fellow Members of Parliament,

Finally, I ask you, regardless of your party affiliation, to support the Government in the fight against mass immigration. Because we only have one country, and it is the duty of us all to protect it.

Thank you for your attention.

(Prime Minister's Office) Retrieved: 04.04.2019. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-primeminister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-address-to-parliament-before-the-start-of-daily-business>

11. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's address in Parliament before the start of daily Business

Budapest, 16 November 2015

Honourable Speaker, Honourable Fellow Members of Parliament, Honourable House,
Our first words today are also of condolence. I wish to take this opportunity to convey the condolences of the Hungarian people and Hungary to France and the French people: we share your grief and stand by you in your moment of need.

Honourable House,

The European Union has been attacked, and we too are in danger. The esteemed President of the French Republic François Hollande has said that what has happened is an act of war. If this is the case – and it is – we must recognise that not only France and the French people are at war. France is a member of the European Union. In this respect, the entire European Union was attacked in Paris. We are a member of the EU, and this is therefore our affair, also. What happened on Friday night could happen anywhere in Europe. We are not safe either. The time has come for the leading politicians of the European Union to also wake up and realise what is at stake. Let us ask a simple question. What is more humane? We Hungarians have been advocating the closure of our borders to stop the flood of people coming from the Middle East and Africa. We have been fiercely criticised for this, by those who claim that this is not a humane approach. But we are faced with a question. Which approach is more humane: to close the borders in order to stop illegal immigration, or to put at risk the lives of innocent European citizens? The right to life takes precedence over all other rights, as does the right to self-defence. No ideology or economic interest of any kind should allow us to risk the lives of European citizens. Whichever way we look at it, the EU is rudderless. It is weak, uncertain and paralysed. There are meetings and conferences galore, but there are no solutions. We are floundering in the net of ideologies, instead of taking firm action on the basis of common sense and our own cultural traditions. The leaders of several European countries are still trying to concoct schemes on how to transport in and absorb masses of immigrants, instead of jointly taking practical steps to finally stop the flow. In Brussels they are still claiming that immigration is a good thing. Meanwhile, day after day we see evidence that immigration is a bad thing. It is not a win-win situation, but lose-lose.

Honourable House,

We feel that the very existence of Europe is at stake. In Brussels, however, all the wrong messages are being sent: there are ever more invitations to migrants, instead of telling them firmly and honestly that what they will find here is not at all what they expect.

Honourable House,

We have repeatedly warned the leaders of the European Union not to invite these people to Europe. Everyone who has soberly thought through the possible consequences of unlimited mass migration can see what dangers are inherent in the uncontrolled, illegal flow of people crossing our borders. European and US security experts, heads of intelligence services and police chiefs have continually warned Europe of the increased terror threat. Every politician and all Europe's leaders have been made aware of the danger. At the beginning of this summer Greece said that it was not possible to rule out the presence of jihadists among the masses of migrants arriving. Seen from the perspective of common sense, it was clear that one simply must not let in large numbers of people without proper controls: hundreds of thousands of people whose exact origins are unknown, whose identities are unknown, and whose motivations are unknown. In addition, Honourable House, they are coming from regions in which European states are currently involved in military operations. The like of this has never happened before. We are allowing in – indeed transporting in – hundreds of thousands of people in an unregulated manner from regions in which the European Union is at war. It has been demonstrated that terrorists are deliberately and systematically exploiting mass migration in order to blend in among masses of people who are leaving their homes in the hope of a better life. We do not think that everyone coming from that direction is a terrorist. But we do not know, and no one can say, how many terrorists have already arrived among the masses of migrants. We do not know how many of them are already here, and how many of them are arriving from day to day. A single terrorist is one too many. It is painful to even consider how many terrorists may have crossed the territory of our country. The time has come to put an end to this all across Europe.

Honourable Fellow Members of Parliament,

It is clear to every person of common sense that Europe cannot cope with so many people. We all know that the European economy cannot cope with such a burden. But beyond the financial and economic realities, mass migration presents three serious risks, each of which is on its own sufficient reason to hold back the flood of people. Firstly, on Friday night we witnessed the fact that mass migration represents an exponentially increasing terror threat – indeed today we are not

even talking about the threat of terror, but the fact and reality of terror. Secondly, mass migration increases the risk of crime. It is not PC, not politically correct, to talk about this –indeed in the Western world this fact is publicly denied – but it is a fact for all that. In those places in Europe with high numbers of immigrants, crime has increased significantly and public security has deteriorated. There is more theft, robbery, physical assault, grievous bodily harm, rape and murder. Whether we talk about them or not, these facts are still facts. Thirdly, mass resettlement of people arriving from other continents and cultures represents a threat to our culture, way of life, customs and traditions. Now those who have lived in the delusion of multi-culturalism – and who have sought to force this delusion on us – can see where all this is leading.

Honourable Speaker, Honourable Fellow Members of Parliament, Honourable House,

In the light of what has happened, we must also speak about the issue of compulsory resettlement quotas. It is still the case that, from somewhere outside Hungary, people want to tell us Hungarians who we should live alongside. This is what the quotas are about. I propose to the Honourable House that we continue to reject the quotas, and continue to insist that we ourselves should decide whom we want to let in and whom we want to live together with. Mandatory resettlement quotas are quite simply not Europe: they are a complete contradiction of the spirit of Europe. They are pointless, because they do not resolve the crisis, but aggravate it. It is clear that mandatory resettlement quotas do not keep migrants away, but are more of an invitation for them. They do not reduce pressure, but add to it – and the rapidly escalating pressure will cause European countries to reinstate their borders within the EU. Such a scenario is just a question of time if things continue as they have done, and this and could mean the end of the Schengen system and of free movement. Honourable Fellow Members of Parliament, mandatory quotas are also illegitimate, as the leaders of Europe have no jurisdiction to make decisions on this issue. They have no powers to force on the Member States a measure on refugees or immigration which the countries concerned do not want. In the light of the terrorist attacks, Brussels can no longer question Member States' right to defend themselves, given that mandatory resettlement quotas are dangerous, because they would spread terrorism across Europe.

