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American Conservatism, the Culture Wars, and the Puritan Legacy

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Master's Thesis

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Abstract

The topic, *American Conservatism, Culture Wars, and the Puritan Legacy*, I believe, serves as an overarching concept of American history from the time of the first settlers to the last quarter of the twentieth century. Rather than focusing on a certain phenomenon or a period of time and questions like *How* and *When*, the topic focuses on ideas as effective forces in American history, and on answering the question *Why*.

The United States is a country of constant making. Generations of many tribes and races reached for their share of the American dream and sought to attain their place in society. But the puritans were the first in the long line of immigrants. Puritans set the moral and political foundations of the new country based on their religious beliefs. Protestantism was the first source of ideas and moral guidance. Attitudes that were not comforting to it, were deemed un-American. Protestantism was not only instrumental in the early formation of the American settlement, but it also became an intellectual and normative context of the United States.

This thesis examines the influence of the Puritan legacy in American culture and how it evolved over time. It began with the puritan narrative of chosen people who arrived in the New World to save the Protestant Reformation. While crossing the wild ocean, they decided that their community will be a city upon a hill, a role model for the rest of the world. Every storm beneath this beacon offered another twist of Puritanism, made its way into American culture, and subsequently to politics. The challenges most often sprang from within. From the First Great Awakening to the twentieth century Culture Wars, Puritanism evolved to Americanism, and the evangelical, born again brand of Protestantism played a major part in this process. The Puritan legacy became the pillar of the American culture. Yet, the United States is a country of constant

making with multicultural, multiethnic, and multiracial society. Different views of virtue often clashed and resulted in Culture wars and in this work, I look at some examples.

Puritans had fled the Old World to redeem the Protestant reformation. The city upon a hill relied on a proper domestic order as described by John Winthrop. But the protestant work ethic offered upward mobility and by the passing time, evolved to the appealing idea of the self-made man. The covenants set precedents for government reflected later in the Constitution. American character became rooted in puritans' morality, civic-mindedness, and protestant work ethic.

In the New World there were no bishops, and enemies to push aside. Religious purity came to be signified by the search for more personal religious experience. The first such episode occurred in Boston with Anne Hutchinson and the antinomians, but the puritan clergy quickly offered to the case a gender twist, thus setting the prototype of the contemporary culture wars. Not until the time of the Great Awakening of the eighteenth century did the enthusiasts win general major victories outside the confines of a single colony.

The First Great Awakening was the first all-American experience. It set the precedent on American shores for the repeated waves of evangelicalism. The more Americans were moving westward, the more evangelical they became. Evangelicals rejected modernism, secularism, and the loose interpretations of the Bible. They perceived the Bible as the highest religious authority and the ultimate source of truth. Their quest for personal religious experience set the base of a profoundly liberal society.

World War I intensified concerns of foreign "isms" and foreigners in general. This period of time coincided with the transition of America from rural to urban culture. Combined these anxieties led to the Culture wars of the 1920s, and reached its peaks in the fight for prohibition,

Scopes Trial, and the 1928 presidential elections. The teaching of Charles Darwin and his theory of evolution at schools came to symbolize everything that was going wrong in this land peopled from the beginning in the words of William Jennings Bryan "not by men and women", but rather "believers and heretics." Anti-intellectualism was not a twentieth century phenomenon, as it can be also traced back to Puritans and the First Great Awakening, but it became another recurring feature of American conservatism.

Protestant work ethic combined with the abundance of the New World led to unabashed individualism. For the generations to come, this combination was appealing as it led to the idea of the self-made man, the basis of the American dream. Moreover, Republicanism conceived the government as a protector, not as a provider. When the New Deal established the welfare state, many Americans saw that as a violation of some of their "unalienable rights," which resulted in a conservative backlash. Christian and Corporate America together started their crusade against the New Deal.

Puritans blamed the individuals that by not working on their sins, they impoverish themselves and their community. The Social Gospel blamed the community for pushing people into corners and saw their sins as a result of poverty - a fair point of view in a country of constant making where the newly arrived immigrants and the African-Americans faced prejudices and historical disadvantages. The Social Gospel reached its tide during the 1960s. The social movements of the decade had a strong cultural influence and helped America to evolve toward a more inclusive society. But in the political realm, the conservative backlash in which Protestant evangelicals played a major role, led to the election of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Progressives were put on the defensive and conservatives celebrated "Morning in America." Once again, Americans turned to the traditional values that had made their nation exceptional.

Contents

Introduction

The United States is a nation, drawn from many tribes and races. But the Puritans were the first in the long line of immigrants. They set the moral and political foundations of the new country based on their religious beliefs. Protestantism was not only instrumental in the early formation of the American settlement, but it also became an intellectual and normative context of the United States. The American character became rooted in Puritans' morality, civic-mindedness, and protestant work ethic. Moral dreams defined the nation's ideals and inspired crusades in the United States and abroad. Religious attitudes continue to influence the nature of America's historical identity and social purpose.

This thesis examines the influence of the Puritan legacy in American culture and how it evolved over time. It began with the puritan narrative of chosen people who arrived in the New World to save the Protestant Reformation. While crossing the wild ocean, they decided that their community will be a city upon a hill, a role model for the rest of the world. Every storm beneath this beacon offered another twist of Puritanism, made its way into American culture, and subsequently to politics. The challenges most often sprang from within. From the First Great Awakening to the twentieth century Culture Wars, Puritanism evolved to Americanism, and the evangelical, born again brand of Protestantism played a major part in this process. The Puritan legacy became the pillar of the American culture. Yet, the United States is a country of constant making with multicultural, multiethnic, and multiracial society. Different views of virtue often clashed and resulted in Culture wars and in this work, I look at some examples.

No other era challenged the core American values quite like the 1960s. Longstanding ideas about national identity, gender relations, the nuclear family were severally challenged. These challenges in return triggered a conservative backlash, which gained political momentum during the 1970s. It helped create a new political coalition in which conservative evangelical Protestants played a major role, and it helped elect Ronald Reagan president in 1980. I will explore some of the longstanding values that the rising conservative movement drew upon to get an upper hand in the Culture Wars of the 1980s. I argue that some of those values are a part of the country's Puritan heritage and that this heritage is still relevant for how many Americans, think about themselves and their national identity.

Theory and Method

This thesis is based on primary and secondary sources – scholarly and newspaper articles, dissertations, books, and book reviews. Since the main concern of this work is to demonstrate the influence of the puritan heritage in terms of ideas, and how it evolved over time, the chronological order was the logical, and clearer choice to fulfill the task. Moreover:

> [I]ntellectual history is a branch of history, one variety of a species, sharing the general characteristics that distinguish historical knowledge. As such, it has an overriding concern with how and why particular human experiences have followed one another through time. However much analysis or evaluation an historian undertakes, movement and continuity are his organizing principles, and his competence is limited to a definite span of time.[2]

[2] Higham, John. "American Intellectual History: A Critical Appraisal." *American Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (1961): 219-233, 220.

John Higham further explains that for the intellectual historian the states of mind make up the foreground of interest and the focus of curiosity. "[I]ntellectual history meant an attempt to trace the development of the inner life of an age or of a people and thereby exhibit the spirit informing its formal philosophies and its practical achievements. This spirit could be discovered by examining a variety of articulate representatives and determining their distinctive "mental habits" or their common "cast of mind."'[3]

Much of the American culture builds on a Puritan legacy. Alexis de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat who traveled (1831-32) to study Democracy in America, famously proclaimed: "I see the destiny of America embodied in the first Puritan who landed on those shores."[4] Americans have inherited the Puritan legacy by promoting the idea of religious freedom, by being a "city upon a hill", a stronghold for democracy, by having a distinct sense of morality and work ethic, and much more.

The Puritan Legacy in Historiography

The founders of New England, filled with a sense of their historic mission, were writing the history of their settlement even before they set foot in the New World. "Theirs was to be a New Canaan as well as a New England, and they were sure the world would one day wish to know how they had preserved the light of the gospel for posterity."[5] Since then, "[t]he lives of the men and women who settled New England have been traced in more detail, the laws they made, the diaries they kept, the letters they wrote, the sermons they preached have been subjected to closer analysis

[3] Ibid., 221.
[4] De Tocqueville, Alexis and Henry Reeve. *Democracy in America: Volumes I & II*. Auckland: The Floating Press, 2009, 534.

[5] Morgan, Edmund S. "The Historians of Early New England." In *The Reinterpretation of Early American History*, edited by Ray Allen Billington. San Marino, California: The Huntington Library, 1966, 41–63, 42.

than the words on any other group of Americans."[6] And yet, in spite of many schools of past and present scrutiny, or because of it, no stable image of the nature of Puritanism or its American settlement has emerged.

The first substantive criticism of American Puritanism came in the 1920s and 1930s with the so-called progressive school. In 1921 James Truslow Adams declared in *The Founding of New England* that "the primary motivation of the lay Puritan in coming to the New World was economic and political, the opportunity to do what one wished for oneself; ... religion was at best a secondary consideration." In his *Main Currents in American Thought,* Vernon Parrington "celebrated the triumph of American "democratic liberalism" over Puritanism's clerical tyranny and capitalistic fervor." For Parrington religious ideas assumed value only insofar as they fostered progressive political liberalism. The progressive school found a popularizer in H. L. Mencken, whose articles "lampooned Puritan intelligence, charity, sexuality, and piety."[7] As Perry Miller put it: "In the mood of revolt against the ideals of previous generations Puritanism has become a shining target for many sorts of marksmen."[8]

One way in which Puritanism lives on in American culture is the Protestant ethic. In 1904-05 German sociologist Max Weber published two articles that would become, in English translation, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* According to Weber, the Calvinistic dogma of predestination imposed enormous psychological anxiety upon the believer. Uncertain of one's eternal fate, the believer sought earthly signs of God's election. Material prosperity was interpreted as a sign of salvation. With the prospect of validating one's salvation, and the

[6] Ibid, 41.
[7] Anker, R. M. The American Puritans and the historians. *Reformed Review*, *39*, no.3 (1986): 161-173, 162. Retrieved from https://repository.westernsem.edu/pkp/index.php/rr/article/view/1035
[8] Miller, Perry. "The Puritan Way of Life." In *Puritanism in Early America*, edited by George M. Waller, Seconded. Lexington, Massachusetts Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973, 35–54, 36.

Calvinistic notion of a worldly calling as "the first premise of Puritanism" serving as justification, the Puritans threw themselves into the pursuit of wealth. This religious mindset in turn fostered a new efficiency in the marketplace and initiated the modern world. Although, Max Weber saw the modern capitalism as an "unforeseen consequence" of the Reformation in general, and the Calvinist dogma of predestination, in particular, in their search for salvation,[9] his work "gelled with the mood of the progressive historians became a major intellectual cliche...of a selfish work ethic and a mercenary religious sect."[10]

Intellectual historians questioned progressive school historical method and philosophic basis for judgment. Its first major critic Samuel Eliot Morison, himself a descendant of the Puritans, in *Builders of the Bay Colony* (1930), consciously set out to challenge the facts and conjectures of Adams' groundbreaking study. "[H]e gave Puritans the benefit of a doubt and supposed that their rhetoric did in fact approximate their actual motives and circumstances." "[Morison's] success lay not only in making the dread Puritans into plausible human beings but into stalwart brave souls who struggled morally and philosophically to tame a wilderness and to live and make sense of a commitment."[11]

Puritans found their most cogent and prolific defender in Perry Miller, who devoted his scholarly career to studying the ideas expressed in writings of the leaders, both civil and church, in Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut. "With exhaustive thoroughness, intellectual complexity, and literary passion, Miller undertook a decades-long foray into the Puritan mind and spirit, thereby initiating the current momentum of historical curiosity."[12]

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[9] Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* London and New York: Routledge, 1992, 89.

[10] Anker, R. M. The American Puritans and the historians. *Reformed Review*, *39*, no.3 (1986): 161-173, 163. Retrieved from https://repository.westernsem.edu/pkp/index.php/rr/article/view/1035

[11] Ibid., 163.

[12] Ibid., p. 163

According to Miller, "Puritanism may perhaps best be described as that point of view, that philosophy of life, that code of values, which was carried to New England by the first settlers in the early seventeenth century... Any inventory of the elements that have gone into the making of the "American mind" would have to commence with Puritanism."[13] For Miller, Puritanism is by no means the only relevant tradition in American culture, but certainly "the most conspicuous, the most sustained, and the most fecund." "Without some understanding of Puritanism," he continued "it may safely be said, there is no understanding of America."[14]

During the seventeenth century, Puritan theology brought to New England remarkably uniform and orthodox. *The New England Mind: the Seventeenth Century* (1939) was the first of a projected series of volumes that were to carry the intellectual history of New England into the nineteenth century. Miller dedicated this first volume to the "architecture of the intellect brought to America by the founders of New England." In the second volume, *From Colony to Province*, Miller examined how this intellect accommodated itself to an American setting: "While the massive structure of logic, psychology, theology stands apparently untouched, the furnishings of the palace are little by little changed, until a hundred years after the Great Migration the New England mind has become strangely altered, even though the process (which, all things considered, was rapid) was hardly perceptible to the actors themselves."[15] American Protestantism was molded by circumstances and local influences "and yet was constantly diverted or stimulated by the influx of ideas from Europe." "What I should most like to claim for this study" continue Miller "is that it amounts to a sort of working model for American history."[16]

[13] Miller, Perry. "The Puritan Way of Life." In *Puritanism in Early America*, edited by George M. Waller, Seconded. Lexington, Massachusetts Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973, 35–54, 35.
[14] Ibid., 36.
[15] Miller, Perry. *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province*. London: Harvard University Press, 1983, vii.

[16] Ibid., viii.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the ideas brought to America by the founders of New England proved to be anything but static. Two distinct schools of thought, almost unalterably opposed to each other, had proceeded from the Puritan philosophy. "Certain elements were carried into the creeds and practices of the evangelical religious revivals, but others were perpetuated by the rationalists and the forerunners of Unitarianism." In America, Puritanism "became several things."[17]

In his 2003 book, *Hellfire Nation*, James Morone argues that American liberalism is tangled up in the search for God. "The nation develops not from religious to secular but from revival to revival. (3) The Puritan search for God organized all pre-liberal institutions; piety drove them toward their modern forms."[18]

Before Puritans had been in America for a decade, rebels like Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson shook up that establishment by demanding a more intense religious experience. Williams separated church and state, to protect the church from worldly corruption. Anne Hutchinson scorched colonial leaders over something vaguely like the right of conscience. A century later, a fiery religious revival in the meetinghouses reorganized colonial politics and primed the colonists to challenge authority – even to defy the crown. "With time, Puritan religious forms and righteous fervor drained away, leaving the foundations of a profoundly liberal society. The result – liberal individualism – is both cheered and deplored. But, good or bad, it is said to drive off almost every other political possibility; liberalism seems to tower over American politics,

[17] Miller, Perry. "The Puritan Way of Life." In *Puritanism in Early America*, edited by George M. Waller, Seconded. Lexington, Massachusetts Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973, 35–54, 37.

[18] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 32.

culture, and institutions."[19] The Christian influence went to the fundamental issue of individual religious liberty, the ground for all other liberties.

In the line of development from Puritanism to frontier revivalism and evangelicalism, "the original doctrines were transformed or twisted into the new versions of Protestantism that spawned in the Great Awakening of the 1740s, in the succeeding revivals along the frontier and through the back country..."[20] American Protestantism was molded by circumstances, but for Puritans, and subsequently to evangelicals, something remain immutable: the norm of absolute moral stand, the truth "had been written down once and for all in a definitive, immutable, complete volume, and the covers closed to any further additions..."[21] American evangelicals three centuries later continue to draw on Puritans' rigorous moral standards, their emphasis on Scripture, and their demand for a conversion experience.

Historians have traced certain cultural aspects of the American mind back to Puritan-Protestant tradition. In his 1963 book, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life*, Richard Hofstadter argues that "With the Awakenings, the Puritan age in American religion came to an end and the evangelical age began."[22] The learned Puritan clergy gave way to preachers who could speak to laymen's emotions rather than the mind. The awakeners quickened the American anti-intellectualism. "A society suspicious of a learned or professional clergy would be disposed to repudiate or deprive its intellectual class, whether religious or secular."[23]

Since Alexis de Tocqueville who traveled the United States in the 1800s and marveled at the many aspects of American culture that struck him as exceptional, among these Americans'

[19] Ibid., 32.
[20] Miller, Perry. "The Puritan Way of Life." In *Puritanism in Early America*, edited by George M. Waller, Seconded. Lexington, Massachusetts Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973, 35–54, 38.
[21] Ibid., p. 49.
[22] Hofstadter, Richard. *Anti-intellectualism in American Life.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, 74.
[23] Ibid., 47.

religious devotion, individualism, and dedication to hard work, many scholars have traced them to the founding Puritan-Protestant communities. These aspects of American exceptionalism still hold true today. "Protestant beliefs can and does appear to occur even among individuals who explicitly reject traditional values, and therefore extends even to Americans with no explicit religious beliefs or affiliations."[24]

Thesis outline

Following the introduction there is a general presentation of morality as a concept in American life, as a distinctive characteristic of the American mind, and the most influential Puritan legacy in the American culture. The Puritan-Protestant settlers and their spiritual descendants set the tone of American culture for centuries to come. "Although further waves of immigration and myriad other events and influences have likewise shaped U.S. culture, the legacy of the Puritan-Protestant founding remains evident today."[25]

Chapter one examines the Puritan legacy – the puritan foundations of morality politics; the case of Antinomians, as a prototype of the contemporary culture wars; the first mass evangelical revival – the Great Awakening, which also exemplifies the first episode of anti-intellectualism in American life; and the protestant work ethic as the base of individualism, and the ground on which in the last quarter of the 20th century conservatives opposed welfare programs.

The Puritan-Protestant tradition has had an indelible influence on the values and ideals of the United States. "Before the Civil War, Puritanism remained the country's dominant spiritual influence... Americans thought of Puritan Christianity as the main source of the country's values

[24] Uhlmann, Eric Luis and Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks. "The Implicit Legacy of American Protestantism." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 45, no. 6 (2014): 992-1006, 993.
[25] Uhlmann, Eric Luis and Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks. "The Implicit Legacy of American Protestantism." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 45, no. 6 (2014): 992-1006, 994.

and outlook."[26] And then anxieties rose - at first, they were related to freedmen and racial intermixing, and by the turn of the twentieth century, they were related to immigrants (mainly Catholics) as well. Puritans, and generations of Neo-Puritans, "studied minutely every phrase of the Scriptures and extracted from it the last ounce of meaning, to that each one of Ten Commandments meant volumes of prohibitions and injunctions to them."[27] Those prohibitions were to the most part an effort of the virtual Puritan American "us" to discipline the threatening un-American "them."