Honourable House, Honourable Speaker,

The facts and tragic events show that we need a new European policy. It is not enough to patch up or repair the old one. I suggest that we put dogma aside, forget about political correctness, and speak in an open and straightforward manner. I suggest that we return from the realm of

ideologies to common sense, and reconsider our European policy on the basis of four self-evident commandments. First of all, we must protect the external borders of the European Union, because security begins with the protection of the borders. Secondly, we must protect our culture, because Europe's essence lies in its spiritual and cultural identity. Thirdly, we must protect our economic interests, because we Europeans must remain at the centre of the world economy. And fourthly, we must give the people the right to have a say in European decisions, because the European Union must be based on democratic foundations.

Honourable Fellow Members of Parliament,

The citizens of Europe did not want hundreds of thousands of outsiders invading their countries by crossing their borders illegally, in an uncontrolled manner. No one anywhere has given authorisation or permission for this. People want to live in security, and want to enjoy the benefits of the European Union. And it is our duty as Members of Parliament and governments throughout Europe to listen to the people's voice.

Thank you for your attention.

(Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister) Retrieved: 04.04.2019. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-address-in-parliament-before-the-start-of-daily-business>

12. Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 15 March

15 March 2016, Budapest

“Salutations to you, Hungarian freedom, on this the day you are born!”

Ladies and Gentlemen, Compatriots, Hungarians around the World,

With a cockade sewn by Júlia Szendrey pinned to his chest, a volume of poems in his pocket, and the still thrilling experience of the Revolution in his head, these are the words with which the poet Sándor Petőfi welcomed the fifteenth of March in his journal. Salutations to you, Hungarian freedom, on this the day you are born! And today also, one hundred and sixty-eight years later, it is with unfettered joy, the optimism of early spring, high hopes and an elevated spirit that across

the Carpathian Basin we celebrate – from Beregszász to Szabadka, from Rimaszombat to Kézdivásárhely: every Hungarian with one heart, one soul and one will.

Just as then in the decisive battles of the Freedom Fight, now also Hungarian hearts are cheered by the fact that we have with us a Polish legion. I welcome the spirited successors of General Bem: we welcome the sons of the Polish nation. As always throughout our shared thousand-year history, now, too, we are standing by you in the battle you are fighting for your country's freedom and independence. We are with you, and we send this message to Brussels: more respect to the Polish people, more respect to Poland! Greetings to you. It is a sign of the shared fate of Poland and Hungary that another glorious revolution of ours – that of 1956 – was born between the Bem Statue and Kossuth tér in Budapest. It rose up with the unstoppable force of our glorious ancestors, and by the evening it had dragged the Soviet generalissimo out of his boots.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

By nature, Hungarians stand up for what is right when the need arises. What is more, they fight for it if needs be, but do not seek out trouble for its own sake. They know that they can often achieve more through patience than through sabre-rattling. This is why those like us are rarely given to revolutions. We have only gone down that path twice in one hundred and seventy years. When we did follow that path, we had reason to do so: we felt that our lungs would burst if we could not breathe in freedom. We threw ourselves into it, and once we had started a revolution, we did so in style. Modern European history has preserved both Hungarian revolutions among the glorious memories of the world: two blazing stars, two national uprisings bursting forth in 1848 and 1956 from Hungarian aspirations and Hungarian interests. Glory to the heroes, honour to the brave. Chroniclers have also recorded the revolution of 1918–19, but the memories of that period are not preserved on the pages of glory; indeed, not only are those memories written on different pages, but they appear in a different volume altogether. The 1918–19 revolution can be found in the volume devoted to Bolshevik anti-Hungarian subversions launched in the service of foreign interests and foreign ambitions; it features under the heading “appalling examples of intellectual and political degeneracy”. Yes, we Hungarians have two revolutionary traditions: one leads from 1848, through 1956 and the fall of communism, all the way to the Fundamental Law and the current constitutional order; the bloodline of the other tradition leads from Jacobin European ancestors, through 1919, to communism after World War II and the Soviet era in Hungary. Life in Hungary today is a creation of the spiritual heirs and offspring of the '48 and '56 revolutions.

Today, as then, the heartbeat of this revolutionary tradition moves and guides the nation's political, economic and spiritual life: equality before the law, responsible government, a national bank, the sharing of burdens, respect for human dignity and the unification of the nation. Today, as then, the ideals of '48 and '56 are the pulse driving the life force of the nation, and the intellectual and spiritual blood flow of the Hungarian people. Let us give thanks that this may be so, let us give thanks that finally the Lord of History has led us onto this path. Soli Deo gloria!

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Not even the uplifting mood of a celebration day can let us forget that the tradition of 1919, too, is still with us – though fortunately its pulse is just a faint flicker. Yet at times it can make quite a noise. But without a host animal, its days are numbered. It is in need of another delivery of aid from abroad in the form of a major intellectual and political infusion; unless it receives this, then after its leaves and branches have withered, its roots will also dry up in the Hungarian motherland's soil, which is hostile to internationalism. And this is all well and good.