Chapter two examines the Victorian era for two reasons – first, in an attempt to demonstrate how neo-puritans led by their anxieties of new forces in American culture, created civil groups who lobbied Congress and put their ideas into effect through legislation. The prohibitions related to "Comstockery" were just the beginning of a phenomenon that reached its climax in the real Prohibition, the ban of alcohol. The latter is not the subject of this work in its full range due to the limits, but it '"was the great Protestant crusade of the twentieth century - the last grand concert of the old moral order,"'[28] a triumph of neo-puritans and politics of righteousness. The Victorian perceptions of virtue, especially to the part related to the family - with a man as a breadwinner and wife as a homemaker, is the second concern of this chapter. Neoconservatives of the last quarter of the twentieth century often turned to this role model in their opposition to feminism, for example.

Chapter three is devoted to the fight for Prohibition as a reflection of the culture wars of the 1920s between the city and the country, which reached its climax in the 1928 presidential

[26] Gelernter, David Hillel. *Americanism: the Fourth Great Western Religion*. New York: Doubleday, 2007, 153.

[27] Morgan, Edmund S. *The Puritan Family: Religion & Domestic Relations in Seventeenth-Century New England*. New York, NY: HarperPerennial, 1966, 11.

[28] McKenna, George. *The Puritan Origins of American Patriotism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, 220.

campaign. Alfred Smith personified the hope of talented immigrants for upward mobility through politics as one way available to them, but his defeat in the presidential elections demonstrated how resilient rural America was, how unwilling to accept foreign-born catholic in the White House. Protestant rural America regarded with suspicion "foreign" ideas and the cities as their hub. These cultural anxieties resulted in the passing of the National Origins Act of 1924, and in the Scopes trial. The latter was an attempt for conservative protestant evangelicals to fight the forces of secularism, but they were making their way into American culture. Conservative protestant evangelicals had to roll back until about fifty years later when again, they set the Bible as the ultimate source of truth against forces of secularism and relativism.

Chapter four examines Christian libertarianism and its opposition to the New Deal's welfare state. Christian libertarians held that religious and economic freedom were two sides of the same coin. They considered the Ten Commandments as the most individualistic charter of all times. Christian libertarians asserted for example that "the Eighth Commandment, 'Thou shalt not steal,' "was the religious justification of the private enterprise system, as understood by the nation's founders, that conceived, "the system of freedom that made America great!"'[29] In their opposition to the New Deal, Christian and Corporate America joined forces to establish a network of local and national organizations and in this chapter, I look at some examples. During the 1950s these organizations "determined to take back what they considered their historical home: the Republican Party."[30]

After a moment of national revival during the 1950s, America was jolted during the 1960s. Many held that American character was racist and militant. The decade gave rise to the

[29] Haddigan, Lee. "The Importance of Christian Thought for the American Libertarian Movement: Christian Libertarianism, 1950-71." *Libertarian Papers* 2, no. 14 (2010): 14, 24.
[30] Bjerre-Poulsen, Niels. *Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2002, 12.

counterculture. “The very idea of a “counterculture” suggests a new self-consciousness about cultural struggles regarding values and lifestyles.” A self-conscious competition for cultural dominance has become more evident. American culture appeared to be divided between competing moral visions of those who believe there are absolute moral truths and those who place moral authority in individual judgment.[31]

Chapter five is concerned both with the changes of the 1960s represented by the New Left and the conservative backlash of the 1970s. Conservative protestant evangelicals played a major role in the New Christian Right – conservative coalition that helped elect Ronald Reagan president in 1980. Theorists of the New Christian Right as Frances Shaffer and Rosas Rushdoony envisaged solutions for the contemporary American cultural and social issues in that old-time religion, in America’s heritage as a Christian country, in that deeply embedded sense of morality in American culture, part of the Puritan past.

Morality

America’s historical development has been marked by moral claims, disputes, and crises to such an extent, that its progress as a society has been closely associated with allusions to moral value as the motivating force and distinguishing signifier of an allegedly exceptional dynamic. The volatility and fervour of America’s moral consciousness lead James Morone to place it not at the margins of society but at the very center of America’s historical processes. He refers to moral

[31] Thomson, Irene Taviss. *Culture Wars and Enduring American Dilemmas*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010;2018, 3. doi:10.3998/mpub.1571326

conflict as having literally made America. The themes of moral health, or alternatively moral crisis, have a pervasive presence in American public debate.[32]

Addressing issues in terms of high virtue and moral degradation can lead to deep ethical disagreements and political deadlock. Americans quarrel sharply about how to apply the basic principles of Americanism they claim to agree about. The United States is overwhelmed by a politics in which issues are polarized between the respective claims of secular humanism and religious ethics to be the authentic source of moral integrity. "This is not to infer that all or most political issues are argued out through a medium of moral outrage. But many either are or remain susceptible to being so...[T]he moral and political spheres are so thoroughly intermixed that they remain largely indistinguishable from one another."[33] Culture wars are the very realization of such expression. The conflict between those values considered traditionalist or conservative and those considered progressive or liberal inform American politics.

Americans are highly religious people and that is the reason morality plays such a crucial role in society and in politics. In 1966, *Time* magazine famously examined whether the United States was on a path to secularization when it published its "Is God Dead?" cover. However, the question proved premature:

> The U.S. remains a robustly religious country and the most devout of all the rich Western democracies. [According to recent studies], Americans pray more often, are more likely to attend weekly religious services and ascribe higher importance to faith in their lives than adults in other wealthy, Western democracies, such as Canada, Australia, and most European states.[34]

[32] Foley, Michael. "Morality." In *American Credo: The Place of Ideas in US Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2008. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232673.003.0008, 2.

[33] Ibid., 3.

[34] Dalia Fahmy, "Americans Are Far More Religious than Adults in Other Wealthy Nations," Pew Research Center (Pew Research Center, July 31, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/31/americans-are-far-more-religious-than-adults-in-other-wealthy-nations/)

The United States is renowned for the multiplicity of its religious organizations. Although these are located predominantly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the primary focus of religious consciousness in America has historically lain within the Protestant experience. Michael Foley argues that in the United States, Protestantism achieves its fullest contemporary expression.

> Given Protestantism's structural and theological predisposition towards sectarian fragmentation and the individual access to grace, then the United States is in many respects *the* Protestant community. Its traditions of voluntary association, decentralized structure, and faith-based salvation have generated a widespread cultural condition in which Protestant attitudes and principles possess a reach far beyond the confines of purely religious categories... Protestant ethic provided the 'moral bedrock on which republican institutions were built'.[35]

Political theorists call the standard American government liberalism. It has little to do with morals. The first settlers sailed away from old world tyranny and settled a vast, unpopulated land. They did not need to push aside barons or bishops to get ahead. "The great advantage of the Americans," as Tocqueville wrote, "is that they have arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and that they are born equal, instead of becoming so."[36] The Founding fathers drafted a government that would require virtue from neither rulers nor citizens. "Free to make their own fortunes amid the new world bounty, Americans developed their celebrated faith – you might even call it a cult: free economic markets, limited government, and a firm commitment to individual rights. The Constitution nailed "Don't tread on me" to the mast of a pragmatic, secular regime that Americans now hawk in every corner of the globe."[37]

[35] Foley, Michael. "Morality." In *American Credo: The Place of Ideas in US Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2008. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232673.003.0008, 5.
[36] De Tocqueville, Alexis and Henry Reeve. *Democracy in America: Volumes I & II*. Auckland: The Floating Press, 2009, 969.
[37] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 6.

The official American story, symbolized by the melting pot, imagines a nation constantly cooking up a richer democracy with thicker rights. The unofficial alternative counters with a less cheerful story: many Americans have faced oppression because of their race, gender, or ethnicity. Generous visions of inclusion face off against hard prejudices. For example, after the Civil War, President Andrew Johnson illustrated how harsh a raw market view could get. "[H]e mused about mass black annihilation: if the former slaves "fail and perish away, let us be careful that the failure shall not be attributable to any denial of justice."' But in 1865 the freedmen had no property, no capital, little education, few rights, and could not move about freely. They lived with the threat of violence and the scars of slavery. President Johnson overlooked the need for a government that protects the basics before people start competing in private sector markets.[38]

And that opens the door to a far more generous, more liberal theory of liberalism. Liberal theorists from Daniel Webster to the 1980s began growing uneasy about unabashed self-interest. The state ought to guarantee that everyone has the basics – food, housing, education, health care. "Market competition is unfair, say people in this camp, if we don't ensure that everyone begins with a certain minimum – like breakfast." Social theorists discovered back in early America a robust collective life. "If a barn burned down, the townsfolk got together and raised another. If iron pots were dear, families shared them with the neighbors – household inventories commonly list a portion of a pot or skillet."[39]

The Puritans bequeathed America two different answers of who is to blame for trouble, the sinners, or the society? The Puritans believed in blaming both. Salvation and perdition fell on individual souls; however, the Puritans covenants held the entire community responsible. One

[38] Ibid., 6.
[39] Ibid., 7.

moral tradition touts personal responsibility. “Sinners impoverish themselves and diminish their community.” The alternative tradition is the social gospel. It shifts the emphasis from the sinners to the system. “Poverty, hunger, segregation, racism, sexism, and despair all push good people into corners – into crime, broken marriages, addiction. Social gospel solutions reverse the focus: rather than redeem the individual, reform the political economy.”[40] The communal story sparks enthusiasm across the political spectrum. Conservatives focus on restoring traditional values, while progressives stress obligations to one another.

1. The Puritan Legacy

In June 1630, four hundred English Puritans, the first boatloads in great migration, arrived in Salem, Massachusetts. Twenty thousand people followed over the next twelve years. By 1640, the New England Puritans made up more than half the European population in what would become the original United States. “In both church and state, leadership fell to men preordained for salvation by their Calvinist God. Puritans calibrated their ranks with fine moral distinctions. Virtue distinguished leaders from followers, us from them.”[41]

1.1. The Mission

The Puritan mission sprang from the chaos of the English Reformation. For a century and half, England lurched back and forth – Catholic, Anglican, and briefly Calvinist. Henry VIII broke with Rome (1534), Mary Tudor returned the state to Catholicism (1553-1558), Elizabeth restored the Church of England (1559). However, Elizbeth’s Protestant church retained many Roman features, and the compromises outraged some Englishmen. They demanded religious purity.”[42]

[40] Ibid., 14.
[41] Ibid., 31.
[42] Ibid., 36.

The New World served as an outlet for religious unrest in Europe. Puritans arrived with a mission – redeeming the Protestant reformation. The notion of a mission is the most recalled aspect of the Puritan world. John Winthrop's sermon delivered aboard the *Arabella*, sums up the flagship of the first Puritan fleet in the great migration. "Winthrop predicted that what "the most" maintain as truth only in profession, "wee must bring into familiar and constant practice."' "To comprehend America," writes Perry Miller, "you have to comprehend this sentence." The New World meant opportunity because there potentiality might become an act. "That purification for which Calvinists on the Continent and Puritans in England had striven for three generations was to be wrought in a twinkling upon virgin soil."[43]

In order to fulfill the mission, the people should stay above conflicts, act as one man in "brotherly affection" and community members would each have to play their own divinely appointed roles, "for "God almighty… health so disposed of the condition of mankind as in all times, some must be rich, some poor, some high and eminent in power and dignity, others mean and in subjugation."' The key to the mission lay in making the Puritan society in a godly fashion. This meant proper hierarchy, "men must defer to their leaders, servant to masters, women to men."[44]

The stakes were huge for: '"If the lord shall be pleased… he shall make us a praise and glory. For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us; so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken… we shall be made a story and a byword through all the world."'[45] New England (and later, the United States) would succeed and be saved if it got all its citizens to behave. Only then others would see great

[43] Miller, Perry. *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province*. London: Harvard University Press, 1983, 8.
[44] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 35.
[45] Ibid., 35.

success and want to emulate it. “The Calvinist culture burst out of New England on gusts of religious revivals led by the purer Puritans, the Baptists.”[46]

From colony to nation, from eighteenth-century republic to twentieth-century superpower the American mission would be constantly rediscovered, reinterpreted, rewritten, but the essential Puritan vision of a community of model citizens lived on. While the precise content of the American lesson evolves – faith, freedom, free markets, 350 years after Winthrop’s sermon, ‘“a population that despite its bewildering mixture of race and creed ... believe in something called American mission and could invest that patent fiction with all the emotional, spiritual, and intellectual appeal of a religious quest.”’[47] Over the years, few things would shake up American politics quite like worries about what the rest of the world might think.

The idea of a redeemer nation at first glance appears to foster precisely the opposite of classical liberalism: “moral politics rush into the private sphere, denying the boundary between public and private. The lawgiver suddenly has everything to do with vice and virtue. Private behavior becomes a public problem.”[48] Throughout American history, moral politics, advanced by conservative lobbies, resulted in obscenity laws, prohibitions, and constitute a major part of the twentieth century culture wars.

1.2. The Covenant

The New England Puritans helped establish American reverence toward a written constitution by organizing their system around a stunning idea: God was offering them a deal, a contract. “Through the covenant”, as Thomas Shepherd put it in 1651, ‘“we see with open face

[46] Ibid., 9.
[47] Ibid., 10.
[48] Ibid., 10.

God's secret purpose…the Covenant being nothing else, but His purposes revealed."' Puritans believed that God promised redemption for His special people.[49]

The "master idea of the age," as Perry Miller call it, the idea that "the illimitable sovereign of the universe should relate Himself to His creatures not only as absolute power but as voluntarily abiding by the stated rules of His regime offered a solution to all difficulties, not only theological but cosmological, emotional, and (most happily) political." Starting from the premise that a regenerate person, entering the Covenant of Grace, is taken into legal compact with God, federal theologians worked out a corollary that God likewise enters into covenant with a group as a unit. Over and above His contracts with persons, God settles the social terms with a band of men, which thereupon becomes committed, as a political entity, to a specifically enunciated political program.[50]

Miller argues that the philosophy of the national covenant was not only a logical deduction from the Covenant of Grace, but also the theme of the Old Testament: "Jacob wrestles in solitude with Jehovah, but Israel make their cohesion visible in an external organization - a church, a corporation, a nation, even a plantation." In their corporate capacity, saints stand, as long as they hold together, in a relation to God separate from their spiritual salvation. As a people, they are chosen because by public act they have chosen God. The prerequisite is a deliberate dedication of the community to a communal decision, like a declaration of war.[51]

John Winthrop committed Massachusetts Bay to the external covenant. In all Protestant theology, there was a realm of conduct over which purely "natural" considerations held sway. "The flight of every sparrow, let alone every motion of man, was governed by providence; nevertheless,

[49] Ibid., 39.
[50] Miller, Perry. *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province*. London: Harvard University Press, 1983, 21.
[51] Ibid., 21.

in politics and public morality, laws were enforced and penalties exacted on the assumption that ordinary men are responsible for such things as fornication, debt, and murder." A nation in the federal covenant differed from the uncovenanted, not because all citizens were holy, but because therein saints administered the laws according to the covenant. The saints did not need to be a majority if only they held the power. In order to keep the covenant alive, a core of saints was necessary, but a saving remnant was enough.[52]

The covenant vision nudged the puritans toward modernity. In the great medieval chain of being, there was no place for negotiating contracts with superiors. The Puritans rewrote hierarchical relations as mutual agreements. "Before any two individuals could stand together in any social relation besides that of parent and child or conqueror and captive, they had to covenant with each other, "by their free consent." "A Covenant, in general, may then be thus described," said Samuel Willard. "*It is a mutual Engagement between two Parties*."'[53] It connects God and man, minister and church, husband and wife.

The Puritan covenants would develop into a pillar of the American regime and forerunners of constitutions. James Morone argues that the American Constitution not only reflects the covenant tradition but echoes its biblical form. "The constitution explicitly abjures power: anything not clearly enumerated as a federal power is left to the states. The first biblical covenant operates precisely the same way: God's deal with Noah relinquishes power – no more floods. For that matter, Americans approach their Constitution with a kind of piety that mimics the biblical fealty."[54]

[52] Ibid., p. 53.
[53] Morgan, Edmund S. *The Puritan Family: Religion & Domestic Relations in Seventeenth-Century New England*. New York, NY: HarperPerennial, 1966, 26.

[54] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 41.

Puritan economics seems to offer its own intimations of the future. "The first settlers managed to squeeze their political institutions out of a commercial charter – then granted broad suffrage to proven saints. Reading salvation and perdition into wealth and poverty eventually merged with the idea of a national mission and produced the nation's unabashed – almost imperial – drive toward capitalism. From this angle, the Puritans help explain the primal energy of American liberalism."[55]

1.3. The Protestant Ethic

In his book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* Max Weber explains why some countries are more advanced than others. He sees the hard work, frugality, and efficiency, as rooted in the Protestant work ethic which particularly flourished among the ascetic sects in the United States. Those same traits became the basis of modern Capitalism.

Modern capitalism was an unforeseen consequence of the Reformation in general, and the Calvinist dogma of predestination, in particular, in their search for salvation. Weber clarifies the part which religious forces have played in forming the developing web of the worldly modern culture, "the manner in which ideas become effective forces in history." "[P]rogrammes of ethical reform never were at the center of interest for any of the religious reformers… The salvation of the soul and that alone was the center of their life and work. Their ethical ideals and the practical results of their doctrines were all based on that alone and were the consequences of purely religious motives."[56]

The regular reproduction of capital, involving its continual investment and reinvestment for the end of economic efficiency is foreign to traditional types of enterprise. The continual

[55] Ibid., 116.
[56] Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* London and New York: Routledge, 1992, 89.

accumulation of wealth for its own sake, according to Weber, is the essence of the spirit of modern capitalism. "Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs."[57]

This historically peculiar circumstance of a drive to the accumulation of wealth conjoined to an absence of interest in the worldly pleasures it can purchase, derives from a distinctively moral outlook, demanding unusual self-discipline. Weber finds the answer in the "this-worldly asceticism" of Puritanism, as focused through the concept of the "calling." It refers to the idea that the highest form of a moral obligation of the individual is to fulfill his duty in worldly affairs. "The notion of the calling, according to Weber, did not exist either in Antiquity or in Catholic theology; it was introduced by the Reformation."[58]

The doctrine of predestination was considered Calvinism's most characteristic dogma. Max Weber is concerned with the historical significance of the dogma. He briefly sketches the question of how the doctrine originated and how it fitted into the framework of Calvinistic theory. Only a small proportion of men are chosen for eternal grace. Only part of humanity is saved, the rest are damned. "To assume that human merit or guilt play a part in determining this destiny would be to think of God's absolutely free decrees, which have been settled from eternity, as subject to change by human influence, an impossible contradiction."[59] God's grace is, since His decrees cannot change, as impossible for those to whom He has granted it to lose as it is unattainable for those to whom He has denied it.