A decent person who raises their children and works hard to build the course of their life does not usually end up as a revolutionary. The right-thinking person who stands on their own two feet and has control over their future knows that upheavals and the sudden upending of the ordinary course of life rarely ends well. The person of goodwill who seeks a life of serene and peaceful progress knows that trying to take two steps at once leads to you tripping over your own legs, and instead of moving forward, you will land flat on your face. And yet these right-thinking people of goodwill, these upstanding citizens of Pest instantly rallied to the call of our revolutions, marching at the front, right behind the university students. They formed the backbone of the revolutions and freedom fights, and they were to pay with their own blood for the honour of the Hungarian people. Every revolution is like the people who make it. On the committee which oversaw order during the 15 March revolution, in the shadow of the colossal figures of Petőfi and Vasvári, we find the furrier Máté Gyurkovics, and the button-maker György Molnár. Our revolutions were led by respectable citizens, military officers, lawyers, writers, doctors, engineers, honest tradespeople, farmers and workers with a sense of national duty: Hungarians who embodied the nation's best aspects, our homeland's very best. Hungarian revolutionaries are not warriors for hare-brained ideologies, deranged utopias or demented, unsolicited plans for world happiness; in Pest you find no traces of the illusory visions of quack philosophers or the raging resentment of failed intellectuals. The revolutionaries of 1848 did not want to salvage

stones from the ruins of absolutist oppression in order to build a temple to yet another tyranny; therefore the Hungarian revolution's songs were not written in honour of the steel blade of the guillotine or the rope of the gallows. Our songs are not sung by lynch mobs or execution-thirsty crowds; the Pest revolution is not a hymn to chaos, revenge, or butchery. The 1848 Revolution is a solemn and dignified moment in our history, when the wounds of the glorious Hungarian nation opened once again. Springing from constitutional roots, it demanded the granting and return of the rights seized from and denied to the nation. It is exhilarating, but sober; ecstatic but practical; glorious, but temperate. It is Hungarian to the core.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Three weeks before his death in battle, in his last letter to János Arany, Sándor Petőfi asked the following question: "So what are you going to do?" When we, his modern descendants, read this, it is as if he is asking us the same question. So what are you going to do? How will you make use of your inheritance? Are the Hungarian people still worthy of their ancestors' reputation? Do you know the law of the Hungarians of old – that whatever you do should not only be measured by its utility, but also by universal standards? This is because your deeds must pass the test not only here, but also in eternity.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We have our inheritance, the Hungarian people still exist, Buda still stands, we are who we were, and we shall be who we are. Our reputation travels far and wide; clever people and intelligent peoples acknowledge the Hungarians. We adhere to the ancient law, and also measure our deeds by universal standards. We teach our children that their horizon should be eternity. Whether we shall succeed, whether finally we see the building of a homeland which is free, independent, worthy and respected the world over – one which was raised high by our forebears from 1848, and for which they sacrificed their lives – we cannot yet know. We do know, however, that the current European constellation is an unstable one, and so we have some testing times ahead. The times in which we live press us with this question, which is like a hussar's sabre held to our chest: "Shall we live in slavery or in freedom?" The destiny of the Hungarians has become intertwined with that of Europe's nations, and has grown to be so much a part of the union that today not a single people – including the Hungarian people – can be free if Europe is not free. And today Europe is as fragile, weak and sickly as a flower being eaten away by a hidden worm.

Today, one hundred and sixty-eight years after the great freedom fights of its peoples, Europe – our common home – is not free.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Europe is not free, because freedom begins with speaking the truth. In Europe today it is forbidden to speak the truth. A muzzle is a muzzle – even if it is made of silk. It is forbidden to say that today we are not witnessing the arrival of refugees, but a Europe being threatened by mass migration. It is forbidden to say that tens of millions are ready to set out in our direction. It is forbidden to say that immigration brings crime and terrorism to our countries. It is forbidden to say that the masses of people coming from different civilisations pose a threat to our way of life, our culture, our customs, and our Christian traditions. It is forbidden to say that, instead of integrating, those who arrived here earlier have built a world of their own, with their own laws and ideals, which is forcing apart the thousand-year-old structure of Europe. It is forbidden to say that this is not accidental and not a chain of unintentional consequences, but a planned, orchestrated campaign, a mass of people directed towards us. It is forbidden to say that in Brussels they are constructing schemes to transport foreigners here as quickly as possible and to settle them here among us. It is forbidden to say that the purpose of settling these people here is to redraw the religious and cultural map of Europe and to reconfigure its ethnic foundations, thereby eliminating nation states, which are the last obstacle to the international movement. It is forbidden to say that Brussels is stealthily devouring ever more slices of our national sovereignty, and that in Brussels today many are working on a plan for a United States of Europe, for which no one has ever given authorisation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today's enemies of freedom are cut from a different cloth than the royal and imperial rulers of old, or those who ran the Soviet system; they use a different set of tools to force us into submission. Today they do not imprison us, they do not transport us to camps, and they do not send in tanks to occupy countries loyal to freedom. Today the international media's artillery bombardments, denunciations, threats and blackmail are enough – or rather have been enough so far. The peoples of Europe are slowly awakening, they are regrouping, and will soon regain ground. Europe's beams laid on the suppression of truth are creaking and cracking. The peoples of Europe may have finally understood that their future is at stake: not only are their prosperity, their comfort and their jobs at stake, but their very security and the peaceful order of their lives

are in danger. The peoples of Europe, who have been slumbering in abundance and prosperity, have finally understood that the principles of life upon which we built Europe are in mortal danger. Europe is a community of Christian, free and independent nations; it is the equality of men and women, fair competition and solidarity, pride and humility, justice and mercy.