[57] Ibid., 53.
[58] Ibid., xii.
[59] Ibid., 103.

"In its extreme inhumanity this doctrine," says Weber, "must above all have had one consequence for the life of a generation which surrendered to its magnificent consistency:

> That was a feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual. In what was for the man of the age of the Reformation the most important thing in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path alone to meet a destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity.[60]

This inner isolation of the individual contains, on the one hand, the reason for the entirely negative attitude of the Puritanism to all the sensuous and emotional elements in culture and in religion. It provides a basis for a fundamental antagonism to a sensuous culture of all kinds. On the other hand, it forms one of the roots of that disillusioned and pessimistically inclined individualism which can even to-day be identified in the national character and the institutions of the peoples with a Puritan past.[61]

The evolution of protestant ethics involves primarily the historical passage that gradually led the roots of Protestantism to immigrate from Europe to the United States. The Pilgrims and Puritans who migrated to Plymouth and Massachusetts would set about to order their lives in a way that fostered the practice of piety in all that they did. "A good Puritan could have been identified as industrious, thrifty, displaying inflexible integrity in his business. They were brought up in the pursuit of a calling with sober living and purpose. Temperance was considered a Christian duty. They displayed a propensity to link religious faithfulness with economic prosperity. These virtues were bound to produce plenty in an abundant land."[62]

[60] Ibid., 104.
[61] Ibid., 105.
[62] Palombaro, Ottavio. "Certitudo Salutis and Perseverance of the Saints: The Missing Piece in the Weberian Puritan Ethic." *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 13, (2017), 6.

Moreover, an emphasis on industry, thrift, frugality, sobriety, honesty, and charitableness characterized both the Puritan work ethic and Benjamin Franklin's plan of moral perfection. "These qualities brought distinction to a man in the workplace and readied him for success. Their opposite concepts on the other hand - idleness, intemperance, prodigality, sloth, and extravagance - were said to lead to economic ruin and poverty." Bible-believers such as Thomas Hooker, John Winthrop, William Bradford, Roger Williams, and William Penn are just a few examples among those who predominantly influenced the religious, economic, and institutional foundations of the United States of America.[63]

The Calvinist God demanded of his believers no single good works, but a life of good works combined into a unified system. The relaxation in the security of possession, the enjoyment of wealth with the consequence of idleness, and the temptations of the flesh were all distractions from the pursuit of a righteous life. But as a performance of duty in a calling, the wealth is not only morally permissible but enjoined. "To wish to be poor was…the same as wishing to be unhealthy…Especially begging, on the part of one able to work, in not only the sin of slothfulness, but a violation of the duty of brotherly love…" The providential interpretation of profit-making justified the activities of the businessman, but it has the highest ethical appreciation of the sober, middle-class, self-made man.[64]

Such an all-encompassing influence of American religiosity was very important for the shaping of the politics of a "nation under God" and the economy based on the motto "In God we trust" starting from the Founding Fathers up until the present time. "The separation of church and state, the absence of an official religious institution, the general tolerance towards all religious

[63] Ibid., 12.
[64] Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* London and New York: Routledge, 1992, 163.

minorities, the public exposition of religion in all aspects of life such as tribunals, schools, or leisure time are just a few examples of this influence." Liberal tendencies towards trade, commerce, and taxation were also unprecedented examples of the Protestant ethic as a key ideological aspect for the future developments of the American nation.[65]

The influence of Calvinist values in the United States has gradually opened to a broader context. They were brought by the Puritans but were also embraced as a virtue by other immigrants with different backgrounds who came subsequently to the United States. The idea of the self-made man became the basis of the American dream. As a result, Protestant ethics in the United States can be observed even outside the borders of Protestantism where those elements have become part of the cultural traits of society. "[A]ll the religious branches holding the belief in the perpetual assurance of salvation are the same branches that generally have higher political participation, support free-market principles, or display attitudes of acceptance toward economic individualism...Those contemporary American evangelicals, doctrinally conservative while not always Calvinist in the strictest sense, share much of Calvinism's preconditions." [66]

1.4. Gender War and the Antinomian Heresy

According to James Morone, the first great intellectual conflict in the English colonies stands as a prototype for America's culture wars. In 1633 minister John Cotton arrived in Boston and quickly made his mark. The Boston church elected him teacher, and his preaching sparked a wave of conversions. A year later, Anne Hutchinson followed John Cotton to Boston. Cotton would later testify that she was "not only skillful and helpful" midwife, but "readily fell into good

[65] Palombaro, Ottavio. "Certitudo Salutis and Perseverance of the Saints: The Missing Piece in the Weberian Puritan Ethic." *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 13, (2017), 13.

[66] Ibid., 16.

discourse with the women about their spiritual estates." Members of Boston congregation began visiting Hutchinson house, which soon developed into something of a theological salon.[67]

Hutchinson followed Cotton back to Calvinist basics: Salvation is entirely and absolutely in God's hands. There is nothing people can do to influence divine judgment. Nor can human behavior offer any clues about whether God has touched a person with grace. "Just as the churchmen were developing their elaborate membership rituals, along came Anne Hutchinson, who – plausibly citing John Cotton, one of the most influential men in town – announced that the entire effort was useless…in fact: raw heresy." Hutchinson bluntly accused the New England ministry of preaching a "covenant of works," the idea that men and women could help determine their own eternal fate through "works" like praying or piety or working diligently. The protestant reformation had rejected this route to salvation.[68]

But if the Holy Ghost directly infused the elect, then there was no point to all the spiritual flagellation that the saints were undergoing to prepare themselves. The elaborate Puritan rules of conduct, the entire framework of the holy commonwealth were all useless. "The authorities did not suffer the assault quietly. Hutchison, they countered, preached rank antinomianism. The term derives from *anti* (against) and *nomos* (law).

> A synod met during the crisis (in August 1637) and identified "unsafe" and "unsavory" antinomian speeches from Hutchinson and her followers. The inventory of reckless talk included, "If I be holy I am never the better accepted of God. If I am unholy, I am never the worse." … And, getting to the bottom Puritan line, "I may know I am Christ's, not because I doe crucifie the lusts of the flesh but because I doe not crucify them." Rather, "Christ…crucified my lusts for me." [69]

[67] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 55.
[68] Ibid., 57.
[69] Ibid., 57.

In trying to pin down Hutchinson's sin, the churchmen expounded the eternal Puritan complaint. Down through the centuries, echoing the synod of 1637, moralists would point at sinners as people who refuse to "crucifie the lusts of the flesh."

At stake were utterly different visions of the Puritan faith. On the one side, New England elites were busy transforming what had been a mechanism of protest into the official faith of a powerful establishment. The New England covenant called for loyalty, discipline, and attention to the behavior of the whole community. On the other side, Anne Hutchinson was searching for the intense personal experience of the old Puritanism. She and her followers longed to feel the unmediated power of the Holy Ghost stir their souls. They were the first in a long American line.[70]

The Puritan ministers gave the antinomian case a dramatic gender spin, both during the Hutchinson's trial and after. "If she had attended her household affairs and such things as belong to women, and not gone out of her way and calling to meddle in such things as are proper for men, she had kept her wits and might have improved them usefully and honorably in the place that God has set her."'[71] Hutchinson and her eighty female followers were fomenting a "revolution of the Eves." They were threatening the godly subordination of woman to man, of man to ministers, of the people to their magistrates. "In a preface to Winthrop's account of the events…Thomas Weld wrote that "carnal and vile persons…commonly…worke first upon women, being the weaker to resist…and if they could winde in them, they hoped by them, as by Eve, to catch their husbands also."'[72]

The Puritans defeated Anne Hutchinson. She was persecuted in part because of her own courageous obstinacy, but largely because the community was persuaded that she was thoroughly

[70] Ibid., 58.
[71] Ibid., 62.
[72] Ibid., 63.

subversive. The court banished her from Massachusetts. But her kind would be back. "Many hot battles were fought over the same moral territory. On one side, moral rules reinforce civic order, social status, and political power. On the other, faith stirring within individuals inspires them to attack the status quo."[73] Not until the time of the Great Awakening of the eighteenth century did the enthusiasts win general major victories outside the confines of a single colony. It was then that they set precedent on American shores for the repeated waves of evangelicalism.

1.5. Anti-intellectualism and the First Great Awakening

In his 1962 book *Anti-intellectualism in American Life*, Richard Hofstadter "use the idea of anti-intellectualism as a device for looking at various aspects, hardly the most appealing, of American society and culture."[74] "American anti-intellectualism," argues Hofstadter, "is older than the American national identity, and has a long historical background."[75] The common strain that binds together the attitudes and ideas that he calls anti-intellectual "is a resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize the value of that life."[76]

> The American mind was shaped in the mold of early modern Protestantism. Religion was the first arena for American intellectual life, and thus the first arena for an anti-intellectual impulse. Anything that seriously diminished the role of rationality and learning in early American religion would later diminish its role in secular culture. The feeling that ideas should above all be made to work, the disdain for doctrine and for refinements in ideas, the subordination of men of ideas to men of emotional power or manipulative skill are hardly innovations of the twentieth century; they are inheritances from American Protestantism.[77]

[73] Ibid., 67.
[74] Hofstadter, Richard. *Anti-intellectualism in American Life.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, vii.
[75] Ibid., 6.
[76] Ibid., 7.
[77] Ibid., 55.

Hofstadter recognizes that the tension between the mind and the heart, between emotion and intellect is everywhere a persistent feature of Christian experience. But what was distinctively American in religious anti-intellectualism was that "the balance between traditional establishments and revivalist or enthusiastic movements drastically shifted in favor of the latter."(55) As a result, the learned professional clergy lost position, and the rational style of religion they found congenial, suffered as well. "At an early stage in its history, America, with its Protestant and dissenting inheritance, became the scene of an unusually keen local variation of this universal historical struggle over the character of religion; and here the forces of enthusiasm and revivalism won their most impressive victories." The American anti-intellectualism owes much of its strength and pervasiveness to the "lack of firm institutional establishments hospitable to intellectuals and to the competitive sectarianism of its evangelical denominations."[78]

America in its early days attracted many of Europe's disaffected and disinherited classes. They have been more moved by emotional religion which stresses the validity of inner religious experience against learned and formalized religion. The religious enthusiasts, as they became known by their critics, "felt toward intellectual instruments as they did toward aesthetic forms: whereas the established churches thought of art and music as leading the mind upward toward the divine, enthusiasts commonly felt them to be at best intrusions and at worst barriers to the pure and direct action of the heart…"[79]

The more Americans were moving westward, as Frederick Jackson Turner put it in his 1893 essay "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," the more they were moving away from the influence of Europe and that meant "a steady growth of independence on American

[78] Ibid., 56.
[79] Ibid., 56.

lines."[80] Similarly, with the advancing frontier, American religious experience became more and more evangelical. As Hofstadter points out, after the Revolution, Americans were moving to the wilderness sometimes more than once in a generation. The organized institutions (churches and schools) could not keep up to that speed.[81] People were moving westward only with their Bibles at hand. Thus, evangelicals perceived the Bible as the true religious authority and the ultimate source of truth.

Men of learning were both numerous and honored among the first generation of American Puritans. They expected their clergy to be distinguished for a scholarship, and during the entire colonial period, the clergymen of the New England Congregational churches had college degrees. "Although Puritans understood that rhetoric appealed to emotions," wrote Perry Miller, "they strove by might and main to chain their language to logical propositions, and to penetrate to the affections of auditors only by thrusting an argument through their reason."[82]

The earliest generations of Harvard graduates were given a narrow theological training. The founding fathers of colonial education saw no difference between the basic education appropriate for a cleric and that appropriate for any other liberally educated men. "These Puritan emigrants, with their reliance upon the Book and their wealth of scholarly leadership, founded that intellectual and scholarly tradition which for three centuries enabled New England to lead the country in educational and scholarly achievement."[83]

[80] Turner, Frederick Jackson. excerpts from "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." in David Nye, Carl Pedersen and Niels Thorsen (eds.): *American Studies: A Source Book*, 2. Edition. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag. 1993, 242-245.

[81] Hofstadter, Richard. *Anti-intellectualism in American Life.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, 76.
[82] Miller, Perry. *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province*. London: Harvard University Press, 1983, 12.

[83] Hofstadter, Richard. *Anti-intellectualism in American Life.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, 60.

With the passing of the first generation and the enlargement of the community, the clergy become diversified. The older clergy, and especially those in the more remote rural communities, clung to the hard orthodoxies in which the Puritan community had begun. By the end of the seventeenth century, there has also arisen a group of young clergymen who were more cosmopolitan in outlook and conversant with the latest intellectual influences from Europe. They used to encourage greater tolerance, a broader pursuit of learning, the cultivation of science, and the restraint of some of the bigoted tendencies of the leading country laymen. [84]

After 1680, the Puritan ministry was more tolerant and more accommodating to dissenters such as Baptists and Quakers than was the Boston public at large. While the cosmopolitan clerics, such as Increase and Cotton Mather, were importing the latest latitudinarian books from England and year by year making more departures from the harsher traditions of Calvinism, leading laymen were often resisting these changes. "In the most controversial and stirring of all scientific questions of the day, that of the adoption of inoculation for smallpox, outstanding clerical intellectuals once again took the lead in defending innovation. Not least of them was Cotton Mather, who held to this position even though a bomb was thrown into his study by anti-inoculation agitators." Even with respect to the much-mooted witchcraft trials, the clerics gave credence to the idea of witchcraft itself, but they were strongly opposed to the extremely loose criteria of evidence that were admitted in the Salem trials.[85]

The first major episode in which the educated clergy was roundly repudiated came during the Great Awakening of the mid-eighteenth century. By that time, America was ripe for religious reawakening. The population had moved beyond the reach of the ministry, either geographically

[84] Ibid., 62.
[85] Ibid., 63.

or spiritually. In some areas, notably in Virginia, a large portion of the Anglican clergy was especially remote and ineffective. Even the religion of New England had cooled. The ministers had lost much of the drive and the prestige of the earlier days. "They were highly civilized, often versatile men; but they were in some cases too civilized, often versatile, too worldly, to play anything like their original role. Their sermons, attended by sleepy congregations were often dull and abstruse exercises in old dogmatic controversies. As the Awakener, George Whitfield, said, "the reason why Congregations have been so dead is because dead Men preach to them."'[86] The latent religious energies of the people thus lay ready for any preacher who had the skill to reach them.

The Great Awakenings began in 1720 in New Jersey. The members of the Dutch Reformed Church began to be aroused by the sermons of a young preacher, Theodore Frelinghuysen, who had come to the New World inspired by English and Dutch Puritanism. The revival in New Jersey was followed by a second among the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians in the Middle Colonies. One of them, William Tennent, established in 1726 his "Long College," a sort of theological school, and there for the next twenty years, he trained young men to carry the revivalist spirit into the Presbyterian ministry. "In 1734 revivalism appeared independently in New England. Jonathan Edwards, a unique figure among the awakening preachers, combined the old Puritan regard for doctrine and the Puritan custom of the written sermon with the passion and religious zeal of the revivalists." Although Edwards revival sermons, inflamed the town of Northampton and the surrounding country during 1734 and 1735, they were limited in their reach compared with those of George Whitfield. [87]

[86] Ibid., 65.
[87] Ibid., 65.

As for the regular ministers, at first, the overwhelming majority of them welcomed the itinerant revivalists as agents who would bring a warmer spirit to the religion of their parishioners. It was only after the Awakening was well under way that the regular ministers began to realize that the awakeners did not regard them as fellow workers in a common spiritual task, but rather as inferior competitors. "The revivalists, with the prominent exception of Edwards, who was an intellectual largely out of rapport with his own congregation, felt little or no necessity to work upon the reason of their audiences or to address themselves to knotty questions of doctrine." They dispensed with written sermons and dealt with the ultimate realities of religious experience -the sense of sin, the yearning for salvation, the hope for God's love and mercy.[88]

Before long, it became clear that the extreme exponents of revivals were challenging all assumptions of the settled churches. "The Congregationalists of New England, and their Presbyterian counterparts elsewhere, had assumed that ministers must be learned professional men. Traditionally their ministers had commanded respect not merely for their learning but also for their piety and their spiritual qualities. But learning was held to be essential because learning and the rational understanding of doctrine were considered vital to religious life."[89] The most extreme revivalists were now undermining the dignity of the profession by their personal, unorderly conduct. They were invading and dividing the allegiances of the established minister's congregations.

The established ministers feared that the evangelists would strike at the very source of the educated ministry by circumventing the colleges and the usual process of ministerial training. This fear was exaggerated and the immediate effects of the Awakening on education were mixed.

[88] Ibid., 67.
[89] Ibid., 68.

William Tennent trained a number of capable scholars at his "Long College." "[T]he revivalist Presbyterians established the College of New Jersey (later Princeton) in 1746, to assure that they would have their own center of learning; and in time other institutions – Brown, Rutgers, and Dartmouth – were founded by men influenced by the revivals. It must be added, however, that the effect of the Awakening was to subordinate the religious factionalism and to consolidate the tradition of sectarian control of colleges."[90] The ardent religious factionalists pushed doctrinal and pietistic considerations forward, at the expense of humane learning.

Hofstadter argues that by achieving a religious style congenial to the common man and giving him an alternative to the establishments run by and largely for the comfortable classes, the Awakening quickened the democratic spirit in America. By telling the people that they have a right to hear the kind of preacher they liked and understood, even a right to preach themselves, the revivalists broke the hold of the establishments and heightened the assertiveness and self-sufficiently, that became a characteristic of the American people.[91]

2. Neo-Puritans - Victorian Quest for Virtue

Amid the Civil War a moral storm burst around the postal service. The story begins with the Young Men's Christian Association. In 1852, a group of concerned New York businessmen and ministers "launched the YMCA out of concern for the growing number of young male clerks who came to work in the city, where they were tempted by alcohol, prostitutes, and a wide variety of printed erotica sold on the street…When the Civil War began and many of these same clerks mustered in with the city's first regiments in May 1861, the YMCA sent them off stocked with

[90] Ibid., 72.
[91] Ibid., 74.

hymnals and bibles." Chaplains were enlisted with the men and created library system that supplied camps and hospitals with boxes of carefully selected books intended as wholesome alternatives to the novels and other printed works circulated in camp. [92]

But moral crusaders did not rest. In January 1865 they looked to friends in Congress to support a bill that would fight obscene materials from the point of entry. Vermont senator Jacob Collamer insisted that "the U.S. Postal Service had become "the vehicle for the conveyance of great numbers and quantities of obscene books and pictures, which are sent to the Army, and sent here and there and everywhere, and that it is getting to be a great evil."[93] None of the debate was concerned with what "obscene books and pictures" exactly meant, but after the saying "I know it when I see it," lawmakers all accepted that it was hurting the Union war efforts.