This danger is not now threatening us as wars and natural disasters do, which take the ground from under our feet in an instant. Mass migration is like a slow and steady current of water which washes away the shore. It appears in the guise of humanitarian action, but its true nature is the occupation of territory; and their gain in territory is our loss of territory. Hordes of implacable human rights warriors feel an unquenchable desire to lecture and accuse us. It is claimed that we are xenophobic and hostile, but the truth is that the history of our nation is also one of inclusion and the intertwining of cultures. Those who have sought to come here as new family members, as allies or as displaced persons fearing for their lives have been let in to make a new home for themselves. But those who have come here with the intention of changing our country and shaping our nation in their own image, those who have come with violence and against our will, have always been met with resistance.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

At first, they are only talking about a few hundred, a thousand or two thousand relocated people. But not a single responsible European leader would dare to swear under oath that this couple of thousand will not eventually increase to tens or hundreds of thousands. If we want to stop this mass migration, we must first of all curb Brussels. The main danger to Europe's future does not come from those who want to come here, but from Brussels' fanatics of internationalism. We cannot allow Brussels to place itself above the law. We shall not allow it to force upon us the bitter fruit of its cosmopolitan immigration policy. We shall not import to Hungary crime, terrorism, homophobia and synagogue-burning anti-Semitism. There shall be no urban districts beyond the reach of the law, there shall be no mass disorder or immigrant riots here, and there shall be no gangs hunting down our women and daughters. We shall not allow others to tell us whom we can let into our home and country, whom we will live alongside, and whom we will share our country with. We know how these things go. First we allow them to tell us whom we must take in, then they force us to serve foreigners in our country. In the end we find ourselves being told to pack up and leave our own land. Therefore we reject the forced resettlement scheme, and we shall tolerate neither blackmail, nor threats.

The time has come to ring the warning bell. The time has come for opposition and resistance. The time has come to gather allies to us. The time has come to raise the flag of proud nations. The time has come to prevent the destruction of Europe, and to save the future of Europe. To this end, regardless of party affiliation, we call on every citizen of Hungary to unite, and we call on every European nation to unite. The leaders and citizens of Europe must no longer live in two separate worlds. We must restore the unity of Europe. We the peoples of Europe cannot be free individually if we are not free together. If we unite our forces, we shall succeed; if we pull in different directions, we shall fail. Together we are strength, disunited we are weakness. Either together, or not at all – today this is the law.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In 1848 it was written in the book of fate that nothing could be done against the Habsburg Empire. If then we had resigned ourselves to that outcome, our fate would have been sealed and the German sea would have swallowed up the Hungarians. In 1956 it was written in the book of fate that we were to remain an occupied and sovietised country until patriotism was extinguished in the very last Hungarian. If then we had resigned ourselves to that outcome, our fate would have been sealed, and the Soviet sea would have swallowed up the Hungarians. Today it is written in the book of fate that hidden, faceless world powers will eliminate everything that is unique, autonomous, age-old and national. They will blend cultures, religions and populations, until our many-faceted and proud Europe will finally become bloodless and docile. And if we resign ourselves to this outcome, our fate will be sealed, and we will be swallowed up in the enormous belly of the United States of Europe. The task which awaits the Hungarian people, the nations of Central Europe and the other European nations which have not yet lost all common sense is to defeat, rewrite and transform the fate intended for us. We Hungarians and Poles know how to do this. We have been taught that only if you are brave enough do you look danger in the face. We must therefore drag the ancient virtue of courage out from under the silt of oblivion. First of all we must put steel in our spines, and we must clearly answer the foremost, the single most important question determining our fate with a voice so loud so that it can be heard far and wide. The question upon which the future of Europe stands or falls is this: “Shall we live in slavery or in freedom?” That is the question – give your answer!

Go for it Hungary, go for it Hungarians!

(miniszterelnok.hu, Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister) Retrieved: 04.04.2019.
<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-by-prime-minister-viktororban-on-15-march>

13. Viktor Orbán's speech at the ceremonial swearing-in of new border hunters

Budapest, 7 March 2017

Ladies and Gentlemen, parents and family members,

We have gathered together here today to witness 462 compatriots taking an oath: in this they pledge to protect Hungary and Hungarian families – at risk of their own lives, if necessary. Protecting the homeland, our homes, women, children and parents is a moral imperative stretching back centuries. It is this imperative that adds to the gravity and sublimity of the current moment. Today you are not simply taking up a job, joining an office or just starting work. On this day you are entering into the service of our country and the Hungarian people, and by doing so you are answering a calling. You who are taking this oath should be proud of this. I ask you to feel proud, because your efforts and exemplary behaviour are a basic condition for the future peace of Hungary and Europe. You should also be proud that on this day you can join a battle-hardened community that stands its ground under the toughest of circumstances: the members of modern-day border-fort garrisons, the body of officers in Hungarian uniform, the police, the border guards – or “border hunters” – and members of the defence forces. These are people who today enable us Hungarians to live in peace and security.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

You have joined this service at a difficult time. Although the daily reports of people illegally crossing the borders no longer describe tens of thousands per day, but a few hundred, we cannot afford to sit back and relax. No one should be under any illusions: even now, as we speak, at this very moment, we are under siege. The migrant flow has not come to an end, but only slowed down. All that has happened is that, between two major attacks, we have gained time to reinforce our lines of defence, to recruit, train and deploy border guards. The storm has not yet passed, but has only subsided temporarily. In the next few years the intense pressure on the border will not come to an end. There are still millions preparing to set out in the hope of a better life: at this very moment, hundreds of thousands are considering setting out for Europe. We cannot rely on

Brussels and the European Union: on the contrary, they just make our work harder. The truth is that we can only rely on ourselves: we have to protect our borders ourselves.

The migration crisis, Ladies and Gentlemen, will continue until we eliminate its root causes. It will remain on the agenda until people everywhere realise that migration is the Trojan horse of terrorism. The people who seek to come here do not want to live according to our culture and customs, but according to their own – with European standards of living.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Honourable recruits,

I ask you to be both firm and humane: to enforce the law to the full, but also to follow the dictates of humanity. Today you are entering the service of the law, and the law applies equally to everyone – including migrants who seek to cross Hungary's border illegally. This is the reality, and no beautifully-worded human rights bombast can override it. The past few years have taught us that we can only withstand the pressure of migration if we show strength, unity and cohesion. So far we have succeeded in doing this. This has made Hungary is one of the safest countries in Europe today. If the world sees that we are able to protect our borders, if they see that the reinforced Hungarian border fence is impenetrable, if they see that we continue to insist on upholding our laws and do not waver for a second, no one will attempt to come to Hungary illegally. It is the Hungarian people's legitimate expectation that entry to the territory of our country should only be allowed to those whom we have thoroughly vetted, and whose identities, motives and intentions have been clarified.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We Hungarians do not want impossible things: on the contrary, what we want is very simple. We want a Hungary in which Hungarians are happy to start families because they know that their children will have a better life than they do. We want a Hungary in which everyone has jobs, and everyone earns the appreciation and reward they deserve on the basis of the work they do. We want a Hungary and a Europe in which being Hungarian is a source of pride and recognition – in which our traditions and history are respected, and in which our culture is also respected. We Hungarians want a Europe in which we can live our own Hungarian lives. In the Hungary that we want, security is the foremost concern. And one can only have a safe and secure life in a place where the laws and the interests of the country are defended by dedicated people in uniform who have sworn to do this task: people like you, who are brave, determined, well-prepared, ready to do their duty and to protect their country. You are now the defenders of both freedom for

Hungary's present and hope for Hungary's future. I ask you to be as proud of this as we are proud of you. I wish you courage and perseverance in your work, and I wish your families strength and good health.

God protect and preserve Hungary!

(Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister) Retrieved: 04.04.2019. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-ceremonial-swearing-inof-new-border-hunters>

14. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at a conference held in memory of Helmut Kohl

16 June 2018, Budapest

Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen, President Spengler, President Zoltán Balog,

I have agreed on a division of labour with Zoltán Balog: I will speak frankly and with no holds barred, while afterwards he will apologise to the audience for this.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

For my part I shall keep to the agreement. Nowadays Europe's vital signs show it to be in a state of feverish agitation. Many things are in motion at once: the warning signs of a trade war with the United States; armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia; a new form of politics in Italy on the horizon; Brexit negotiations. In other words, those who deal with European politics nowadays need composure, calm nerves, courage and a good sense of timing. As regards our meeting today, we are spoilt for choice. But we must not overcommit ourselves, because the invitation did not ask audience members to bring their own provisions for an extended stay. We simply have enough time to bow our heads in honour of the memory of Helmut Kohl, and after that to outline the Hungarian position on a few important European issues.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Honourable President Spengler,

In politics, providence is the right person in the right place at the right time. It is no exaggeration to say that Helmut Kohl was a gift from providence to Germany and Europe. For us Central Europeans, Helmut Kohl is the exemplar for the Christian European. He represented the Christian Europe to which we have always belonged, and after forty years of communism his political will paved the way for our return to the community of the peoples of Europe. Chancellor Kohl's political courage laid the foundations for the reunification of Germany and Europe, and therefore we will always remember him with respect and gratitude. May the earth rest lightly on him.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As regards the relationship of Hungary and European politics, we must first of all clarify what Hungary's role in European politics can be. Hungary is aware of its own strength, influence and mission. This is called self-knowledge. Well-founded self-knowledge is the basis and starting point for all good political action. As a Member State of the European Union, Hungary does not aspire to a European political role. For us Hungary comes first, and neither the country nor I have – or will have – any such ambition. Ten million citizens, a GDP of EUR 114 billion, fewer than twenty thousand soldiers: this is the reality. Our involvement in serious disputes on important issues with Brussels and some larger Member States has created the tempting illusion that Hungary can have a significant influence on European politics. This temptation must be resisted and, above all else, we must focus our efforts on defending Hungary's national interests. This is not altered by the fact that, as you will learn from a statement to be released this afternoon, a few minutes ago I had a telephone conversation with President Donald Trump, in which we discussed the difference between a “beautiful wall” and a “beautiful fence”.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In any case, the core of my message is that Hungary and the Hungarians are a people with self-respect and pride, but also sound self-knowledge and a realistic assessment of their situation. The area in which we have strong ambitions is Central Europe and the Visegrád Four. The Hungarian

ambition is to enable Hungary to live in a strong Central European region comprised of countries which cooperate closely, and which help and encourage one another. This is where the strength represented by Hungary has influence and importance. Hungary recognises Poland's determining and leading role in the Central European region, and through its own strength it seeks to guide Central European international relations towards cooperation. A further ambition of Hungary is to promote accession to the European Union of the countries in the Western Balkans – with particular emphasis on the future membership of Serbia. It is our ambition to convince the other Member States that the European Union needs this, and that it can gain new resources through further enlargement of the EU. Helmut Kohl had a precise understanding of the meaning of equality among the Member States of the European Union. Obviously this does not mean that they have equal influence. Here the key word is Augenhöhe. If I understand it correctly, it means something like “eye level” – or an equal footing – which, if translated in cultural terms, is appropriate for what I am thinking about. This may suit us, because the Hungarian mentality is one which sets things side by side – and in that respect we are perhaps unique in the whole of Europe.

Allow me to say a few words about relations between Germany and Hungary. Two years ago I went to the Chancellor Adenauer House in Rhöndorf, and saw the statues of Adenauer and de Gaulle. They are the work of Imre Varga, who also sculpted the statue of Saint Stephen of Hungary which stands outside the Chapel of Hungary at that proud cathedral of Christian Europe in Aachen. For Germans this is an understandable answer to the historical and ideological question of where Hungary belongs. Helmut Kohl understood that there is great value in Germany having friends; back then things were not particularly favourable in that department. Helmut Kohl also valued our friendship. Hungary has a memorial day to commemorate the deportation of ethnic Germans in Hungary. In Hungary Germans have a Member of Parliament in their own right. There are thirteen national and ethnic minorities living in Hungary, and this represents both ethnic diversity and civilisational and cultural homogeneity. The number of German schools and of their students is also rising.