This was just the beginning. In the half century following the Civil War, censorship of the federal mail became powerful tool in the hands of moral reformers, who used it against dealers in erotica, free love activists, birth control advocates, and abortion providers. "The swelling list of prohibitions expanded government authority, inspired fresh reform groups, and cracked down on dangerous races. In the tumult, the United States constructed a virtue regime that stood for almost a century. The laws governing sex and reproduction did not fully fall till 1973..."[94]

There were plenty of reasons to feel anxious about morals. A nation born in the country was rushing to town. Urban America seemed to be constructed out of lax rules and low races. More than 10 million immigrants came ashore between 1905 and 1914 alone. Among the dangers posed by foreigners where that they "drank, indulged in casual sex, spread venereal disease, and had only

[92] Giesberg, Judith. *Sex and the Civil War: Soldiers, Pornography, and the Making of American Morality.* The University of North Carolina Press, 2017, 4.

[93] Ibid., 1.

[94] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 219.

loosest idea about family responsibility." Worse, the Anglo-Saxon middle class had grown feeble – it married late and raised fewer children with every generation. "Horatio Robinson Storer, a vice president of the American Medical Association and formidable anti-abortion crusader, summed up the sexual stakes: "The great territories of the far West…offer homes for countless million yet unborn. Shall they be filled by our own children or by those of aliens? This is a question that our own women must answer; upon their loins depends the future destiny of the nation."'[95]

2.1. Comstockery

Puritans, and generations of neo-puritans "studied minutely every phrase of the Scriptures and extracted from it the last ounce of meaning, so that each one of the Ten Commandments meant volumes of prohibitions and injunctions to them."[96] In 1872 a formidable crew – millionaires, gentlemen, captains of industry, men listed in the *Social Register* - organized the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice. Anthony Comstock charged down to Washington, wielding the clout of his patrons. "During the war Comstock had been shocked to see fellow soldiers drink, smoke, swear, gamble, and frolic with women. He prayed and preached: "Touch not. Taste not. Handle not." His comrades, he said, "twitted" him and ran him down. By the time the Society for the Suppression of Vice called on Comstock, he was haunted by a single idea: "Our youth are in danger."' Comstock brought before Congress 15,000 letters "written by students of both sexes," ordering obscene literature.[97]

Before the Civil War, reformers had tried to persuade the sinners, now they backed up their sermons by proposing tough purity laws. The Congress passed the obscenity bill. The law - which

[95] Ibid., 220.
[96] Morgan, Edmund S. *The Puritan Family: Religion & Domestic Relations in Seventeenth-Century New England*. New York, NY: HarperPerennial, 1966, 11.

[97] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 228.

revised postal regulations – erected a framework for controlling obscenity: smut, bad thoughts, birth control, abortion, and "immoral articles." The federal legislation, in turn, inspired state laws; and both federal and state action empowered the private vice societies that backed up an increasingly formidable Post Office. In the absence of a definition of "obscene," censorship of the federal mail worked to effectively silence political critics, feminists, and gay rights activists. James Joyce, Upton Sinclair, and Lillian Smith were all be banned in Boston well into the twentieth century until a series of court cases expanded First Amendment speech protections to most previously outlawed expressions.[98]

2.2. Birth Control

The Comstock Act took a firm stance against two increasingly visible reproductive technologies – contraceptives and abortion. Most feminists and many free-love advocates also opposed birth control, fearing that it would further license male promiscuity and even sexual aggression. When it came to abortion, the vice regulators enjoyed a powerful ally - the American Medical Association. "Together these groups constructed a legal birth regime – bars on birth control and bans on abortion – that would stand for a century. The conflicts surrounding reproductive politics summed up all the gender issues: the woman's role in society, sexuality, and the nature of the family."[99] The legislatures, the courts, even the postal bureaucracy, reached into the very heart of the private sphere.

In the first part of the nineteenth century abortions were legal and widely available. Neither politics nor morality defined abortion as a problem. After the Civil War, the first anti-abortion movements swept across the states. "The fetal politics covered a lot of ground: the social role of

[98] Giesberg, Judith. *Sex and the Civil War: Soldiers, Pornography, and the Making of American Morality.* The University of North Carolina Press, 2017, 4.
[99] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 249.

women, cross-pressures on male identity, the status of the medical profession, the falling birthrate, America's racial character, and the question of just when life begins. By the time it was over, the reformers had managed a sensational social transformation: they turned a common practice into a terrible crime."[100]

The great shift in attitudes began, like so many moral itches, in the wicked city where abortionists proliferated and developed their practices into sophisticated commercial operations with multiple clinics. Their advertisements appeared in city newspapers. The commercial drug industry pushed the abortion business. Providers found a ready market in a bourgeoisie eager to limit family size. By mid-century, abortion, from "rare and secret occurrence," had become "frequent and bold" practice.[101]

At its 1859 annual meeting, the AMA committed itself to publicly "protest against the unwarrantable destruction of human life" and to urge the "legislative assemblies of the union" to revise their abortion laws. The doctors took their stand that the beginning of life was the very moment of conception. At the time, physicians were reaching for professional authority. They had not yet won their place at the center of American healing. Rivals flourished on all sides. Botanic doctors, homeopaths, and midwives challenged the profession. "In truth, obstetrics and gynecology did not yet offer much of a scientific alternative; its members would not fully work out the menstrual cycle till the 1920s – a half-century away."[102] The medical societies prodded state government into whipping out the competition. But physicians' search for status went beyond their role as healers.

[100] Ibid., 250.
[101] Ibid., 250.
[102] Ibid., 253.

The doctors simultaneously cleared away their fraudulent rivals and posed a moral pillar of the community. By standing up for Science, God, and Country, they were stepping into the role of civic leaders. The doctors also shared class anxieties about all those strangers. "Abortion was "infinitely more frequent among Protestant women than among Catholic," warned Storer. The great war had already torn "gaps in our population." Now, the better classes shirked their childbearing responsibilities."[103]

Two great organizations fighting for purity found precisely opposite villains. Each group used the dangers it attacked to define its political agenda, to define itself and its members. The doctors defined their profession partially through a great attack on middle-class women. As the AMA saw it:

> Victorian women were drunk on women's rights and fashionable pleasures. They recklessly threw off all controls (meaning male authority), aborted their babies, and ducked both motherhood and duty…The Women's Christian Temperance Union pointed right back – at oppressive, lustful men and the laws that permitted them to use and abuse their wives. Women were fighting for home protection…The women were under no illusion about getting much help from even middle-class men who still vibrated with "past savagery" and the present "immolation" of their wives. The WCTU used the wayward husband to help forge an image of his spiritual counter, the wife and mother.[104]

Once the doctors and their allies put the issue into political play, abortion would always be either banned or bitterly contested. "The issue is so powerful because it wraps murder charges around the three irresistible themes of American sexual politics. First, abortions offer women a way to elide motherhood – dredging up the deepest questions about gender roles and obligations…Second, abortions conjure up images of sex without consequences, of women who

[103] Ibid., 253.
[104] Ibid., 255.

fail to crucify their lusts… Finally, gender wars always gather velocity when hazardous others stand on the threshold of the American Eden."[105] The strangers keep threatening to breed their way in and bastardize that race. The immigrants bred too quickly for the upright middle class. Aborting white babies hastened the alien triumph over America's special people. Victorian reformers evoked the old-fashioned family and its values. In every generation the family is ground zero of the culture wars.

3. The Fight for Prohibition – Culture War Between the City and the Country

Richard Hofstadter argues that "the 1920s proved to be the focal decade in the *Kulturkampf* of American Protestantism." The rural and small-town America, now fully embattled against the invasion of modern life, made its most determined stand against cosmopolitism, Romanism, and the skepticism and moral experimentalism of the intelligentsia. In the rigid defense of Prohibition, the Scopes trial, and the campaign against Alfred Smith in 1928, the older American tried to reassert its authority. But its only victory was the defeat of Smith, and even that was tarnished by his success in reshaping the Democratic party as an urban and cosmopolitan force, a success that laid the groundwork for subsequent Democratic victories.[106]

3.1. Restriction Movement

World War I shook America's confidence in its ability to absorb large numbers of foreign-born. The war revealed that the sympathies of millions of Americans were determined by their countries of origin. The fight over the League of Nations reflected the animosities of Irish-

[105] Ibid., 255.
[106] Hofstadter, Richard. *Anti-intellectualism in American Life.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, 123.

Americans, German-Americans, and other "hyphenated Americans." Many felt hostile to anything foreign. These sentiments reached their climax in the Restriction movement. Initially, Restrictionism could not overcome the industrialists' demand for cheap labor. By 1923 the increasing mechanical efficiency reduced such need and the chief obstacle to permanent immigration restriction was removed. [107]

The drive for immigration restriction after the war was based, to a far greater degree than before, on a pseudo-scientific racism. "In *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916), Madison Grant contended that race was the determinant of civilization that only Aryans had built great cultures. "The man of the old stock," alleged Grant, "is being crowded out of many country districts by these foreigners, just as he is to-day being literally driven off the streets of New York City by the swarms of Polish Jews. These immigrants adopt the language of the native American, they wear his clothes, they steal his name, and they are beginning to take his women, but they seldom adopt his religion or understand his ideals."'[108]

In 1924, Congress passed the National Origins Act. The law, reflecting racist warning about a threat to "Anglo-Saxon" stock, aimed at freezing the country ethnically by sharply restricting the "new" immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe. "For three hundred years, English squires and cutthroats, French Huguenots, Spanish adventurers, pious subjects of German duchies,...peasants from Calabria to Ukraine had come to America in search of gold, or land, or freedom, or something to which they could not put a name. Now it was over. One of the great folk movements in the history of man had come to an end."[109]

[107] Leuchtenburg, William E. *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32*. 11.impression ed. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 1966, 204.
[108] Ibid., 205.
[109] Ibid., 207.

3.2. Prohibition movement

Prohibition was a way that rural Americans could impose their mores on city folk; that Protestants could badger people of other faiths, especially Catholics; that Anglo-Saxons could compel newer arrivals to conform; and that the middle class could get workingmen to give up their favorite beverages. "The Eighteenth Amendment...was a victory for the "Corn Belt over the conveyor belt." Prohibition and a pervasive anti-urbanism went and in hand. [110]

> The [old Puritan] percept "thou shalt not" had no attraction for Irish Catholic teamsters nursing their gin on Boston's dockside or German Lutheran workers guzzling ale in Milwaukee's breweries. Nor did it appeal to the Episcopalian hostesses of cocktail parties on Chicago's Gold Coast or San Francisco's Nob Hill. Some wets even claimed that consuming liquor was a public good. "The more advanced a country is," asserted Congressman George Tinkham of Massachusetts, "the higher its alcoholic content," while the president of Washington and Lee University called prohibition "the longest and most effective step forward in the uplift of the human race ever taken by any civilized nation."[111]

The fanaticism of the extreme drys permitted their urban critics to caricature prohibition, often unfairly. In fact, during these years drinking declined. Prohibition had shut down the noxious saloons, sobered up the working class, and slashed liquor consumption. Americans did not get back to their pre-Prohibition drinking levels till 1971. Arrests for public drunkenness fell, and there were fewer deaths from alcoholism. The zealotry of many of the drys, however, open the experiment to ridicule. They viewed the immensely complex problem with which they were dealing primarily in moral terms, and their picture of the world of drink was a nightmare vision.[112]

Prohibition had come in with all kinds of promises about improving America. When the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified, the drys forecast that since most of the adult criminals are

[110] Ibid., 213.
[111] Ibid., 213.
[112] Ibid., 214.

"whiskery-made," prohibition would reduce or eliminate crime. But the Eighteenth Amendment arrived "at the end of a decade in which the population balance of America had shifted from rural areas to cities, and at the start of a decade with young people chock full of attitude: irreverent, contrary, cheeky." Told that there was a new law saying they must not touch alcohol; their immediate impulse was to hunt up the nearest bootlegger. That attitude did not go unnoticed by people who saw an opportunity to make a good living from it.[113]

Bootlegging became the main source of income for gangs which infested the large cities and frequently bought or coerced their way into municipal governments. In 1920 Al Capone, a New York hoodlum from the Five Points Gang, moved to Chicago. By 1927 he was operating "a $60 million business of alcohol, gambling, prostitution, and drugs." His private army of close to one thousand hoodlums "rubbed out" rival bootleggers attempting to cut into Capone's "territory." In many of the great cites the gangsters either infiltrated the government or were permitted to create their own private governments. [114]

Against such formidable power, and charged with administering a law that millions abhorred, enforcement agencies had a nearly impossible assignment. They never had enough officers, and their agents were often venal political hacks, quick to resort to violence. "In wet cities such as New York and San Francisco, the easiest way for a stranger to locate a speakeasy…was "to ask the nearest cop," who could usually point out one to him just a few doors away. In 1929 Mabel Walker Willebrandt, who had been Assistant Attorney-General of the United States in

[113] McKenna, George. *The Puritan Origins of American Patriotism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, 220.

[114] Leuchtenburg, William E. *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32*. 11.impression ed. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 1966, 215.

charge of prohibition prosecutions, conceded that liquor could be bought "at almost any hour of the day or night, either in rural districts, the smaller towns, or the cities."[115]

Throughout the 1920s, a swelling chorus called for a repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. "The president of Carnegie Tech testified at a Senate committee hearing that rum was "one of the greatest blessings that God has given to men out of the teeming bosom of Mother Earth…" The demand for repeal, was centered in urban industrial states and led by Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York and Governor Albert Richie of Maryland. But those who held conservative views, especially in the South, did not give up yet. They would cast their vote for prohibition during the 1928 presidential elections.[116] Other apprehensions related to new modes imposed by the city to rural America gave their voice during the Scopes trial.

3.3. Scopes Trial

In the 1920s many people believed science to be the universal balm that would answer every human need. High priests of the science cult dismissed traditional concerns as remnants of an irrational age. Responding to various assaults on evangelical orthodoxy, Lyman and Milton Stewart of Union Oil in California, financed the publication of a series of pamphlets called *The Fundamentals*. The pamphlets outlined the essentials of orthodoxy: "biblical inerrancy, the virgin birth, Christ's atonement and resurrection, the authenticity of miracles, and the system of biblical interpretation comprising dispensational premillennialism." These five points of fundamentalism became the focus of doctrinal struggles in the 1920s, with the "fundamentalists" defending the doctrines against the "modernists" or liberals.[117]

[115] Ibid., 216.
[116] Ibid., 217.
[117] Balmer, Randall and Lauren F. Winner. *Protestantism in America*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, 19.

The city dwellers "found fundamentalism incomprehensible because the rational methods of production in the factory and life in the metropolis suggested that man, through science and education, could solve the major problems of living…"[118] Churchgoers were concerned about a dogma that stripped away myths, presented no adequate system of ethics, offered little sustenance in terms of grief, and provided a partial, limited glimpse of the man and the universe. Moreover, fundamentalism made sense to men and women in isolated rural areas still directly dependent on nature for their livelihood. They put their trust in divine intervention.

Richard Hofstadter refers precisely to this type of society, in advancing his argument of the American anti-intellectualism. "As the people moved westward after the Revolution, they were forever outrunning the institution of settled society; it was impossible for institutions to move as fast or as constantly as the population… Many families made not one but two or three moves in a brief span of years. Organizations dissolved; restraints disappeared. Churches, social bonds, and cultural institutions often broke down, and they could not be reconstituted before the frontier families made yet another leap into the wilderness or the prairie."[119] "It was a society of courage and character, of endurance and practical cunning, but it was not a society likely to produce poets or artists or savants."[120] During the 1920s, these people opposed Darwinism and modernism in general. The evangelicals perceived the Bible as the ultimate source of truth.

Controversy over Charles Darwin's theories of human evolution and metaphorical interpretations of Biblical text had been bubbling for decades among Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, and other Protestants. Traditionalists insisted that the Book of Genesis and the Scripture offered believers an inerrant guide to divine plan and order. World War I heightened

[118] Leuchtenburg, William E. *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32*. 11.impression ed. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 1966, 222.
[119] Hofstadter, Richard. *Anti-intellectualism in American Life.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, 76.
[120] Ibid., 80.

concerns over modern creeds. Some theologians thought that evolutionary doctrines had caused the war. By 1920, many evangelicals linked evolutionary precepts to the evils of modern atheism, secularism, immorality, materialism, and disintegration of the family.[121]

The first explicit prohibition of Darwinian teaching in the public schools came in Tennessee. "The Butler Act of 1925 forbade instruction in "any theory that denies the story of the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible and teaches instead that man has descended from a lower order of animals."' Signed as a symbolic gesture by a governor who believed the statute was too vague to be enforced, the antievolution bill nevertheless aroused the attention of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which sought to test its constitutionality in a civil proceeding.[122]

In that spring, in the mountain town of Dayton, Tennessee, John T. Scopes, "a slim, bespectacled young biology teacher at Central High School, a man with engaging modesty and wit, was sipping lemon phosphates at Robinson's Drug Store with several of his friends, and in particular with George Rappelyea, manager of the local mine, and druggist Robinson, chairman of the county schoolbook committee." They discussed the law, of which they disapproved. They also talked about the fact that the ACLU had offered counsel to any Tennessee teacher who challenged the law. "More in the spirit of fun than of social protest, the mine manager and the teacher hatched a scheme. The next day Scopes lectured from Hunter's Civic Biology and Rappleyea filed a complaint with local officials. The police brought Scopes before the justices of the peace, and he was bound over to a grand jury."[123]

[121] Horowitz, David A. *America's Political Class Under Fire: The Twentieth Century's Great Culture War*. London: Routledge, 2013;2003, 22. doi:10.4324/9780203955031.

[122] Ibid., 23.

[123] Leuchtenburg, William E. *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32*. 11.impression ed. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 1966, 220.