If we speak about German-Hungarian relations, we should also remember 1989. Kohl understood the integral link between Hungarian sovereignty and German unity. Hungary knocked the first

brick out of the Berlin Wall. In 1989 many people wanted to talk us out of opening the border.

In 1989 many people wanted to talk Helmut Kohl out of German unification, and a unified Germany's membership of NATO. Hungary did not fear German reunification, but there were few nations – if any – which thought like us. In 1990 support for German reunification was higher in Hungary than in Germany itself. Today I see European politicians who back then opposed German unification, but who today want to lecture us on how to be good Europeans. And then Hungary became a member of the European Union. We are grateful to Germany for this.

I should also point out at this event that German taxpayers have nothing to worry about: we have not come into the European Union to beg, and we do not want to live off German money. We are preparing for a situation in which, by 2030, Hungary will be a net contributor to the European Union budget. Furthermore, Germany's combined trade with the V4 countries is now significantly higher than its trade with, for example, France, Italy or Britain. The Germans and the other Member States are profiting nicely from us. Neither they nor we have reason to complain.

Furthermore, an important element in German-Hungarian relations is that we are exclusively using our own resources to defend our southern border – and thereby Germany – from the arrival of some twelve thousand migrants per day. We have not let down either Germany or Europe. As we have said, we are the captains of border fortresses, and we know our duty. The lesson of German-Hungarian relations was the same in 1989 as it was in 2015: when the moment arrives one must not hesitate, but one must decide and take action; we must nail our colours to the mast. This is exactly what we did in 1989, and also in 2015.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Now for the border and the fence. We must defend the external border: this is the precondition for free movement in the interior. Defence of the border is a “compulsory homework task”: border defence is not a Europe-wide task, but a national task for Member States. There can be

European assistance, but the responsibility is a national one. We have seen that Hungary's position, which was previously condemned, is now gaining increasing acceptance. We do not expect thanks, and we are not used to that. Neither will we gloat. It brings no pleasure to see that there are those for whom the penny has only dropped after three years, when for us it did so immediately.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Can there be compromise in the migrant debate? No – and there is no need for it. There are those who imagine that each opposing side should make concessions, that they should reach out to each other and shake hands. This is a bad approach. There are questions on which there will never be agreement. That will not happen, and it is not necessary for it to happen. Immigration is one such question. There is no document that we are aware of which states that if you enter the European Union you must become an immigrant country. When we entered we made no such commitment. It is also true that the founding documents of the European Union do not declare that a Member State may not seek to transform itself into an immigrant country. This is why there are immigrant countries in the EU, where migrants are welcomed, where people want to mix with them, and where people want to integrate them. And there are countries which do not want migrants, which do not want to mix with them, and where their integration is therefore out of the question. In such situations there is a need not for compromise, but for tolerance. We tolerate the fact that some Member States in the Schengen Area admit migrants. This has and will have consequences – including for us. Meanwhile they should tolerate the fact that we do not wish to do so. They shouldn't lecture us, they shouldn't blackmail us, they shouldn't coerce us, but they should just give us the respect that is due to Member States; and then there will be peace on the Mount of Olives.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Similarly – in addition to immigration – there is a need not for compromise and agreement, but for tolerance and respect on some other issues: the concept of the nation; the basic principles of family policy; the regulation of marriage; and social integration. These issues fall within the

sphere of competence of Member States, and underlying the lack of agreement on them are cultural specificities and historical roots. Therefore it is pointless to repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempt to convince one another on questions about which we do not need to jointly decide.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would now like to say a few words about Europe's failures in the past five years. It has been a long time since the European Union had five years as unsuccessful as these past five years have been. Three grave errors weigh upon the conscience of Brussels: firstly, we have lost the United Kingdom; secondly, we have been unable to defend our continent against migrants; and thirdly, Brussels has upset the balance between East and West. The responsibility of the current European leadership is as clear as day. With the election of Jean-Claude Juncker – which the British opposed, steadfastly and to the last – we placed dynamite under the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union. With the exception of Hungary, everyone ignored the opposition of the British. So we have no reason to be surprised that the spark of migration lit the fuse, and the dynamite exploded.

Of course, it is also true that in the past five years there have also been positive results – even if they have been outweighed by our failures. Juncker's economic stimulus program, for example, has really helped some Member States. It is also an achievement that, even at a time of failures, Brussels has been able to maintain the functioning of the EU. It is true that we have an ambitious digital strategy, and we have also taken important steps towards joint defence. In times of peace this achievement could justify loud acclaim. Recent years have not been years of peace, however – because we have lost Britain, because we have failed to defend ourselves against the migrant invasion, and because Brussels has opened up a conflict between the eastern and western halves of the EU. This is what I would now like to say a few words about.