To Scope's defense came Clarence Darrow, "the most famous defense lawyer in the country and an avowed agnostic, Arthur Garfield Hays, a civil liberties attorney, and Dudley Field Malone, who in other years had campaigned with Bryan for the Democratic cause." Meanwhile, the World's Christian Fundamentals Association, organized in 1919 to fight modern theology in Protestant churches, retained William Jennings Bryan to assist the prosecution. [124]

Bryan has been heralded as the twentieth century's most important evangelical politician, certainly the central figure in American reform politics between the 1890s and the 1920s. "Remembered for his stirring 1896 presidential campaign in support of the free coinage of silver, Bryan used his influence in the Democratic Party to oppose the annexation of the Philippines in 1899 and to crusade against U.S. intervention in World War I. In 1910, the Boy Orator of the Platte added prohibitionism to a wide array of causes that included woman's suffrage, labor rights, regulation of monopolies, electoral primaries, and direct election of U.S. senators."[125]

The Midwest folk hero blamed social and economic elites for cultural corruption, holding them responsible for the excesses of the consumer economy and its accompanying hedonistic values. Bryan had called upon Wisconsin taxpayers in 1922 to dismiss a university president whose toleration of evolution in the curriculum undermined the religious beliefs of most of the people.[126]

At the Dayton trial, the court focused on the issue weather Scopes had violated the law, which he clearly had. But the defense attempted to shift the emphasis to the questioning of the law itself. Scope's attorneys, who argued that a belief in evolution was consistent with Christian faith and that Genesis was allegorical, were frustrated in their efforts to demonstrate that the statute was

[124] Ibid., 221.
[125] Horowitz, David A. *America's Political Class Under Fire: The Twentieth Century's Great Culture War*. London: Routledge, 2013;2003, 23. doi:10.4324/9780203955031.
[126] Ibid., 26.

either wicked or foolish. Then, Hays hit upon the idea of calling Bryan to the stand as an expert on the Bible. “Bryan made a fatal admission: he conceded that when the Bible said the world had been created in six days, it did not necessarily mean that a “day” was twenty-four hours long; it might be a million years.” Thus Bryan, who believed that the Bible must be read literally, had himself “interpreted” the Bible, by that destroying the basis for opposition to modernism.[127]

Scopes was found guilty and fined $100. The Tennessee supreme court later threw out the fine on a technicality, thereby blocking his attorneys from testing the constitutionality of the law. “Yet in a 3 to 1 decision, the court sustained the Butler Act, which remained on the books until 1966. The 1920s also produced antievolution laws in Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas, while the populist governor of Texas, Miriam “Ma” Ferguson, banned all references to Darwinism in public school textbooks. Many educational publishers voluntarily followed suit.”[128] Meanwhile, John Scopes received a scholarship to study geology at the University of Chicago. The Dayton trial ended in a hollow victory for the fundamentalists. They were losing “the more important battle, the larger cultural battle.”[129]

3.4. The 1928 Presidential Campaign

For more than a century, American politics has been dominated by the country. No asset was greater than that of birth in a log cabin. In the 1920s, for the first time, a man who was unmistakably of the city made a bid for national power. In the career of Alfred E. Smith and the presidential campaign of 1928, all the tensions between rural and urban America reached their highest pitch.[130]

[127] Leuchtenburg, William E. *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32*. 11.impression ed. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 1966, 223.
[128] Horowitz, David A. *America's Political Class Under Fire: The Twentieth Century's Great Culture War*. London: Routledge, 2013;2003;. doi:10.4324/9780203955031, 30.
[129] Balmer, Randall and Lauren F. Winner. *Protestantism in America*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, 64.
[130] Leuchtenburg, William E. *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32*. 11.impression ed. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 1966, 229.

Alfred Smith was born in 1873 in New York's Lower East Side. From the age of seven until he was fourteen, he served seven o'clock Mass as altar boy in the neighborhood Catholic church. At the age of fifteen , he was forced to quit school to go to work at the fish market. Later, Smith joined Tammany Hall and after a long apprenticeship, moved the ranks of political preferment. In 1903, at the age of thirty, as a reward for faithful service, Smith was sent to the New York state legislature where he made a brilliant record and awakened the country for the need of social legislation. "The best-informed man on legislative matters in the entire state," in 1918 he was elected governor of the most populous state in the country. Smith was the logical candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1928.[131]

The Republicans turn to Herbert Hoover as their presidential candidate. As Secretary of Commerce, Hoover epitomized the new capitalism, with its emphasis on efficiency, distribution, co-operation, and service. Smith could make the appeal of a humanitarian and a friend of business at the same time. It was his misfortune to run against a man in 1928 who could make precisely the same claims and did not have Smiths' liabilities. "On almost every important issue, the Democratic platform of 1928 paralleled that of the Republicans…Smith's inability or unwillingness to establish a progressive position sharply different from Hoover's permitted the campaign to focus on religion, prohibition, and personalities. Well before the battle began, foes of Smith warned that his election would mean the control of the White House by a foreign pope…"[132] Not until 1960, when John F. Kennedy was elected president, did a Catholic enter the White House.

Competing religion in importance in alienating the South from the Democratic nomination was the prohibition issue. In his final campaign stop, in Milwaukee, Smith told the crowd that the

[131] Ibid., 230.
[132] Ibid., 233.

Volstead Act should be amended to let the states decide their own drinking rules, and that "the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy." [133] Hoover, on the other hand, called prohibition a "great social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far reaching in purpose."

The presidential campaign reflected a deep antagonism between rural and urban America that went beyond any single issue. "The choice between Hoover and Smith was one "between two levels of civilization - the Evangelical, middle-class America and the Big City Tammany masses…It is the old American, Puritan-based ideals against the new Latin ideals…It is the old stock against the loose, fluctuating masses of the Big Cities. It is dry against wet. It is Protestant against Catholic."[134]

For the next fifty years, conventional wisdom pegged the Scopes trial and Prohibition as the final twitches of the American fundamentalists. They denied science and were humiliated before the nation at the Scopes trial; they hung on grimly to a Prohibition program that would not last long outside of the South. Prohibition's fall would signal the end of a long neo-Puritan swing.[135]

4. Christian Libertarians Opposing the New Deal

In introducing the New Deal, Roosevelt and his allies revived the old language of the Social Gospel to justify the creation of the modern welfare state. The original proponents of the Social Gospel back in the late nineteenth century, had significantly reframed Christianity as a faith concerned less with personal salvation and more with the public good. "The 1930s version of this

[133] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 340.
[134] Leuchtenburg, William E. *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32*. 11.impression ed. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 1966, 239.
[135] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 337.

gospel brimmed with social… commandments: Laisses-faire is a morally dubious principle. Honor the labor movement. Condemn not individual sinners but the economic system that pushes poor people into hard corners."[136]

4.1. Spiritual Mobilization

In the early 1930s, Southern California, a continent away from the East Coast establishment, proved to be the perfect place for new modes of thought and action. Richard Hofstadter quoted Norman Vincent Peale who wrote: '"*Christianity…is entirely practical*. It is astounding how defeated persons can be changed into victorious individuals when they actually utilize their religious faith as a workable instrument."… And whereas men had once been able to take heart from business success as a sign that they had been saved, they now took salvation as a thing to be achieved in this life by an effort of will, as something that would bring with it success in the pursuit of worldly goals. Religion is something to be *used*."[137] This expression represents the new trends that religion and business established, to defeat the New Deal.

In 1935 James W. Fifield Jr. had been recruited to take over the elite First Congregational Church in Los Angeles. In his sharp direction , "its membership nearly quadrupled, making it the single largest Congregationalist church in the world and the church of choice for Los Angeles's elite."[138] The minister was well matched to the millionaires in his pews, but Fairfield's connection to his congregation extended to their perspectives on religion and politics too. "[T]hroughout the 1940s and early 1950, Fifield and like-minded religious leaders advanced a new blend of

[136] Ibid., 348.
[137] Hofstadter, Richard. *Anti-intellectualism in American Life.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, 265.

[138] Kruse, Kevin M. *One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2015, 9.

conservative religion, economics, and politics that came to be known as "Christian libertarianism."'[139]

Christian libertarians saw Christianity and capitalism as inextricably intertwined and argued that spreading the gospel of one required spreading the gospel of the other. They opposed the postwar America's liberal public policies. Christian libertarians presented their alternative vision of how the United States should be governed, more accurately, how Americans should govern themselves. The traditional defense of individual freedom, according to Christian libertarians can only be appreciated by understanding the religious arguments for political liberty.

Spiritual values continue today to provide the founding convictions of many American libertarians and conservatives. "In fact, if the beliefs of the founding fathers are taken at face value, then Christian libertarianism - the defense of individual freedom as the will of God - is the first and most enduring American political and moral philosophy. A case can even be made that Christian libertarianism forms the foundation of any claims for 'American Exceptionalism.'"[140] As a body of political thought, and largely, a consequence of the pressures exerted upon individual freedom by New Deal liberalism, Christian libertarianism received its fullest exposition in the 1950s and the 1960s.

To lead his crusade in defense of individual freedom, Fifield offered services of Spiritual Mobilization. The organization's credo reflected the common politics of the minister and the millionaires in Fifield's congregation. "It held that men were creatures of God imbued with "inalienable rights and responsibilities," specifically enumerated as "the liberty and dignity of the individual, in which freedom of choice, of enterprise and property is inherent."' Fifield charged

[139] Ibid., p. 7.
[140] Haddigan, Lee. "The Importance of Christian Thought for the American Libertarian Movement: Christian Libertarianism, 1950-71." *Libertarian Papers* 2, no. 14 (2010): 14, 2.

that among the "grievous sin" of the New Deal was that '"[t]he President of the United States and his administration are responsible for the willful or unconscious destruction of thrift, initiative, industriousness and resourcefulness which have been among our best assets since Pilgrim days."' Fifield called for a return to traditional values. He held that it was not merely the rich who were suffering but all Americans.[141]

International tensions soon marginalized domestic politics and prompted the country to rally around Roosevelt again. As the distraction of the foreign war drew to a close, Fifield looked forward to renewing the fight against the New Deal. The minister counted on the support of the former president Herbert Hoover and an impressive array of conservative figures in politics, business, and religion. The advisory committee of Spiritual Mobilization included "three past or present presidents of the US Chamber of Commerce, a leading Wall Street analyst, a prominent economist at the American Banking Association, the founder of the National Small Businessmen's Association, a US congressman, Dr. Norman Vincent Peale, a few notable authors and lecturers, and the president of the California Institute of Technology, Stanford University, the University of California, the University of Florida, and Princeton Theological Seminary."[142]

Spiritual Mobilization's national ambitions soon stretched its budget beyond even the ample resources of First Congregational, leading Fifield to search for new sponsors. In 1944 he won several powerful new patrons, among them J. Howard Pew Jr., the president of Sun Oil, who not simply supported Spiritual Mobilization financially but also helped in shaping its growth and effectiveness. A national network of clergymen was built, and this was the primary channel through which the work and writings of Spiritual Mobilization would flow.[143]

[141] Ibid., 12.
[142] Ibid., 14.
[143] Ibid., 17.

Organization's opposition to liberalism did not reach its full audience until the publication of the first *Faith and Freedom* in December 1949. Through the monthly journal, originally edited by William Johnson, these corporate leaders and conservative intellectuals strove to convince clergymen to reject the New Deal state. In that first issue, in the article 'Should Government Be Our Brother's Keeper,' written by ex-President Herbert Hoover, he began by recognizing the strain increased taxation had placed on the individual's ability to voluntarily contribute to welfare agencies, but gave several reasons why citizens should not relinquish the desire to continue their own charitable activities. "The first, not surprisingly for Hoover, argued that the exceptional 'free and noble' character of American civilization rested upon the inspiration for progress the country's voluntary organizations—churches, businesses, women's organizations, labor and farmer associations, charitable agencies— galvanized. If this "very nature of American life" was absorbed by government bureaucracies, the result would be that something "neither free nor noble would take its place." His final rationalization for the voluntary impulse extended this argument to the future of world civilization. [T]he world "is in the grip of a death struggle between the philosophy of Christ and that of Hegel and Marx," he contended."[144]

Faith and Freedom stressed that America's greatest danger came from the nation's spiritual malaise, not from outside enemies. In September 1954 article, 'Freedom Under God,' James Fifield argued that the founding fathers recognized that there is a moral law which inheres in the nature of the universe, and that they found the rules in the Ten Commandments and the Beatitudes. "It was the assurance gained from such knowledge that encouraged them to overthrow the immoral rule of the British, and to establish a government which recognized the natural right of individuals to live their lives free from government interference. In recent times adherence to this moral law

[144] Haddigan, Lee. "The Importance of Christian Thought for the American Libertarian Movement: Christian Libertarianism, 1950-71." *Libertarian Papers* 2, no. 14 (2010): 14, 12.

had been abandoned, Fifield contended, and instead of "inquiring whether a thing is right or wrong, we have wondered whether it is Right or Left."'[145] The result was confusion and fear; the same emotions that had allowed Hitler, with the misguided assistance of the country's opinion makers, to destroy freedom in Germany. Fifield maintained that Americans must seek to re-establish their faith, and the belief in the dignity of man and his freedom that necessarily accompanied it.

Hence, argues Kevin M. Kruse, the postwar revolution in America's religious identity embodied in the phrase "freedom under God" had its roots not in the foreign policy panic of the 1950s but rather in the domestic politics of the 1930s and early 1940s. The architects of the "Christian libertarianism" feared most not the Soviet regime in Moscow, but Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal administration in Washington. "By the late 1940s and early 1950s, this ideology had won converts including religious leaders as Billy Graham and Abraham Vereide and conservative icons ranging from former president Herbert Hoover to future president Ronald Reagan."[146]

4.2. Public Payers

Abraham Vereide, a Methodist clergyman was thoroughly conservative in his political views. The Norwegian had immigrated to America in 1905 and, a decade later, begun work as a minister in Seattle. During the 1920s, he ran Goodwill Industries' operation in the city with efficiency, organizing forty-nine thousand housewives into thirty-seven districts to collect used good for the needy. "While his approach to running the charity was businesslike, so too was his attitude toward the underlying idea. "Promiscuous charity pauperizes," he insisted in 1927, "and

[145] Ibid., 16.
[146] Kruse, Kevin M. *One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2015, xiv.

the average person seeking aid…does not want to work for it."' He became convinced that "[the] depression was moral and spiritual as well as material." According to Vereide, the country needed a spiritual awakening as the only foundation for economic stability. [147]

In 1935 with the help of Seattle prominent local developer Walter Douglass, Vereide arranged what had become a regular prayer breakfast for businessmen called the City Chapel. Their services were nondenominational but called for a return to basic biblical principles. "[T]he founders of City Chapel announced their intention "to foster and promote the advancement of Christianity and develop a Christian nation."' As the Seattle group flourished, businessmen in other communities reached out to Vereide in hopes of starting ones of their own. Vereide traveled tirelessly around the country to organize and mobilize new meetings.[148]

Of all cities enamored by the prayer breakfast, none was more important than Washington, D.C. In January 1942, in the midst of a massive blizzard, Vereide brought together seventy-four prominent men – mostly congressmen, but with a few business and civic leaders as well – for a luncheon at the Willard Hotel. Vereide suggested to members of Congress that they begin to meet in a similar fashion and set the pace for a "God-directed and God-controlled nation." The next week, the House of Representatives breakfast group began, and soon a regular Senate group met as well.[149]

These congressional breakfast meetings quickly became a fixture on Capitol Hill. The congressional prayer meeting gave Vereide immediate access to the nation's political elite. "The more politically connected he became, the more leading businessmen sought time with him. And the more backing he secured from corporate titans, the more eager politicians were to count

[147] Ibid., 40.
[148] Ibid., 42.
[149] Ibid., 44.

themselves as his friend." Vereide believed he was bringing these influential people closer to God – but he was also bringing them closer to one another.[150] In other words, such meetings became the story of a "would be political elite." Vereide's prayer breakfast meetings exemplify the "loosely knit network of local and national organizations" that helped conservatives' "deliberate attempt in the postwar years, to move from the sidelines of American politics to center stage through the creation of a counterpart to the "liberal establishment" they so resented."[151]

Public prayer highlighted the official inaugural festivities as well. Chief Justice Fred Vinson, on had to deliver the oath of office, welcomed the religious emphasis. When he had risen to the high court, the Kentucky Democrat had taken part in a "consecration ceremony" sponsored by a new prayer breakfast group in the Senate. "There, before a gathering of more than two dozen senators and the attorney general, the chief justice of the United States testified about "the importance of the Bible being the Book of all the people and how the whole superstructure of government and jurisprudence is built upon it."'[152]

In the 1940s and 1950s, the prayer breakfast meetings of Abraham Vereide, Billy Graham's evangelical revivals, and the presidential campaign of Dwight D. Eisenhower encouraged the spread of public prayer as a means to advance Christian libertarianism. "Just as Spiritual Mobilization used faith to defend free enterprise, these movements called for a return to prayer to advance the same ends."[153] But the popularity of Graham and the broad audience of his "old-fashioned" revivals also marked the beginning of a new phenomenon – a distinctive type of revivalist nationalism.

[150] Ibid., 46.
[151] Bjerre-Poulsen, Niels. *Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2002, 11.

[152] Kruse, Kevin M. *One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2015, x.
[153] Ibid, 37.

Although evangelicals believed that conversion ultimately depended upon the working of the Holy Spirit, they had eternal belief and expectation that God truly worked in history through mass revival. “Joel Carpenter has called this faith an “evangelical Whig” tradition of political thinking, “which by means of revivalism and voluntary reform sought to provide the virtuous political culture that would keep the American republic true to its covenant.”[154]

4.3. Revivalist Nationalism

‘“Wake up, America! Stir thyself!” The fiery words of a young Billy Graham in 1947 poured forth to an audience of thousands, pleading to each person, and to a nation: “God help us to return before it is too late!” Graham was preaching revival - revival of the soul and the nation.” Graham’s theory of political change was that saved souls lead to a saved nation. In his Los Angeles crusade of 1949, which launched him into national prominence, Graham warned that the fate of the City of Angels hinged on the spiritual lives of his listeners. His words provided his audience with a politics that emphasized personal morality and individual responsibility. “Thirty years later, a call for revival, in a similarly spectacular setting, came from a man in many ways the opposite of Graham. While the evangelist preached against the apostasy of Los Angeles, Ronald Reagan made his name and his early career in Hollywood. Graham preached spiritual conversion above all else; Reagan’s theory of political change had no explicit mention of Jesus Christ. Graham crusaded for souls; Reagan crusaded for principles.” [155] In his 1980 Reagan outlined his own revivalist agenda expressed through his revivalist campaign slogan, “Let’s Make America Great

[154] Hummel, Daniel. "Revivalist Nationalism since World War II: From “Wake Up, America!” to “Make America Great again”." *Religions* 7, no. 11 (2016): 128, 3.

[155] Ibid., 1.

Again." His primary passion was to revive hope, to renew American compact of freedom, the principles of small government and American exceptionalism.

"Graham's religious revivalism and Reagan's political revivalism," argues Daniel Hummel, "highlight how broad and malleable the practice of revival remained in postwar America, and yet also how distinct different types could be." Graham's certainty in each man's piety made him perhaps too attached to personal persuasion. He was driven by the conviction that good leaders inevitably produced good policy, much as his revivalism was built on the conviction that revived citizens inevitably produced a good nation.[156]

Graham's revivals evidenced a fusion of "old-fashioned" revivalism and new technologies and organization. "Speaking of his early work for Youth for Christ in 1945–1948, Graham recalled, "We used every modern means to catch the ear of unconverted young people and then punched them straight between the eyes with the gospel."…As Graham focused on urban areas like Charlotte, Miami, and Baltimore, his revivals took place either in buildings meant to accommodate mass meetings (large churches, auditoriums, and stadiums) or, as in the case of Los Angeles in 1949, a massive tent on a vacant lot with seating for thousands."[157] Revivalism, more than virtually any other sphere of evangelical activity, brought evangelical religion and politics together to the masses. Pervading the entire revival, at each stage and in each organizational decision, was the priority to reach the most people possible with the gospel message.

Jerry Falwell, who succeeded Graham as the unofficial spokesman for evangelicalism in the 1970s, articulated a new theory of revival and its relationship to politics. He held that God cared less about individual souls and more about the principles that society was based upon.

[156] Ibid., 2.
[157] Ibid., 4.

According to Falwell, "If a nation or a society lives by divine principles, even though the people personally don't know the One who taught and lived those principles, that society will be blessed. An unsaved person in business will be blessed by tithing to the work of God. He'll still go to hell a tither, but God blesses the principle." Falwell reversed the evangelical priority of personal salvation to save the nation. Instead, he sought to save the nation first, which would protect the needed political freedoms with which to save souls. The Religious Right inherited and leveraged revival with one major exception: it dropped the evangelism. It adopted the form of revival but shifted the emphasis. The result was a more political, less evangelistic, but equally urgent and populist revival suitable to the demands of grassroots, local, and culture wars politics. What principles did Reagan stand for, more than his personal faith, concerned the Religious Right. [158]

By tracing revivalist nationalism through the postwar period, Daniel Hummel points at three summarizing aspects. First, the centrality of revivalism to American evangelical nationalism reshapes how scholars understand postwar evangelicalism, the rise of the Religious Right, and postwar conservatism. Second, revivalist nationalism is both an ideology and a process that contributed to the politicization of postwar evangelicals. Many of the most successful evangelical leaders, from Graham to Falwell to Pat Robertson, experienced decisive spiritual and political awakenings in the context of revival. And finally, because of revivalist nationalism's changing objectives over time - from winning individual souls to renewing the principles of the nation – "a gradual secularization of revivalist nationalism can be observed, one that could even accommodate a non-evangelical figure like Donald Trump, so long as this figure was suitably "pro-principle."' This line of argument has pervaded evangelical discussions of the 2016 election and Trump's campaign to, once again, "Make American Great Again. "It would be too much to conclude that

[158] Ibid., 11.

Trump's urgent message of recent national decline is merely an expression of a secularized revivalism," argues Daniel Hummel, "but it would be too little to ignore how this form, and its brand of nationalism, have shaped how millions of Americans understand the nation."[159]

4.4. Anti-intellectualism in the 1950s

During the 1950s anti-intellectualism became a movement. "A term only rarely heard before", writes Hofstadter, "became a familiar part of [the] national vocabulary of self-recrimination and intramural abuse." Primarily it was the McCarthyism which aroused the fear that the critical mind was at a ruinous discount in America. "Of course, intellectuals were not the only targets of McCarthy's constant detonations – he was after bigger game – but intellectuals were in the line of fire, and it seemed to give special rejoicing to his followers when they were hit. His stories against intellectuals and universities were emulated throughout the country by a host of less exalted inquisitors."[160]

The right-wing crusade of the 1950s was full of heated rhetoric about

> "Harvard professors, twisted-thinking intellectuals…in the State department"; those who are "burdened with…academic honors" but not "equally loaded with honesty and common sense";..."the pompous diplomat in stripped pants with phony British accent"; those who try to fight Communism "with kid gloves in perfumed drawing rooms"; Easterners who "insult the people of the great Midwest and West, the *heart* of America"; [and] whose loyalty is still not above suspicion...[161]

Dwight Eisenhower's decisive victory at the 1952 presidential elections was taken both by the intellectuals themselves and by their critics as a measure of their repudiation by America.

[159] Ibid., 15.
[160] Hofstadter, Richard. *Anti-intellectualism in American Life.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, 3.
[161] Ibid., 12.

Succeeding twenty years of Democratic rule, during which the intellectual had been respected and understood, business had come back into power.

"Although", argues Hofstadter, "the anti-intellectualism of businessmen, interpreted narrowly as hostility to intellectuals, was mainly a political phenomenon... interpreted more broadly as a suspicion of intellect itself, it is part of the extensive American devotion to practicality and direct experience which ramifies through almost every area of American life." With some variations, the excessive practical bias so often attributed only to business is found almost everywhere in America.[162]

For the average American, the development of character and applying common sense to a high degree was more important than intellect. "The plain sense of the common man, especially if tested by success in some demanding line of practical work, is an altogether adequate substitute for, if not actually much superior to, formal knowledge and expertise acquired in the schools…In any case the discipline of the heart and the old-fashioned principle of religion and morality, are more reliable guides to life than an education which aims to produce minds responsive to new trends in thought and art."[163] This is an apparent example of how the Protestant work ethic influenced American culture. Americans were suspicious of knowledge that could not be put into practice. Conservative politicians and most of all Ronald Reagan appealed to the common sense of those men of self-reliance, to restore American values and get an upper hand in the culture wars in the 1980s.

Billy Graham - the most successful evangelist of the mid-twentieth century, held that "moral standards of yesterday to many individuals are no standards for today, unless supported by

[162] Ibid., 237.
[163] Ibid., 19.

the so-called "intellectuals." '"[In place of the Bible]", he said, "we substituted reason, rationalism, mind culture, science worship, the working power of government, Freudianism, naturalism, humanism, behaviorism, positivism, materialism, and idealism. [This is the work of] so-called intellectuals. Thousands of these "intellectuals" have publicly stated that morality is relative – that there is no norm of absolute standard."[164] As during the 1960s, relativism was embraced to a full extent, those same concerns resonated with the next generation conservative evangelicals.

5. The Sixties and the Conservative Backlash

The sixties stand for a neat version of the Social Gospel. The activists tossed aside taboos on "intemperance" or "unchastity" and aimed their jeremiads at "injustice" and "oppression." American Puritanism imploded. Critics still fume over the long roster of sins: drugs, sex, homosexuality, hedonism, feminism and so on. "The public bulwarks of private virtue – purity laws, obscenity standards, decency groups, television norms... – all tumbled down. As moral order seemed to collapse in the private realm, moralizing flooded into politics." Beneath the contemporary fight over the sixties lies a conflict between two American moral traditions. Conservatives struggle to restore the Victorian virtues, meanwhile, progressives look back wistfully at the faded Social Gospel ideals.[165]

[164] Ibid., 15.
[165] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 407.

5.1. The 1960s Legacy

Race

The years after World War II where characterized by a sense of national well-being. There was a "baby boom" principally because people felt that the future held promise in which they could safely rise a family. But there were some specific problems in American life. Racial and ethnic prejudice continued to be part American national character. Blacks and other minorities had tried to gain place as equals in American life for generations. That effort was intensified after World War II. Black soldiers had gone to fight and die for "freedom." Yet they returned home to a segregated society that denied them basic rights that America claimed were due to all citizens. Agitation for civil rights for blacks intensified after the war. In 1954 the Supreme Court declared in *Brown v. Board of Education*, that educational institutions should not be segregated by race. The 1960s was a decade, dominated by the civil rights movement.

On 1 February 1960, four black college students in Greensboro, North Carolina, walked into a Woolworth's store, sat down at the lunch counter, and asked for coffee. When they were as usually denied service, based on the prevailing racial customs ,they refused to move away from the counter until it was closed that day. Thus, was born the "sit-in," a strategy to confrontation that brought black expectations for equal treatment to the awareness of the white community. Sit-ins were often accompanied by an economic boycott. Discrimination was pervasive in society and the economic boycott of the businesses in a community gave blacks move visibility and leverage that did attaching eating facilities only.[166]

[166] Flowers, Ronald B. *Religion in Strange Times the 1960s and 1970s*. Macon, GA: Mercer University, 1984, 5.

Another strategy to call attention to the plight of black people in a segregated society was the organized march. The most famous was the March to Washington in 1963. Before the eyes of the nation, thousands of blacks and their sympathizers of other races illustrated the need for a change in the racial patterns of American society. At the end of that march, in front of the Lincoln Memorial, Martin Luther King, Jr. made his "I have a dream" speech, articulating the yearning of blacks to take their rightful place in society and their resolve to continue to work until they accomplished that goal.[167]

The sit-ins, which galvanized the civil rights movement in the 1960s, were apparently conceived and certainly carried on by black college students. "Although the media emphasized the leadership roles of older people like Martin Luther King Jr., A. Philip Randolph, and Bayard Rustin, many leadership positions in the movement were filled capably by people in their early twenties." Indeed, around 1964, he Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) became one of the principal groups agitating for social change in America. Some white people of all ages joined the blacks in their effort to achieve equality.[168]

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 abolished segregation in public places, even if they were privately run – movie theaters, restaurants, hotels, gas stations. "The law forbade discrimination in institutions that received federal funds. It barred discrimination by employers or unions. And it created an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to oversee compliance. The following year the liberals broke another filibuster and passed what the *New York Times* called the strongest voting right bill in American history."[169]

[167] Ibid., 6.
[168] Ibid., 10.
[169] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 431.

Meanwhile, the escalation of the Vietnam war had become an issue transcending other concerns. Those idealistic white youth who still wanted to promote change through direct action turned their attention to antiwar activities. In general, they "began to believe that the "respectable society" was facade covering a multitude of evils needing correction." The government, institutions of society such as the university, and the middle class life-style itself were all labeled "establishment." '"Establishment" became a dirty work in the minds of a multitude of disillusioned youth because they regarded it as not only racist and militaristic, but as excessively materialistic, devoid of meaning , stifling of individuality and personal freedom.[170] The sixties ushered in an intense new form of polarization that hinged on the very question of America and its meaning. The decade became ground zero for the contemporary culture wars.

The New Left

The sixties were a watershed decade due to the role played by the New Left – a set of social movements including the antiwar, Black Power, feminist, and gay liberation movements, among others. "[They] surged across America, radically changing the relationship between white people and people of color, how the U.S. government conducts foreign policy, and the popular consensus regarding gender and sexuality. Together, these movements redefined the meaning of democracy in America."[171] Although its political goals never really got off the ground, the New Left transformative effects were to be found in the shifting cultural sensibilities.

[170] Flowers, Ronald B. *Religion in Strange Times the 1960s and 1970s*. Macon, GA: Mercer University, 1984, 11.
[171] Gosse, Van. *Rethinking the New Left: An Interpretative History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005;2016, 2. doi:10.1007/978-1-4039-8014-4.

While the New Left's central focus in the late 1950s and early 1960s, was the Civil Rights movement in the South, a parallel student movement developed among white youth in the North. Northern campus radicalism was not organized around a single cause but embraced many.

> [I]n the 1959-1962 period these included both nuclear disarmament…and campaigns demanding free speech on campus. Student activists also opposed the racial and religious discrimination practiced by many fraternities and sororities and denounced the "parietal" rules that regulated students' social and sexual lives. Of particular importance was a new group, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which offered a comprehensive critique of American society and a new theory of social change it called "participatory democracy."[172]

The white New Left of the sixties was younger and more affluent than any American Left before or since. "We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit." This first sentence of the Port Huron Statement, authored by twenty-two-year-old Tom Hayden, announced the birth of the SDS. The nucleus of the white New Left was found on the nation's college campuses. Hundreds of thousands of young white Americans, inspired by the civil rights movement and radicalized by the Vietnam War, committed themselves to leftist activism of one sort or another.[173]

In late 1964 the nation's attention was riveted by the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley. Mario Savio and his fellow University of California protesters demanded the right of Berkeley students to engage in political activity on campus. On October 1, police were called in to arrest an activist. "Over the next two months, an escalating war of attrition, repression, and surprise attack was played out between an ineffectual administration led by President Clark Kerr and an experienced student leadership, many of them self-named "red diaper babies" from leftwing

[172] Ibid., 64.
[173] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., 2015, 11.

families. Savio became nationally famous, giving impromptu speeches of fervent eloquence." [174] The organizers understood that if they kept a large base of student support by emphasizing free speech, a sacred American principle, they could bring the faculty over to their side and isolate Kerr. They succeeded.

Among the intellectuals who helped New Leftists to explain their estrangement from America were C. Wright Mills and Paul Goodman. Mills projected the image of a renegade: the Texas-born sociologist rode a motorcycle and donned a leather jacket. His ideas enunciated the type of antiauthoritarianism that excited New Leftists such as Hayden who modeled the Port Huron statement on Mills's thought. "In his popular 1951 book *White Collar*, Mills depicted America as a dystopian, bureaucratic "iron cage." In … *The Power Elite*, published in 1956, Mills similarly applied Max Weber's lens to the institutional structures of the American rich, "those political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences."[175] For the college students, reading Mills provoked individualistic urges to rebel against the repressiveness of cultural conformity.

Paul Goodman was a secular New York Jewish leftist. His popularity with the New Left owed to his intuitions and his open bisexuality. Goodman believed social change required that individuals simply live differently. Such an approach resonated with New Leftists, who sought alternative ways of living that bypassed corrupted institutions. The book that unexpectedly made Goodman famous, *Growing Up Absurd: The Problems of Youth in the Organized Society*, published in 1960, "dealt with two of the most analyzed issued of the time, the "disgrace of the Organized System" and juvenile delinquency, arguing that the former caused the latter. It is easy

[174] Gosse, Van. *Rethinking the New Left: An Interpretative History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005;2016, 71. doi:10.1007/978-1-4039-8014.
[175] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., 2015, 13.

to understand why reading Goodman came to be a cathartic experience for so many young people, even young women who overlooked Goodman's glaring misogyny while embracing his antiauthoritarianism."[176]

The ways in which Goodman blurred the boundaries between political and cultural radicalism portended the affinity between the New Left and what became known as "the counterculture." "In 1968, New Leftist Theodore Roszak explained how this worked: "The counter culture is the embryonic cultural base of New Left politics, the effort to discover new types of community, new family patterns, new sexual mores, new kinds of livelihood, new aesthetic forms, new personal identities on the far side of power politics, the bourgeois home, and the Protestant work ethic."[177]

Feminism

The Port Huron Statement's real legacy, argues James Morone, lies with the women who took those nebulous values of peace and social justice and infused them with meaning. They joined a larger social movement that grew stronger as the decade went on. "The political vanguard was already active. Between 1960 and 1966, Congress considered over 400 pieces of legislation on women's rights. However, the breakthrough – the feminist equivalent of *Brown v. Board of Education* – came with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Congressman Howard Smith, an ardent segregationist form Virginia, rose during the legislative battle and proposed an amendment: prohibit employers from discriminating by sex as well as by race, religion, or national origin."

[176] Ibid., 14.
[177] Ibid., 14.

Smith hoped to turn the proposed law into a farce and give northern representatives cover for rejecting the whole thing.[178]

But then an earnest voice entered the debate. Eleven of the twelve women in Congress broke with the official liberal line and supported the gender provision. "Quoting Gunnar Myrdal, the Representative Martha Griffiths said: "White women and Negroes occupied the same position in American society…" She also commented on all the fun the boys were having. "If there had been any necessity of pointing out that women were a second-class sex, the laughter would have proved it." Howard Smith's gender amendment passed, and, two days later, the entire civil rights bill went through the House."[179]

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in charge of enforcing the employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act, regarded ending racial discrimination as its primary mission and did little on behalf of women. In June 1966, women attending the National Conference of Commissions on the Status of Women urged the EEOC "to take sex discrimination as seriously as race discrimination. As the resolution filed, some in attendance the new organization needed to be formed "to take the actions needed to bring women into the mainstream American society." As a result, in October 1966 National Organization for Women was found and became a focal point for the movement for women's liberation.[180] "The goal seemed simple: "the hallmark of American democracy – equality, no more, no less." But getting there required rethinking of the most basic social categories: responsibility in the family, opportunity in society, the cultural expectations about sex and gender."[181]

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[178] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003. p. 440.

[179] Ibid., 441.

[180] Berkowitz, Edward D. *Something Happened: a political and cultural overview of the seventies.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 138.

[181] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 442.

During the late sixties and early seventies, the women's liberation movement made a major impression on America. "In the aftermath of the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago, with its confrontations between young Vietnam protesters and police, the women's movement staged its own protest. It took place at the Miss America Pageant, a beauty contest traditionally held in Atlantic City, New Jersey, after Labor Day…The protesters, in the spirit of the Yuppies who had nominated a pig for president in Chicago, crowned a sheep as Miss America." They also threw object that they regarded as emblematic of their oppression, such as dishcloths, cosmetics, and high-heeled shoes, into what they called Freedom Trash Can.[182]

A part of the 1964 law that prohibited discrimination in employment based on gender, race, color or national origin, exempted colleges, and universities from its reach. Therefore, advocates for women's rights probed ways of extending the law to colleges. In 1970, Congressman Edith green who had already served eight terms, used her seniority on the House Education Committee to investigate sexual discrimination in education. She collected more than thousand pages on the subject. "The hearings helped to create a favorable climate of opinion for changing another key law of the 1960s, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965…in order to end discrimination in education on the basis of sex. The resulting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 stated that "no person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal finance assistance."'[183]

Title IX had the potential to be the source of sweeping changes in education, depending on how the federal government chose to implement the law, as nearly every school district in the

[182] Berkowitz, Edward D. *Something Happened: a political and cultural overview of the seventies.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 138.
[183] Ibid., 140.

country received federal funds. The law could be applied to the entire country and end such things as separate high schools for boys and girls. The title supplied an important part of the impetus for changes in the ways that male and female students related to one another in elementary schools, high schools, and colleges. By the end of the millennium, a considerable change had occurred in a quiet way, women wrestled on high-school teams and people watched women's college and professional basketball games on television.[184]

5.2. Neoconservatism

If the New Leftists gave shape to one side of the culture wars, those who came to be called neoconservatives were considerably influential in shaping the other. "[I]n their spiritual defense of traditional American institutions, and in their full-throated attack on those intellectuals who composed…"adversary culture," neoconservatives helped draw up the very terms of the culture wars."[185]

Many of those who became neoconservatives had their origins in the Democratic Party and in the liberal reform tradition of the New Deal. Over time, they became disillusioned by the Democratic party, and alarmed over "the destructive energies of an apparently dysfunctional society." "In many areas of public policy, neoconservatives sought to demonstrate that government programmes have not only failed to diminish social problems but have actually served to exacerbate them."[186] The neoconservative response was to make a robust analytical claim for a thorough reassessment of public policy priorities. Their previous liberal allies in government and academia labelled them 'neoconservatives' as a term of ridicule, but the epithet was accepted by

[184] Ibid., 141.
[185] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., 2015, 38.
[186] Foley, Michael. "Conservatism." In *American Credo: The Place of Ideas in US Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2008, 29. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232673.003.0014.

the recipients who believed that their outlook would represent a genuinely new variant of American conservatism.[187]

The neoconservatives have a strong sense of purpose, place, and identity. They form a social and intellectual network and, on this basis, have developed their own foundations, publishing houses, journals, magazines, radio and television outlets, research institutes, and think tanks, located for the most part in New York City and Washington, DC. "The weight given by neoconservatives to public intellectualism makes them an unconventional component of American conservatism. [T]heir 'strategies for retaking cultural and political territory lend a conservative authenticity to their critiques of the media, educational, and policy establishments…Traditional American conservatism was anti-intellectual; neoconservatism is counter-intellectual.'"[188] Neoconservatives understood that the only way to resist a cultural elite is to replace it with another.