Everyone can see that there is a metaphorical fault line between East and West. The tributes paid to Fidel Castro by the Commission and our joint president caused some awkwardness. We put up with them. But the eulogies for Marx stuck in our throats, and made our blood boil, because for

us this is incomprehensible. Marx promulgated the abolition of private property; he promulgated the dissolution of nations; he promulgated the abolition of the family model which has been in existence for a thousand years; he promulgated the abolition of the church and of faith; and, finally, he created modern anti-Semitism, when he branded Jews as the quintessence of a doomed capitalism. How can this be praiseworthy? Who has lost their mind? What is certain is that someone has lost their mind – either they have, or we have. But we would have somehow bridged even this metaphorical East-West fault line. What has proved to be unbridgeable is that in practical disputes centred on competitiveness, the Commission exclusively represents the interests of the Western countries. In our experience, when the Western countries have some natural competitive advantage – as for example in the free flow of money and capital – Brussels fights tooth and nail to protect it, in the name of the market. I think it is right to do so. In those areas, however, in which the Eastern countries have a relatively strong competitive position – as in labour and services – Brussels immediately cries foul, declaring it to be dumping, and forces corrective measures on us; suddenly the market is a secondary consideration. This is costing us a great deal, and it is completely unfair.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Helmut Kohl was also the president of his own party, and so in a speech delivered in his memory it is perhaps appropriate to speak about relations between Hungary's governing parties and the European People's Party. Despite the mistakes made by leaders of the European People's Party at our expense, we have decided to continue standing with this European family of parties. In relation to the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, it would be easy to, say, establish a new formation from like-minded Central European parties – or, indeed, a pan-European anti-immigration formation. There is no doubt that we would have great success in the 2019 European elections. But I suggest that we resist this temptation, and stand by Helmut Kohl's ideals and party family. Instead of desertion, we should take on the more difficult task of renewing the European People's Party, and helping it to find its way back to its Christian democratic roots. The European People's Party is the most successful party in the history of the European community. At the beginning of the 2000s, at Helmut Kohl's invitation, the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union joined this great community, and over the course of two decades it has become one of its

strongest and most successful parties. The European People's Party has managed to achieve its outstanding European results by being a party of winners, right from the beginning. We laid the foundations for our successes not in Brussels, but within our nations. Both in home countries and in the EU, the People's Party has done the job that is fundamental for a party – indeed for every party: it has represented the people's will in the decision-making political institutions, and therefore has solid foundations on which to claim the right to mark out the directions of European integration. Our rigid left-wing and liberal political rivals have lost themselves in ideologies and have become slaves to unrealistic doctrines formulated at writing desks. For decades our popular support has been far greater than that of other formations because, in contrast to those rivals, we have always stood with both feet on the ground, have understood the people, have gained thorough knowledge of our own countries, and have always paid attention to what the citizens of Europe want. We have indeed represented them.

Even though today it remains the continent's largest party, over the past fifteen years the European People's Party has been slowly but steadily losing strength and influence. The most important development – and a number of elections in recent years testify to this – is that, step by step, our parties' influence with our voters has decreased. The response to this situation from the leadership of the People's Party has been a bad one: it has created an anti-populist people's front. Germany is a good example of this, but it is also true in the European Parliament. This anti-populist people's front seeks to oppose the emerging new parties by uniting all the traditional forces: from the communists, through the greens, social democrats and liberals, all the way to the Christian democrats. We believe that this is a mistake. It is a mistake because, firstly, it throws a lifeline to a rapidly weakening Left. Secondly, it is a mistake because of its bipolar political dynamic: instead of weakening the forces we want to defeat, it will in fact strengthen them, as the only alternative to the ruling elite.

While the leadership of the European People's Party has given a bad response, successful national models have also been formed. The other model which has been successfully tested in Austria and Hungary is taking up the challenge, is not creating such a people's front, is taking the issues raised by new parties seriously and is giving responsible answers to them. It is doing so without embracing the Left – which seeks to pull us in the wrong political direction and leech off

us.

The only reason our diminishing strength is not more spectacular, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that our conventional rivals are diminishing even faster than we are. This is cold comfort, however. Our left-wing and liberal opponents want to lock us in an intellectual cage; they want to tell us – from left to right – what to do and what to think; they want to dictate what we can and cannot talk about, and who we can and cannot ally with. Most recently they have even wanted to tell us, from left to right, who can and cannot be a member of the European People's Party. This is nothing short of absurd. For us, the countries that have experienced communism, this brings back bad memories. This is eerily reminiscent of the salami tactics employed across the whole of Central Europe in the middle of the last century by communists – supported by the Soviet Union and global geopolitical deals – in order to gradually eliminate civic parties.

We are undoubtedly the CSU of the European People's Party, constituting the right-wing, Christian democratic platform of the European People's Party. We believe that the time has come for a Christian democratic renaissance, not an anti-populist people's front. Unlike liberal politics, Christian politics is able to protect people, our nations, families, our culture rooted in Christianity, and equality between men and women: in other words, our European way of life.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

After speaking about party affairs, let me say a few words about the future of the EU. The European Union is still rich, but now it is weak. It will further weaken with Brexit, while our external competitors will strengthen. We can have no goal other than a strong European Union; but a strong EU needs strong Member States. In the economy individual responsibility cannot continue to be vaporised, and it cannot be dissolved into some magical process of community formation. This is a precondition for a strong Europe: first of all, everyone must keep their own house in order, because only a strong Member State can hasten to the help of another which finds itself in trouble through no fault of its own. I would like to remind everyone that we were the first to find ourselves in the financial safety net. But, back in 2013, we were also the first to repay the financial assistance we received – to the last cent. We believe in Mr. Schäuble's concept that

major structural reforms can be carried out against the background of fiscal discipline. We know that this is possible because we have tried it, and we have been successful.

The future of the European Union depends on whether it is able to defend its external borders. This is the next question facing the future of the EU. If we defend our borders, the debate on the distribution of migrants becomes meaningless, as they won't be able to enter. If they're unable to enter, there is no one to distribute. This is a commonsense concept. And if we follow this course of action, the only question is what we should do with those who have already entered. Our answer to this question is that they should not be distributed, but should be taken back home.

And, finally, defence is also one of the main issues for the future of Europe. On this we must speak clearly: those who are unable to protect themselves with their own resources will always be at the mercy of others – even in peacetime, though then not so conspicuously. This means that, to be able to defend itself, Europe needs its own defence force. The good news is that we have made progress in this direction – albeit slowly, and perhaps more slowly than we should.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The European Union's greatest weakness is a lack of internal trust. I'd now like to say a few words about this. The Commission committed a cardinal error when it announced that it would no longer continue in its old neutral role, but would instead become a political commission. The very term is ominous. We also committed a cardinal error in not speaking out against this, and simply tolerating it. Today the situation is that the Commission is an instrument which the large states use against the smaller ones. What else could the role of a political body be? In such a situation political reality must be given due weight. This is why the Commission not only fails to protect us against the overwhelming force we're facing, but it bends the rules in favour of the large states, leads the way in the stealthy – and therefore unlawful – alteration of powers, and the Commission uses its instruments for the purpose of blackmail. Although the comparison is slightly problematic in terms of the time dimension, I could say that it is turning into Moscow. In 2019 this must be brought to an end. This Commission must go, and we will need a Commission and a Parliament that reflects the new European realities.

And so we come to the issue of the new European budget, which has just been submitted for debate. Ladies and Gentlemen, this budget is exactly like the European Commission itself: pro-immigration and pro-migrant. The essence – or, if you like, the novelty – of this budget is that it takes money from European people and gives it to migrants and NGOs. It is as if George Soros wrote it – and perhaps he did. The Italians have finally declared something that we all know: that the NGOs are in fact white-collar people smugglers. The Commission’s budget seeks to finance them, meaning that it seeks to support the coalition of white-collar and blue-collar people smugglers. This is what the Italians have stated.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

If physical weakness has a spiritual cause, as is the case with EU, then treatment must begin not with the body, but with the spirit. I am convinced that the European Union has lost its former exemplary problem-solving ability because it has surrendered its own past, and has thereby discarded its decades of experience in governance. It has developed amnesia. This is what we have learnt from the writings of József Szájer. According to the EU’s current official ideology, peace, progress and cooperation in Europe began with the establishment of the European community. What preceded it was petty, fragmented, nation-state and religious rivalry which was fuelled by national and sectarian impulses, and which led to bloody wars – and finally to the Holocaust itself. Therefore, the Brussels logic runs, to rely on that older practice for guidance is not only unrealistic: if you do so, you act in direct contravention of the new Europe’s neutral fundamental values; to do so is exclusionary, harmful and outright criminal. Thus Europe has donned a spiritual straitjacket, and has cast aside the lessons from hundreds – or even thousands – of years of governance. We must first free ourselves from this spiritual straitjacket, because it is not only causing us spiritual problems, but also practical political problems. In something else written by József Szájer I read that those who surrender, who discard their past – or who allow their past to be taken away from them – should not be surprised if, when they seek to solve the new problems they face, they discover that they have also lost their compass. This is how it has been possible for highly-regarded statesmen to recently make assertions that can be easily refuted with a minimal knowledge of history; one such assertion being that maritime borders cannot be

defended. Over the past few years the arguments they have raked together about borders, walls and fences are contradicted by the experience of humankind stretching back thousands of years. Borders, after all, are fundamental aspects of life: without borders, existence is impossible. Something which has no borders, no contours, does not exist. And if sea borders cannot be defended, how on earth can countries with sea coasts even exist? It is obvious that what was lacking was not the possibility for defence, but the will; and this has been proved by the most recent actions of the Italian government.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

When we speak about the potential renaissance of Christian democrats and Christian democracy, for me the dominant thought is one which the Germans received in a radio message transmitted from America some time around 1945. It went like this: “Christianity is the background against which all our thoughts derive meaning. Not every European need believe in the truth of Christian faith; yet anything they say, make or do will derive its meaning from the Christian heritage.”

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today the liberal order is collapsing because it has become clear that its ideals are based not on life, not on reality and not on history, but on artificial constructs which simply cannot accommodate concepts which they see as irrational configurations, but which have shaped and determined Europe and the lives of Europeans for two thousand years: concepts such as faith, nation, community and family.

And finally I must say a few words about federalist aspirations – for which the latest pseudonym is the “rule of law mechanism”. The European Commission – but here we can include the European Parliament – is continuously dissatisfied with its own room for manoeuvre, and it seeks to expand into ever more areas. An object lesson in this is the so-called rule of law mechanism, an in-depth analysis of which is once again provided by József Szájer. In this he points out that this mechanism has hardly any legal foundations – at least not in the founding treaties of the European Union. The essence of the trick is simply this: citing the fact that certain national authorities and regulatory bodies to an extent also apply EU law, the EU demands a say in how

individual national legal systems operate, what supervisory mechanisms they should have, and how the individual Member States should organise their own legislative practice. This is why we say that the rule of law mechanism is merely a code name for the federalist aspiration, seeking to put pressure on reluctant governments.

In conclusion, perhaps I should address the question of what Hungary can contribute to common European politics. With all due modesty, we can offer the following list. First of all, we can present a good example in the field of economic reform. When necessary we can offer assistance in transporting migrants back home. For a long time we have been saying that we should export help, not import problems. We can also give advice to anyone who requests it. There is one unsolicited piece of advice we can also give, because in this Hungary has historical experience: everyone should be wary of the idea of Islam being part of any European country. It is as well to know the reply of Islam. We Hungarians know what it is. If Islam is part of Germany, for instance, in Muslim terms this means that Germany is part of Islam. This is something that is worth pondering. In addition to offering an example, assistance and advice, we must also point out – gently but clearly – that we shall not give up in the future either, and we shall not allow anyone to force anything on us against our will. If we are unable to reach a satisfactory result in negotiations, if now we are unable to accept – or even tolerate – one another’s views on the issues of migration and the budget, then let us wait. Let us wait for the European people to express their will in the 2019 elections to the European Parliament. Then what must be shall be.

Thank you for your attention.

(Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister) Retrieved: 04.042019. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-a-conference-held-in-memory-of-helmut-kohl>