Conservative partisans in the culture wars assumed that the American culture was in decline. Most conservatives throughout the twentieth century, especially those with Christian fundamentalist theological bent, saw the origins of American cultural decay in Darwinism, biblical criticism, and other nineteenth-century harbingers of secularism. Neoconservatives, in contrast, believed the decline resulted from much more recent phenomena. Gertrude Himmelfarb, for example, argued that "sheathed in Victorian virtues, Western culture had weathered the storm of modernity – that is, until the sixties. It was only during and after that landmark decade that the moral certainties of the Victorian mind were destroyed by a countercultural ethos that had gone mainstream." Himmelfarb's husband, Irving Kristol, "the godfather of neoconservatism," argued that "neoconservatism was tasked with converting "the Republican party, and American

[187] Ibid., 28.
[188] Ibid., 28.

conservatism in general, against their respective wills, into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy."'[189]

In 1965 Kristol started *The Public Interest*, along with his fellow, the sociologist Daniel Bell. The new journal became renowned for its profound skepticism regarding merits of liberal reform. *The Public Interest* was instrumental in undermining the liberal idea that government policy could solve problems related to racism and poverty. "Kristol believed that welfare had become "a vicious circle in which the best of intentions merge into the worst of results." Kristol argued that a more generous welfare system would create more dependency.[190]

In 1972 Irving Kristol joined forty-five intellectuals, in signing a full-page advertisement that ran in the *New York Times* just prior to Nixon's landslide defeat of George McGovern. "[T]he signatories declared, "we believe that Richard Nixon has demonstrated superior capacity for prudent and responsible leadership."' They supported Nixon as they believed that the New Left, in the form of the "New Politics" movement that enabled the McGovern nomination, had captured the Democratic Party.[191]

The McGovern nomination represented a breaking point for Kristol and many other Cold War liberals, but their frustration with the increasing influence of the New Left had been bubbling for years. The earliest flashpoint was the overwhelming controversy of "the Moynihan Report." Daniel Patrick Moynihan, an urban sociologist who regularly contributed to *The Public Interest* wrote a polarizing paper in 1965 while serving as assistant secretary of labor in the Johnson administration. "In his controversial report, officially titled *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*, Moynihan argued that the equal right won by blacks in the legal realm - fruits

[189] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., 2015, 39.
[190] Ibid., 42.
[191] Ibid., 43.

born of the civil rights movement - brought newfound expectations for equal results. But achieving equal results would prove more difficult because blacks lacked the cultural conditioning necessary to compete with whites…"[192] For skeptics like Moynihan, the idea that culture impeded liberal reform efforts was an illuminating lens through which to view black poverty.

The most contentious aspect of the Moynihan Report was its focus on how differences in family structure isolated African Americans from the rest of the nation. Moynihan saw the fundamental problem in the crumbling Negro family in the urban ghettos. He was cagey on what came first: family disintegration or poverty. He argued that "the cause of disfunction…was that the black family tended to be matriarchal, a pattern that dated back to slavery. This, he believed, put blacks in a distinct disadvantage because male breadwinners were the source of American family stability." Despite this emphasis on the culture of poverty, Moynihan concluded his report with a call to expand jobs programs, since the black family could be made stable only if black men had decently paying jobs.[193]

Owing in part to the ideological success of the sixties liberation movements, especially Black Power, a large number of critics sharply rejected the logic that undergirded much of the Moynihan Report. William Ryan, a psychologist and civil rights activist, coined the phrase "blaming the victim" for what he described as Moynihan's act of "justifying inequality by finding defects in the victims of inequality. "Just as Black Power theorists Stockley Carmichael and Charles Hamilton explained racial inequality in institutional terms, Ryan emphasized how the American social structure favored whites over blacks."[194] Moynihan came to believe that a fair political debate of racial equality was no longer possible.

[192] Ibid., 43.
[193] Ibid., 44.
[194] Ibid., 45.

Another magazine crucial to the formation of the neoconservative persuasion was *Commentary*. Its longtime editor Norman Podhoretz, like Moynihan, break with the Left, partly motivated by personal factors. In his 1963 essay for *Commentary*, "My Negro Problem – and Ours," Podhoretz made an honest admission that most whites, even liberals were "twisted and sick in their feelings about Negros." He had grown weary of black arguments for special treatment, given that Jews never received such treatment and yet had managed to overcome past discrimination. In writing this piece, "Podhoretz claimed that the intention was merely to demonstrate the difficulties presented by racial integration. But plenty of readers, and Stockley Carmichael, interpreted it differently and proclaimed him a "racist." [195]

By the 1970 Podhoretz was an unapologetic neoconservative. He had declared ideological war against New Leftists and counterculture enthusiasts. Podhoretz and his fellow neoconservatives were unable to sympathize with people who hated a country that had given them so much opportunity. In seeking to explain such inexplicable attitude, the neoconservatives developed a persuasive theory about a "new class" of powerful people whose collective interests were inimical to traditional America. '"New Class" thought gained a larger audience in the United States after the publication of Yugoslav dissenter Milovan Djilas's 1957 book *The New Class*, which postulated that the communist elite gained power through the acquisition of knowledge as opposed to the acquisition of property."[196]

Neoconservatives, many of them former anti-Stalinist leftists, found the "new class" thought that migrated from the communist world compelling. But more central to their analysis of an American "new class" was Lionel Trilling's famous examination of the avantgarde revolt

[195] Ibid., 48.
[196] Ibid., 51.

against bourgeois society, what Trilling called the "adversary culture." "Modernist artists had long challenged conventional bourgeois norms. Such an adversarial attitude, Trilling noted, was the very premise upon which modernism was founded." The "adversary culture" came to be used interchangeably with the "new class" and was a powerful tool for understanding the anti-American turn taken by those in academia, media, fine arts, foundations, and even some realms of government, such as social welfare and regulatory agencies. [197]

5.3. Affirmative action

In 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order 11246, committing the federal government to affirmative action. Since all taxpayers, white and black, funded federal construction projects, the federal government would ensure that white and black taxpayers were hired to build those projects. The contractor should take affirmative steps to increase the number of its minority and female employees up to an agreed limit. Failure to make a good faith effort would mean the contractor could lose the contract. It was no longer enough for these companies not to discriminate against a given individual; they now had to achieve positive results in the racial composition of their workforce. During the seventies, with opportunities constricting for all workers, affirmative action had the potential to be a very divisive policy. Although it applies to all racial minorities and women as well, affirmative action increasingly became perceived as a special benefit for African Americans.[198]

The same logic was applied to higher education as well, granting white and black taxpayers access to the American universities they subsidized. "With this, the rhetoric about affirmative action shifted in focus from "merit" to preference." If two candidates…were equal, everything else

[197] Ibid., 51.
[198] Berkowitz, Edward D. *Something Happened: a political and cultural overview of the seventies.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 171.

considered, the black candidate was to be given preference."[199] The case that came to symbolize the problem involved the University of California – Davis Medical School. By 1791 most of the students were white. The racial homogeneity concerned the faculty, which established a special program to attract minority applicants. "At the time, no better ticket to a secure and prosperous life existed than admission to a medical school… One aspiring doctor was a man named Alan Bakke who applied for admission to Davis in 1973. Although his grades and test scores were higher than the averages obtained by people admitted under the special program for minorities, he was rejected."[200] He sued, claiming that the university had violated the terms of the 1964 Civil Right Act by discriminating against him on the basis of race.

The Bakke case attracted a great deal of attention as it made its way through the California court to the U.S. Supreme Court. It divided the nation and the Supreme Court. "[F]our justices held that the University of California maintained a racial quota system that violated the Civil Rights Act. In a separate opinion, Justice Lewis Powell agreed, although on different grounds, thus creating a majority in favor of admitting Bakke. The other four justices each wrote dissenting opinions in which they stated that race could be used as a criterion for admissions decisions. Powell, whose opinion turned out to be the judgment of the court, joined those opinions as well." The court found that there were constitutional and unconstitutional ways to use race as a factor in admission decisions. [201] As a result, affirmative action was weakened but intact. By the time Ronald Reagan moved into the White House conservatives were calling for "equal opportunity" for white Americans allegedly subjected to "reverse discrimination."

[199] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015, 104.
[200] Berkowitz, Edward D. *Something Happened: a political and cultural overview of the seventies.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 172.

[201] Ibid., 172.

Most conservatives rejected affirmative action from the outset. Some, like Barry Goldwater, couched their arguments against it in libertarian terms. They argued that "it was unwarranted government intervention into free labor market exchanges." With the time, the right-wing rhetoric became increasingly "colorblind." "Reagan did his part in this cause by regularly invoking Martin Luther King as his inspiration for a colorblind America, claiming he was committed to "a society where people would be judged on the content of their character, not the color of their skin."'[202] He suggested that the law should be solely concerned with the rights of individuals.

Initiatives such as affirmative action, bilingual education, busing, and other forms of social engineering led to what Lester Thurow called "zero-sum" society. "A growth society eased conflict by increasing the size of its economy. In a zero-sum economy, one person's gain was another person's loss."[203] During the 1970s, remedies for avoiding conflicts of the postwar era, such as the extension of civil-rights protections and Keynesian economics, no longer seemed to work. "But people as always cared about the well-being of their children and the stability of their communities. The result was both a rights revolution *and* a resurgence of conservative values that was itself a means by which evangelicals, Irish Catholics…, and Eastern European ethnics…could assert *their* rights."[204]

5.4. Equal Rights Amendment

By the 1970s, signals that the traditional family was in decline were everywhere, such a higher rate of divorce and out-of-wedlock pregnancy. According to Andrew Hartman, this was a

[202] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015, 107.
[203] Berkowitz, Edward D. *Something Happened: a political and cultural overview of the seventies.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. p. 163.
[204] Ibid., p. 177.

result of several factors, including economic changes associated with deindustrialization and falling wages. The decay of the historically male "blue-collar" job market mostly factory work that tended to be well-paying and secure due to high degrees of unionization, coincided with the explosion of the historically female "pink-collar" job market, mostly service work that tended to be low-paying, insecure, and nonunionized. Women entering the workforce in unprecedented numbers, in addition to the hardships associated with falling wages, put pressure on the traditional family model that relied upon a male breadwinner and a female caretaker. Christian conservatives ignored such sociological explanations for the crumbling family. Instead they blamed feminists, who had indeed been critical of the sexism inherent to the traditional family, well before the sixties, and before economic transformations.[205]

The historical struggle to add an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution had been on the agenda of woman's rights activists since the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, which gave women the right to vote in 1920. The sixties feminist movement injected new life into the struggle for the ERA. As a sign of the feminist movement's success, both houses of Congress passed the amendment in 1972, sending it to the states, which were given seven years to ratify it. Before the final states voted on ratification, a movement to stop the ERA gathered, ensuing its eventual demise. Conservatives thought that ERA would enlist the federal government in the feminist movement's goal for total equality between sexes. They considered such a prospect dangerous to the traditional family.[206]

In the wake of congressional passage in 1972, southern evangelicals attacked the measure as offensive, but it was an Ivy League-educated Roman Catholic from Illinois who turned the

[205] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., 2015. p. 87.
[206] Ibid., 88.

opposition into a powerful movement. Phyllis Schlafly believed that motherhood was a woman's most fulfilling calling, a belief, that directly challenged "women's libbers" like Betty Friedan, who "view the home as a prison, and the wife and mother as a slave." Schlafly was a strategic thinker who collaborated with different religious groups in different states to fight ratification. "She partnered with Church of Christ lay leaders in Oklahoma and Texas and with Mormons in the West. Significantly, Fundamentalist and evangelical leaders began with the STOP-ERA campaign to take a more pragmatic, less sectarian approach." STOP-ERA represents the best early example of a conservative movement that weaved together evangelical, Catholic, and partisan threads. [207]

Although feminists were united in their opposition to conservatives, they fought among themselves over the best way to frame new understandings of gender. They debated the delicate issues of sexual difference and sexual equality. '"The definitional axis of feminism swings between *difference*, meaning an emphasis on the qualities that distinguish 'woman' from 'man' and determine the distinctive roles, rights, and identities of each; and *equality*, meaning a claim to autonomy and justice based on the common humanity of men and women." Andrew Hartman argues that the fight over the feminism's legacy was crucial to the culture wars as its complex questions about difference and equality could be asked about both feminism and Americanism. "This puzzle mirrored a contradiction intrinsic to the larger American project summed up by the Latin phrase *E Pluribus Unum*: Could the United States be both diverse and unified? Could feminism value difference and equality?"[208]

[207] Harp, Gillis J. "Postwar America, 1945–1970s." In *Protestants and American Conservatism: A Short History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2019, 30. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199977413.003.0007.
[208] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015, 139.

5.5. Abortion

Abortion brings all the gender issues to full boil. In *Roe v. Wade*, 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that a woman's constitutional right to privacy prohibited the government from interfering with abortion in the first trimester. The decision created a storm, and the fight that followed, redefined American morality politics. Christian fundamentalists swept back into politics for the first time since the 1920s. They become openly political and championed what had been previously seen as mostly a Roman Catholic concern. "This was as evil as slavery, wrote Jerry Falwell; it was another Holocaust."[209] When the Court issued its decision, only four states had abortion statutes that were liberal enough to satisfy the Court's demands; the other forty-six had to revise their abortion laws in order to comply with the ruling.[210]

Roe v. Wade ruling transformed abortion into a national political issue. Many progressives embraced the court's logic that state may not meddle in private affairs. They defended the private realm, denounced religious politics, and drew on science. On the other hand, fighting abortion offered a way to resist hedonism, eroding family values, and changing gender roles. Rejecting abortion would restore the link between sex and families and return women to motherhood. Here lies a rejoinder to the sexual revolution. "Bill Kristol, the editor of the influential *Weekly Standard,* puts it bluntly: "Abortion is today the bloody crossroads of American politics. It is where judicial liberation (from the Constitution), sexual liberation (from the traditional mores), and women's liberation (from natural distinctions) come together. It is the focal point of liberalism's simultaneous assault on self-government, morals and nature."'[211] Public religious appeals became

[209] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 488.
[210] Williams, Daniel K. "The Grassroots Campaign to Save the Family." In *God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right*, by Williams, Daniel.. Oxford University Press, 2010. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2010, 12. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340846.003.0006.
[211] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 488.

the sole property of conservative causes, while moral claims and Social Gospel drained quietly out of the political left.

The abortion conflict turns on the role of women in contemporary society. Feminists fix on precisely the same data that enrages the anti-abortion activists: one out of two American women has an abortion sometime during her life. Feminists look at the numbers and see nothing less than a bulwark for equality. Opponents build barriers and slowly pushed discouraged providers out of entire areas. Those kinds of limits go furthest against poor people, for they rise costs. Henry Hyde, a respected Republican congressman from Illinois, placed what lawmakers called a "rider" on an appropriations bill. "The Hyde Amendment, as it came to be known, banned federal funding for abortions, just as Representative Adam Clayton Powel had once used a similar device to ban federal funding for segregated schools. As a practical matter, Hyde's rider meant people who received federally funded health care, such as people on welfare, could not receive abortions."[212]

For progressive politics, that underscores the trouble with the liberal approach in the first place. Gender rights won over the past decades have become more precarious for low-income women. "It is the outcome that runs through every aspect of modern morality. Limits of every sort…coil around poor people. Abortion politics pushes the same old story into another realm. Can progressives reverse that long list of biases? The historic way to mobilize support for big changes lies in a Social Gospel that was discarded and has lain largely dormant for a generation – in fact, since right around the time of the *Roe* decision in 1973."[213] *Roe v. Wade* extracted a heavy price form American progressives. The left has ceded its moral politics to conservatives – across the full

[212] Berkowitz, Edward D. *Something Happened: a political and cultural overview of the seventies.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 148.
[213] Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.* New Haven &London: Yale University Press, 2003, 491.

range of American politics. Privacy rights work only for people who wield power in their personal lives. It leaves others to fend for themselves against the odds.

5.6. The New Christian Right

Many commentators who wrote about the seventies as they were happening, believed that the rights revolution demonstrated what was wrong with the era. People clamoring for their rights were acting in a self-absorbed, hedonistic, narcissistic, selfish, and uncompromising manner. The rights revolution was "less about improving the whole society and more about one part of America gaining an advantage over another in a slow-growth economy in which one person's victory meant another person's loss."[214]

Tom Wolfe's essay "*The Me Decade and the Third Great Awakening*" appeared during the nation's bicentennial year, when Americans made concerted attempts to reflect on their accomplishments and shortcomings. "Wolfe pointed to two important changes between the seventies and the postwar era. The first concerned alternations in family structure. In the postwar era, only the very privileged got to "shuck over ripe wives and take on fresh ones."…During the "Me Decade," it became normal for people of all social classes to divorce, and the divorce rate soared."[215] In a society where women were gaining equal rights, they as well as men, might wish to terminate the marriage. What some might reflexively condemn as a sign of moral decline was for others an example of liberation.

The second change Wolfe described concerned religion and what he called the "third great awakening." After the 1965 the evangelical denomination of Protestantism increased in

[214] Berkowitz, Edward D. *Something Happened: a political and cultural overview of the seventies.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 158.

[215] Ibid., 159.

membership, and "liberal" denominations declined. "[T]he organized Protestant sects that had predominated after the Second World War were "finished, gasping, breathing their last," and new evangelical congregations were on the rise."[216] Religion remained as important as ever. Tom Wolfe, and many others, found the emphasis on being born again as further evidence of the era's self-absorption, yet paradoxically they also worried about the increased involvement of what came to be called the new Christian right in politics. [217]

When the conservative evangelicals, who had retreated to their own congregations since the twenties, perceived the government condoning abortion, according rights to homosexuals, protecting pornography, and banning prayer and Bible readings in schools, they felt the need to join in the public debate. Questions of morality rather than abstract consideration of social justice engaged them. "Thus, the American culture wars, a recurring feature of American history, were renewed in the seventies." [218]

For the left-leaning intellectuals and the liberal leaders of the rights revolution, the rise of the new Christian right came "as more bad news in an era of bad tidings." It signaled the rebirth of the postwar intolerance and anti-intellectualism. "For many despairing intellectuals, it marked a throwback to the age of William Jennings Bryan and the Scopes Trial. In this view, America was a religious society that had risen above religion and now seemed posed to sink back into it."[219]

Religious conservatives held that America was founded as a Christian nation. For them, an increasingly secular government represented the gravest threat to Christian values. Part of this had to do with the conservative religious impression that the government conspired against the

[216] Ibid., 160.
[217] Ibid., 161.
[218] Ibid., 162.
[219] Ibid., 162.

traditional family unit. Conservatives posited that the government's meddling in the form of welfare policies weakened the traditional family structure. As conservative activist Connie Marshner put it: "[T]he more government, combined with the helping professions establishment, take away the functions families need to perform – to provide their health care, their child care, their housing – the less purpose there is for a family, *per se*, to exist."'[220]

By the same logic, the Christian Right focused on the role of public education. By the 1970s, the Christian Right had a valid reason to believe that the nation's public schools no longer represented their moral vision. In 1962 *Engel v. Vitae* ruled that school prayer violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. In 1963 the court built an even higher wall of separation between church and state with its *School District of Abington Township v. Schempp* decision in favor of Ellory Schempp, a Unitarian freethinker who challenged the constitutionality of mandatory bible reading in his high school. "In polls taken since the sixties, the school prayer and Bible-reading rulings have routinely ranked as the most unpopular Supreme Court decisions, particularly among conservative Christians, many of whom considered *Engel* and *Abington* the beginning of American Civilization's downfall."[221]

Post-sixties curriculum trends also distressed conservative Christians. In social studies classes, students were increasingly challenged to clarify their own values, independent of those instilled by parents and churches. In science, teachers slowly overcame the perpetual taboo against teaching evolution. And in health classes, honest discussion of sex came to replace moral exhortation. Religious conservatives organized against these curriculum reform efforts from the outset, particularly against sex education.

[220] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015, 72.
[221] Ibid., 74.

In 1963 Dr. Mary Calderone founded the Sex Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS) on the premise that objective sex education was a more realistic means to suppress the sexual revolution than chastisement. "Many educators agreed with her, but her curriculum described sexual intercourse in relatively graphic fashion for students as young as twelve and provided information to older students about birth control, in recognition that premarital sex was likely."[222] Some of the most influential evangelical writers of the 1970s, including Francis Schaeffer and Tim LaHaye, placed education at the center of their plans to redeem American culture.

Evangelical Protestantism contributed significantly to the moralism of the Religious Right movement while lending apparent biblical sanction to already well-established conservative political positions such as limited government and free market economics. Participants in the Religious Right drew selectively from theologians such as Rousas John Rushdoony and Francis Schaeffer, but a nontheological pragmatism ultimately came to characterize the movement under television evangelists Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson.[223]

Although he remained more of a fringe figure than Schaeffer, Rushdoony's approach enjoyed a surprisingly broad influence during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Rushdoony's background and education made him an unlikely theorist for a movement of conservative, suburban white Protestants. He was born in New York City in 1916, in a family of Armenian immigrants. Rushdoony obtained his BA in English and MA in Education from the University of California at Berkeley, before studying divinity at the Pacific School of Religion, a mainline seminary founded by ecumenically minded Congregationalists. As a young pastor in

[222] Ibid., 75.
[223] Harp, Gillis J. "The Success and Failure of the Religious Right, 1970s–2010." In *Protestants and American Conservatism: A Short History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2019, 1. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780199977413.003.0008.

California, Rushdoony was influenced by James Fifield's robust defense of free market capitalism and warnings about communist subversion. Rushdoony read avidly *Faith and Freedom* and was especially impressed by articles written by Congregationalist pastor Edmund Ortiz. "Ortiz articulated what Rushdoony later termed a "libertarian theology of freedom" that sought to build a laissez-faire political platform on an evangelical foundation." Rushdoony believed that only knowledge derived directly and immediately from the Christian scriptures was a sound basis for social and political thinking.[224]

In 1965 in Southern California, Rushdoony established Chalcedon Foundation and turned to developing a systematic biblical and theological treatment of the ideal legal and political order. Through editing the monthly *Chalcedon Report* and especially by producing his massive three-volume The Institutes of Biblical Law (volume 1, 1973), Rushdoony began to attract a substantial following. More ambitious and theoretical than anything he had written previously the Institutes had a broad influence. Rushdoony articulated his vision of total social reconstruction that involved a return to the civil laws established under Moses in the Old Testament. He maintained that Genesis called the Christians to implement their rightful dominion in every sphere of human activity. Rushdoony and his students were convinced that this Christian reconstruction could be achieved not only in the United States but worldwide. They were postmillennialists and saw the Christian church as triumphing on earth prior to the Christ return.[225]

As for the relationship between church and state, Rushdoony contended that "most of the colonies had been founded as "holy commonwealths" with government viewed as a divinely ordained institution. The First Amendment was simply designed to prevent the federal government

[224] Ibid., 4.
[225] Ibid., 6.

from imposing a national church, not to separate government from religious belief." He stressed that the New England Puritan conception of the relationship between church and state was as "two free covenantal orders."[226]

"While some journalists have exaggerated the influence of the Reconstructionist," argues Gillis Harp, "Rushdoony and others did help promote political engagement by evangelicals, furnishing them with marching orders that were explicitly and unapologetically Christian. Those inspired by Reconstructionism to various degrees made important contributions to both electoral politics in general and to the legal debate about homeschooling." Furthermore, Rushdoony and his associates played a crucial role in the conservative movement by promoting the further integration of evangelical theology and libertarianism.[227]

The influence of evangelical thinker Francis Schaeffer demonstrated that conservative Protestantism found ways to adjust to secular modernity and that the Christian Right was both reactionary and often innovative. He furnished evangelical Christianity with an ecumenical spirit, at least in its willingness to form political alliances with nonevangelical conservatives. Schaeffer pastored a number of churches in the United States before moving to Switzerland as a missionary in 1947. After fundamentalist firebrand Carl McIntire astonishingly accused him of being a communist and fired him from the mission, Schaeffer and his wife Edith founded L'Abri in 1955. "Although charging Schaeffer with communism was outrageous, living in Europe had indeed led him to reject the pietism of American evangelicalism and to embrace more modern spiritualism, part and parcel of his newfound interest in art, music, and philosophy."[228]

[226] Ibid., 5.
[227] Ibid., 7.
[228] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., 2015, 80-81.

Schaeffer's reckoning with the acids of modernity helped reshape evangelical thought. Like early-twentieth-century evangelicals who read Nietzsche in order to better relate their theology to modern America, Schaeffer grappled with modernist giants in order to reinvigorate fundamentalism. "He also tangled with modish artists and musicians. "In the early '60s," his son bragged, "he was probably the only fundamentalist who had even heard of Bob Dylan." Shaeffer's method – what he called his "Christian apologetic," a system of thought for relating the meaning of modern cultural form to scripture – thus gave biblical inerrancy a wider currency by certifying it for a new generation."[229] Of course, being familiar with countercultural music did not lead Shaeffer to abandon the old-time religion.

Western society, according to Schaefer, by adopting secular humanism as its organizing principle, had crossed a "line of despair." "[He] argued that Hegel represented the first step toward the post-Christian line of despair because Hegel theorized that synthesis, not antithesis, was the superior method of thought. Synthesis, in Schaeffer's reading of Hegel, implied relativism, since all acts, all gestures, had an equal claim to truth, in that the dialectical process would eventually envelop everything. Napoleon's conquest of Europe was to be judged not by the brutality of its individual acts but by the synthesis of the "world spirit on horseback" that Hegel famously believed Napoleon signified."[230]

Schaeffer's antithesis methodology had conservative political implications. For instance, he made clear, that he considered homosexuality an expression of modern despair. '"In much of modern thinking all antithesis and all the order of God's creation is to be fought against-including the male-female distinction." And yet despite the anti-homosexual connotations of his theology,

[229] Ibid., 81.
[230] Ibid., 82.

his son Frank describes his father as having been decidedly unprejudiced. "Dad thought it cruel and stupid to believe that a homosexual could change by 'accepting Christ.'" Schaeffer thought homosexuality was a sin, but a sin on par with other, less politicized sins, such as gluttony.[231]

"Unlike modern relativists", argued Schaeffer, "the American colonists subscribed to traditional ethical absolutes and sought to create a republic based on the idea of a higher law, not on the laws of men." He highlighted the teaching of the English Puritan Samuel Rutherford, especially as contained in his essay *Lex Rex* and its supposed influence on the Founders. Rutherford taught that the law was supreme and that when rulers set themselves up as the law, they could be forcibly removed.[232]

> While the Founders had understood the Christian "base of government and law," Schaeffer contended, the recent "takeover" of America by secular humanists was producing a repudiation of this position. As this liberal–humanist shift occurred in public policy, philosophy, and theology during the twentieth century, very few orthodox Christians in various walks of life sounded an appropriate alarm because, lamented Schaffer, evangelicals were "not very good at blowing trumpets." Despite having previously eschewed partisan politics, Schaeffer went on to describe Ronald Reagan's election as grounds for rejoicing by evangelicals and representing "an open window" of opportunity for Christians. The political "conservative swing in the United States in the 1980 election" was now treated by Schaeffer as part of a larger spiritual movement.[233]

Schaeffer's encouraging telephone call in 1978 to Jerry Falwell appears to have performed an important role in convincing the previously separatist, apolitical Baptist to step out onto the political stage. "Falwell wrote later that Schaeffer had "shattered that world of isolation for me . . . . He was the one who pushed me into the arena and told me to put on the gloves."' Falwell had

[231] Ibid., 83.
[232] Harp, Gillis J. "The Success and Failure of the Religious Right, 1970s–2010." In *Protestants and American Conservatism: A Short History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2019, 10. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780199977413.003.0008.
[233] Ibid., 11.

prepared for the ministry at a Fundamentalist seminary in Missouri, and returned to Lynchburg, Virginia in 1956 to found Thomas Road Baptist Church. As a result of his effective use of radio and television, Falwell's congregation grew to several thousand members.[234]

Like many others, Falwell was concerned about what virtues were the school going to convey to the next generations. "Between 1965 and 1975 Christian day school enrollment grew by over 202 percent, and by 1979 more than one million American children attended Christian schools." Falwell's Lynchburg Christian Academy opened its doors in 1967. Although the Christian day school movement grew in the South, it also exploded in other states. "The California Association of Christian Schools listed 350 schools as members, including a growing network of schools in San Diego run by Tim LaHaye, who made clear that his schools existed as an alternative to secular humanist schools." The Popularity of Christian day schools owed as much to fears about the secularization of curriculum as to resistance to desegregation. Christian parents sent their children to Christian schools, to have them avoid sex education, values clarification, and Darwinism, not just blacks. [235]

Regardless of parents' actual motivation, in 1978 the Internal Revenue Service announced that it would attempt to enforce federal civil rights policies by requiring private schools to meet minority enrollment quotas in order to maintain their tax-exempt status. Administrators at the nation's five thousand Christian schools protested and lobbied in Congress to prevent the IRS from enforcing its new policy. They claimed that they did not discriminate, and some said that they had never denied an African American candidate's application for admission. But the political and

[234] Ibid., 15.
[235] Hartman, Andrew. *A War for the Soul of America.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., 2015, 85.

social conservatism that pervaded many Christian schools, pushed away the majority of African Americans.[236]

Robert Billings, an Indiana Baptist school administrator who had launched Christian School Action in 1977 to protect the rights of Christian educators, encouraged evangelicals to overwhelm the IRS with letters of protest. Evangelicals extended their political coalition to Catholic school administrators and even some Orthodox Jews, who feared that the IRS directive would destroy their religious academies. Billings declared that "the IRS controversy had "done more to bring Christians together than any man since the Apostle Paul."' The conservative evangelicals who waged this battle had no intention of leaving the political arena. "Falwell founded the Moral Majority less than a year after the IRS controversy…As Billings admitted, evangelicals were already deeply antipathetic toward the federal government, and were on the verge of creating a national political movement.[237] For religious conservatives, Jimmy Carter's intervention against the Christian schools symbolized the government's disregard for their values.

The New Christian Right explicitly embraced free enterprise, private property, and postwar consumer society. Throughout the postwar revival, evangelicals struggled with the tension between a moral code of antimaterialist self-discipline and the sanctification of a booming consumerist setting. The New Christian Right offered a bold new solution to this dilemma of having to navigate between a traditionalist emphasis on moral order and a libertarian emphasis on individual freedom. It did so by merging evangelical and countercultural impulses.

> Together with neoconservatives like William F. Buckley, Frank Meyer, and M. Stanton Evans, conservative evangelicals depicted neo-liberal policies like supply-side economics and tax cuts simultaneously as morally disciplining instruments and as means of upholding

[236] Williams, Daniel K. "Moral Majority." In *God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right*, by Williams, Daniel.. Oxford University Press, 2010. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2010, 5. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340846.003.0008.
[237] Ibid., 6.

> a "countercultural" identity centered on individual self-realization and expressiveness. The rightwing critics of liberalism thus "championed a 'counterculture' of their own, based on biblical injunctions, the patriarchal family, and the economic homilies of nineteenth-century capitalism.[238]

Ronald Reagan resolved to win the votes of this newly discovered "religious right." The climax came in august 1980, when he accepted an invitation to address the National Affairs Briefing of the Religious Roundtable in Dallas. Some fifteen thousand evangelical and fundamentalist ministers, including Falwell, Robertson, and the head of the Southern Baptist Convention, were on hand, hoping they might finally find a champion in Reagan. "I know you can't endorse me," he told [the audience]. "But I want you to know I endorse you and what you are doing."' Duly impressed, religious conservatives rallied around him, and when Reagan swept to victory that November, they were happy to claim the credit. As Falwell put it, "the conservative landslide was "my finest hour."'[239]

Reagan drew upon the grassroots conservatism gaining ground since at least the Goldwater candidacy but also included antiregulation probusiness groups and neoconservative intellectuals. Finally, Reagan's nostalgic invocations of a simpler American past and criticism of the cultural legacy of the 1960s attracted many Protestant conservatives.[240]

The revivalist nationalism of Falwell and Schaeffer not only supported the Reagan Revolution, but Reagan himself fashioned his campaign as a revival to "make American great again". Reagan clearly defined what America needed to be revived. '"This country needs a new

[238] Schäfer, Axel R. and Sch Fer, Axel R R. *Countercultural Conservatives: American Evangelism from the Postwar Revival to the New Christian Right*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011, 127.

[239] Kruse, Kevin M. *One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2015, 278.

[240] Harp, Gillis J. "The Success and Failure of the Religious Right, 1970s–2010." In *Protestants and American Conservatism: A Short History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2019, 2. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780199977413.003.0008.

administration, with a renewed dedication to the dream of America—an administration that will give that dream new life and make America great again". A growing economy and American exceptionalism - "this last best hope of man on earth, this nation under God" - were two key components of this dream." These principles, Reagan prophesied, would find a revival of spirit and practice in his new administration."[241]

Reagan playing the role of revivalist was in many ways unprecedented in modern American politics. Most postwar presidents gave tacit approval to improving the nation's civic religiosity, but few "endorsed" the work of conservative religious leaders, as Reagan did in 1980. He borrowed a line from a Puritan forebear and referred to "America as a "shining city upon a hill," a radiant refuge of liberty that a "Divine Providence" had created for "all those people in the world who yearn to breathe freely."' Some of America's recent leaders had lost sight of the nation's purpose, but Ronald Reagan offered the hope of redemption.[242]

[241] Hummel, Daniel. "Revivalist Nationalism since World War II: From "Wake Up, America!" to "Make America Great again"." *Religions* 7, no. 11 (2016): 128, 12.

[242] Williams, Daniel K. "Reagan." In *God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right*, by Williams, Daniel.. Oxford University Press, 2010. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2010, 3. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340846.003.0009.

Conclusion

The United States is a country with no long historical past. It was rather founded by people who fled the past. There was no long line of enemies to define the national identity in the Old-World terms. And that absence of historical substance proved to be the unique American opportunity. American national identity became bound around ideas. Puritans came to the New World to save the Protestant reformation and live their lives in religious purity on a city upon a hill. Thus, Protestantism became the primary source of ideas in New England and subsequently in the United States.

Puritans sprang into many sects. In their constant quest for religious purity, those who favored more personal religious experience were called evangelicals. They deemed the Bible, the highest religious authority. Evangelism fitted well the new conditions and the New World way of life. While people were moving westward, sometimes more than once in a generation, churches and schools could not always keep up to the same speed, but they had their Bibles. Evangelicalism became a cornerstone of American culture and American conservatism.

The type of emerging society favored men of character and was suspicious of knowledge that could not be put into practice and did not derive from the Bible. Evangelicals saw the twentieth century turn to secularism as an attack upon American values. Moreover, the Protestant work ethic promoted self-reliance as a path to salvation. For Calvinists, God helps those who help themselves. The idea of self-reliance extended to economics and politics. It became a distinctive feature of American conservatism. Scripture taught that private property rights were inviolable. Conservatives held that spiritual freedom and economic freedom are two sides of the same coin.

The influence of Calvinist values in the United States has gradually opened to a broader context. They were brought by the Puritans but were also embraced as a virtue by other immigrants with different backgrounds who came subsequently to the United States. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Republican party harbored those all-American values and get an upper hand in the culture wars.

Of course, the United States is an egalitarian society, made by many tribes and races. America's progressives emphasize diversity and favor the Social gospel and a more liberal approach to American liberalism. American progressivism and American conservatism are each other's corrective, and they compete in each historical time. The culture wars helped America to evolve toward a more inclusive society. This unique cultural and political debate is the very expression of democracy and the evidence that everyone can find their place in this "nation under God."

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